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25.03 War Review The War Has Killed Television: Russia’s inability to win in Ukraine is eroding public trust in TV propaganda 20.03 War Analytics The Zone of Absolute Death: Ukraine’s drone superiority could thwart a Russian offensive in 2026 By the start of the Russian spring offensive, an unfavourable shift in the balance of forces had taken place for Russia, driven by two factors: a sharp increase in the effectiveness of Ukraine’s drone forces and a reduction in the inflow of personnel into Russian troops. If Moscow fails to reverse at least one of these trends, the offensive is unlikely to materialise. 13.02 War Analytics The Price of Donbas: The Kremlin's manpower costs in a new offensive would exceed 5 trillion roubles Donald Trump is increasing pressure on Kyiv, forcing it to agree to Russia's demand for the voluntary transfer of northern Donbas. This would allow Vladimir Putin to retain a combat-ready 600,000-strong force that could be deployed in a new offensive, and would free up around 4 trillion roubles amid the looming budget crisis. 13.01 War Analytics Positional Deadlock: Why did Russia fail to achieve a breakthrough in Donbas, and how will this affect the scenarios for the continuation of the conflict in 2026? A shortfall in military capabilities could push the Kremlin either towards freezing the conflict through an unstable ceasefire agreement or towards escalating tensions with Ukraine’s European allies in the hope of deepening divisions within Europe. The most likely scenario for 2026 appears to be the continuation of hostilities accompanied by a substantial reduction in their intensity. 25.12.25 War Analytics Missiles, Not Manpower: Kyiv's lack of long-range missiles remains the main factor in Russia's advantage in the war and reduces the Kremlin's incentives to conclude a peace agreement Russia’s territorial gains by the end of 2025 are unlikely to exceed last year’s to any significant extent, and the complete seizure of northern Donbas would require Russia to conduct at least another year of combat operations. By contrast, Russia’s offensive against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure appears far more successful, with the sector having been subjected to sustained large-scale attacks for more than three months. 04.12.25 War Analytics Victory on Credit: What is true and what is false about the state of the Russian-Ukrainian front The Russian army is in a phase of active offensive operations, with a pace intended to convince the United States, the West and Ukraine itself that Moscow is capable of securing control over the Donbas by military means. However, an analysis of frontline reports shows that it has not yet managed to achieve encirclement or reliably block Ukrainian formations on any axis. 07.11.25 War Analytics The Pokrovsk Dilemma: Experts believe the city is practically lost; the question is whether this can be considered a success for the Russian offensive The Russian army is close to successfully completing a strategic manoeuvre to capture Pokrovsk. However, the key question today remains: how should the fall of the city after a year and a half of Moscow’s military efforts be interpreted – as evidence of the strength of the Russian army, or of its weakness? This is the issue that will become the focus of the political battle in the coming weeks. 13.10.25 War Analytics War in The Air: Russia strikes back at Ukrainian infrastructure, with high costs for both Ukraine and Europe In terms of the scale of damage, Russian strikes in the first half of October appear to have immediately exceeded the harm inflicted on Russian oil infrastructure by Ukrainian attacks over the past two months. In this context, the question of domestic missile production and the supply of long-range Western missiles to Kyiv becomes particularly acute. 02.10.25 War Analytics From Stings to Deterrence: The drone army allows Ukraine not to avoid defeat, but remains incomplete without the missile component The current balance of power in the war is largely determined by the drone race; however, in the long term, the key issue for Ukraine remains the development of a missile programme. Such a programme would not only enable Kyiv to carry out combined attacks, as Russia does, but could also become a crucial element of its deterrence strategy. 30.09.25 War Analytics Military stalemate: Why Russia is not winning the war of attrition and what this means for all sides Kirill Rogov A military stalemate is the new framework that will shape the understanding of the current stage of the Russia–Ukraine conflict. It will deprive those against military aid to Ukraine of their arguments, strengthen the discipline of the sanctions coalition, and force Putin to choose between a deep crisis in state finances and abandoning his attempts to seize the Donbas. 16.09.25 War Analytics On the Eve of the ‘Decisive Breakthrough’: Russia is preparing for a large-scale offensive that will long determine the trajectory of the conflict and the scenario for its conclusion In the coming weeks, the Russian army will likely attempt a decisive breakthrough on the Donbas front in an effort to make up for the failures of its offensive in this sector, which has been ongoing since January 2024. The next two months will mark the climax of the Battle of Donbas, and possibly of the entire four-year war. 08.09.25 War Analytics Summer Infrastructure Offensive: Ukraine’s drone front becomes a systemic factor in Russia’s economic and social life Since the beginning of the year, Ukraine has carried out at least 96 successful drone strikes on Russian infrastructure, more than half of which took place in July and August. The sharp increase in their intensity and effectiveness makes it possible to speak of a specific 'infrastructural' offensive by Ukraine, or the emergence of an 'infrastructure' front in the Russia–Ukraine war. 17.07.25 War Analytics Missile-Financial Balance: Russia is testing a model of air warfare in Ukraine that could be used in a conflict with NATO countries In 2025, the scale of Russian missile and drone strikes increased manifold, and the weapons themselves have evolved. The severity of this issue is heightened by the growing imbalance between the cost of such attacks and the cost of defending against them. Russian missiles and drones are generally significantly cheaper than the air defence systems required to intercept them. 09.06.25 War Analytics Trump Has Given Putin a Chance to Win a War of Attrition. Will the Kremlin be able to take advantage of it? The summer Russian offensive will unfold against the backdrop of three unfavourable factors for Ukraine: the imminent depletion of US arms supplies, Trump's reluctance to exert additional economic pressure on Moscow, and the expansion of the Russian army's drone capabilities. This gives the Kremlin hope for success in a new round of war of attrition. 04.06.25 War Analytics David's Slingshot: How drones became a survival strategy for Ukraine, are changing the global balance of power, and are becoming a global threat to international order FPV drones are rapidly becoming the Kalashnikovs of the 21st century – a versatile and widely used weapon without which modern warfare is no longer conceivable. A shortage of manpower is forcing Ukraine to rely on innovative unmanned systems, and the defence industry is evolving into a startup-driven ecosystem. And it is not just about technological innovations, but social transformation plays a key role as well. 14.05.25 War Review A Wall of Drones Vs. Hordes of Motorcycles: Will Russia succeed in its 2025 campaign if no truce is reached? 04.03.25 War Analytics Cargo 200 Thousand: For each kilometre of Ukrainian territory captured during the 2024 offensive, Russia sacrificed the lives of 30 military personnel The total number of Russians killed in the war with Ukraine is close to the 200,000 mark, with about half of them likely occurring in 2024. Meanwhile, during last year's offensive, Russian forces captured about 2,600 square kilometres, which accounts for only 0.4% of Ukraine's territory within its 1992 borders. 03.12.24 War Analytics The Vortex of a Global conflict: The war in Ukraine marked the end of the era of limited wars and continues to spread its destructive potential The Russian invasion of Ukraine marked the beginning of a new era in military conflicts. Dozens of countries have, in one way or another, become indirect participants in the protracted war, while the nature of combat itself has significantly evolved. The destructive potential of the confrontation continues to spread, creating conditions for a comprehensive global conflict. 26.11.24 War Analytics Psychological Attack: Russia's 2024 offensive could be considered a failure if not for the demoralisation of Ukraine and its Western allies Having expended enormous resources, in 2024, the Russian army expanded its zone of control by approximately 2250 square kilometres, which constitutes 0.37% of Ukraine's entire territory and is 4.5 times smaller than the area regained by the Ukrainian Armed Forces during their counteroffensive in the fall of 2022. Russia's primary success was achieved not on the battlefield but in the demobilisation of Ukraine's allies and Ukrainian society. 11.11.24 War Review Asymmetric Warfare: Over two years, the Russian army has launched 1834 combined missile strikes on Ukraine, while Ukraine is forced to respond mainly with drone attacks 03.09.24 War Analytics The War of Attrition’s Kursk Battle: The interim results of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ invasion The Ukrainian Armed Forces breakthrough in the Kursh region has brought back into focus the question of Russia's ability to win a war of attrition, while the authorities' efforts to minimise the effects of the invasion in public opinion have achieved only limited results. Polls show rising anxiety, worsening assessments of the situation in the country and a decline in Putin's approval ratings. 17.07.24 War Analytics An Hour Before Dawn: Russia failed to capitalise on the advantage it had at the start of this year's major offensive in Ukraine While in early May most military analysts were extremely pessimistic about the situation of the Ukrainian army following the start of the Russian offensive, by early July the tone of the commentary had changed. The Russian offensive in the Kharkiv region has been halted and has not achieved its objectives, and although the likelihood of further Russian advances remains, the probability of this no longer seems high. 23.04.24 War Review War Draws Closer: The war in Ukraine and geopolitical turbulence have triggered a global arms race — everyone is arming themselves 19.04.24 War Review The Point of No Return: As a result of strategic miscalculations and the indecision of its allies, Ukraine is on the brink of military disaster 21.03.24 War Review Window of Defeat: The Russian army is advancing its offensive by exploiting the advantage in manpower, innovation and the lack of weaponry on the Ukrainian side 29.02.24 War Review Calculating Losses: The ‘meat grinder' strategy remains the main element of the Russian offensive doctrine 14.02.24 War Review Year of resilience: If Ukraine holds out in 2024, experts believe Russia will never be able to achieve victory in the war 09.02.24 War Review Out of the trenches: To avoid losing a war of attrition, Ukraine must transform the conflict into an asymmetric war of tactical and technological innovation 20.11.23 War Review Competitive Contracts for 'Meat Grinder’ Assaults: The Russian command believes that the capture of Avdiivka will have a great psychological effect and is therefore worth any losses 25.09.23 War Review Graveyard Monitoring: The intensity of Russian military casualties in Ukraine has decreased in recent months 22.09.23 War Analytics Monument to a Deserter: What do we know about desertion in the Russian army and will there be more defectors? Alexander Finiarel Desertion by Russian servicemen has not yet become a widespread issue, as sometimes happens during protracted conflicts. However, given that the Kremlin has decided not to rotate mobilised troops, the dynamics of desertion may change significantly during the second year of the war. What factors will influence desertion in the Russian army? 21.09.23 War Analytics Second Front: Who Will Win The First Drone War? The widespread use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, has fundamentally transformed the nature of modern warfare. Drones have become a tool of resistance, levelling the playing field and neutralising the advantages of stronger adversaries. The ongoing race of drone innovation and ingenuity in their application will undoubtedly remain one of the central storylines of the Russia-Ukraine war. 11.09.23 War Review Battle of The Reserves: Experts believe Ukraine is more effective than Russia in a war of attrition 05.09.23 War Review Who Will Win the War of Attrition? Analysts say that Ukraine has a chance of success if it adjusts its tactics properly 19.07.23 War Review Death Toll: The number of Russian soldiers killed in the war with Ukraine is likely in the range of 50,000-65,000 individuals 10.07.23 War Review 500 Days of the New Old War: The protracted military conflict in Ukraine has upended notions of modern warfare, but has not changed its essence 07.06.23 War Review Ukrainian Counteroffensive: Soviet-inherited management style has the potential to hinder the accumulated advantages of the Ukrainian armed forces 25.05.23 War Review Meatgrinder tactics: the Russian army is getting better at fighting, requiring the Western coalition to adjust its military aid to Kyiv 23.05.23 War Review Bloody Bakhmut: How have the past four months of battle for the city altered the picture of Russian military losses? 14.04.23 War Review A natural ally: Artificial intelligence is becoming an increasingly important tool in warfare, but it requires access to an extensive civilian digital infrastructure 10.03.23 War Review War Data: OSINT technology has transformed modern warfare into a ‘people’s warfare’, so that now anyone with an Internet connection can take part 20.02.23 War Review Big War Returns: what lessons have been learnt a year into the first major conventional military campaign of the 21st century? 31.01.23 War Review Hidden by the Fog of War: assessing the number of civilian casualties in Ukraine 20.01.23 War Analytics Unknown Soldiers: What Do We Know About Russian Military Losses in the War with Ukraine? What are Russia’s losses following eleven months of the war in Ukraine? This issue has received little media attention, but it is both pressing and paints a depressing picture of events. The dead have been hidden by the ‘fog of war’, which has meant that Russian society has been unable to comprehend or assess the real costs of the conflict. However, even allowing for the most conservative estimates, it appears that the Russian army’s losses are many times greater than the Soviet army’s casualties during the ten year war in Afghanistan. 17.01.23 War Review Counter Mobilisation: the quantity of weapons promised to Ukraine is not enough to compensate for Russia's advantage in the next stage of the war 09.12.22 War Review Failed State: even early 2000s "terrorists" are sent to fight in Ukraine 23.11.22 War Review Criminal-Patriotic War: the contractual army crisis has forced the Kremlin to rely on informal armies and criminal contingents 18.11.22 War Analytics Sixteen Scenarios and Five Triggers There is some agreement among experts that, when it comes to multiple possible scenarios for the outcome of the war, their probability is determined by several key factors: further arms supplies to Ukrainian troops, Russia's ability to overcome the disorganisation and demoralisation of its army, the condition of Ukrainian critical infrastructure, the nuclear "card", and the fate of the Putin regime itself. 15.11.22 War Review Negotiating a Future War: the world wants Ukraine to agree on freezing the conflict, while Putin has already created a pretext for a new invasion 03.11.22 War Review The Kremlin Is Betting on Human Forces in the War, But With the Support of the Western Coalition Kyiv Will Be Able to Counteract It by Building up Technological Advantage and Mobility of Troops, Analysts Say 28.10.22 War Review Russia Has a Developed Infrastructure for Biological Weapons Production, Which Can Be Used in the War with Ukraine 04.08.22 War Review Cyber War: international cooperation and horizontal coordination helped Ukraine resist Russian cyber aggression, experts believe 10.07.22 War Review War of Attrition: The outcome of the war in Ukraine will depend almost entirely on whether the West can organize arms deliveries in a rational and focused manner 21.06.22 War Review The Wrong War: Russian Military exercises did not prepare the army for full-scale offensive war 15.06.22 War Review Counter-Reform Fallout: British analysts believe that the failures of Russian Intelligence in Ukraine are connected to the way the FSB evolved under Putin 15.06.22 War Review The "Genocide" Controversy: the New Lines Institute and the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights have attempted to define whether Russian invasion of Ukraine is genocidal in character 05.06.22 War Review Mediazona discovered 60 tons of parcels sent by Russian soldiers from Ukraine back home, to small towns with a lower standard of living 27.05.22 War Review Commanders of the Invasion: an Investigation by Proekt Media Presented a Portrait of Russian Army Leadership Waging a War in Ukraine 08.05.22 War Review "Responsibility to Protect" or "License to Attack": the justification for the Russian aggression against Ukraine once again raises questions about the interpretation of "Sovereignty" and the conditions for its violation

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