Television continues to shift to the periphery of Russians' informational landscape, with another major shift occurring in the past two years – during the war, according to survey data. The mention of television as a source of information has dropped from 90% in the early 2010s to 61% in 2021-2022 and 56% this year. As of November, the share of television in the total number of mentioned sources of information stands at 35%, while internet sources account for 45%. Among people aged 18-45, television is mentioned in only about 20% of cases.
Such a rapid decline in the role of television is not a universal trend but a response to the extremely conservative, 'pensioner-oriented' style and ideology of Russian television. In European countries, television is still cited as a source of information by about 75% of respondents, and around 60% among younger age groups.
Russians’ trust in television as an information source is also falling: in 2015, 63% of respondents named TV as the most trustworthy source, but by the first year of the war, this had dropped to 42%, and in the fall 2024 survey, it fell further to 38%. Compared to 2021, the share of those who say they never watch television or do not own a TV has risen from 14% to 25%. Television maintains its strongest hold among the elderly, the poor, and the less educated.
The spirit of Russia's current pro-war TV aligns with the preferences of a specific segment of the audience while alienating others. Due to the Kremlin's traditionally strong focus on television, Russian TV has turned into a kind of 'pensioner's' conservative-militarist utopia, whose sphere of influence is simultaneously shrinking. This shrinking influence increases the regime's need to invest in tighter control over the internet and to saturate it with 'correct,' ideologically charged content.
Television continues to move to the periphery of Russians' informational landscape, with another noticeable shift occurring during the current war, according to a survey conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) in November. Over the long term, the mention of television as a source of information has declined from 90% in the early 2010s to 70% in 2018-2019, then to 61% in 2021-2022, and to 56% over the past year.
However, even this figure no longer indicates that television holds the top position among sources of information. Since respondents named multiple sources, the share of television in the total mentions stands at 35%, while internet sites, social networks, and blogs (which effectively operate as a unified information ecosystem) account for 45% of all mentions.
Among young respondents aged 18-30, television was mentioned by 21%, making it only the fourth most mentioned source in this group, following 'internet sites,' 'blogs and social networks,' and even 'conversations with relatives and acquaintances' (24%). Among respondents aged 31-45, television was mentioned by 40%, placing it in third position. In the youngest cohort, television accounted for 12% of all mentions, while internet sources (websites and social networks) accounted for 67%; in the older cohort, these figures were 24% and 57%, respectively. Only in the next age group, 45-60 years, did television and internet sources have equal weight (40%). For those aged over 60, television firmly holds first place – mentioned by 85%, with 56% of the total mentions among all sources, compared to 23% for internet sources (another 21% came from radio and print media).
It is important to note that such a noticeable decline in the role of television is not a universal trend but rather a reaction to its highly conservative, 'pensioner-oriented' style and ideology in today’s Russia. In the Eurobarometer survey, covering the populations of all 27 EU countries and conducted mid-year, in response to the question, 'Which media have you mainly used to get news in the last seven days?' television was mentioned by 75% of those surveyed, 58% of those aged 15-24, and 64% of those aged 25-39; among those aged 55+, the figure was the same 85%. This indicates an age gap, but younger demographics in Europe rely on television as a source of information twice as often as in Russia.
Russians' trust in television as an information source is also declining: in 2015, 63% of those surveyed named TV as the most trustworthy source, but by the first year of the war, this dropped to 42%, and in the latest survey, it fell further to 38%. Among the youngest respondents, internet sources are cited as trustworthy four times more often than television (66% vs. 17%), and in the next age cohort, twice as often (50% vs. 23%). However, both the use of television and trust in it are influenced not only by age but also by education and income levels. Among people with higher education, 47% watch television, and 30% trust it; among the less educated, these figures are 60% and 43%, respectively. A similar trend is observed across income levels: television is primarily for the poor.
Among the topics that particularly interest Russians, 'The Russian Armed Forces' stands out sharply – an unmistakable euphemism for the war. Between 2015 and 2019, 30% of those surveyed expressed interest in this topic, ranking it below 'Politics,' 'International Relations,' and 'Social Issues.' By 2023-2024, this topic was mentioned by about 50%, while interest in 'Russian Politics' and 'International Relations' decreased compared to the mid-2010s. A striking difference between Russians and Europeans is their interest in 'Economics and Finance': 14% of Russians call it an interesting topic, compared to 34% of Europeans (though this likely reflects Russian television content rather than the population itself). In the early 2010s, 65% of those surveyed mentioned 'news' when asked, 'What programs do you watch most often?' This fell to 53% in 2016-2018 and to 39% in the latest 2024 surveys (19% among youth). Moreover, television is losing ground not only as a source of information but also as a form of entertainment: mentions of watching movies declined from 63% in the early 2010s to 35%, and mentions of entertainment programs fell from 35% to 19%.
Undoubtedly, the shift from television to the internet is driven by a wide range of cultural and technological factors. However, survey data suggests that this shift also has a significant political dimension: television, as a hub of war propaganda, has been losing ground particularly sharply over the past two years. In the early 2010s, only 3-4% said they never watch television or do not own one. In surveys from 2020-2021, this figure rose to 14%; in February 2024, it reached 23%; and by November, it stood at 25%. Among the 75% who do watch television at least occasionally, one-third say they are willing to abandon it in favour of other sources (among the youngest group, where only half watch TV occasionally, 60% of viewers are ready to give it up).
Between 2019 and 2021, about 27% of respondents said that information from television often caused them distrust; in the latest surveys, this figure is around 20%. However, these percentages reflect the overall number of those surveyed and do not include the 10% who stopped watching television in the last three years – presumably due to a lack of trust in the information. The proportions of those who trust everything they hear on television and those who only occasionally distrust it have remained stable at 15% and 40%, respectively. Between 2019 and 2022, 31% of respondents believed that the quality of informational TV programs had improved, while 20% thought it had worsened. In the latest surveys, about 37% speak of improved quality, while 14% report a decline. Again, it should be noted that approximately 10% of respondents have stopped watching television entirely.
Thus, the spirit of today’s pro-war television caters to the demands of a specific segment of society while alienating another. Perhaps the most significant takeaway from this survey is the clear role of the new, militarised face of Russian television in driving the decline in interest. Due to the Kremlin’s traditionally strong focus on television – where the tone is also set by the older generation – Russian TV has become a domain of sorts, a 'pensioner’s' conservative-militarist utopia, whose sphere of influence is simultaneously shrinking. This shrinking influence increases the regime's urgency to invest in tighter control over the informational ecosystem of the internet and to saturate it with 'correct,' ideologically charged content.