Polls
Anti-War Drift: Loyalty to the war is being eroded among the young and economically Disadvantaged
‘Withdraw the troops and return the territories': A Levada Center poll indicates that, in Russia, this formula for peace is predominantly opposed by pensioners and television viewers
Military Burnout: Attention to the fighting in Ukraine and the level of patriotic feeling have hit their lowest levels since the start of the war
Peace without Concessions: Surveys show that most Russians want an end to the war but are not ready to give up what they have won
Militarists, the semi-war party, and the semi-peace party: sociological data allow us to identify the main groups in attitudes towards war in Russian society
INFORMATION UPRISING: PRIGOZHIN'S REVOLT IS THE RESULT OF FUNDAMENTAL SHIFTS IN THE RUSSIAN MEDIA LANDSCAPE
The alternative pro-war agenda deployed in a number of Telegram channels has become the ideological platform of the Prigozhin rebellion and the reason behind its fairly widespread popularity. However, this effect reflects a more fundamental shift — the continuing decline in the influence of television in the Russian information space.
Aftertaste of Rebellion: The level of support for Prigozhin is estimated to be at least 20% after the rebellion, but it could potentially be significantly higher
Rebellion and Peace: The share of those who believe it is time to move to peace talks with Ukraine has increased, while a significant part of society sympathises with the Prigozhin uprising
Loyal but weary: A new poll indicates a gradual erosion of the dominant pro-war rhetoric in the public sphere
Between China and Belarus: The war has changed Russians' perception of their friends and enemies, but the new picture of geopolitical solidarity appears artificial and circumstantial
After Bakhmut: The number of supporters of continuing the war increased in Russia in May, but so did uncertainty about the possibility of victory
Easter Eggs: Russia remains a country with low levels of religiosity, and Russians’ declarative orthodoxy is primarily associated with festive social rituals
Russians are tired of Putin and would not mind seeing another person take his place, but the demand for democratisation remains relatively low
The Conservatism Clinch: Can Russia Become an Orthodox Iran?
The Russian authorities are attempting to cultivate orthodox religiosity and conservative values, but they have failed to take into account that, in Russia, the popularity of these values has a limited range and a specific political profile. Contrary to the Kremlin's beliefs, the promotion of traditionalism as an official ideology may actually serve to reduce public support for the regime.
Anticipating the Counteroffensive: Public Opinion Surveys Suggest Concern and Unfocused Negativity about the War, but Not Even Electronic Summonses Have Provoked Outrage
Crimean relapse: since the start of the war poll respondents see Russia as more developed, wealthy, and free than they did during peacetime
General Demobilisation: Russian society is paying less attention to the war in Ukraine and support for the ‘special operation’ continues to wane
RUSSIAN FIELD: SUPPORT FOR NON-SUPPORT OF PEACE AND WAR
Over the past year, the independent Russian Field project has been surveying its respondents about their support for a renewed offensive against Kyiv and their support for a peace agreement with Ukraine. The answers to these questions allow us to identify three different groups: those who support escalation, those who are opposed to it, and conformists who approve of any decision made by the authorities. What is the structure of these groups and how do they relate to one another?
The Fog of War and The Climate of Opinion: polls indicate rising pro-war sentiments, increasingly positive assessments of the success of the ‘special military operation,’ and growing fear of pollsters
THE PLUNGE INTO WAR: PUBLIC OPINION CHRONICLED
While at first glance it may seem as though there is a declarative ‘majority of support’ for the war, there is perhaps more significantly a ‘majority of non-resistance’, which allows the pro-war minority to dominate the public debate. For mainstream Russian society, the ‘plunge into war’ remains a coerced strategy, and the consolidation of revanchist sentiments among one segment of society coexists with the considerable potential for demobilisation within another. Re: Russia presents an overview of the results of public opinion polling conducted by the independent Chronicles project.
Coercive Cohesion: both in Russia and Ukraine, the results of opinion polls should be treated with caution during times of war
Navalny Forgotten: the politician's significant decline in the politician’s visibility and recognition over the past 11 months appears to be yet another paradox of wartime public opinion
Foreign Agents and Wartime Anomalies: polling shows increasing distortions in public opinion in 2022
Normative Loyalty: loyalty to the war and official rhetoric among pollsters surveyed remains high, although there are very few war enthusiasts
The War Is Stuck: the tension of mobilisation has diminished, supporters of peace negotiations remain in the majority, but a less overwhelming one
Special Operation Frustration
Russian citizens are finding it increasingly difficult to respond to questions regarding the ‘special military operation’, such as when it will end and how well it is going. The number of Russians who are experiencing anxiety and depression is growing. These are the latest findings from polling by the independent Chronicles project. Although the level of support for the war recorded by this project has remained unchanged since the beginning of the summer — hovering at about 55% — the core of supporters of the ‘special operation’ stands at no more than a third of all respondents.
The Inclusion Of Occupied Ukrainian Territories In Russia Has Not Met Any Emotional Response Among Russians: by the end of October, only 6% of the respondents remembered about this event
The War Party Is Losing Ground In All Polls
Time is working against the war — respondents' expectations regarding their financial situation and economic prospects are deteriorating, and the support for military operations in Ukraine is decreasing along with them. According to data from three independent sociological projects, the core of support for the "special military operation" and the "war party" is also shrinking.
Support For the War Among Russians Is Rapidly Declining But Has Not Yet Converted Into Rising Opposition, New "Levada-Center" Polls Show
"To Be a Man": polls show fairly high loyalty to the announced mobilisation despite gradual decline in the war support
Despite War Fatigue, Ukrainian Society Not Polarised on Key Issue: its occupied territories must be returned
The Frustration of the Mobilisation: Russian Society’s Spring-Summer Optimism Replaced by Confusion and Scepticism
The Journey from 1945 to 1941
According to sociological data, Russia’s mobilisation came as a shock to its citizens. Even among the war’s supporters there are at least three different parties with their own justifications and interpretations of current events.
Geopolitics, Escapism, Depression: Researchers have analysed 213 interviews to understand Russians' attitudes to war
The opinions of Russians on whether to continue military action in Ukraine or move to peace talks are almost evenly divided, Levada Center poll shows
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A Broad Front of Inadequacy
The July poll conducted by the Levada Center demonstrates that the Russian’s attitudes toward the war and Kremlin policies remain unchanged and are largely accompanied by a surprisingly high optimism regarding the prospects of the Russian economy and society as a whole. Kirill Rogov discusses the specifics of social attitudes in the summer of 2022.
Support for Ukraine in Europe remains high, but the differences between Northern and Southern Europe are becoming more pronounced, a Eurobarometer survey shows
INFORMATION UPRISING: PRIGOZHIN'S REVOLT IS THE RESULT OF FUNDAMENTAL SHIFTS IN THE RUSSIAN MEDIA LANDSCAPE
The alternative pro-war agenda deployed in a number of Telegram channels has become the ideological platform of the Prigozhin rebellion and the reason behind its fairly widespread popularity. However, this effect reflects a more fundamental shift — the continuing decline in the influence of television in the Russian information space.
Aftertaste of Rebellion: The level of support for Prigozhin is estimated to be at least 20% after the rebellion, but it could potentially be significantly higher
Rebellion and Peace: The share of those who believe it is time to move to peace talks with Ukraine has increased, while a significant part of society sympathises with the Prigozhin uprising
Loyal but weary: A new poll indicates a gradual erosion of the dominant pro-war rhetoric in the public sphere
Between China and Belarus: The war has changed Russians' perception of their friends and enemies, but the new picture of geopolitical solidarity appears artificial and circumstantial
After Bakhmut: The number of supporters of continuing the war increased in Russia in May, but so did uncertainty about the possibility of victory
Easter Eggs: Russia remains a country with low levels of religiosity, and Russians’ declarative orthodoxy is primarily associated with festive social rituals
Russians are tired of Putin and would not mind seeing another person take his place, but the demand for democratisation remains relatively low
The Conservatism Clinch: Can Russia Become an Orthodox Iran?
The Russian authorities are attempting to cultivate orthodox religiosity and conservative values, but they have failed to take into account that, in Russia, the popularity of these values has a limited range and a specific political profile. Contrary to the Kremlin's beliefs, the promotion of traditionalism as an official ideology may actually serve to reduce public support for the regime.
Anticipating the Counteroffensive: Public Opinion Surveys Suggest Concern and Unfocused Negativity about the War, but Not Even Electronic Summonses Have Provoked Outrage
Crimean relapse: since the start of the war poll respondents see Russia as more developed, wealthy, and free than they did during peacetime
General Demobilisation: Russian society is paying less attention to the war in Ukraine and support for the ‘special operation’ continues to wane
RUSSIAN FIELD: SUPPORT FOR NON-SUPPORT OF PEACE AND WAR
Over the past year, the independent Russian Field project has been surveying its respondents about their support for a renewed offensive against Kyiv and their support for a peace agreement with Ukraine. The answers to these questions allow us to identify three different groups: those who support escalation, those who are opposed to it, and conformists who approve of any decision made by the authorities. What is the structure of these groups and how do they relate to one another?
The Fog of War and The Climate of Opinion: polls indicate rising pro-war sentiments, increasingly positive assessments of the success of the ‘special military operation,’ and growing fear of pollsters
THE PLUNGE INTO WAR: PUBLIC OPINION CHRONICLED
While at first glance it may seem as though there is a declarative ‘majority of support’ for the war, there is perhaps more significantly a ‘majority of non-resistance’, which allows the pro-war minority to dominate the public debate. For mainstream Russian society, the ‘plunge into war’ remains a coerced strategy, and the consolidation of revanchist sentiments among one segment of society coexists with the considerable potential for demobilisation within another. Re: Russia presents an overview of the results of public opinion polling conducted by the independent Chronicles project.
Coercive Cohesion: both in Russia and Ukraine, the results of opinion polls should be treated with caution during times of war
Navalny Forgotten: the politician's significant decline in the politician’s visibility and recognition over the past 11 months appears to be yet another paradox of wartime public opinion
Foreign Agents and Wartime Anomalies: polling shows increasing distortions in public opinion in 2022
Normative Loyalty: loyalty to the war and official rhetoric among pollsters surveyed remains high, although there are very few war enthusiasts
The War Is Stuck: the tension of mobilisation has diminished, supporters of peace negotiations remain in the majority, but a less overwhelming one
Special Operation Frustration
Russian citizens are finding it increasingly difficult to respond to questions regarding the ‘special military operation’, such as when it will end and how well it is going. The number of Russians who are experiencing anxiety and depression is growing. These are the latest findings from polling by the independent Chronicles project. Although the level of support for the war recorded by this project has remained unchanged since the beginning of the summer — hovering at about 55% — the core of supporters of the ‘special operation’ stands at no more than a third of all respondents.
The Inclusion Of Occupied Ukrainian Territories In Russia Has Not Met Any Emotional Response Among Russians: by the end of October, only 6% of the respondents remembered about this event
The War Party Is Losing Ground In All Polls
Time is working against the war — respondents' expectations regarding their financial situation and economic prospects are deteriorating, and the support for military operations in Ukraine is decreasing along with them. According to data from three independent sociological projects, the core of support for the "special military operation" and the "war party" is also shrinking.
Support For the War Among Russians Is Rapidly Declining But Has Not Yet Converted Into Rising Opposition, New "Levada-Center" Polls Show
"To Be a Man": polls show fairly high loyalty to the announced mobilisation despite gradual decline in the war support
Despite War Fatigue, Ukrainian Society Not Polarised on Key Issue: its occupied territories must be returned
The Frustration of the Mobilisation: Russian Society’s Spring-Summer Optimism Replaced by Confusion and Scepticism
The Journey from 1945 to 1941
According to sociological data, Russia’s mobilisation came as a shock to its citizens. Even among the war’s supporters there are at least three different parties with their own justifications and interpretations of current events.
Geopolitics, Escapism, Depression: Researchers have analysed 213 interviews to understand Russians' attitudes to war
The opinions of Russians on whether to continue military action in Ukraine or move to peace talks are almost evenly divided, Levada Center poll shows
A Broad Front of Inadequacy
The July poll conducted by the Levada Center demonstrates that the Russian’s attitudes toward the war and Kremlin policies remain unchanged and are largely accompanied by a surprisingly high optimism regarding the prospects of the Russian economy and society as a whole. Kirill Rogov discusses the specifics of social attitudes in the summer of 2022.
Support for Ukraine in Europe remains high, but the differences between Northern and Southern Europe are becoming more pronounced, a Eurobarometer survey shows