Sanctions Rally: International sanctions lead to patriotic mobilisation while their economic impact on the 'common man' seems to be insignificant

Russians are even less concerned about the economic sanctions imposed on Russia today than they were two years ago or a year ago. However, this trend is uneven across different social groups, masking polar emotions and potentially changing under certain circumstances. 

In 2022, just after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the introduction of the first package of sanctions, about half of those surveyed (47%) were concerned about the economic impact of the sanctions, while the other half (53%) stated that the sanctions did not bother them. The proportion of those concerned then steadily declined, and by June 2023, the sanctions worried only about one-third of respondents (36%) while two-thirds (63%) were not worried. According to the latest measurement by the Levada Centre at the end of May 2024, the share of those concerned was 29%, and those not concerned was 68%.

This trend is not surprising. Observations of public opinion regarding sanctions show that they generally do not produce the intended effect. The economic damage they cause does not translate into decreased support for the government and its policies (which provoked the sanctions); rather, it often leads to increased support for the authorities – the 'rally round the flag' effect (a classic case being the reaction to the 'soft' European sanctions against Israel in 2015). Citizens perceive sanctions as an attack on national sovereignty. However, more nuanced studies (based on public opinion research in Myanmar, Nepal, and Indonesia) show that sanctions actually have a dual effect: among opponents of the regime and its policies, they lead to increased anti-government sentiment, while in another segment of society, on the contrary, they provoke an increase in support for the regime and a rally effect. Thus, sanctions increase polarisation in society, and those who are undecided about their attitude towards the government are more likely to support it in this situation. Therefore, the initial political balance of power becomes very important: if the government's position is weak, sanctions will worsen its situation.

Political scientist Timothy Frye came to similar conclusions when he studied the reaction of Russian public opinion to the sanctions imposed in response to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Concern about the economic consequences of the sanctions can lead to a sharp decline in government support. However, the ideological frame – the message that the sanctions were imposed by Russia's 'enemies' for its 'reunification' with Crimea – produces a rallying effect that outweighs economic considerations.

'Are you concerned about political and economic sanctions of Western countries against Russia?', 2014-2024, % of those surveyed

'Have the sanctions of Western countries created problems for you and your family?', 2014-2024, % of those surveyed

As we can see, the first (and very limited) package of sanctions in post-Soviet history introduced after the annexation of Crimea caused concern for more than 40% of respondents. Russians did not fully understand its possible consequences, but over the following months, the rally effect and the insignificance of economic impacts led to the distribution we observe today: about 70% are not concerned about the sanctions, and about 30% are concerned. This occurred despite the fact that in July 2014, in response to Russian aggression in Donbas and the downing of the Malaysian plane, the sanctions package was significantly expanded.

However, in late 2014, the fall in oil prices triggered a rapid devaluation of the ruble, high inflation, and an economic crisis. This led to the share of those concerned about the sanctions exceeding the share of those not concerned, with about a third of respondents stating that the sanctions were harming them and their families. The crisis continued throughout 2015, but its perceived connection to the sanctions weakened over time. Nonetheless, the 30-to-70 ratio of concerned to unconcerned individuals was only restored in 2017.

The sanctions imposed after the outbreak of war in 2022 were significantly more extensive and initially also caused crisis effects comparable to those at the end of 2014 (devaluation, inflation). The impact of these sanctions was slightly less pronounced: 46% were concerned (possibly because this time they already had experience living under sanctions), and nearly 30% said the sanctions affected them personally. Both indicators then began to decline, but the final calm (a 30-to-70 distribution) only emerged in the spring of 2024. Additionally, over time, there was a change in perceptions of who was actually affected by the sanctions. At the beginning of the war, about 70% of respondents believed that the sanctions affected 'broad sections of the Russian population', and about a quarter believed that they affected 'a narrow circle of people responsible for policy'. Now, 46% of respondents say the sanctions affect only the elite, and 45% say they affect 'a broad sections'.

From this we can infer that in case of a new aggravation of the economic situation (lower oil prices or reduced export revenues) the issue of sanctions will become relevant again. The 'rally round the flag' effect balances the real economic damage felt by 'ordinary people', even if this damage is not directly related to the sanctions. At the same time, even during periods of high concern about the sanctions, about two-thirds of respondents believe that the country should continue the same policies that provoked the sanctions.

Additional questions from sociologists allow us to discern different areas and subjects of concern. For example, there is an 'elite group' worried about the departure of 'brands', meaning familiar Western goods (21%, down from 27% a year ago), the disappearance of Visa and Mastercard payment systems (20%, down from 25% a year ago), and the inability to travel abroad directly (19%, the same as last year at 20%).

However, another area of concern is related to the 'rally round the flag' effect. Just as last year (27%), a quarter of respondents (26%) expressed concern about the cancellation of Russian cultural events abroad, and concern about frozen Russian currency reserves has increased: 54% compared to 48% a year ago. This likely reflects the debate over their expropriation that has unfolded in the West in recent months and been broadcast by Russian official media.

The most concerned about the sanctions are respondents from poorer groups (34%), those who are also more critical of the war with Ukraine, those who believe the country is on the wrong path (46%), and those who disapprove of Vladimir Putin's performance as President of the Russian Federation (57%). Opponents of the regime are also more likely to say that they had personally faced problems caused by the imposition of Western sanctions: almost a third of those who believe that the country is on the wrong track and a quarter of those who disapprove of Putin's performance said so. At the same time, over the past year it is in the poorer groups that the level of concern about sanctions has fallen most markedly — from 45% to 34%. This also points to the strong effect of real economic dynamics.

Concern about Western sanctions by financial situation, 2023-2024, % of those surveyed in groups with different consumer statuses

In terms of age, the dynamics of concern are highly nonlinear. The most concerned about the sanctions are respondents in the youngest (28%) and oldest (35%) age cohorts. This situation has remained stable: in March 2022, these two groups also showed the highest levels of concern about the sanctions. However, the reasons for this concern appear to be completely different for the two groups. Older people are worried because they are more engaged with news and propaganda content broadcast on television and because they fear the economic consequences of the sanctions. Younger people, on the other hand, seem more concerned about the departure of 'brands' and the reduced availability of Western entertainment and leisure content. This is indicated by different trends in concern: while the share of concerned respondents among the older age groups has dropped by 11 percentage points over the past year, it has not only not decreased among the younger age groups but has even slightly increased.

Concern about Western sanctions by age, 2023-2024, % of those surveyed by age groups

The effect of sanctions reflected in surveys may be somewhat distorted by the fact that respondents who are critical of the authorities are probably less likely to participate in the surveys (→ Re: Russia: Pro-war Spring). Considering this factor, the distribution may be more balanced. On the other hand, as we can see, the overall reaction to the sanctions is very similar to what we observed in 2014. It is primarily defined by a distinct ‘rally round the flag’ effect. Between two-thirds and three-quarters of survey participants throughout the observation period said that the main goal of the sanctions is to humiliate and weaken Russia and that Russia should not change its policies because of them.

At the same time, however, concern about sanctions increases if the economic situation begins to seriously deteriorate, even if the deterioration is not directly related to sanctions. In such a scenario, the 'rally' effect is neutralised. In general, the poorer cohorts, as well as the youngest and oldest age groups, are the most sensitive to sanctions. The former are highly sensitive to the real economic effect of sanctions (primarily to price increases). The second group are 'deprived of their future' and access to Western content, and are therefore least susceptible to the cohesion effect. Finally, the third group, on the contrary, are the most susceptible to this effect, and thus their concerns are translated into increased support for the government.