Shades of Grey: The conditions of peace and costs of war as perceived by Russians

The end of war and the formula for peace

The topic of ending the war through peace negotiations occupies a central place in today’s discussions surrounding the Russia-Ukraine conflict. And although the opinions of Russian citizens living under Putin’s dictatorship are far from the most important issue in this debate, their attitudes toward potential peace scenarios are of interest for understanding social moods in Russia and the real attitude of Russians toward the war. Re:Russia has attempted to summarise what is known about the views of Russia's residents regarding scenarios for ending the conflict based on sociological surveys (it should be noted that survey data is likely biased in favour of more loyal segments of the population, as disloyalty to the war is criminalised and persecuted by the authorities in Russia.)

In the latest wave of the Russia Field survey, conducted from 7-12 November, more than half of the respondents (53%) expressed support for transitioning to peace negotiations with Ukraine rather than continuing combat operations. This result, which was noted by many media outlets, does not, however, appear sensational: in the Levada Centre polls, where the corresponding question is formulated in a completely neutral way (‘Do you think military actions should continue or peace negotiations should begin?’), a stable majority in favour of peace negotiations has been observed since the fall of 2022: on average, 52% support this scenario, against 40% who favour continuing military actions (eight waves of the survey from September 2022 to October 2024).

The slightly more formal wording of the question by Russian Field, which emphasises Russia’s subjectivity ('In your opinion, should Russia continue military operations on Ukrainian territory or transition to peace negotiations?'), may be the reason why, in their surveys from the fall of 2022 to the fall of 2023, fewer respondents (44%) supported peace negotiations, while slightly more (45%) favoured continuing military actions compared to the Levada data. However, over the past year, the figures have gradually converged: the share of supporters of continuing military actions, according to both surveys, slightly exceeds a third (36%), while the share of those in favour of negotiations is about half of those surveyed.

Continuation of military operations or peace talks? Levada Centre and Russian Field polls, 2022-2024, % of those surveyed

When the figure of Putin is added to the 'peace equation,' the outcome becomes indisputable. The proportion of those surveyed who support the scenario in which Putin 'signs a peace agreement and stops the”'military operation”’ in the Russian Field survey is 79%. At the beginning of 2023, 66% supported this scenario, and by mid-2023, 72%; since then, this proportion has steadily increased, while the share of those opposing an immediate peace agreement signed by Putin has decreased from 24% in the first year of the war to 13% in the latest survey. Even among supporters of continuing military actions, the scenario of ending the war, approved by Putin, is acceptable to the majority (55%).

However, in a scenario where Russia (with no mention of Putin) signs a ceasefire agreement without any conditions and only then starts negotiations with Ukraine (the wording of another question in the Russian Field survey), only 60% express agreement. About 18% of those surveyed in this case align with those who, at this stage of the war, are fundamentally against a peace agreement (13%). These 30% are either not ready to stop the war at the current frontlines or are willing to do so only under certain conditions. Meanwhile, 60% consider halting the fighting the main priority, without giving much thought to the conditions.

In surveys conducted by the Chronicles project and the ExtremeScan research group (full data available at Re:Russia's disposal), respondents were asked: ‘If Vladimir Putin decides to withdraw Russian troops from Ukrainian territory and starts negotiations for a ceasefire, would you support or oppose this decision?’ The same 61% answered positively, and 39% negatively. However, when respondents were made aware that the goals of the ‘military operation’ would not be achieved, the proportion of support decreased to 49%, although it still surpassed the opposition group (40%). It seems that respondents did not pay much attention to the conditions of the ‘troop withdrawal’, not fully realising where Russian troops are positioned in Ukraine or where the new Russian border lies according to the Kremlin’s version.

In some waves of the regular poll, Levada Centre polsters divided respondents into two groups. The first group was asked whether they would support Putin if he decided to ‘end the military conflict with Ukraine’ this week. The second group’s question was formulated as ‘end the military conflict with Ukraine and return the annexed territories to Ukraine’. In the first case, 72% of respondents supported Putin’s decision (which is 10 percentage points more than in May 2023), while in the second, emphasising the ‘territorial concessions’, only 31% supported it (and this share has hardly changed over the past year and a half).

When peace conditions involve certain concessions from Russia, it provokes a negative reaction from a larger share of respondents. For example, in a Levads survey conducted in May 2024, only 17% of those surveyed considered the ‘return’ of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions and the self-declared LNR and DNR to Ukraine as an ‘acceptable’ condition for peace. However, this does not reliably indicate a high value for the occupied territories in 2022 among Russians.

For example, in the September Chronicles and ExtremeScan survey, when asked ‘What should Russia aim for in peace negotiations with Ukraine?’ 46% chose the priority of ‘Ukraine’s renouncement of joining NATO’, while only 26% chose the priority of ‘retaining territories’. This result may seem surprising, but it aligns with responses to an open-ended question by the Levada Centre about the benefits brought by the ‘military operation’ (September 2024). A third of all answers referred to the geopolitical goals of the ‘military operation’ (‘strengthening Russia's position in the world’, ‘stopping NATO expansion’, ‘strengthening independence from the West’), slightly fewer consider the ‘protection of Russians oppressed in Ukraine’ as a success (‘protected Russians, Russian speakers’, ‘protection from fascism’), and less than a quarter of responses mentioned territorial and resource gains from the occupation (‘return of territories’, ‘larger population’, ‘gained resources, coal, land’). Given that the question was answered by those who see more benefits in the war (28%), such answers were given by just over 7% of those surveyed.

It is evident that under the authoritarian and repressive ‘climate of opinions’, the views of Russians on the contours of a desirable peace are vague and quite contradictory. About 75% of survey participants would welcome the end of the war, assuming that it would be favourable for Russia and approved by Putin. For 60%, the end of the war is a priority, and its specific conditions are of secondary importance. Finally, between 50% and 30% of survey participants are ready for peace, even if its conditions are not entirely favourable for Russia or involve concessions from its side (‘peace, but not victory’). Summarising this data, it can be said that the priority for survey participants is the end of the war, and the key conditions of the peace formula are Putin's agreement to this formula and the absence of obvious signs of ‘weakness’ or ‘concessions’ from Russia. At the same time, 63% of respondents in the Chronicles and ExtremeScan surveys listed a ‘peace treaty with Ukraine with mutual concessions’ among the desired events of the year.

Shades of grey and costs of war

When analysing survey results, experts typically try to answer the question of how much the Russian population supports the war, but they often reach an impasse because support or opposition to the war, under current conditions, is not a subject of choice for most respondents – it is not about making such a choice. The dynamics of war perception are better reflected in responses to questions that do not present respondents with this choice. These are either indirect questions or questions that address various aspects of ‘wartime’.

At the same time, both Russian and global media are more likely to quote survey data that confirm the loyalty of Russians to the war. Against this backdrop, the distribution of answers to the Levada Centre question on whether the ‘military operation’ has caused more harm or more benefit (September 2024) went largely unnoticed. Meanwhile, the first option (‘harm’) was chosen by 47% of those surveyed, while the second (‘benefit’) was chosen by 28%, as already mentioned. Notably, in May 2023, the response distribution was almost equal – 41% (‘harm’) versus 38% (‘benefit’). This indicates a significant increase in the perception of the war's costs over this period.

The answers to the question about the desire to cancel the decision to start the ‘military operation’, if it were possible to go back in time, appear relatively stable. In the Russian Field surveys, which first used this wording, the share of those who would cancel it grew from 33% in the first year of the war to 36% in the last, while the share of those opposed to the imaginary cancellation slightly decreased to 50%. In the Levada Centre surveys (four waves from May 2023 to October 2024), the share of ‘cancellers’ was slightly higher (39%), and the ‘non-cancellers’ share was slightly lower (46%). In essence, this distribution reflects the ratio among those agreeing to participate in surveys: those who accept the official justification and consider the war justified (45-50%) and those who do not trust the official arguments and do not consider the attack on Ukraine justified (35-40%).

‘Would you cancel the decision to launch a “military operation” if you could go back in time?’ Levada Centre and Russian Field surveys, 2022-2024, % of those surveyed

Surprisingly, in the latest Russian Field survey, the proportion of respondents who personally feel a danger related to the ‘military operation’ has increased to 40%, while those who do not feel danger have decreased to 58% (last summer, the ratio was 36% versus 62%). The main factor of concern appears to be the increased frequency and scale of Ukrainian attacks deep within Russia: 45% of those who feel danger mentioned ‘drone strikes’ and ‘shelling/strikes’. The fact that ‘strikes’ and ‘drones’ are significant social irritants is also reflected in initiatives by Russian authorities: in some regions, posting photos and videos of drones is already banned at the regional level, and discussions about a nationwide ban on this matter are taking place in the corridors of the Federation Council and the Duma. Economic factors of ‘danger’ were mentioned by 23%, and mobilisation by 17%, though among men, this figure is 24%, and among youth (18-29 years old), it is 30%.

The relationship of Russians to sanctions appears more complex when comparing different data and question formulations. For instance, the widely spread belief that sanctions do not concern Russians much largely relies on the Levada Centre survey. In their version, the question is phrased as: ‘Are you concerned about the political and economic sanctions from Western countries against Russia?’ Mentioning ‘political sanctions’ shifts the focus of the question from their purely economic consequences to sanctions themselves as a political tool and method of pressure. Immediately after the war began and sanctions were imposed, 47% of those surveyed answered that they were ‘very or fairly concerned’, while 52% answered negatively. Since the second half of 2022, the proportion of those concerned has dropped to 40%, and in May this year, it was down to 30%.

When asked by Levada Centre if ‘sanctions have created problems for you and your family’, 30% answered positively shortly after the war began, and in the latest survey, only 11%. (It should be noted that Levada Centre surveys are conducted face-to-face, while other surveys mentioned here are conducted by phone.) At the same time, in a softer formulation from Russian Field (‘Do you feel the impact of sanctions on your life, the life of your loved ones, and friends?’), the answers were split evenly – 49% said ‘yes’, and 49% said ‘no’. This is less than in surveys from March-April 2022 (on average, 57% felt the impact of sanctions), but the distribution is unchanged from July 2022. Among the 18-29 age group, 62% feel the impact of sanctions, while in the 30-44 age group, 56% do. However, their significance sharply decreases among those over 60. Among lower-income and higher-income groups, the differences in perceiving sanctions are minimal, but there is a noticeable gap between those with higher education and those without it – 57% (feel their impact) versus 36% (do not feel). In the Chronicles and ExtremeScan survey, 65% cited the lifting of sanctions as a desired event for the coming year (this is more than the share who mentioned events such as ‘restoring relations with Western countries’ at 50% and ‘a peace treaty with Ukraine with mutual concessions’).

Thus, it can be said that sanctions are indeed a significant inconvenience for a large portion of respondents, especially among those with a higher level of consumption (youth, people with higher education). At the same time, when the question emphasises the political aspect of sanctions and their role as a means of pressure on Russia, respondents tend to downplay their significance, choosing the ‘resistance’ and ‘rallying around the flag’ approach (similar effects have been identified in some international studies).

The contradictory attitude toward various aspects of the war also manifests in Russians' reactions to military service advertisements. As shown by the latest Russian Field survey, 90% of respondents have seen such advertisements. However, among the various emotions these advertisements evoke, 27% indicated positive emotions, 40% negative, and 30% neutral or no emotions at all. While positive emotions slightly outweigh negative ones among men, among women, negative emotions dominate by a ratio of almost 2 to 1, and among youth, it is 3 to 1. On one hand, military service protects Russians from the threat of a new mobilisation; on the other, in Russian cities far from the Russian-Ukrainian border, it serves as almost the only ‘reminder’ of the war, which people encounter daily and which brings to the forefront the full range of frustrations and discomforts associated with the war.

On the whole, this data indicates that the costs of war are significantly present in the self-perception of Russians, although not in acute forms, but they remain practically outside the field of political conceptualisation. At the same time, the well-known liberal anti-war discourse does not play this role, as it implies a high degree of confrontation with the repressive regime.