Train, Inner Circle, Kremlin: Russians' attitudes to the war in different communicative situations

Contents

Vladimir Zvonovsky, Alexander Khodykin. From The Train To The Kremlin: The spiral of silence and elite division in the mirror of public opinion

Kirill Rogov. Discussion of the war and the gradient of silence

From The Train To The Kremlin: The spiral of silence and elite division in the mirror of public opinion

Vladimir Zvonovsky

Sociologist

Alexander Khodykin

Sociologist

Most people's attitudes toward various social and political issues are strongly influenced by their surroundings – both their immediate social circle, which shapes their daily interactions, and the broader public sphere, where opinions are expressed in society and the media. When studying Russians’ attitudes toward the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine, it is crucial to consider both of these levels: the social environment in which respondents find themselves and the groups that shape their daily informational context, as well as the nature of public discourse and the representation of different viewpoints within it.

Although various measurements indicate that around 20% of the Russian population holds an anti-war stance, this group lacks public representation in society – let alone within the ruling elite. There is not a single member of the State Duma who openly opposes the 'special military operation' (SMO), nor is this viewpoint publicly represented in the government, the presidential administration, or on central television channels. As a result, Russian society lacks a political group that anti-war voters could identify with, one that could formulate a coherent agenda, attract supporters, and maintain dialogue with them. This significantly weakens the anti-war position in both mass and interpersonal communication.

At the same time, it can be argued that Russian citizens have access to a diversity of opinions about the ongoing conflict, and their everyday social circles are quite heterogeneous in this regard. Moreover, even Russians' perceptions of how the elite views the conflict – despite its outward show of total solidarity with the president’s position – are also diverse.

Train sociology: the second railway test

One of the most well-known theories describing the influence of social surroundings on people’s willingness to express or even change their opinions is Elizabeth Noel-Neumann's concept of the ‘spiral of silence’. It suggests that individuals who are not deeply engaged in politics tend to refrain from expressing unpopular opinions if they fear social disapproval. This, in turn, leads to those opinions being voiced less frequently, reinforcing the impression that they are indeed unpopular, thus making people even more reluctant to express them.

In 2023, the authors of this text replicated Noelle-Neumann’s scenario of a conversation between strangers on a train in a sociological survey (→ Between ‘Spiral of Silence’ and ‘Jumping on the Bandwagon’). Respondents were first asked about their attitude toward the military actions and then whether they would be willing to discuss the issue with random fellow travelers who held opposing views. The results showed that most Russians would avoid discussing the 'SMO' with strangers. War opponents were significantly more likely to refrain from such discussions than supporters – 77% versus 55%. Among war supporters, 35% were willing to engage in conversation, compared to only 21% of opponents. This gap in willingness to express opinions was not insurmountable but was large enough to make it difficult for anti-war voices to spread their views.

A year and a half later, in February 2025, we repeated the test. This time, however, the question about attitudes toward the 'special operation' was worded differently, allowing respondents more room to avoid a direct answer ('Do you support or not support Russia’s 'military operation' in Ukraine, are you unsure how to answer, or do you not want to answer this question?'). As a result, in the first case, the ratio of opponents to supporters was 71% to 20%, while in the second case, it was 52% to 11%, with 37% of those surveyed not giving a clear answer.

Thus, in the second test, the categorisation of supporters and opponents of the 'SMO' was stricter, as those who were uncertain could refrain from expressing a definite opinion. Among supporters of the 'special operation', 43% were now willing to defend their stance, while among opponents, 25% were willing to do so. The proportion of those ready to speak out increased more among supporters than among opponents, which aligns with the expectations of the 'spiral of silence' theory. However, it is also important to note that among opponents, the share of those willing to speak did not decrease. This may indicate that, a year and a half later – despite repression and extensive propaganda efforts – anti-war respondents do not feel that their position has been completely marginalised.

The inner circle phenomenon

Despite the fact that the second 'railway' test sample included more strongly convinced supporters of both viewpoints, the majority, both among opponents and supporters of the 'special operation', preferred not to engage in conversation. This is one of the key characteristics of Russians' attitudes toward the 'special operation': it is a topic people prefer not to discuss. In September 2024, during the fourteenth wave of the Chronicles project poll, only 14% of Russian adults stated that they would like to discuss the war more within their close social circles, either to defend their own viewpoint or to learn about others’. Meanwhile, around 40% expressed a desire to talk about the 'special operation' less, and 22% actively tried to avoid the topic altogether. Thus, despite the fact that the 'SMO' remained the most significant event for Russians over three years, more than 60% avoided discussing it – not only in public settings like a train but also within their immediate social circles.

The willingness to discuss the 'SMO' with a fellow traveler on a train depends on the respondent’s everyday social environment – in other words, on their perception of the balance of support and opposition to the 'special operation' among those around them. In multiple survey waves conducted by the ‘Chronicles’ and ExtremeScan projects, respondents were asked: 'In your opinion, do the majority of your close acquaintances, relatives, and colleagues support or not support the 'military operation'?' The results showed that 50% or slightly more believed that the majority in their environment supported the 'SMO'. Between 22% and 29% (27% in the latest measurement) stated that their environment was evenly split between supporters and opponents ('half support, half do not support'), while around 15% reported that most people around them did not support the 'SMO'. These findings suggest that approximately 50% of those surveyed live in an environment where 'special operation' supporters form a majority, while 40% or slightly more Russians live in an environment where such a pro-war majority does not exist.

Figure 1: Dynamics of support for the ‘SMO’ among respondents and their social circles, 2023-2025, % of those surveyed

This data is quite intriguing. The proportion of Russians whose social circles do not have a pro-'special operation' majority is significantly larger than the share of those who explicitly state their opposition to the military actions in response to a direct question. It is also notable that, unlike the direct question about attitudes toward the 'SMO', where about 40% avoided giving a clear answer, only 10% were uncertain when asked about their social environment.

A year and a half ago, in the context of the 'railway' test, supporters of the 'SMO' who lived in mixed environments – where both supporters and opponents were equally represented – were less willing to discuss the topic with random fellow travelers. Opponents of the 'special operation', however, were already more accustomed to the unpopularity of their stance. Still, their willingness to discuss it was lower when they found themselves in everyday environments where pro-'SMO' sentiment was dominant.

Today, both supporters and opponents are more likely to engage in discussions with a stranger holding opposing views if they live in a mixed environment of 'SMO' supporters and opponents in daily life. Their experiences have convinced them of their ability to sustain such a debate. Even more striking is the increased willingness to argue among opponents of the 'special operation' who are surrounded by its supporters in everyday interactions. This suggests that, over the past year and a half, they have not been dissuaded from the importance of their arguments.

The main takeaway from the repeated 'railway' test is that the 'spiral of silence' is not tightening further. Over the past year and a half, the willingness to discuss the issue has not declined among either supporters or opponents of the military actions. This means that despite the criminalisation of anti-war positions and the aggressive promotion of the official pro-war narrative, the proportion of 'SMO' opponents, as well as their presence in Russians’ everyday environments, has at least remained stable. This is further supported by trends in responses about close social circles, where the balance between hypothetical supporters and opponents of the 'military operation' has also remained stable.

Projection onto the Kremlin and three parties

In the latest wave of the Chronicles project survey, respondents were asked not only about the prevailing attitudes toward the war in their social circles but also about how they believed Putin’s inner circle views the 'special operation.'

One might assume that ordinary Russians would be certain that Putin's entourage fully supports the leader and that complete unity prevails in the government. Alternatively, given the opaque nature of Russia’s ruling elite, they might at least respond with 'I don’t know.' However, only a quarter of those surveyed (26%) gave this response, while three-quarters expressed a definite opinion. Among them, 47% believe that supporters of the 'special operation' dominate at the top of the Russian power structure, 5% think that opponents do, and 27% believe that both sides are equally represented.

This distribution closely resembles the pattern of opinions regarding the 'SMO' in respondents' own social circles. Just under half of those surveyed believe that Putin’s inner circle is predominantly composed of 'SMO' supporters. Meanwhile, a third of those surveyed (32%) think that Putin’s inner circle does not have a clear majority of 'SMO' supporters (by comparison, 40% of those surveyed live in environments where pro-'SMO' sentiment does not dominate). This is a rather surprising finding. Not only do a significant number of Russians live in environments where diverse opinions on the 'special operation' exist, but they also believe, despite extensive efforts to stigmatise the anti-war stance, that a similar diversity of opinion exists within the Russian elite.

Figure 2: Perceived attitudes towards the ‘SMO’ among Russians’ close social circles and Putin’s inner circle, February 2025, % of those surveyed

Those who state in the survey that they support the 'special operation' (50% of those surveyed) mostly find themselves in pro-'SMO' environments (79% of them). However, only 59% of these supporters believe that Putin's inner circle shares the same level of support, while 25% think there is no pro-war majority around Putin. The undecided respondents – those who were unsure or refused to state their own position on the 'special operation' (37%) – rarely live in a predominantly pro-war environment (21%). Instead, 43% of them exist in mixed social circles, and another 16% are surrounded primarily by opponents of the 'special operation.' At the same time, about 40% of these undecided respondents believe that Putin is surrounded by 'SMO' supporters, while 35% (almost the same number) think that no such majority exists within his inner circle. Finally, the open opponents of the 'SMO' (11% of those surveyed) mostly live among like-minded individuals (58%). Only about 30% of these opponents believe that there is a pro-war majority around Putin, while 55% think that such a majority does not exist. In other words, more than half of them perceive a significant gap between Putin’s stance on the war and the position of the Russian elite.

To what extent do Russians believe that the views present in their own social circles are also represented in the president’s inner circle? If the distributions are identical, this suggests that respondents believe those 'at the top' see the situation similarly to those 'at the bottom.' If there are discrepancies, it implies that those surveyed perceive the political elite as being detached from the general population.

Table 1. Perceptions of attitudes toward the war in one’s own social circle and Putin's inner circle, February 2025, % of those surveyed, excluding those who found it difficult to answer

Table 1 illustrates the overlap between respondents’ perceptions of their own social circles and their perceptions of Putin’s inner circle (excluding those who were undecided on either question). The first group consists of those who believe that attitudes toward the conflict in Ukraine are distributed similarly in Putin’s inner circle as in their own environment. This group makes up 43% of those surveyed. They assume that the opinions of their daily social circles are well represented among the elite. We can call this group 'The people and the Party are united.' The second group (12%) believes that the 'military operation' is supported less within Putin’s inner circle than in their own surroundings, meaning that the elite is more anti-war. To put it bluntly, this group thinks that 'the Kremlin is infiltrated by a 'fifth column.'' Finally, the third group believes that the pro-war unity within the elite is stronger than among the general public. They assume that 'the Kremlin is a monolithic squad of militarists,' meaning that the war is supported by the elite to a greater extent than by ordinary citizens. This group makes up 19% of those surveyed.

Thus, fewer than half of those surveyed believe that the opinions of their immediate surroundings are adequately represented among decision-makers. About one in eight (12%) assumes that many within Putin’s circle are secretly anti-war, while nearly one in five (19%) believes the elite is more militaristic than the general public and that the anti-war stance is underrepresented at the top.

EAs expected, supporters of the 'special operation' are more likely to feel that their views are well represented within the ruling elite (54%). However, this group also contains the largest share (18%) of those who believe the Kremlin harbors a 'fifth column' of covert war opponents – a narrative that has gained traction among pro-war bloggers. On the other hand, opponents of the 'SMO' overwhelmingly believe that people like them are underrepresented in Putin’s inner circle. Among them, 42% think that the Kremlin is more pro-war than the general population. Among the undecided, a third (33%) believe that sentiments in the Kremlin reflect those 'on the ground.' However, a nearly equal share (27%) assumes that the anti-war stance is underrepresented in Putin’s inner circle.

Figure 3: Shares of different groups in assessing the situation within the Russian elite, among supporters and opponents of the ‘military operation’ and the undecided, February 2025, % of those surveyed

Among men, the shares of the second and third groups are evenly distributed (15% each). However, among women, there is a significantly higher proportion of those who believe that the views of everyday Russians who do not share the enthusiasm of 'special operation' supporters are underrepresented in the Kremlin. This reflects not only a more anti-war sentiment among Russian women but also their perception of the ruling elite as more aggressive than the general population. In contrast, men are more inclined to see conspiracies within the ruling group that supposedly hinder both the government and the national leader from conducting the 'special operation.'

Discussions about a 'fifth column' in the Kremlin are more common among older age groups, while concerns about the underrepresentation of anti-war views are more prevalent among younger respondents. In terms of income, the second group (those who suspect the presence of a 'fifth column') is significantly concentrated at middle income levels, while the third group (those who believe that anti-war views are underrepresented in the Kremlin) is more common among lower-income respondents. Interestingly, the wealthiest groups, who are presumably the most connected to the elite, are the least convinced (39%) that the ruling class reflects mass attitudes toward the 'special operation.' This group includes both those who expose the 'fifth column' and those who believe that 'the Kremlin is a monolithic squad of militarists.'

Unsurprisingly, supporters of the second group (those who see a 'fifth column' within the Kremlin) are more prevalent among those who perceive the 'special operation' as having a positive impact on their financial well-being (21%). In general, the more consistently a person defends the values and goals of the 'special operation' – and the more willing they are, at least verbally, to participate – the more convinced they are that Russia’s decision-making centers are significantly influenced by the 'fifth column' of opponents. Conversely, those who hold more peaceful views believe that such peaceful positions are insufficiently represented within the country's leadership.

Figure 4: Assessments of the unity of the Russian elite regarding the ‘SMO’, February 2025, % of those surveyed

Discussion of war and the gradient of silence

Kirill Rogov

Director of Re:Russia

The distribution of respondents' answers to the direct question of whether they support the 'military operation' has remained largely unchanged over the past three years across almost all available Russian surveys. However, this distribution is highly dependent on the wording of the question and the response options provided. When respondents are given the opportunity to avoid a clear answer or to refrain from responding altogether (as seen in the question formulations used by the 'Chronicles' project and ExtremeScan), the group that does not take a clear position reaches about 40%, making it only slightly smaller than the group that declares support for the war. At the same time, the group of explicit opponents of the war appears very small, at just over 10%.

People respond much more readily to the question of how their immediate social circle views the 'military operation' (only 10% struggle to answer). Here, we encounter an obvious paradox. While only about one in nine respondents identified as a war opponent in a direct question, only 50% believe they live in an environment where war supporters are in the majority. Meanwhile, 40% claim that war supporters are not the majority in their social circle – of these, 27%believe both sides are equally represented, and 13% say opponents are the majority. This distribution is almost as stable as responses to the direct question, suggesting that in everyday interactions, where trust is higher and communication is more nuanced, people perceive the balance of war supporters and opponents differently than how it appears in surveys. (If respondents' close social circles do not overlap and are of equal size, the mathematical minimum percentage of war opponents in the population, based on survey data, would be 19.8%, and the maximum 52.2%, with the most likely range being 30-40%.)

Finally, the ‘railway test’, just as it did a year and a half ago, reveals that in random encounters with unfamiliar people, opponents of the 'special operation' are far less likely to speak out than supporters. As a result, their presence in public discussions appears even lower than in public opinion surveys. Among those who declared their support for the war (52%), 43% were willing to engage in discussion, making up 22.4% of the total sample. Among those who oppose the war (11%), only 25% were willing to discuss it – just 2.8%of the total sample. Thus, in a survey where 63% expressed an opinion, the number of declared war supporters was 4.7 times higher than that of declared opponents. But in a hypothetical Russian train conversation, where only 25% would participate in a discussion, the number of war supporters would outnumber opponents by eight times. This is how the 'spiral of silence' works.

The three questions addressed in the article by Vladimir Zvonovsky and Alexander Khodykin – about personal attitudes toward the war, perceptions of war sentiment in one’s social circle, and willingness to engage in a debate with someone holding an opposing view in a public place – are closely interconnected. Essentially, these three questions capture three different types of communication that respondents engage in under an unfavorable (authoritarian) opinion climate. In each case, the distribution of support and opposition is different. In a public space, similar to the train scenario, the ratio of these two groups is distorted compared to that in a sociological survey as anti-war views are less audible. However, in everyday personal interactions, the balance shifts in the opposite direction: respondents perceive the proportion of war opponents in their close circle to be much higher than in the survey data.

The varying response distributions across these three communication contexts correlate with different proportions of 'silent' respondents, i.e. those who do not express their views. In the railway test, more than 75% remain silent. In a survey, about 40% avoid taking a clear stance. This suggests that the distribution of war supporters and opponents in everyday private conversations is markedly different because, in such settings, people are more aware of the opinions of those around them. In other words, the share of war opponents increases as more people 'reveal' their true views. Moreover, silence in a survey (refusing to take a clear stance) and silence in real life can be interpreted differently depending on one's perspective. From an anti-war viewpoint, it may appear as a form of escapism or even conformity. But from another perspective, it could be seen as a refusal to conform to the state-imposed norm of supporting the war, which implicitly signals opposition.

The fact that survey responses about respondents’ social circles show a significantly higher proportion of war opponents does not necessarily reveal the true ratio of supporters and opponents. Rather, it indicates that in an authoritarian and repressive environment, different communicative contexts (including surveys) produce different results. It also suggests that, in the perception of a large number of respondents (likely even a majority), Russian society is more diverse in its attitudes toward the 'special operation' than one might assume based on train conversations or sociological surveys.

Moreover, answers to the fourth question – about how respondents perceive attitudes toward the war within Putin’s inner circle – add two important dimensions to this picture. First, they show that a significant proportion of those surveyed do not see diversity of opinion about the 'special operation' as merely a bubble effect within their own circles but rather as a broader characteristic of Russian society, present at various levels. Second, they indicate that even supporters of the war, who live among other supporters, are aware of the heterogeneity of opinions in society and assume that this diversity (which they may disapprove of) is present even at the highest levels of power.

A close comparison of responses to all four questions demonstrates that, despite the authorities’ efforts, discussions about the war continue within Russian society, even under unfavorable conditions. And as the 'elite test' shows, this discussion has political implications. However, the more public the setting, the more this discussion takes place in silence. Yet this does not mean that its participants are not listening or unable to recognise it.