Polls

29.04 USA Analytics Unpopular Populism: Trump's ratings in American polls are falling, but not as dramatically or quickly as liberals would like Trump's main pillar of support in American public opinion has been his anti-immigration campaign, while the most sensitive issue has proven to be the worsening of Americans' economic assessments and expectations. Trump's foreign policy ratings are also declining, particularly his policy on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. 03.04 Polls Expertise Train, Inner Circle, Kremlin: Russians' attitudes to the war in different communicative situations Vladimir Khodykin, Alexander Zvonovsky, Kirill Rogov In the perception of the majority of people surveyed, they live in a society where there is a greater diversity of opinions about the war than their direct responses to sociologists' questions might suggest. Moreover, a significant proportion of those surveyed view the polarisation of opinions on the ‘special operation’ not as a phenomenon limited to their immediate social circle but as a characteristic of Russian society as a whole, manifesting itself at various levels. 28.03 Polls Analytics No One Believes Trump: In both Ukraine and Russia, citizens do not trust his peacekeeping initiatives, but hope to use them for their own purposes Ukrainians support Trump's initiative for a 30-day ceasefire; however, most see this support as merely a tactical move. 80% of Ukrainians reject the Kremlin's ultimatum demands and believe that in the event of a cessation of US aid, they should continue resisting with support from Europe alone. 19.03 Polls Analytics Two and a Half Europes: The Ukrainian question and the future of the continent through the lens of European public opinion European public opinion has been caught off guard by the ‘betrayal’ of the United States and is unprepared to confront the collusion between Putin and Trump, despite the fact that this ‘deal’ significantly diverges from Europeans' ideas of justice and their own values. Europe itself has been divided into two poles and three camps by the Ukrainian issue. 11.03 Polls Analytics Ukrainian Rally in the Oval Office: How public opinion in Russia and Ukraine is reacting to the pro-Russian drift of Trump and his team In both Russia and Ukraine, there is growing confidence that Trump has taken a pro-Russian stance, while trust in Trump himself is at an extremely low level. The attacks on Zelensky by Trump and his team have led to a consolidation of Ukrainian society, which has unequivocally sided with its president and rejects Trump's claims, including those regarding the presidential election. 06.03 Polls Analytics Three Parties and a Swing Group: How Russians view scenarios for the end of the war Surveys show that the end of the war seems to have become more tangible in the minds of Russians. In January 2024, 34% believed the war would last no more than a year; by July 2024, this number had risen to 40%, and by January 2025, it reached 43%, according to data from the Levada Centre. With what sentiments and expectations does the average Russian view the scenarios and possibilities for the war’s end? 20.12.24 Propaganda Review Grandfather Box: In Russia, television is losing audience and trust much faster than in Europe, and this process has accelerated during the war 18.12.24 Polls Review Protest Message: A third of Russians have noticed overseas opposition rallies – and that is not insignificant 29.11.24 Polls Analytics Shades of Grey: The conditions of peace and costs of war as perceived by Russians A stable majority of Russians who agree to participate in surveys – slightly over half – support transitioning to peace negotiations, while slightly more than a third favour continuing military actions. The key condition for a peace formula in Russian public opinion is Putin's approval and the absence of clear signs of 'weakness' or 'concessions' from Russia. 05.11.24 USA Review Russia's ‘Saviour Trump’: Russians hope a Trump victory could break the military and sanctions stalemate 23.10.24 Polls Review Two types of Anti-Western Sentiment: How Russians' views on Russia's place in the world differ from Putin's views 15.10.24 Polls Analytics The Frustration of Loyalty: Russians want the war to end quickly, but without it appearing as a defeat for Russia The majority of Russian citizens remain loyal to the ‘special military operation’, yet the demand for its swift conclusion continues to grow. At the same time, Russian citizens reject the prospect of not only a military defeat but even a symbolic defeat for Russia, and the likelihood of such a scenario increases their loyalty to the war and to Putin. 03.09.24 War Analytics The War of Attrition’s Kursk Battle: The interim results of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ invasion The Ukrainian Armed Forces breakthrough in the Kursh region has brought back into focus the question of Russia's ability to win a war of attrition, while the authorities' efforts to minimise the effects of the invasion in public opinion have achieved only limited results. Polls show rising anxiety, worsening assessments of the situation in the country and a decline in Putin's approval ratings. 19.07.24 Polls Review Positive stratification: Russians' economic optimism continues to grow, alongside concerns and frustrations about their future and security 15.07.24 Polls Review Erosion of Clarity: Support for Ukraine and President Zelensky is waning worldwide, while there has been a slight increase in sympathy for Russia and Putin 26.06.24 Polls Review Sanctions Rally: International sanctions lead to patriotic mobilisation while their economic impact on the 'common man' seems to be insignificant 18.06.24 Polls Analytics Pro-War Spring: Support for the war in Russia is growing amid economic prosperity and belief in imminent victory The spring increase in support for the 'special military operation' among Russians is linked to the overall improvement in social sentiments and heightened confidence in Russia's advantage on the battlefield. However, the poll results are likely to inaccurately reflect public preferences: in reality, the proportion of those not sympathetic to the war may be about one and a half times higher than what we see in the poll distributions. 14.05.24 Polls Analytics The War of Narratives: By imposing its interpretation of the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall, the Kremlin has been able to absolve itself of responsibility for the failure and also influence the growth of support for the war According to polls, about 65% of Russians support the Kremlin's version of events that Ukrainian and Western security services were behind the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall. The propaganda-imposed framing of an ‘existential’ confrontation with the West has helped the authorities mitigate the catastrophic failure of the security services, which failed to prevent the terrorist attack despite warnings. 14.05.24 Polls Expertise Between Moderate Xenophobia and Low Tolerance: The perception of migrants after the terror attack at Crocus City Hall Vladimir Zvonovsky, Alexander Khodykin After the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall, the number of attacks on Central Asian migrants and anti-migrant statements by Russian authorities and politicians has markedly increased. However, polling data does not indicate a surge in xenophobia, which remains at a moderate level, rather it shows a majority loyal to the authorities, who are not receiving signals of tolerance from above. It is these signals that fuel their ‘suspicion’ towards migrants. 04.04.24 Polls Review Conditional Peace: The group in favour of unconditional peace may constitute up to 25-30%, while the group in favour of unconditional victory could be around 20%, a Russian poll suggests 05.03.24 Navalny Analytics Lethal Neutrality: What do public opinion polls say about Navalny's death as a political event? Despite the silence in state-controlled media, Navalny's death came as a shock to Russian society. There is no doubt that this event and its interpretation will be the subject of a fierce political struggle in the days to come. What do the initial public opinion polls say about the population's reaction to the demise of Putin's main opponent? 28.02.24 Polls Analytics Middle-Age Deprivation: Why do most Russians want an end to war, but will not support an anti-war candidate in the elections? And, is that really accurate? Among Russian youth, supporters of an unconditional end to the war dominate, while among older age groups, proponents of pro-war views prevail. In between are those who are willing to support a transition to peace initiated by Putin or the start of peace negotiations but are not ready for the unilateral withdrawal of troops or to support an anti-war candidate as an alternative to Putin. 16.02.24 Polls Review The Struggle for Peace: The Nadezhdin case and the expansion of calls for an end to the war may influence Vladimir Putin's election rhetoric 09.02.24 Polls Review Three majorities: Russians continue to support military action in Ukraine, but consider the cost too high and are leaning towards peace talks 26.01.24 Polls Review Military Deadlock: How Russians' views on the ‘military operation’ changed during the second year of the conflict 24.01.24 Polls Expertise The Dead Ends of War: How public opinion changed during the second year of the war Elena Koneva, Vladimir Zvonovsky, Kirill Rogov, Alexander Khodykin 24.01.24 Polls Expertise Second Demobilisation: How public opinion changed during the second year of the war Elena Koneva, Kirill Rogov The core of support for the war in 2023 decreased one and a half times and became proportionate to those who generally lean towards anti-war views. The share of those who would be unwilling to support a decision by Putin to immediately withdraw troops also decreased, and by the end of the year, it became smaller than the share of those who would be willing to support such a decision. However, all this has led not to an increase in the number of people who oppose the war, but rather to the expansion of a zone of blurred and alienated attitudes toward it. 24.01.24 Polls Expertise Between 'Spiral of Silence' and 'Jumping on the Bandwagon': The influence of others on Russians' opinion of the Russia-Ukraine war While, in Russia, opponents of the war are disinclined to voice their opinions when they think they believe they are surrounded by those who support it, those who declare their support for the war are disinclined to defend their loyalty when they find themselves in a mixed society where different views on the war are represented. 12.12.23 Polls Review The Waiting Game: Russians remain loyal to the regime and the war, but the number of people who want it to end as soon as possible has grown significantly in recent months 16.11.23 Polls Review Anti-War Drift: Loyalty to the war is being eroded among the young and economically Disadvantaged 03.11.23 Polls Review ‘Withdraw the troops and return the territories': A Levada Center poll indicates that, in Russia, this formula for peace is predominantly opposed by pensioners and television viewers 12.10.23 Polls Review Military Burnout: Attention to the fighting in Ukraine and the level of patriotic feeling have hit their lowest levels since the start of the war 07.09.23 Polls Review Peace without Concessions: Surveys show that most Russians want an end to the war but are not ready to give up what they have won 18.07.23 Polls Review Militarists, the semi-war party, and the semi-peace party: sociological data allow us to identify the main groups in attitudes towards war in Russian society 06.07.23 Prigozhin Analytics INFORMATION UPRISING: PRIGOZHIN'S REVOLT IS THE RESULT OF FUNDAMENTAL SHIFTS IN THE RUSSIAN MEDIA LANDSCAPE The alternative pro-war agenda deployed in a number of Telegram channels has become the ideological platform of the Prigozhin rebellion and the reason behind its fairly widespread popularity. However, this effect reflects a more fundamental shift — the continuing decline in the influence of television in the Russian information space. 05.07.23 Prigozhin Review Aftertaste of Rebellion: The level of support for Prigozhin is estimated to be at least 20% after the rebellion, but it could potentially be significantly higher 03.07.23 Polls Review Rebellion and Peace: The share of those who believe it is time to move to peace talks with Ukraine has increased, while a significant part of society sympathises with the Prigozhin uprising 29.06.23 Polls Review Loyal but weary: A new poll indicates a gradual erosion of the dominant pro-war rhetoric in the public sphere 15.06.23 Polls Review Between China and Belarus: The war has changed Russians' perception of their friends and enemies, but the new picture of geopolitical solidarity appears artificial and circumstantial 08.06.23 Polls Review After Bakhmut: The number of supporters of continuing the war increased in Russia in May, but so did uncertainty about the possibility of victory 24.05.23 Polls Review Easter Eggs: Russia remains a country with low levels of religiosity, and Russians’ declarative orthodoxy is primarily associated with festive social rituals 24.05.23 Polls Review Russians are tired of Putin and would not mind seeing another person take his place, but the demand for democratisation remains relatively low 15.05.23 Ideologies Analytics The Conservatism Clinch: Can Russia Become an Orthodox Iran? The Russian authorities are attempting to cultivate orthodox religiosity and conservative values, but they have failed to take into account that, in Russia, the popularity of these values has a limited range and a specific political profile. Contrary to the Kremlin's beliefs, the promotion of traditionalism as an official ideology may actually serve to reduce public support for the regime. 10.05.23 Polls Review Anticipating the Counteroffensive: Public Opinion Surveys Suggest Concern and Unfocused Negativity about the War, but Not Even Electronic Summonses Have Provoked Outrage 12.04.23 Polls Review Crimean relapse: since the start of the war poll respondents see Russia as more developed, wealthy, and free than they did during peacetime 04.04.23 Polls Review General Demobilisation: Russian society is paying less attention to the war in Ukraine and support for the ‘special operation’ continues to wane 09.03.23 Polls Analytics RUSSIAN FIELD: SUPPORT FOR NON-SUPPORT OF PEACE AND WAR Over the past year, the independent Russian Field project has been surveying its respondents about their support for a renewed offensive against Kyiv and their support for a peace agreement with Ukraine. The answers to these questions allow us to identify three different groups: those who support escalation, those who are opposed to it, and conformists who approve of any decision made by the authorities. What is the structure of these groups and how do they relate to one another? 07.03.23 Polls Review The Fog of War and The Climate of Opinion: polls indicate rising pro-war sentiments, increasingly positive assessments of the success of the ‘special military operation,’ and growing fear of pollsters 01.03.23 Polls Expertise THE PLUNGE INTO WAR: PUBLIC OPINION CHRONICLED While at first glance it may seem as though there is a declarative ‘majority of support’ for the war, there is perhaps more significantly a ‘majority of non-resistance’, which allows the pro-war minority to dominate the public debate. For mainstream Russian society, the ‘plunge into war’ remains a coerced strategy, and the consolidation of revanchist sentiments among one segment of society coexists with the considerable potential for demobilisation within another. Re: Russia presents an overview of the results of public opinion polling conducted by the independent Chronicles project. 23.02.23 Polls Review Coercive Cohesion: both in Russia and Ukraine, the results of opinion polls should be treated with caution during times of war 19.01.23 Polls Review Foreign Agents and Wartime Anomalies: polling shows increasing distortions in public opinion in 2022 12.12.22 Polls Review Normative Loyalty: loyalty to the war and official rhetoric among pollsters surveyed remains high, although there are very few war enthusiasts 06.12.22 Polls Review The War Is Stuck: the tension of mobilisation has diminished, supporters of peace negotiations remain in the majority, but a less overwhelming one 30.11.22 Polls Expertise Special Operation Frustration Nadya Evangelian, Andrey Tkachenko Russian citizens are finding it increasingly difficult to respond to questions regarding the ‘special military operation’, such as when it will end and how well it is going. The number of Russians who are experiencing anxiety and depression is growing. These are the latest findings from polling by the independent Chronicles project. Although the level of support for the war recorded by this project has remained unchanged since the beginning of the summer — hovering at about 55% — the core of supporters of the ‘special operation’ stands at no more than a third of all respondents. 16.11.22 Polls Review The Inclusion Of Occupied Ukrainian Territories In Russia Has Not Met Any Emotional Response Among Russians: by the end of October, only 6% of the respondents remembered about this event 07.11.22 Polls Analytics The War Party Is Losing Ground In All Polls Time is working against the war — respondents' expectations regarding their financial situation and economic prospects are deteriorating, and the support for military operations in Ukraine is decreasing along with them. According to data from three independent sociological projects, the core of support for the "special military operation" and the "war party" is also shrinking. 31.10.22 Polls Review Support For the War Among Russians Is Rapidly Declining But Has Not Yet Converted Into Rising Opposition, New "Levada-Center" Polls Show 24.10.22 Polls Review "To Be a Man": polls show fairly high loyalty to the announced mobilisation despite gradual decline in the war support 19.10.22 Polls Review Despite War Fatigue, Ukrainian Society Not Polarised on Key Issue: its occupied territories must be returned 18.10.22 Polls Review The Frustration of the Mobilisation: Russian Society’s Spring-Summer Optimism Replaced by Confusion and Scepticism 03.10.22 Polls Analytics The Journey from 1945 to 1941 According to sociological data, Russia’s mobilisation came as a shock to its citizens. Even among the war’s supporters there are at least three different parties with their own justifications and interpretations of current events. 19.09.22 Polls Review Geopolitics, Escapism, Depression: Researchers have analysed 213 interviews to understand Russians' attitudes to war 12.09.22 Polls Review The opinions of Russians on whether to continue military action in Ukraine or move to peace talks are almost evenly divided, Levada Center poll shows 05.08.22 Polls Analytics A Broad Front of Inadequacy The July poll conducted by the Levada Center demonstrates that the Russian’s attitudes toward the war and Kremlin policies remain unchanged and are largely accompanied by a surprisingly high optimism regarding the prospects of the Russian economy and society as a whole. Kirill Rogov discusses the specifics of social attitudes in the summer of 2022. 27.06.22 Polls Review Support for Ukraine in Europe remains high, but the differences between Northern and Southern Europe are becoming more pronounced, a Eurobarometer survey shows 02.06.22 Polls Expertise The Imposed Consensus: What do the polls say about support for the war and can they be believed? Mikhail Komin, Kirill Rogov