Propaganda
Manipulative Intelligence: AI has already become a battleground for ideological confrontation and propaganda manipulation, but the main fight is still to come
Grandfather Box: In Russia, television is losing audience and trust much faster than in Europe, and this process has accelerated during the war
Telegram from The Kremlin and its Readers: External information intervention is effective when it resonates with real dissatisfaction with the political and economic situation
In post-Soviet countries, where cultural and informational ties to Russia remain significant and the choice in favour of European integration has not yet been made, Telegram propaganda campaigns are effective – provided that their narratives fall on fertile ground of disillusionment with the prospects of EU membership and dissatisfaction related to domestic issues.
Three Types of Patriotism: Younger generations of Russians are more critical of the war and isolationist policies and are therefore subject to various 're-education' strategies
Contrary to the belief that society is an arena of confrontation between true patriots and 'enemies of Russia', Russian public opinion distinguishes three varieties of 'patriotism': the coercive paternalistic-Soviet type, characteristic of older generations; a more modern version, typical of the youth; and the repressive-militaristic type, focused on uncompromisingly combating the ‘youthful’ version.
World Wide Web Laundry: Russian propaganda reaches Western and global audiences through an Internet promotion ecosystem that the West cannot counteract
Pre-election Pacifism: The Kremlin has signalled its readiness for peace talks as part of a strategy to support the pacifist rhetoric of the far right and far left ahead of the European Parliament elections
Firehose of Falsehoods: Russian propaganda is increasingly looking like an existential problem for the West that it is not yet able to effectively address
Propaganda helps Moscow to win the favour not only of the populations of the Global South, but also with residents of Western countries. In a global and open information network, blocking and banning ‘brands’ does not work well and leads only to the ‘mimicry of disinformation'. To counter the power of Russian propaganda, The West lacks the resources, as well as the understanding of how to fight this battle.
Kremlin Swipe: Ahead of the US election, the Kremlin is betting on TikTok, the popularity of which is rapidly growing in America, but experts believe that shutting down the social network would be a bad decision
Bots On Russian Social Media: How Network Propaganda Works
We deal with bots and trolls every day, often without noticing or realising it. There may not be many of them, but their activity, consolidated position, and aggressiveness allow them to capture and moderate the discussion, provoking an effect similar to the phenomenon of the ‘spiral of silence'. Bots and trolls are tools of horizontal network propaganda, designed to distort real users' perception of the nation’s 'imaginary majority'.
Propaganda in the Network Environment: How propaganda has changed in the era of social media and during times of war
Propaganda in the era of social media is aimed not so much at promoting a particular ideological doctrine as at moderating public discourse. It may address various messages to different audiences and primarily involves engaging the consumer in the process of dissemination, a sort of process of co-authorship. Today, the Russian state effectively utilises all these properties and capabilities of network propaganda.
Trolls, Elves and Other Public Sector Workers: The Russian authorities are developing a post-Prigozhin system of astroturfing, while the opposition is trying to oppose them with the same methods
Splitting the Truth: In the current conflict in Gaza, the information war is play as much, if not more, of a role than events on the battlefield
Global Rumour Mill: Pro-Russian narratives in Central and Eastern Europe focus on Ukrainian ‘Nazism’ and the demonisation of Zelensky
Undercurrents in a Sea of Podcasts: Can podcasts influence American public opinion on Russia and Ukraine?
'US Intelligence Is Planning to Assassinate Zelensky': Pro-Russian disinformation in Central Europe in August 2023
Intensive Normalisation: Russian propaganda is aimed not at mobilising citizens, but at forcing ritual loyalty
The ‘Vulkan’ leak: documents from a little-known firm reveal Russia's digital authoritarianism strategy
The Non-Mobilising Web: How pro-Kremlin media laid the groundwork for the invasion of Ukraine
Mistrust Makers: The Structure of the Kremlin's Disinformation and Astroturfing Campaigns
The Kremlin's large-scale activity on TikTok and other social networks yields no direct results, but has a serious secondary effect: Kremlin campaigns do not change the minds of those who hold opposing viewpoints, but sow mistrust and a sense of vulnerability of the sustainability of normative and liberal social structures.
Guns Instead of Butter: the Russian pro-government media is more willing to tell the public about the war, and are ‘squeezing’ economic topics out of the news agenda
"Kremlin Trolls Never Sleep": Russian propaganda campaigns on European social media are not very effective but can cause problems in crisis situations
Telegram's Frankenstein: how social media dynamics are changing the political agenda in Russia
Putin Fans or Kremlin Bots?
Over the past decade Russia has created a powerful infrastructure of "networked authoritarianism". This is focused not on restriction but on the active creation of social media content. Analysis of simulated support for the authorities through astroturfing and the real response of social media users to the war in Ukraine shows that, despite the variety of the Kremlin’s online strategies, its social media propaganda is not always successful. However, it functions to distort our perceptions of "grassroots sentiment".
Twitter Weapons: the war of narratives around the confrontation between Russia and the West is taking over the world and has been moderately successful so far
Telegram from The Kremlin and its Readers: External information intervention is effective when it resonates with real dissatisfaction with the political and economic situation
In post-Soviet countries, where cultural and informational ties to Russia remain significant and the choice in favour of European integration has not yet been made, Telegram propaganda campaigns are effective – provided that their narratives fall on fertile ground of disillusionment with the prospects of EU membership and dissatisfaction related to domestic issues.
Three Types of Patriotism: Younger generations of Russians are more critical of the war and isolationist policies and are therefore subject to various 're-education' strategies
Contrary to the belief that society is an arena of confrontation between true patriots and 'enemies of Russia', Russian public opinion distinguishes three varieties of 'patriotism': the coercive paternalistic-Soviet type, characteristic of older generations; a more modern version, typical of the youth; and the repressive-militaristic type, focused on uncompromisingly combating the ‘youthful’ version.
World Wide Web Laundry: Russian propaganda reaches Western and global audiences through an Internet promotion ecosystem that the West cannot counteract
Pre-election Pacifism: The Kremlin has signalled its readiness for peace talks as part of a strategy to support the pacifist rhetoric of the far right and far left ahead of the European Parliament elections
Firehose of Falsehoods: Russian propaganda is increasingly looking like an existential problem for the West that it is not yet able to effectively address
Propaganda helps Moscow to win the favour not only of the populations of the Global South, but also with residents of Western countries. In a global and open information network, blocking and banning ‘brands’ does not work well and leads only to the ‘mimicry of disinformation'. To counter the power of Russian propaganda, The West lacks the resources, as well as the understanding of how to fight this battle.
Kremlin Swipe: Ahead of the US election, the Kremlin is betting on TikTok, the popularity of which is rapidly growing in America, but experts believe that shutting down the social network would be a bad decision
Bots On Russian Social Media: How Network Propaganda Works
We deal with bots and trolls every day, often without noticing or realising it. There may not be many of them, but their activity, consolidated position, and aggressiveness allow them to capture and moderate the discussion, provoking an effect similar to the phenomenon of the ‘spiral of silence'. Bots and trolls are tools of horizontal network propaganda, designed to distort real users' perception of the nation’s 'imaginary majority'.
Propaganda in the Network Environment: How propaganda has changed in the era of social media and during times of war
Propaganda in the era of social media is aimed not so much at promoting a particular ideological doctrine as at moderating public discourse. It may address various messages to different audiences and primarily involves engaging the consumer in the process of dissemination, a sort of process of co-authorship. Today, the Russian state effectively utilises all these properties and capabilities of network propaganda.
Trolls, Elves and Other Public Sector Workers: The Russian authorities are developing a post-Prigozhin system of astroturfing, while the opposition is trying to oppose them with the same methods
Splitting the Truth: In the current conflict in Gaza, the information war is play as much, if not more, of a role than events on the battlefield
Global Rumour Mill: Pro-Russian narratives in Central and Eastern Europe focus on Ukrainian ‘Nazism’ and the demonisation of Zelensky
Undercurrents in a Sea of Podcasts: Can podcasts influence American public opinion on Russia and Ukraine?
'US Intelligence Is Planning to Assassinate Zelensky': Pro-Russian disinformation in Central Europe in August 2023
Intensive Normalisation: Russian propaganda is aimed not at mobilising citizens, but at forcing ritual loyalty
The ‘Vulkan’ leak: documents from a little-known firm reveal Russia's digital authoritarianism strategy
The Non-Mobilising Web: How pro-Kremlin media laid the groundwork for the invasion of Ukraine
Mistrust Makers: The Structure of the Kremlin's Disinformation and Astroturfing Campaigns
The Kremlin's large-scale activity on TikTok and other social networks yields no direct results, but has a serious secondary effect: Kremlin campaigns do not change the minds of those who hold opposing viewpoints, but sow mistrust and a sense of vulnerability of the sustainability of normative and liberal social structures.
Guns Instead of Butter: the Russian pro-government media is more willing to tell the public about the war, and are ‘squeezing’ economic topics out of the news agenda
"Kremlin Trolls Never Sleep": Russian propaganda campaigns on European social media are not very effective but can cause problems in crisis situations
Telegram's Frankenstein: how social media dynamics are changing the political agenda in Russia
Putin Fans or Kremlin Bots?
Over the past decade Russia has created a powerful infrastructure of "networked authoritarianism". This is focused not on restriction but on the active creation of social media content. Analysis of simulated support for the authorities through astroturfing and the real response of social media users to the war in Ukraine shows that, despite the variety of the Kremlin’s online strategies, its social media propaganda is not always successful. However, it functions to distort our perceptions of "grassroots sentiment".
Twitter Weapons: the war of narratives around the confrontation between Russia and the West is taking over the world and has been moderately successful so far