On The Brink of a New Arms Race: Russian nuclear blackmail and China's nuclear build-up trigger a new era of nuclear competition

A double challenge

For more than three decades following the end of the Cold War, the world was not faced with significant nuclear threats. This situation began to change in the early 2020s and was dramatically altered after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

In the early days of the war, Russian authorities made it clear that nuclear weapons were looming in the background of the conflict. Employing almost direct threats on several occasions, the Kremlin demonstrated that it views nuclear weapons not merely as a deterrent but as a functional tool – a lever of pressure in international affairs and conventional military conflicts (→ Re:Russia: Doctrine of Nuclear Non-Deterrence). The second major development of the early 2020s was China’s accelerated nuclear buildup.

Against this backdrop, the United States can no longer rely on its previous nuclear force architecture, which was designed to deter a single adversary, as former chair of the Strategic Policy Commission, Madeleine Creedon and Commission member Franklin Miller, who held various positions in the Pentagon and the National Security Council for thirty years, wrote in Foreign Affairs. The US nuclear advantage is rapidly becoming outdated, and Washington no longer has the time to adapt to this new reality at the pace it once planned, the authors argue.

For example, Moscow has already improved its strategic triad – land-based intercontinental missiles, strategic submarines and their missile systems, as well as bombers and air-launched cruise missiles. This modernisation disrupts the existing strategic balance, according to Kreidon and Miller. For example, the 'Sarmat,' a massive Russian missile developed to replace the heavy intercontinental ballistic missile RS-36 (SS-18), can carry multiple nuclear warheads designed to attack US intercontinental missile complexes. The nuclear torpedo 'Poseidon,' designed to cause unacceptable damage to coastal territories, is also a major concern.

No less of a challenge is the modernisation of China’s nuclear forces. Beijing has already developed an effective strategic triad, similar to those of the US and Russia, though on a smaller scale, and is expanding and diversifying its regional nuclear forces. Meanwhile, China’s nuclear buildup is progressing at a pace faster than originally predicted. This year, China’s total number of warheads surpassed 600, according to a recent Pentagon report. In 2020, its stockpile was about 200, and it was expected to double by 2030. In fact, it has tripled in just four years. At this rate, China could become the third major nuclear power by the early 2030s, with a nuclear arsenal of up to 1000 warheads, and by the middle of the next decade, its stockpile could reach at least 1500 warheads (the US currently possesses 3700 nuclear warheads).

However, predicting the pace of China’s nuclear buildup is not easy. Like Russia, China conceals its actual military spending. According to Pentagon estimates, its military spending is at least 40% higher than reported in the official defence budget. In 2024, Beijing’s real defence spending could range from $330-450 billion. Russia’s official military spending in 2025 is projected to be around $135 billion (a figure that is also understated), while S. defence spending is $895 billion. However, as previously noted, comparing military budgets in nominal dollars distorts the picture: many costs (e.g., labour) are incomparable across countries (→ Re:Russia: Trump's challenge and Europe's dilemma). When assessing them based on purchasing power parity, it may turn out that China’s military spending is comparable to the US (the IMF estimates China’s GDP in 2024 at $18.2 trillion in nominal dollars and $37 trillion by purchasing power parity, while Russia’s is $2.2 trillion and $6.9 trillion, respectively).

Will China follow in Russia's footsteps?

The goals of China’s nuclear buildup have not been openly articulated, notes Jessica Matthews, who headed the Global Issues Section of the US National Security Council from 1977 to 1979, in the Guardian. Beijing has never participated in arms control negotiations, leaving its true nuclear strategy largely unknown. The expansion of its nuclear arsenal may be part of preparations for a potential war over Taiwan and future dominance in the Indo-Pacific region, or a component of a broader strategy to limit American hegemony. Most likely, it is a combination of these objectives.

Beijing is seeking to overcome its continental isolation, write Kyle Balzer and Dan Blumenthal, experts at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) in their article in Foreign Affairs. Much like Napoleonic France in the 19th century and Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the 20th, Beijing perceives itself as surrounded by hostile states that constrain its power and, in turn, are supported by a dominant global naval power – the United States. China actively pursues a policy of countering the American alliance system in the Pacific, aiming to weaken and dismantle it, with its expanded nuclear arsenal providing additional leverage for this goal.

In quantitative terms, China’s nuclear arsenal will remain smaller than that of the United States, but in a regional context, it will gain several advantages, the authors note. China already has more land-based intercontinental missile launchers and medium-range missiles. Meanwhile, its capacity to strike the continental United States continues to grow, which alone will constrain Washington’s freedom of action.

Chinese military theorists frequently describe the country’s modernised nuclear arsenal as a 'trump card' that makes external interference in regional affairs impossible. According to Balzer and Blumenthal, they have concluded that Putin’s nuclear blackmail during the war against Ukraine was quite effective – it prevented NATO from engaging more openly and deeply in the conflict. Training manuals for the Chinese army’s missile forces include provisions stating that simply bringing nuclear weapons to a state of readiness 'will shock the enemy psychologically' and influence their actions. To further intensify psychological pressure, Beijing may eventually abandon its declared no-first-use nuclear policy, Balzer and Blumenthal suggest.

All of this closely mirrors Russia’s tactics, where, during the war in Ukraine, nuclear weapons are being transformed from a deterrent into a tool of intimidation. Putin announced the heightened readiness of Russia’s nuclear deterrence forces at the start of the conflict, while hawkish Kremlin-aligned internationalists are laying the groundwork for a possible radical revision of nuclear doctrine, including discussions on the purported benefits of a preemptive nuclear strike. Furthermore, Putin has publicly suggested that in the event of a limited nuclear conflict between Russia and European countries, Washington might hesitate to escalate it globally, as such a conflict would put the US at risk from Russian strategic nuclear forces (→ Re:Russia: The Doctrine of Nuclear Non-Deterrence).

These parallels suggest that we may be witnessing a unified or coordinated strategy of escalating nuclear threats by both Russia and China.

Palliative Update

To prepare for the possibility of coordinated or opportunistic aggression from both Russia and China, Joe Biden amended the country’s nuclear doctrine in June, reflecting the need to expand and diversify the nuclear arsenal, while simultaneously deterring its primary competitors – Russia, China, and North Korea. This also initiated the development of new nuclear delivery systems and warheads. However, the US does not need to increase its nuclear arsenal to match the combined arsenals of Russia and China, argue Madelyn Creedon and Franklin Miller. It merely needs to continue modernising it.

The first nuclear triad (land, air, and sea-launched missiles) was developed under the administration of John F. Kennedy. Two decades later, during Ronald Reagan's presidency, it underwent modernisation. At that time, Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were equipped with new engines and guidance systems, a new class of strategic submarines was designed, and aging bombers were armed with long-range cruise missiles. By the early 21st century, this nuclear triad had become hopelessly outdated. However, the US saw little need to update it due to the reduced threat of nuclear confrontation.

In 2010, Barack Obama’s administration initiated a program to replace all three legs of the triad. Yet, full implementation has not been achieved, and the operational life of most US strategic nuclear systems now exceeds their designed service periods. For instance, the Minuteman missiles, deployed in the mid-1970s and upgraded in the 1990s, cannot remain in service beyond the mid-2030s. The Ohio-class strategic submarines, designed for a service life of approximately 30 years, are now operating beyond that limit – 11 of the 14 vessels in the arsenal have exceeded their planned lifespan. Similarly, the AGM-86 ALCM air-launched cruise missile, introduced in 1980 with a planned service life of ten years, continues to be used. Meanwhile, new systems are being developed at a sluggish pace. For example, the Sentinel ICBM, intended to replace the LGM-30G Minuteman III, requires significantly more investment than initially anticipated. Production of the first Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, set to replace the Ohio class, may be delayed by one to two years due to the inability of the US defence industry to manufacture key components on schedule.

Another weak point in the current US nuclear architecture lies in its regional deterrence forces. Over 90% of the nuclear weapons systems deployed abroad during the Cold War were dismantled under a series of bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union and Russia in 1991-1992. However, Moscow later abandoned its commitments and restored its land, sea, and air-based tactical and intermediate-range nuclear forces. The US, by contrast, maintains only a limited tactical nuclear arsenal in Europe. While exact figures are classified, current estimates suggest around 100 nuclear warheads are stored under the protection of US Air Force units across five NATO countries in Europe.

In 2013, Washington retired its only deployed nuclear system in the Pacific region (a submarine-launched cruise missile), leaving it without a regional nuclear deterrent in the event of a crisis to reassure its allies. Congress has tasked the Biden administration with developing and deploying a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) to ensure deterrence in the Pacific. However, this will only affect the balance of power in the medium term.

Overall, the US must transition from extending the service life of existing warheads to producing new ones. This shift necessitates a rebuilding of the industrial base to relearn the production of critical components and materials or find alternatives, as well as adapting to modern manufacturing technologies, Creedon and Miller note. Until these capabilities are fully operational, Washington will have to maintain aging systems while addressing several challenges simultaneously. The new US nuclear program recently articulated by the Biden administration remains relevant, and there is no need for the Donald Trump administration, they argue, to revise it – a process that would require extensive interagency analysis. Nevertheless, since 1952, every US administration has reviewed its predecessor’s defence policies, including nuclear strategy. Thus, their advice is unlikely to be heeded.

In any case, the balance of nuclear power globally is set to change significantly in the near future. This prospect will demand yet another strategic response from the US and the West as a whole.