Sanctions
Sanctions Rally: International sanctions lead to patriotic mobilisation while their economic impact on the 'common man' seems to be insignificant
Dynamics of Isolation in Conditions of Fragmentation: The results of two years of the sanctions experiment
The limited effect of sanctions against Russia has been determined by several factors: changes in the structure of the global economy, the effects of the logic of arbitrage, and the internal contradictions of the sanctions regime. Any further dynamics of the impact of sanctions will be cyclical: new tools of control will be created and new ways to circumvent them will emerge as a result. And, in the long term, everything will depend on the extent to which the Russian economy retains its market core.
Sanctions Compliance: Western banks can play a key role in controlling the supply of dual-use goods to Russia
Sanctions Game: The US has managed to create problems for the import of microelectronics into Russia, but even more importantly, to limit the development of its domestic production
Liquification of Plans and Tertiary Sanctions Effect: How and why Russia lost its prospects in the global LNG market
As a rule, sanctions do not lead to the immediate loss of export markets, but to their gradual restructuring. Political decisions transform into economic costs, resulting in a sharp contraction of the niche for Russian producers. Alongside the arms and metals markets, LNG exports represent another sphere of lost opportunities for Russia.
The Discount has Shifted: Russian budget oil and gas revenues soared at the beginning of the year due to the narrowing discount of Urals to Brent, but there is still potential for sanctions to be toughened
How Sanctions Work: High-tech industries manage to maintain services and infrastructure, but fail to develop them
Rusty Business: The fight against Russia's shadow fleet may only have a significant impact within conditions of a deficit-free oil market and relatively low prices
Minus $50 Billion: The Yermak-McFaul group has proposed measures to undermine the Kremlin’s ability to finance the war and maintain stability in Russia
Spillover Effect: Russia’s economy may face a new wave of sanctions stress at the beginning of the year
Servant of Two Masters: Without the creation of a new and comprehensive export control system, sanctions are unable to stop the rearmament of the Russian army using Western components
Prices below the cap: The year that the mechanism to limit Russian oil prices has been in operation has shown its ineffectiveness in its current form
Dancing around Sanctions: The EU is finding it increasingly difficult to impose new restrictions as the old ones are not working
A Hollow Ceiling and a Rusty Fleet: Russian oil sales and the price cap problems
Bad Weapons for the Poor and the Unfortunate: Russia is irreversibly losing its place in the middle-tech arms markets but may still maintain its position as a supplier to impoverished and isolated nations
Naked Goliath: Russia's defence industry has failed to solve the shortage of imported components as equipment and weapons reserves are being depleted
Southern Corridor: The West is struggling to disrupt the supply of electronics to Russia, with investigators uncovering new schemes and channels for such deliveries
Sanctions Counteroffensive: Even a partial restriction of the 'grey' import of microelectronics to Russia could shift the balance of power on the battlefield
Import Substitution: Most Russian companies will be unable to abandon foreign equipment or raw materials in the near future
Artisanal Digital Authoritarianism: Despite the remaining loopholes for circumventing sanctions, the Russian IT sector is doomed to degrade
Slow Poison: Russia has failed to replace the imports of high-tech goods hit by direct sanctions
The Russian car market has taken a step back, reverting to the structure it had in the 2000s and potentially heading towards becoming more like China
The West intends to continue its fight, threatening to inflict new problems on the Russian economy in the near future
Flight Against Sanctions: The government is aiming to commence aircraft fleet localisation by the late 2020s, while airlines are reducing their safety standards and resorting to cannibalisation
Schrödinger's Boycott: Why Have Western Companies Not Left Russia Properly?
Many foreign companies pledged to leave the Russian market in the initial weeks after the country’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This process was very active at first, but then it clearly began to stall. Moreover, some of the companies that had seemed to have left without too much fuss have begun to return cautiously.
How Sanctions Have Changed the Kremlin’s Strategy in Ukraine: according to experts, the Russian army’s weakness is no longer people but weapons
Irrecoverable losses: how sanctions have hit Russia’s most competitive industries the hardest
Although sanctions have not led to a complete collapse of the Russian economy, they have caused significant and irreversible damage. Industries which had once achieved significant success on the international market have suffered the most and have been pushed towards demodernisation. A striking example of this is the Russian timber industry, which has lost its foothold in the European market.
The One-Sided Fence: American chips worth hundreds of millions of dollars are entering Russia via China, and there seems to be no way to prevent this
Negative Mixed Effect: a quarter of industrial enterprises have benefited from the ‘positive’ effect of sanctions, but this will eventually lead to the growth of a ‘stagnant sector’ in industry
Europe is set to buy $70 billion dollars worth of oil and gas from Russia this year, but even with tougher sanctions, Putin’s regime is unlikely to be crippled
Will Russia have enough money for the war? Oil prices are falling, but the IEA predicts an increase in demand by the end of the year, rendering sanctions ineffective
Who is Helping Russia Fight? As the war approaches its one-year mark, sanctions remain largely symbolic according to Russian customs data
The Not-so-peaceful Atom: can Europe afford sanctions against Russian nuclear power?
A Price Cap or Smoke and Mirrors? How Much Does Russian Oil Actually Cost?
There’s an assumption that the price cap on Russian oil is working perfectly. However, the terms of the Russian oil trade have changed, and it is therefore useless to employ the old methods of assessing the market under the current circumstances. Today these do not provide us with actual transparency so much as imitate it. In fact, it is most likely that the discount on Russian oil is not as significant as it seems at first glance, and moreover it is advantageous for Russian players to maintain the perception that sanctions on oil are working effectively.
The Race of Restrictions: sanctions may not critically damage a large economy, but they may permanently undermine its technological competitiveness potential
Not Everyone Has Left: the exodus of iconic international brands from Russia made a lot of noise, but in reality, about half of the foreign companies that worked here before the war still remain on the Russian market
As Russia’s seaborne oil exports fall and its budget revenues slide, the negative impact of sanctions on the economy and ordinary Russians increases
The Hybrid Resistance Economy: Russian Central Bank outlines the financial architecture of Russian economy's survival “without the West”
The number of companies experiencing issues with import supplies has halved, but remains high, surveys of the Central Bank show
The Conservation Effect
The dominant perception in Russia has been that the impact of sanctions is insignificant: in addition to the public optimism of officials and major CEOs, a positive attitude is widespread among the people and a significant part of the business community. SERGEY ALEKSASHENKO, OLEG BUKLEMISHEV, OLEG VYUGIN, KIRILL ROGOV and YULIA STAROSTINA discuss how sanctions actually work and how they do not, and why the country's ability to resist them maximizes its long-term losses.
Worse Gets Better: Central Bank surveys show signs of import substitution, decline of production in extractive industries and a general reduction in the intensity of negative assessments
The Government should focus on supporting those industries that have been increasingly competitive globally over the past decade, but may lose export markets due to sanctions, experts say
Since the start of the war at least half of the major foreign companies operating in Russia have limited their activities in one way or another, but another half stayed
70% of German economists believe that tariffs on Russian oil and gas imports are more effective than the embargo. Survey by the ifo Institute
Six Crisis Channels: the Central Bank economists assessed the effect of sanctions on the financial sector
Import cuts will cost the Russian economy 4–10% of GDP, while China will only partially replace trade supply from advanced economies, says Bank of Finland Analytics Center
Buyers' Cartel: Russian oil consumers need to negotiate lower prices by setting up an "Anti-OPEC"
The Geopolitical Polygon: why India would not join sanctions against Moscow
The limited effect of sanctions against Russia has been determined by several factors: changes in the structure of the global economy, the effects of the logic of arbitrage, and the internal contradictions of the sanctions regime. Any further dynamics of the impact of sanctions will be cyclical: new tools of control will be created and new ways to circumvent them will emerge as a result. And, in the long term, everything will depend on the extent to which the Russian economy retains its market core.
Sanctions Compliance: Western banks can play a key role in controlling the supply of dual-use goods to Russia
Sanctions Game: The US has managed to create problems for the import of microelectronics into Russia, but even more importantly, to limit the development of its domestic production
Liquification of Plans and Tertiary Sanctions Effect: How and why Russia lost its prospects in the global LNG market
As a rule, sanctions do not lead to the immediate loss of export markets, but to their gradual restructuring. Political decisions transform into economic costs, resulting in a sharp contraction of the niche for Russian producers. Alongside the arms and metals markets, LNG exports represent another sphere of lost opportunities for Russia.
The Discount has Shifted: Russian budget oil and gas revenues soared at the beginning of the year due to the narrowing discount of Urals to Brent, but there is still potential for sanctions to be toughened
How Sanctions Work: High-tech industries manage to maintain services and infrastructure, but fail to develop them
Rusty Business: The fight against Russia's shadow fleet may only have a significant impact within conditions of a deficit-free oil market and relatively low prices
Minus $50 Billion: The Yermak-McFaul group has proposed measures to undermine the Kremlin’s ability to finance the war and maintain stability in Russia
Spillover Effect: Russia’s economy may face a new wave of sanctions stress at the beginning of the year
Servant of Two Masters: Without the creation of a new and comprehensive export control system, sanctions are unable to stop the rearmament of the Russian army using Western components
Prices below the cap: The year that the mechanism to limit Russian oil prices has been in operation has shown its ineffectiveness in its current form
Dancing around Sanctions: The EU is finding it increasingly difficult to impose new restrictions as the old ones are not working
A Hollow Ceiling and a Rusty Fleet: Russian oil sales and the price cap problems
Bad Weapons for the Poor and the Unfortunate: Russia is irreversibly losing its place in the middle-tech arms markets but may still maintain its position as a supplier to impoverished and isolated nations
Naked Goliath: Russia's defence industry has failed to solve the shortage of imported components as equipment and weapons reserves are being depleted
Southern Corridor: The West is struggling to disrupt the supply of electronics to Russia, with investigators uncovering new schemes and channels for such deliveries
Sanctions Counteroffensive: Even a partial restriction of the 'grey' import of microelectronics to Russia could shift the balance of power on the battlefield
Import Substitution: Most Russian companies will be unable to abandon foreign equipment or raw materials in the near future
Artisanal Digital Authoritarianism: Despite the remaining loopholes for circumventing sanctions, the Russian IT sector is doomed to degrade
Slow Poison: Russia has failed to replace the imports of high-tech goods hit by direct sanctions
The Russian car market has taken a step back, reverting to the structure it had in the 2000s and potentially heading towards becoming more like China
The West intends to continue its fight, threatening to inflict new problems on the Russian economy in the near future
Flight Against Sanctions: The government is aiming to commence aircraft fleet localisation by the late 2020s, while airlines are reducing their safety standards and resorting to cannibalisation
Schrödinger's Boycott: Why Have Western Companies Not Left Russia Properly?
Many foreign companies pledged to leave the Russian market in the initial weeks after the country’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This process was very active at first, but then it clearly began to stall. Moreover, some of the companies that had seemed to have left without too much fuss have begun to return cautiously.
How Sanctions Have Changed the Kremlin’s Strategy in Ukraine: according to experts, the Russian army’s weakness is no longer people but weapons
Irrecoverable losses: how sanctions have hit Russia’s most competitive industries the hardest
Although sanctions have not led to a complete collapse of the Russian economy, they have caused significant and irreversible damage. Industries which had once achieved significant success on the international market have suffered the most and have been pushed towards demodernisation. A striking example of this is the Russian timber industry, which has lost its foothold in the European market.
The One-Sided Fence: American chips worth hundreds of millions of dollars are entering Russia via China, and there seems to be no way to prevent this
Negative Mixed Effect: a quarter of industrial enterprises have benefited from the ‘positive’ effect of sanctions, but this will eventually lead to the growth of a ‘stagnant sector’ in industry
Europe is set to buy $70 billion dollars worth of oil and gas from Russia this year, but even with tougher sanctions, Putin’s regime is unlikely to be crippled
Will Russia have enough money for the war? Oil prices are falling, but the IEA predicts an increase in demand by the end of the year, rendering sanctions ineffective
Who is Helping Russia Fight? As the war approaches its one-year mark, sanctions remain largely symbolic according to Russian customs data
The Not-so-peaceful Atom: can Europe afford sanctions against Russian nuclear power?
A Price Cap or Smoke and Mirrors? How Much Does Russian Oil Actually Cost?
There’s an assumption that the price cap on Russian oil is working perfectly. However, the terms of the Russian oil trade have changed, and it is therefore useless to employ the old methods of assessing the market under the current circumstances. Today these do not provide us with actual transparency so much as imitate it. In fact, it is most likely that the discount on Russian oil is not as significant as it seems at first glance, and moreover it is advantageous for Russian players to maintain the perception that sanctions on oil are working effectively.
The Race of Restrictions: sanctions may not critically damage a large economy, but they may permanently undermine its technological competitiveness potential
Not Everyone Has Left: the exodus of iconic international brands from Russia made a lot of noise, but in reality, about half of the foreign companies that worked here before the war still remain on the Russian market
As Russia’s seaborne oil exports fall and its budget revenues slide, the negative impact of sanctions on the economy and ordinary Russians increases
The Hybrid Resistance Economy: Russian Central Bank outlines the financial architecture of Russian economy's survival “without the West”
The number of companies experiencing issues with import supplies has halved, but remains high, surveys of the Central Bank show
The Conservation Effect
The dominant perception in Russia has been that the impact of sanctions is insignificant: in addition to the public optimism of officials and major CEOs, a positive attitude is widespread among the people and a significant part of the business community. SERGEY ALEKSASHENKO, OLEG BUKLEMISHEV, OLEG VYUGIN, KIRILL ROGOV and YULIA STAROSTINA discuss how sanctions actually work and how they do not, and why the country's ability to resist them maximizes its long-term losses.
Worse Gets Better: Central Bank surveys show signs of import substitution, decline of production in extractive industries and a general reduction in the intensity of negative assessments
The Government should focus on supporting those industries that have been increasingly competitive globally over the past decade, but may lose export markets due to sanctions, experts say
Since the start of the war at least half of the major foreign companies operating in Russia have limited their activities in one way or another, but another half stayed
70% of German economists believe that tariffs on Russian oil and gas imports are more effective than the embargo. Survey by the ifo Institute
Six Crisis Channels: the Central Bank economists assessed the effect of sanctions on the financial sector
Import cuts will cost the Russian economy 4–10% of GDP, while China will only partially replace trade supply from advanced economies, says Bank of Finland Analytics Center
Buyers' Cartel: Russian oil consumers need to negotiate lower prices by setting up an "Anti-OPEC"
The Geopolitical Polygon: why India would not join sanctions against Moscow