Peculiarities of Hybrid Mobilisation: The commercial contract has become not only the main way of replenishing the front with manpower, but also the primary tool of social stabilisation in times of war
The replenishment of manpower for the frontline through commercial contracting proved to be one of the main institutional innovations of the Putin regime during the war. In fact, it has not only served as an alternative to the highly unpopular mobilisation of society, but also as an important shock absorber of war-related social tensions.
Ambivalent Supercycle: Elections in more than 60 countries demonstrate that electoral democracy is not failing, unlike liberal democracy
The results of this year's 76 national elections in 63 countries do not demonstrate the trend of democratic recession observed over the past decade. It is not democracy per se that is weakening, but rather liberal democracy, criticism of which has become the centrepiece of right-wing populist campaigns in the countries of the ‘collective West’.
Cars, Intermediaries, and Defectors: How Russia has managed sanctions pressure on import supplies
Difficulties with cross-border payments constrained Russian imports for most of this year. However, in recent months, these issues have been largely resolved. Data from the Central Bank, the Federal Customs Service, and Russia's trading partners indicate a recovery in the total volume of shipments in the third quarter to last year's levels.
Yulia Galyamina: Most Russians are in favour of a cessation of hostilities and peace talks and at the same time are not against the authorities and Putin.
Vladimir Gel'man: Political reforms in Russia in the 1990s were deliberately sacrificed to economic transformation.
Lev Gershenzon: The rigid dichotomy ‘censorship — freedom’ in relation to search platforms and social media is false.
Trump has repeatedly stated that he intends to increase oil production dramatically to reduce global hydrocarbon prices. However, in reality, he has far fewer energy-related levers to pressure Putin than many would like to think. And Trump’s campaign slogan, ‘Drill, baby, drill’, is unlikely to have seriously intimidated the Russian president.
Asymmetric Warfare: Over two years, the Russian army has launched 1834 combined missile strikes on Ukraine, while Ukraine is forced to respond mainly with drone attacks
Time for Revenge: The pendulum that swung left has been pushed backwards by voters
Throughout his presidency, Trump will attempt to partially roll back the gains made by Democrats over the past decades; however, his reform plans are unusually ambitious for a Republican. Meanwhile, the polarisation of American society will have a significant impact on the situation in the country.
Merchant or Messiah: Why Trump’s second term may be worse than the first
Trump clearly has no intention of fulfilling some of his most sweeping promises; however, his actual policies may turn out to be far more messianic than transactional. Today, he enters office riding a wave of triumph, with battle experience and surrounded by a large number of supporters.
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Tuesday of Discord: Why neither of the two candidates will win the US election
Not long ago, the sharpest disagreements between American Democrats and Republicans revolved around issues such as healthcare reform and tax rates. Today, pre-election debates are increasingly less about practical policy and more about cultural conflicts that are or appear to be existential.
After The Rally: Ukrainian society is disillusioned with the government and politicians, while attempts to force Ukraine into an unfavourable peace could lead to a collapse of trust in Zelensky and a political crisis, polls show
Ukrainian society has not lost its will to resist Russian aggression, but it has definitively moved past the ‘rally around the flag’ effect that characterised the early stages of the war. As a result, its perspective on the situation in the country, the actions of the government, and Ukrainian politicians in general is becoming increasingly critical.
The 'Ukraine Plan' and Scholz's Plan: The Western coalition will ensure Ukraine's current financing at the expense of long-term funding
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A Question of Will: What does Russian military history tell us about the probability of of Russia's victory or defeat in the war with Ukraine?
The Russia-Ukraine conflict has a number of specific features characteristic of wars lost by Russia: primarily, the underestimation of the opponent’s resource potential and will to fight, which leads to failures on the battlefield and subsequent public disappointment in the capabilities of the state and military apparatus, followed by its demobilisation.
Will Russia Benefit From The Korean Deal: Oil in exchange for corpses, strategic threats and the South's asymmetric response?
BRICS Minus: Why and how Russia failed in its attempt to create a parallel financial reality at the Kazan summit
Invincible pipes: Europe will not give up Russian gas for political and economic reasons
Swarm From The Future: The development of AI-powered drones could permanently deprive Russia of its advantages in armaments and manpower once thought unassailable
Experts believe that within one to two years, Ukraine could make a decisive leap in the use of artificial intelligence technologies in drone warfare. This advancement would not only make intercepting drones significantly more difficult but also enable the deployment of swarms of hundreds or even thousands of UAVs, exponentially increasing the destructive impact of attacks.
Two types of Anti-Western Sentiment: How Russians' views on Russia's place in the world differ from Putin's views
Prices in The Fog of War: Actual consumer inflation in Russia may be higher than official data, while actual industrial growth may be lower
The rate of price growth in the Russian economy is not only not slowing down, but it may also be inadequately reflected in official statistics – to a lesser extent. This is indicated by an unusual discrepancy between various price indices. In this case, the challenge faced by the Russian authorities appears more dramatic than it previously seemed.
From Shadow to Light: Why the Western coalition is struggling to significantly limit oil trade above the price cap or to block the shadow fleet
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Exhausted or Hardened? Can Russia prepare for a new war in the near future?
Has the Russian military machine become stronger as a result of its combat experience and the rapid expansion of its defence industry, or has it, on the contrary, been depleted by the war and will need a long time to rebuild its capabilities? The answers to these questions will determine the strategy for European military development in the near future.
Talk, baby, talk: why Trump's intentions to enforce lower oil prices are unlikely to scare Putin
Trump has repeatedly stated that he intends to increase oil production dramatically to reduce global hydrocarbon prices. However, in reality, he has far fewer energy-related levers to pressure Putin than many would like to think. And Trump’s campaign slogan, ‘Drill, baby, drill’, is unlikely to have seriously intimidated the Russian president.
Time for Revenge: The pendulum that swung left has been pushed backwards by voters
Throughout his presidency, Trump will attempt to partially roll back the gains made by Democrats over the past decades; however, his reform plans are unusually ambitious for a Republican. Meanwhile, the polarisation of American society will have a significant impact on the situation in the country.
Five Discourses Around The War: A new map of the Russian public sphere
The majority of Russian citizens gravitate towards a discourse on war that is almost absent in the Russian public sphere. This is loyalist pacifism, where dissatisfaction with the war is combined with loyalty to Putin and the Russian government. The demand for public representation of this ‘silent majority’ will grow as the costs of the war increase – if this happens, an unexpected transformation of Russia's discursive landscape may occur.
In Search of Causes: the Russian ‘majorat’, the non-re-establishment of the state and the collapse of Russian democracy
The political catastrophe that Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 became has driven the Russian intellectual elite to analyse the post-Soviet period of Russian history with particular intensity, focusing primarily on the notorious 1990s. This kind of search for a ‘poisoned source’ and ‘point of no return’ is natural and acquires a special significance when it comes to tragic turning points in national history.
Algorithms – Reputation – Karma: Why fake news is taking over the world and defeating quality information
The algorithms of search platforms and networks have largely devalued the reputation system of media outlets, which used to establish markers of information quality and structure the flow of information. A counterbalance to the short-term benefits of clickbait could be an automatically generated ‘information karma’ code, built into the algorithms of networks and platforms. This would make the costs of spreading false or harmful content higher than the profits gained from increased user engagement.
From adaptation to mobilisation: The logic of changes in state-business relations in the context of war and sanctions
If macroeconomic conditions deteriorate, a revision of the principles of coexistence and interaction that have developed between Russian business and the state over the past two decades seems almost inevitable – even though these very principles have ensured that the Russian economy has been highly adaptable to the shocks experienced.
Unpopular War: Russian opponents and non-opponents of the invasion of Ukraine. Part 2
Researchers identify four types of opponents to the war: ‘integrators’',isolationists', 'the oppressed', and 'activists', noting that a common trend among them is to seek common ground and interaction with the surrounding atmosphere of acceptance of the war, which, however, does not turn them into its supporters.
Unpopular War: Russian Opponents and Non-Opponents of the Invasion of Ukraine. Part 1
The personal impressions accumulated by the average Russian about the course of the war and its impact on the life of the country partially undermine trust in official information and provoke more critical judgements about the military conflict and its consequences for Russia and Russian society. However, this criticism is not transformed into an anti-war stance.
Nuclear Inferiority Complex: Escalation rhetoric through the prism of the Cold War experience
Russia's current leadership has inherited from the Soviet rulers a sense of a lack of recognition of its right to be a global power. This tension defined Soviet policy during the Cold War — from Stalin's expansionism to Khrushchev's nuclear adventurism. Today's Russian leaders have largely replicated this model; however, the Kremlin's capabilities are much further removed from these global ambitions than they were during the Soviet era.
Parallel Cheremushkin: The Absence and Presence of 'War' in a Provincial Russian City
From the very beginning of the war, sociologists have faced the question of how to study public opinion under a repressive and militaristic regime. To understand how Russians feel about the war and adapt to the new military reality, researchers from the Public Sociology Laboratory have conducted an incredible immersion experiment – they travelled to three Russian regions, where they spent a month in participant observation mode, without publicising the subject of their study.
Protracted Military Putinism: How long it will last and how it will end. Realities and projections
The political regime that emerged in Russia as a result of the transformation of the war from blitzkrieg into a protracted conflict has overcome a period of vulnerability and instability. Protracted military Putinism should now be considered the baseline scenario, within which the regime is able to mitigate imbalances, endure significant deterioration of the economy and manage political risks. However, this does not mean that the regime has overcome threats and challenges.
Dynamics of Isolation in Conditions of Fragmentation: The results of two years of the sanctions experiment
The limited effect of sanctions against Russia has been determined by several factors: changes in the structure of the global economy, the effects of the logic of arbitrage, and the internal contradictions of the sanctions regime. Any further dynamics of the impact of sanctions will be cyclical: new tools of control will be created and new ways to circumvent them will emerge as a result. And, in the long term, everything will depend on the extent to which the Russian economy retains its market core.
The Aftermath of Crocus City Hall Terrorist Attack: Labor Migration Policy, Public opinion and Dysfunctional Autocracy
The terror attack at Crocus City Hall was a catastrophic failure by the Russian authorities and security services. However, the Kremlin's dual strategy of blaming Ukraine and the West for the attack along with a large-scale anti-migrant campaign, has allowed the authorities to shirk responsibility for this failure. Authoritarian dysfunction results in human and economic losses but is offset by the successful use of conservative mobilisation tools.
Inside and Outside Censorship: The Russian media landscape two years after the outbreak of the war
Over the past two years, the Russian media landscape has undergone an unprecedented transformation. Following the onset of the war and the introduction of what can be considered as wartime censorship in Russia, a significant portion of the country’s media relocated beyond the country and continued its activities in uncensored spaces. The outcomes of this unique experiment are likely to be significant not only for Russia but also for other countries undergoing processes of autocratisation.
Between Moderate Xenophobia and Low Tolerance: The perception of migrants after the terror attack at Crocus City Hall
After the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall, the number of attacks on Central Asian migrants and anti-migrant statements by Russian authorities and politicians has markedly increased. However, polling data does not indicate a surge in xenophobia, which remains at a moderate level, rather it shows a majority loyal to the authorities, who are not receiving signals of tolerance from above. It is these signals that fuel their ‘suspicion’ towards migrants.
Bots On Russian Social Media: How Network Propaganda Works by
We deal with bots and trolls every day, often without noticing or realising it. There may not be many of them, but their activity, consolidated position, and aggressiveness allow them to capture and moderate the discussion, provoking an effect similar to the phenomenon of the ‘spiral of silence'. Bots and trolls are tools of horizontal network propaganda, designed to distort real users' perception of the nation’s 'imaginary majority'.
'The Russian Model' in Search of Unemployment: the specifics of the Russian labour market hinder its adaptation to structural shifts
Labour shortage and the frantic demand for workers are contributing to wage growth and adding to the overheating of the Russian economy and inflation. This unfavourable situation is exacerbated by the specific features of the Russian labour market model that have developed in the post-Soviet period. It ensures low formal unemployment and enables the market to adapt well to crises, but it hinders the relocation of the workforce in the face of various structural or cyclical shifts.
The Opposition Paradox: Putin has more opponents in Russia than it seems, but they lack a common public agenda
One of the reasons for the repeated failures of the Russian opposition lies in its traditional fixation on 'playing by the other team’s rules', that is they focus on electoral procedures, which bring moral satisfaction from participation but invariably result in political defeat. The other side to this fixation is the weakness of the public agenda, the lack of a coherent picture of ideas and convictions that could oppose Putinism.
Propaganda in the Network Environment: How propaganda has changed in the era of social media and during times of war
Propaganda in the era of social media is aimed not so much at promoting a particular ideological doctrine as at moderating public discourse. It may address various messages to different audiences and primarily involves engaging the consumer in the process of dissemination, a sort of process of co-authorship. Today, the Russian state effectively utilises all these properties and capabilities of network propaganda.
Spontaneous sanctuaries: Navalny's death and memorial protest in Russia
Over the past two weeks, a wave of spontaneous memorials to Navalny has swept across Russia around symbolically charged places such as monuments to victims of political repression, but also in courtyards and entrances of residential buildings, and even on online maps. During this time, there have been at least 500 'flower' memorials in 232 cities and towns in Russia, and the list continues to grow. What do they mean, and what tradition stands behind them?
The Lead-up to the Murder: Navalny and protest politics in Russia
Alexei Navalny emerged as a central figure in opposition to Putin's authoritarianism, inspiring tens of thousands with the heroism of his fearlessness and fostering a new ethic of resistance. However, Navalny's political biography is not merely a derivative of his heroic persona. The phenomenon of Navalny is shaped by a confluence of expectations and aspirations that he embodied, becoming both a voluntary hostage and a symbol of them.
Historical Politics: Ideologisation of society as an attempt to change Post-Soviet identity
The current stage of the state's ideological expansion is designed, on the one hand, to definitively exclude and 'cancel' the liberal segment of Russian society, and, on the other hand, to change the identity of that part of society that absorbed the ideological opportunism of the 2000s, thereby neutralising the value baggage and liberal aspirations of the perestroika and post-perestroika era.
The Dead Ends of War: How public opinion changed during the second year of the war
Second Demobilisation: How public opinion changed during the second year of the war
The core of support for the war in 2023 decreased one and a half times and became proportionate to those who generally lean towards anti-war views. The share of those who would be unwilling to support a decision by Putin to immediately withdraw troops also decreased, and by the end of the year, it became smaller than the share of those who would be willing to support such a decision. However, all this has led not to an increase in the number of people who oppose the war, but rather to the expansion of a zone of blurred and alienated attitudes toward it.
Between 'Spiral of Silence' and 'Jumping on the Bandwagon': The influence of others on Russians' opinion of the Russia-Ukraine war
While, in Russia, opponents of the war are disinclined to voice their opinions when they think they believe they are surrounded by those who support it, those who declare their support for the war are disinclined to defend their loyalty when they find themselves in a mixed society where different views on the war are represented.
Reaping War: The Russian orthodox church and the Russian invasion of Ukraine
Public perception identifies the position of the Russian Orthodox Church with the pro-war statements of Patriarch Kirill, but in reality the position of most of its clergy is determined by a compromise between loyalty to the Kremlin and commitment to the institutional interests of the church. It remains the largest public organisation in a number of post-Soviet countries, demonstrating a similar spectrum of attitudes towards the war as exists in society as a whole.
Four Myths about Russia: Why not to view Russia through Vladimir Putins's eyes
The historical fatalism of the Russian opposition sometimes seems like a mirror image of Putinist mythology. Was the post-Soviet era a lost thirty years in the history of Russia? Is imperial expansion inherent to Russian political thinking? Could things have unfolded differently in the 1990s? And, is it true that something will only be possible 'post-Putin'?
The Anti-crisis Trap: How crisis management creates an economy of permanent crisis
The high frequency of economic crises has shaped a unique type of anti-crisis economic policy in Russia: 'overcoming' each crisis involves freezing its consequences and factors of inefficiency. As a result, there is extremely slow growth during inter-crisis periods, which are becoming shorter and shorter. This model not only deprives the economy of incentives for development but also increases the probability of new crises, reducing their cost for the country's leadership.
Second Chance Opposition: Can the Russian opposition community abroad influence what is happening in Russia?
Russian anti-war emigres have yet to be able to create their own political representation — political structures that could declare themselves an alternative to the current course of the Kremlin. What does the Russian opposition community represent today? What is happening to it? What factors determine its strengths and weaknesses? What might its future look like, and when and how might this community be able to influence events in Russia?
Why Putinism Is (Still) Not An Ideology
Ideologies usually create a kind of political map that can be used to understand where political processes are heading. However, Putin has long and successfully avoided ideological clarity, which has enabled him to maintain a certain political intrigue around his key decisions. This characteristic of the regime persists today: the Kremlin can neither explain the reasons and goals of its war in Ukraine nor ensure ideological mobilisation in support of it.
Does the Putin regime have an ideology?
The ideology of the Putin regime is resilient because it responds to the existing demands of the population, draws on deeply rooted Soviet traditions, and at the same time fills the ideological void that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This will help to sustain the Putin regime for many years to come.
In Memoriam: Yasin's Legacy of Freedom
Today in Moscow, a farewell is being bid to a prominent figure in the Russian political landscape of recent decades, Evgeny Yasin. Mr. Yasin served as the Minister of Economics during the era of reforms, was the founder and leader of the Higher School of Economics, and presided over the independent "Liberal Mission" Foundation. On the Re: Russia platform, notable figures such as Sergei Aleksashenko, Evgenia Albats, Sergei Guriev, Igor Klyamkin, Lev Gudkov, Konstantin Sonin, and others are paying their respects to Mr. Yasin.
Outside and Inside: What The Experience of Russia’s Exiled Opposition Teaches and Does Not Teach Us
A large number of activists, journalists and human rights defenders have left Russia since the war began, but in the past year and a half they have failed to create institutions that could represent the Russian opposition abroad and serve as the voice of the Russian democratic movement. How unique is this situation? What is the experience of other opposition diasporas that have left their countries due to domestic repression? What can such opposition achieve from abroad?
Between De- and Hyper-Politisation: The evolution of Russian authoritarianism
Over the past two decades, the Russian political regime has evolved through three distinct phases. Initially, during the 2000s, it embraced a depoliticised authoritarianism that focused on economic efficiency and imposed selective constraints on political liberties. In the following decade, the regime encountered a gradual resurgence of political awareness within society, prompting it to adopt a counter-politicisation strategy in response. However, as these measures proved inadequate in the 2020s, the regime turned to external aggression and intense politicisation, resulting in a radical transformation of both the regime itself and of broader society.
Between mobilisation and tolerance lies the evolving nature of Ukrainian attitudes toward peace-minded Russians
In late 2022, surveys indicated that most Ukrainians were hesitant to engage with Russian citizens, regardless of their views on the ongoing war. However, as of today, there is a growing agreement within Ukrainian society about the potential for cooperation with peace-oriented ‘ordinary’ Russians. There is now an unstable majority in favour of dialogue with the Russian leadership in the event that Russia sees a change of power and policy. Nevertheless, few currently believe that such a turn of events is possible.
From Triumph to Collapse: How Germany is parting with Ostpolitik and what comes next
Over the past fifty years 'Ostpolitik', Germany's 'eastern policy', formed an integral part of German identity, and the idea of a special relationship with Russia became a key element of Germany's global political and economic positioning. The invasion of Ukraine marked the collapse of 'Ostpolitik', which is understood as the collapse of the entire German foreign policy of previous decades. Germany's political system, which resembles a super-heavy oil tanker, is now forced to perform an abrupt pivot.
Special Military Economic Geography: Changes in the Russian Economy by Region
Looking at the dynamics of the Russian economy by region provides a multidimensional lens that reveals something that is not otherwise obvious from a sectoral analysis. The relatively good average figures conceal multidirectional dynamics, while the localisation of zones of abnormal growth and abnormal decline allows us to see past the optimistic figures of the Russian economy as a whole and to identify the process of structural transformation associated with its current anomalous conditions.
The Disappearance Dilemma: Post-Putin Russia must begin before Putin leaves
Hopes of a new future for Russia ‘after Putin’ may fail to materialise if the demand for change is not already in place before he leaves. However, the sceptics' view that Putinism will necessarily outlive Putin does not seem all too convincing either. They underestimate the potential for modernisation that has been accumulated by Russian society throughout the post-Soviet decades.
The Exodus Year: Those Who Left, Those Who Stayed, and the Breakdown in Communication
Both those who left Russia and those who stayed have a similar outlook on the political situation and rely on similar information sources. However, many of those who have stayed believe that those who have left hold them more responsible for the ongoing war and view their decision to stay as a deviant attitude. Overcoming this tension and developing an ideology of solidarity between the two groups is crucial as both groups need each other's support.
Children, Chaebols and Adjutants: Human resource policy during the war’s first year
In autocracies, the place of public politics is occupied by personnel politics, which becomes both the reflection and the result of struggles among elite factions, influence groups, and corporate interests, all of which are not able to be balanced out by the activities of public parties and associations. Against the backdrop of the tectonic social shifts associated with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the personnel changes of the first year of the war seem very modest. However, it is likely to be a lull caused by confusion in the face of setbacks.
‘Once we've started, we can't stop’: how Russians' attitudes to the war in Ukraine are changing
Over the past year, a number of opinion polls have attempted to discover which Russians support the war in Ukraine and which do not. However, in-depth interviews reveal that these efforts may not be capable of yielding any satisfactory results: the majority of Russians both support and do not support the war at the same time. The attitudes of Russian citizens towards the war are a patchwork, contradictory and in flux, consisting of arguments and narratives from each side.
Putinism without Putin: what is it and is it even possible?
Not only for the Russian elites, but also for a significant part of the population who were relatively satisfied with the economic prosperity of life before the war, an attractive scenario for the future is not the total collapse of the regime, but rather the establishment of Putinism without Putin himself, as he has now threatened the very existence of this ideology
THE PLUNGE INTO WAR: PUBLIC OPINION CHRONICLED
While at first glance it may seem as though there is a declarative ‘majority of support’ for the war, there is perhaps more significantly a ‘majority of non-resistance’, which allows the pro-war minority to dominate the public debate. For mainstream Russian society, the ‘plunge into war’ remains a coerced strategy, and the consolidation of revanchist sentiments among one segment of society coexists with the considerable potential for demobilisation within another. Re: Russia presents an overview of the results of public opinion polling conducted by the independent Chronicles project.
Worse Than a Crisis. The 2022 Russian economic anomaly: how it works, and where it is headed
The Russian economy's decline in 2022 was not as severe as economists predicted, but that does not mean it was able to ‘withstand’ the impact of sanctions. These figures merely reflect the effective mobilisation of economic resources, and as the country’s revenues decline, the economy will face investment deficiency, devaluation, budget deficits, and demand contraction — all of which are symptoms of the conventional economic crisis that awaits Russia.
Crisis in Abundance: why did the Russian economy fail to collapse and is there a crisis on the horizon?
The sanctions imposed on the Russian economy are unprecedented in scale, but they appear to have been less effective than was initially expected. A combination of factors has helped stave off the collapse of the Russian economy, including contradictory sanctions policies, radical administrative decisions taken by the Kremlin, and a surge in Russian export revenues alongside a trade surplus reinforced by restrictions on Russian imports.
A Price Cap or Smoke and Mirrors? How Much Does Russian Oil Actually Cost?
There’s an assumption that the price cap on Russian oil is working perfectly. However, the terms of the Russian oil trade have changed, and it is therefore useless to employ the old methods of assessing the market under the current circumstances. Today these do not provide us with actual transparency so much as imitate it. In fact, it is most likely that the discount on Russian oil is not as significant as it seems at first glance, and moreover it is advantageous for Russian players to maintain the perception that sanctions on oil are working effectively.
The Russian Rhizome: A Social Portrait of New Immigrants
The new wave of emigration from Russia differs greatly from those that occurred in the twentieth century — the 2022 emigrants typically exhibit high levels of trust and social mobility, and they are ready and willing to become involved in the life of their host countries and actively participate in social initiatives. While these new emigrants have strong ties to Russia, they remain sceptical of the chance for positive change in their home country in the near future. Will the new diaspora have an impact on Russia's history?
Regime of Imperial Paranoia: War in the Age of Empty Rhetoric
Any rational explanation for Russia's invasion of Ukraine seems inadequate and unsatisfying, as it has never been based on any rational grounds. The war with Ukraine is a void created by the continual repetition of pseudo-meanings. Through rhetoric and projections into theatricalised rituals, it organises reality into simple and accessible behaviours that can be easily and widely assimilated thanks to their simplicity.
The Patchwork Quilt: The Man-Made Crisis of 2022 and its Effect on Russia’s Regions
In 2022, Russia has witnessed a variety of economic trends: some Russian regions have shown strong economic growth, while others have witnessed significant decline. These discrepancies, as Russian businesses have attempted to tackle the ongoing crisis, can be explained by an extensive list of factors: sanctions, the disruption of supply chains, government support packages, increased defence spending, Western companies leaving the Russian market, and the emergence of new product niches. Significantly, however, high revenues from raw material exports continue to mitigate the crisis.
War as a Civilisational Shift
The war against Ukraine has become an instrument to sever Russia's ties with the West in a radical manner. This may likely result in an equally radical transformation of Russian society, altering the natural course of its development. Marina Davydova, one of the main ideologues and facilitators of the integration between Russian and European theatre over the last decade, analyses the nature of this cultural and civilisational shift and its potential consequences, and describes the pogrom that Russian theatre has experienced since the start of the war.
Special Operation Frustration
Russian citizens are finding it increasingly difficult to respond to questions regarding the ‘special military operation’, such as when it will end and how well it is going. The number of Russians who are experiencing anxiety and depression is growing. These are the latest findings from polling by the independent Chronicles project. Although the level of support for the war recorded by this project has remained unchanged since the beginning of the summer — hovering at about 55% — the core of supporters of the ‘special operation’ stands at no more than a third of all respondents.
Putin Fans or Kremlin Bots?
Over the past decade Russia has created a powerful infrastructure of "networked authoritarianism". This is focused not on restriction but on the active creation of social media content. Analysis of simulated support for the authorities through astroturfing and the real response of social media users to the war in Ukraine shows that, despite the variety of the Kremlin’s online strategies, its social media propaganda is not always successful. However, it functions to distort our perceptions of "grassroots sentiment".
Crisis Instead of a Deal
Europe will survive the approaching winter without Russian gas, but the energy crisis will continue beyond this year, widening into a global economic crisis. Nevertheless, contrary to Kremlin expectations, the West has rejected the possibility of a political deal with Moscow, and the costs to Russia of the energy and sanctions war will mount rapidly. A new report by Sergei Vakulenko draws some preliminary conclusions from Russia's energy confrontation with the West.
The Reverse Evolution of a Spin Dictatorship
In the 21st century, repressive dictatorships seem to have morphed into "spin dictatorships" based on control over the media, but Russia is undergoing a reverse evolution, turning back into a traditional "dictatorship of fear". According to Daniel Treisman, the reason for this regression is not the conservatism and imperial ambitions of the Russian people, but rather the inability of Putin's regime to cope with a successful modernisation of Russian society.
An ideology without principles
Authoritarian regimes paid great attention to ideological construction in the twentieth century, but in the twenty-first century they have been characterised by ideological passivity. Despite this, Putin's war requires not only military but also political mobilisation. The war requires the construction of ideological narratives that can capture and consolidate the population. In our discussion series, Andrei Zorin, Ekaterina Schulmann, Alexander Panchenko, and Gulnaz Sharafutdinova consider whether the Russian regime has an ideology.
The Conservation Effect
The dominant perception in Russia has been that the impact of sanctions is insignificant: in addition to the public optimism of officials and major CEOs, a positive attitude is widespread among the people and a significant part of the business community. SERGEY ALEKSASHENKO, OLEG BUKLEMISHEV, OLEG VYUGIN, KIRILL ROGOV and YULIA STAROSTINA discuss how sanctions actually work and how they do not, and why the country's ability to resist them maximizes its long-term losses.
The Nazification of Denazification
The Imposed Consensus: What do the polls say about support for the war and can they be believed?
Trump has repeatedly stated that he intends to increase oil production dramatically to reduce global hydrocarbon prices. However, in reality, he has far fewer energy-related levers to pressure Putin than many would like to think. And Trump’s campaign slogan, ‘Drill, baby, drill’, is unlikely to have seriously intimidated the Russian president.
Time for Revenge: The pendulum that swung left has been pushed backwards by voters
Throughout his presidency, Trump will attempt to partially roll back the gains made by Democrats over the past decades; however, his reform plans are unusually ambitious for a Republican. Meanwhile, the polarisation of American society will have a significant impact on the situation in the country.
Five Discourses Around The War: A new map of the Russian public sphere
The majority of Russian citizens gravitate towards a discourse on war that is almost absent in the Russian public sphere. This is loyalist pacifism, where dissatisfaction with the war is combined with loyalty to Putin and the Russian government. The demand for public representation of this ‘silent majority’ will grow as the costs of the war increase – if this happens, an unexpected transformation of Russia's discursive landscape may occur.
In Search of Causes: the Russian ‘majorat’, the non-re-establishment of the state and the collapse of Russian democracy
The political catastrophe that Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 became has driven the Russian intellectual elite to analyse the post-Soviet period of Russian history with particular intensity, focusing primarily on the notorious 1990s. This kind of search for a ‘poisoned source’ and ‘point of no return’ is natural and acquires a special significance when it comes to tragic turning points in national history.
Algorithms – Reputation – Karma: Why fake news is taking over the world and defeating quality information
The algorithms of search platforms and networks have largely devalued the reputation system of media outlets, which used to establish markers of information quality and structure the flow of information. A counterbalance to the short-term benefits of clickbait could be an automatically generated ‘information karma’ code, built into the algorithms of networks and platforms. This would make the costs of spreading false or harmful content higher than the profits gained from increased user engagement.
From adaptation to mobilisation: The logic of changes in state-business relations in the context of war and sanctions
If macroeconomic conditions deteriorate, a revision of the principles of coexistence and interaction that have developed between Russian business and the state over the past two decades seems almost inevitable – even though these very principles have ensured that the Russian economy has been highly adaptable to the shocks experienced.
Unpopular War: Russian opponents and non-opponents of the invasion of Ukraine. Part 2
Researchers identify four types of opponents to the war: ‘integrators’',isolationists', 'the oppressed', and 'activists', noting that a common trend among them is to seek common ground and interaction with the surrounding atmosphere of acceptance of the war, which, however, does not turn them into its supporters.
Unpopular War: Russian Opponents and Non-Opponents of the Invasion of Ukraine. Part 1
The personal impressions accumulated by the average Russian about the course of the war and its impact on the life of the country partially undermine trust in official information and provoke more critical judgements about the military conflict and its consequences for Russia and Russian society. However, this criticism is not transformed into an anti-war stance.
Nuclear Inferiority Complex: Escalation rhetoric through the prism of the Cold War experience
Russia's current leadership has inherited from the Soviet rulers a sense of a lack of recognition of its right to be a global power. This tension defined Soviet policy during the Cold War — from Stalin's expansionism to Khrushchev's nuclear adventurism. Today's Russian leaders have largely replicated this model; however, the Kremlin's capabilities are much further removed from these global ambitions than they were during the Soviet era.
Parallel Cheremushkin: The Absence and Presence of 'War' in a Provincial Russian City
From the very beginning of the war, sociologists have faced the question of how to study public opinion under a repressive and militaristic regime. To understand how Russians feel about the war and adapt to the new military reality, researchers from the Public Sociology Laboratory have conducted an incredible immersion experiment – they travelled to three Russian regions, where they spent a month in participant observation mode, without publicising the subject of their study.
Protracted Military Putinism: How long it will last and how it will end. Realities and projections
The political regime that emerged in Russia as a result of the transformation of the war from blitzkrieg into a protracted conflict has overcome a period of vulnerability and instability. Protracted military Putinism should now be considered the baseline scenario, within which the regime is able to mitigate imbalances, endure significant deterioration of the economy and manage political risks. However, this does not mean that the regime has overcome threats and challenges.
Dynamics of Isolation in Conditions of Fragmentation: The results of two years of the sanctions experiment
The limited effect of sanctions against Russia has been determined by several factors: changes in the structure of the global economy, the effects of the logic of arbitrage, and the internal contradictions of the sanctions regime. Any further dynamics of the impact of sanctions will be cyclical: new tools of control will be created and new ways to circumvent them will emerge as a result. And, in the long term, everything will depend on the extent to which the Russian economy retains its market core.
The Aftermath of Crocus City Hall Terrorist Attack: Labor Migration Policy, Public opinion and Dysfunctional Autocracy
The terror attack at Crocus City Hall was a catastrophic failure by the Russian authorities and security services. However, the Kremlin's dual strategy of blaming Ukraine and the West for the attack along with a large-scale anti-migrant campaign, has allowed the authorities to shirk responsibility for this failure. Authoritarian dysfunction results in human and economic losses but is offset by the successful use of conservative mobilisation tools.
Inside and Outside Censorship: The Russian media landscape two years after the outbreak of the war
Over the past two years, the Russian media landscape has undergone an unprecedented transformation. Following the onset of the war and the introduction of what can be considered as wartime censorship in Russia, a significant portion of the country’s media relocated beyond the country and continued its activities in uncensored spaces. The outcomes of this unique experiment are likely to be significant not only for Russia but also for other countries undergoing processes of autocratisation.
Between Moderate Xenophobia and Low Tolerance: The perception of migrants after the terror attack at Crocus City Hall
After the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall, the number of attacks on Central Asian migrants and anti-migrant statements by Russian authorities and politicians has markedly increased. However, polling data does not indicate a surge in xenophobia, which remains at a moderate level, rather it shows a majority loyal to the authorities, who are not receiving signals of tolerance from above. It is these signals that fuel their ‘suspicion’ towards migrants.
Bots On Russian Social Media: How Network Propaganda Works by
We deal with bots and trolls every day, often without noticing or realising it. There may not be many of them, but their activity, consolidated position, and aggressiveness allow them to capture and moderate the discussion, provoking an effect similar to the phenomenon of the ‘spiral of silence'. Bots and trolls are tools of horizontal network propaganda, designed to distort real users' perception of the nation’s 'imaginary majority'.
'The Russian Model' in Search of Unemployment: the specifics of the Russian labour market hinder its adaptation to structural shifts
Labour shortage and the frantic demand for workers are contributing to wage growth and adding to the overheating of the Russian economy and inflation. This unfavourable situation is exacerbated by the specific features of the Russian labour market model that have developed in the post-Soviet period. It ensures low formal unemployment and enables the market to adapt well to crises, but it hinders the relocation of the workforce in the face of various structural or cyclical shifts.
The Opposition Paradox: Putin has more opponents in Russia than it seems, but they lack a common public agenda
One of the reasons for the repeated failures of the Russian opposition lies in its traditional fixation on 'playing by the other team’s rules', that is they focus on electoral procedures, which bring moral satisfaction from participation but invariably result in political defeat. The other side to this fixation is the weakness of the public agenda, the lack of a coherent picture of ideas and convictions that could oppose Putinism.
Propaganda in the Network Environment: How propaganda has changed in the era of social media and during times of war
Propaganda in the era of social media is aimed not so much at promoting a particular ideological doctrine as at moderating public discourse. It may address various messages to different audiences and primarily involves engaging the consumer in the process of dissemination, a sort of process of co-authorship. Today, the Russian state effectively utilises all these properties and capabilities of network propaganda.
Spontaneous sanctuaries: Navalny's death and memorial protest in Russia
Over the past two weeks, a wave of spontaneous memorials to Navalny has swept across Russia around symbolically charged places such as monuments to victims of political repression, but also in courtyards and entrances of residential buildings, and even on online maps. During this time, there have been at least 500 'flower' memorials in 232 cities and towns in Russia, and the list continues to grow. What do they mean, and what tradition stands behind them?
The Lead-up to the Murder: Navalny and protest politics in Russia
Alexei Navalny emerged as a central figure in opposition to Putin's authoritarianism, inspiring tens of thousands with the heroism of his fearlessness and fostering a new ethic of resistance. However, Navalny's political biography is not merely a derivative of his heroic persona. The phenomenon of Navalny is shaped by a confluence of expectations and aspirations that he embodied, becoming both a voluntary hostage and a symbol of them.
Historical Politics: Ideologisation of society as an attempt to change Post-Soviet identity
The current stage of the state's ideological expansion is designed, on the one hand, to definitively exclude and 'cancel' the liberal segment of Russian society, and, on the other hand, to change the identity of that part of society that absorbed the ideological opportunism of the 2000s, thereby neutralising the value baggage and liberal aspirations of the perestroika and post-perestroika era.
The Dead Ends of War: How public opinion changed during the second year of the war
Second Demobilisation: How public opinion changed during the second year of the war
The core of support for the war in 2023 decreased one and a half times and became proportionate to those who generally lean towards anti-war views. The share of those who would be unwilling to support a decision by Putin to immediately withdraw troops also decreased, and by the end of the year, it became smaller than the share of those who would be willing to support such a decision. However, all this has led not to an increase in the number of people who oppose the war, but rather to the expansion of a zone of blurred and alienated attitudes toward it.
Between 'Spiral of Silence' and 'Jumping on the Bandwagon': The influence of others on Russians' opinion of the Russia-Ukraine war
While, in Russia, opponents of the war are disinclined to voice their opinions when they think they believe they are surrounded by those who support it, those who declare their support for the war are disinclined to defend their loyalty when they find themselves in a mixed society where different views on the war are represented.
Reaping War: The Russian orthodox church and the Russian invasion of Ukraine
Public perception identifies the position of the Russian Orthodox Church with the pro-war statements of Patriarch Kirill, but in reality the position of most of its clergy is determined by a compromise between loyalty to the Kremlin and commitment to the institutional interests of the church. It remains the largest public organisation in a number of post-Soviet countries, demonstrating a similar spectrum of attitudes towards the war as exists in society as a whole.
Four Myths about Russia: Why not to view Russia through Vladimir Putins's eyes
The historical fatalism of the Russian opposition sometimes seems like a mirror image of Putinist mythology. Was the post-Soviet era a lost thirty years in the history of Russia? Is imperial expansion inherent to Russian political thinking? Could things have unfolded differently in the 1990s? And, is it true that something will only be possible 'post-Putin'?
The Anti-crisis Trap: How crisis management creates an economy of permanent crisis
The high frequency of economic crises has shaped a unique type of anti-crisis economic policy in Russia: 'overcoming' each crisis involves freezing its consequences and factors of inefficiency. As a result, there is extremely slow growth during inter-crisis periods, which are becoming shorter and shorter. This model not only deprives the economy of incentives for development but also increases the probability of new crises, reducing their cost for the country's leadership.
Second Chance Opposition: Can the Russian opposition community abroad influence what is happening in Russia?
Russian anti-war emigres have yet to be able to create their own political representation — political structures that could declare themselves an alternative to the current course of the Kremlin. What does the Russian opposition community represent today? What is happening to it? What factors determine its strengths and weaknesses? What might its future look like, and when and how might this community be able to influence events in Russia?
Why Putinism Is (Still) Not An Ideology
Ideologies usually create a kind of political map that can be used to understand where political processes are heading. However, Putin has long and successfully avoided ideological clarity, which has enabled him to maintain a certain political intrigue around his key decisions. This characteristic of the regime persists today: the Kremlin can neither explain the reasons and goals of its war in Ukraine nor ensure ideological mobilisation in support of it.
Does the Putin regime have an ideology?
The ideology of the Putin regime is resilient because it responds to the existing demands of the population, draws on deeply rooted Soviet traditions, and at the same time fills the ideological void that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This will help to sustain the Putin regime for many years to come.
In Memoriam: Yasin's Legacy of Freedom
Today in Moscow, a farewell is being bid to a prominent figure in the Russian political landscape of recent decades, Evgeny Yasin. Mr. Yasin served as the Minister of Economics during the era of reforms, was the founder and leader of the Higher School of Economics, and presided over the independent "Liberal Mission" Foundation. On the Re: Russia platform, notable figures such as Sergei Aleksashenko, Evgenia Albats, Sergei Guriev, Igor Klyamkin, Lev Gudkov, Konstantin Sonin, and others are paying their respects to Mr. Yasin.
Outside and Inside: What The Experience of Russia’s Exiled Opposition Teaches and Does Not Teach Us
A large number of activists, journalists and human rights defenders have left Russia since the war began, but in the past year and a half they have failed to create institutions that could represent the Russian opposition abroad and serve as the voice of the Russian democratic movement. How unique is this situation? What is the experience of other opposition diasporas that have left their countries due to domestic repression? What can such opposition achieve from abroad?
Between De- and Hyper-Politisation: The evolution of Russian authoritarianism
Over the past two decades, the Russian political regime has evolved through three distinct phases. Initially, during the 2000s, it embraced a depoliticised authoritarianism that focused on economic efficiency and imposed selective constraints on political liberties. In the following decade, the regime encountered a gradual resurgence of political awareness within society, prompting it to adopt a counter-politicisation strategy in response. However, as these measures proved inadequate in the 2020s, the regime turned to external aggression and intense politicisation, resulting in a radical transformation of both the regime itself and of broader society.
Between mobilisation and tolerance lies the evolving nature of Ukrainian attitudes toward peace-minded Russians
In late 2022, surveys indicated that most Ukrainians were hesitant to engage with Russian citizens, regardless of their views on the ongoing war. However, as of today, there is a growing agreement within Ukrainian society about the potential for cooperation with peace-oriented ‘ordinary’ Russians. There is now an unstable majority in favour of dialogue with the Russian leadership in the event that Russia sees a change of power and policy. Nevertheless, few currently believe that such a turn of events is possible.
From Triumph to Collapse: How Germany is parting with Ostpolitik and what comes next
Over the past fifty years 'Ostpolitik', Germany's 'eastern policy', formed an integral part of German identity, and the idea of a special relationship with Russia became a key element of Germany's global political and economic positioning. The invasion of Ukraine marked the collapse of 'Ostpolitik', which is understood as the collapse of the entire German foreign policy of previous decades. Germany's political system, which resembles a super-heavy oil tanker, is now forced to perform an abrupt pivot.
Special Military Economic Geography: Changes in the Russian Economy by Region
Looking at the dynamics of the Russian economy by region provides a multidimensional lens that reveals something that is not otherwise obvious from a sectoral analysis. The relatively good average figures conceal multidirectional dynamics, while the localisation of zones of abnormal growth and abnormal decline allows us to see past the optimistic figures of the Russian economy as a whole and to identify the process of structural transformation associated with its current anomalous conditions.
The Disappearance Dilemma: Post-Putin Russia must begin before Putin leaves
Hopes of a new future for Russia ‘after Putin’ may fail to materialise if the demand for change is not already in place before he leaves. However, the sceptics' view that Putinism will necessarily outlive Putin does not seem all too convincing either. They underestimate the potential for modernisation that has been accumulated by Russian society throughout the post-Soviet decades.
The Exodus Year: Those Who Left, Those Who Stayed, and the Breakdown in Communication
Both those who left Russia and those who stayed have a similar outlook on the political situation and rely on similar information sources. However, many of those who have stayed believe that those who have left hold them more responsible for the ongoing war and view their decision to stay as a deviant attitude. Overcoming this tension and developing an ideology of solidarity between the two groups is crucial as both groups need each other's support.
Children, Chaebols and Adjutants: Human resource policy during the war’s first year
In autocracies, the place of public politics is occupied by personnel politics, which becomes both the reflection and the result of struggles among elite factions, influence groups, and corporate interests, all of which are not able to be balanced out by the activities of public parties and associations. Against the backdrop of the tectonic social shifts associated with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the personnel changes of the first year of the war seem very modest. However, it is likely to be a lull caused by confusion in the face of setbacks.
‘Once we've started, we can't stop’: how Russians' attitudes to the war in Ukraine are changing
Over the past year, a number of opinion polls have attempted to discover which Russians support the war in Ukraine and which do not. However, in-depth interviews reveal that these efforts may not be capable of yielding any satisfactory results: the majority of Russians both support and do not support the war at the same time. The attitudes of Russian citizens towards the war are a patchwork, contradictory and in flux, consisting of arguments and narratives from each side.
Putinism without Putin: what is it and is it even possible?
Not only for the Russian elites, but also for a significant part of the population who were relatively satisfied with the economic prosperity of life before the war, an attractive scenario for the future is not the total collapse of the regime, but rather the establishment of Putinism without Putin himself, as he has now threatened the very existence of this ideology
THE PLUNGE INTO WAR: PUBLIC OPINION CHRONICLED
While at first glance it may seem as though there is a declarative ‘majority of support’ for the war, there is perhaps more significantly a ‘majority of non-resistance’, which allows the pro-war minority to dominate the public debate. For mainstream Russian society, the ‘plunge into war’ remains a coerced strategy, and the consolidation of revanchist sentiments among one segment of society coexists with the considerable potential for demobilisation within another. Re: Russia presents an overview of the results of public opinion polling conducted by the independent Chronicles project.
Worse Than a Crisis. The 2022 Russian economic anomaly: how it works, and where it is headed
The Russian economy's decline in 2022 was not as severe as economists predicted, but that does not mean it was able to ‘withstand’ the impact of sanctions. These figures merely reflect the effective mobilisation of economic resources, and as the country’s revenues decline, the economy will face investment deficiency, devaluation, budget deficits, and demand contraction — all of which are symptoms of the conventional economic crisis that awaits Russia.
Crisis in Abundance: why did the Russian economy fail to collapse and is there a crisis on the horizon?
The sanctions imposed on the Russian economy are unprecedented in scale, but they appear to have been less effective than was initially expected. A combination of factors has helped stave off the collapse of the Russian economy, including contradictory sanctions policies, radical administrative decisions taken by the Kremlin, and a surge in Russian export revenues alongside a trade surplus reinforced by restrictions on Russian imports.
A Price Cap or Smoke and Mirrors? How Much Does Russian Oil Actually Cost?
There’s an assumption that the price cap on Russian oil is working perfectly. However, the terms of the Russian oil trade have changed, and it is therefore useless to employ the old methods of assessing the market under the current circumstances. Today these do not provide us with actual transparency so much as imitate it. In fact, it is most likely that the discount on Russian oil is not as significant as it seems at first glance, and moreover it is advantageous for Russian players to maintain the perception that sanctions on oil are working effectively.
The Russian Rhizome: A Social Portrait of New Immigrants
The new wave of emigration from Russia differs greatly from those that occurred in the twentieth century — the 2022 emigrants typically exhibit high levels of trust and social mobility, and they are ready and willing to become involved in the life of their host countries and actively participate in social initiatives. While these new emigrants have strong ties to Russia, they remain sceptical of the chance for positive change in their home country in the near future. Will the new diaspora have an impact on Russia's history?
Regime of Imperial Paranoia: War in the Age of Empty Rhetoric
Any rational explanation for Russia's invasion of Ukraine seems inadequate and unsatisfying, as it has never been based on any rational grounds. The war with Ukraine is a void created by the continual repetition of pseudo-meanings. Through rhetoric and projections into theatricalised rituals, it organises reality into simple and accessible behaviours that can be easily and widely assimilated thanks to their simplicity.
The Patchwork Quilt: The Man-Made Crisis of 2022 and its Effect on Russia’s Regions
In 2022, Russia has witnessed a variety of economic trends: some Russian regions have shown strong economic growth, while others have witnessed significant decline. These discrepancies, as Russian businesses have attempted to tackle the ongoing crisis, can be explained by an extensive list of factors: sanctions, the disruption of supply chains, government support packages, increased defence spending, Western companies leaving the Russian market, and the emergence of new product niches. Significantly, however, high revenues from raw material exports continue to mitigate the crisis.
War as a Civilisational Shift
The war against Ukraine has become an instrument to sever Russia's ties with the West in a radical manner. This may likely result in an equally radical transformation of Russian society, altering the natural course of its development. Marina Davydova, one of the main ideologues and facilitators of the integration between Russian and European theatre over the last decade, analyses the nature of this cultural and civilisational shift and its potential consequences, and describes the pogrom that Russian theatre has experienced since the start of the war.
Special Operation Frustration
Russian citizens are finding it increasingly difficult to respond to questions regarding the ‘special military operation’, such as when it will end and how well it is going. The number of Russians who are experiencing anxiety and depression is growing. These are the latest findings from polling by the independent Chronicles project. Although the level of support for the war recorded by this project has remained unchanged since the beginning of the summer — hovering at about 55% — the core of supporters of the ‘special operation’ stands at no more than a third of all respondents.
Putin Fans or Kremlin Bots?
Over the past decade Russia has created a powerful infrastructure of "networked authoritarianism". This is focused not on restriction but on the active creation of social media content. Analysis of simulated support for the authorities through astroturfing and the real response of social media users to the war in Ukraine shows that, despite the variety of the Kremlin’s online strategies, its social media propaganda is not always successful. However, it functions to distort our perceptions of "grassroots sentiment".
Crisis Instead of a Deal
Europe will survive the approaching winter without Russian gas, but the energy crisis will continue beyond this year, widening into a global economic crisis. Nevertheless, contrary to Kremlin expectations, the West has rejected the possibility of a political deal with Moscow, and the costs to Russia of the energy and sanctions war will mount rapidly. A new report by Sergei Vakulenko draws some preliminary conclusions from Russia's energy confrontation with the West.
The Reverse Evolution of a Spin Dictatorship
In the 21st century, repressive dictatorships seem to have morphed into "spin dictatorships" based on control over the media, but Russia is undergoing a reverse evolution, turning back into a traditional "dictatorship of fear". According to Daniel Treisman, the reason for this regression is not the conservatism and imperial ambitions of the Russian people, but rather the inability of Putin's regime to cope with a successful modernisation of Russian society.
An ideology without principles
Authoritarian regimes paid great attention to ideological construction in the twentieth century, but in the twenty-first century they have been characterised by ideological passivity. Despite this, Putin's war requires not only military but also political mobilisation. The war requires the construction of ideological narratives that can capture and consolidate the population. In our discussion series, Andrei Zorin, Ekaterina Schulmann, Alexander Panchenko, and Gulnaz Sharafutdinova consider whether the Russian regime has an ideology.
The Conservation Effect
The dominant perception in Russia has been that the impact of sanctions is insignificant: in addition to the public optimism of officials and major CEOs, a positive attitude is widespread among the people and a significant part of the business community. SERGEY ALEKSASHENKO, OLEG BUKLEMISHEV, OLEG VYUGIN, KIRILL ROGOV and YULIA STAROSTINA discuss how sanctions actually work and how they do not, and why the country's ability to resist them maximizes its long-term losses.
The Nazification of Denazification
The Imposed Consensus: What do the polls say about support for the war and can they be believed?