Three Types of Patriotism: Younger generations of Russians are more critical of the war and isolationist policies and are therefore subject to various 're-education' strategies

Youth deviation

Young groups of Russians are less supportive of the war and the conservative-isolationist course of the Russian authorities compared to other groups, according to survey data from the Levada Centre, ExtremeScan, and Russian Field. Among them, fewer express support for the war in response to direct questions, and more either avoid expressing support or explicitly do not support the war. Additionally, a higher proportion of young people advocate for transitioning from military hostilities to peace negotiations (62-70% compared to 44-51% on average) and would reverse the decision to start the war if they could go back in time (49-55% compared to 34-37% on average). There is significantly less support for the war among the youth's social circles (37% compared to 53% on average), and more hold a positive view of the European Union and the USA (32-33% compared to 18-19% on average).

Non-support for the war in Ukraine among Russians by age, spring 2024, % of those surveyed by age group

The difference becomes even more striking when comparing their responses with those of the most conservative older age groups. Analysing surveys from three polling projects, it can be noted that in Levada Centre surveys (conducted face-to-face), the responses of the youngest participants differ on average by 10 percentage points from the overall sample and by 18 percentage points from older groups. In telephone surveys by ExtremeScan and Russian Field, the 'youth deviation' is 15-25 percentage points from the average and 30-40 percentage points from the most conservative older groups (see the table at the end of the text).

After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine,the evaluations of Putin's activities and the state of affairs in the country increased among young Russians roughly in line with other groups. However, it is important to note that sociological data in the context of military conflict and repression may be biassed due to the reluctance of respondents disloyal to the authorities to participate in surveys (→ Re:Russia: Pro-war Spring). Therefore, we are interested not so much in the absolute distributions across the sample as in the differences by age group. Here, it can be definitively said that among the youth, the war and isolationist course enjoy significantly, though not radically, less support.

Red Guard 'from below'

This state of affairs is, of course, a constant concern for the authorities. School 'Conversations about Important Things', aimed at 'strengthening traditional Russian spiritual and moral values', the 'Yunarmiya', the 'Movement of the First', and various military-patriotic organisations – all these campaigns are oriented towards further indoctrinating teenagers towards militaristic and state-centric patriotism. It is more challenging with those who have already left school, are far less susceptible to forced upbringing, and tend to reject 'brainwashing’. Here, as has happened in other episodes of the formation of ideocratic and totalitarian regimes, movements grown within the youth environment itself, capable of exerting influence and pressure on their peers, must play an important role – like the Red Guards in Maoist China or the Hitler Youth and the League of German Girls in Nazi Germany.

In a sense, a prototype of such a movement could be the student club network ‘Akademists’, operating under the patronage of ‘Orthodox oligarch’ Konstantin Malofeev, which, according to the publication Verstka, already has branches in 25 cities. At their meetings, ‘Akademists’ discuss the history, culture, and figures of the Russian Empire, hold fundraisers for the needs of Russian soldiers, learn to operate drones, weave camouflage nets, and make trench candles.

Although many aspects of the ‘Akademists’ align with official rhetoric (militant imperialism, reliance on conservative 'traditional' values, fighting the 'fifth column'), the movement takes more radical positions than those articulated by the Kremlin. In the program texts of the movement, it is asserted that ‘the revival of Russia as a great power is impossible without gathering historical Russian lands and reuniting the triune Russian people within the borders of a single state’. Therefore, the 'national liberation war on the southwestern borders of Russia, during which the Russian people defend their honour, freedom, and right to live in a unified Russian state with arms in hand', holds special significance for the ‘Akademists’. Among the movement's goals is the return of the entire post-Soviet space to Russia's exclusive sphere of influence and the eradication of 'Russophobic, hostile political regimes towards Russia and its people' in these territories.

The ‘Akademists’ emphasise their 'historical continuity' with the right-wing nationalist movements of the early 20th century and sometimes use pre-revolutionary Russian orthography, as noted in an article by 'Holod'. Nikita Izyumov, the coordinator of the ‘Akademists’, has criticised the Kremlin for its insufficiently strict migration policy and advocates for the complete liquidation of Ukraine as a state. According to ‘Verstka’, the ‘Akademists’ have reported anti-war artists and even teachers. On the movement's website, the section 'Fighting Russophobes and Traitors of Russia' is listed under ‘Human Rights Activities’.

However, the influence of these 'young nationalists' should not be overestimated at present: regional public pages of the ‘Akademists’ have between 16 and 900 subscribers. This indicates that the movement has not yet received administrative support and remains a 'grassroots' initiative of a nationalist oligarch. It is highly likely that such support will not be forthcoming, as the Kremlin and the Presidential Administration are suspicious of any initiatives not integrated into the administrative hierarchy, even ideologically aligned ones, and view any 'bottom-up mobilisation' as a threat. Nonetheless, the impending 'battle of three patriotisms' within the youth environment should not be underestimated.

Three patriotisms

The above-mentioned 'youth deviation' in views on the war and isolationist policies does not imply that young Russians are unpatriotic. Rather, it signifies a difference among three types of patriotism: a more modern patriotism, a paternalistic-Soviet patriotism, and a militaristic turbo-patriotism promoted, in particular, by the Orthodox oligarch.

Specially focused surveys on youth opinions reveal that 82% of young Russians are proud of being citizens of the Russian Federation to some extent (joint research by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Levada Center, March 2024), with 65% being very proud and 17% being somewhat proud. However, this is not a unique characteristic of Russian youth during the era of 'war-time Putinism'. In the US, a Gallup poll from last year found that 72% of respondents aged 18 to 34 reported feeling varying degrees of pride in being American ('extremely', 'very', and 'moderately'). Among those aged 55+, this pride is expressed by 96% of respondents, demonstrating a significant age-related difference in national pride. While 79% of American respondents feel 'extremely' or 'very' proud to be American, only 42% of those aged 18 to 34 feel the same way, reflecting a widening generational gap on this issue in recent years.

Russian youth are not very different from American youth in terms of their views on national exceptionalism. In March 2024, 52% of young Russians agreed with the statement 'Russians are a great people with a special role in world history’, the lowest level of agreement since the Levada Centre began asking this question in 1999. At that time, 57% believed in the exceptionalism of their nation, peaking at 64% in 2018. Today, 45% of respondents think that Russians are no more exceptional than other peoples. In contrast, another Chicago Council study shows that more than two-thirds of Americans aged 60+ see the US as the greatest country in the world, 55% of Generation X (ages 45-59) agree, 40% of Millennials (ages 27-42) share this view, and only 34% of Generation Z (ages 14-28) do the same.

As we have previously discussed, Russian society, which generally considers itself patriotic, displays two distinct types of patriotism: a militaristic-state-centred form prevalent among older generations, and a less militaristic, modern form especially characteristic of certain segments of the younger generation (→ Re:Russia: War of Patriotisms). In late May 2024, a new survey on patriotism by FOM showed that responses to 'litmus test' questions were similar to those from the previous year. When asked whether patriotism is influenced by patriotic education or other reasons, with special patriotic education playing a minimal role, opinions among younger individuals (ages 18-45) were split equally (46% supporting 'educational' patriotism vs. 44% favouring 'choice' patriotism), while among older age groups (born before 1980), around 60% supported the notion of patriotic education compared to 31-32% supporting personal choice. Among younger generations, only 18-23% believe that 'every citizen should be a patriot', while 75-80% think that 'being a patriot or not is a personal matter'. In contrast, among those over 45, twice as many respondents (41-44%) support the idea that 'every citizen should be a patriot’.

It is evident that the boundary between the two types of patriotism – imposed patriotism and patriotism by choice – is determined by the presence of Soviet social experience. The new patriotism distances itself from this past experience, appearing more 'Westernised' and not aligning with the ideology of the militaristic and isolationist turn of 'war-time Putinism'. Despite the declared emphasis on 'traditional values' from the mid-2010s onward, surveys indicate that the trend of diverging forms of patriotism has actually become more pronounced over the past ten years. Malofeev’s initiative represents an attempt to counter the 'negative trends' in the youth environment with a third form of patriotism – radical and repressive – that stands in opposition to both paternalistic-Soviet and bureaucratic forms. Although his organisational models are unlikely to receive official support from the Kremlin, some of his ideas might be considered. In contrast to the paternalistic-Soviet, bureaucratic form of patriotism, this version proposes a far more radical intrusion into the 'private' lives of young people. Thus, the long-term impact of repressive patriotic education among students remains uncertain, with the potential for significant backlash that might become evident only after some time.

Attitudes of Russians to the war in Ukraine and the European Union by age, spring 2024, % of those surveyed by age groups