29.04 USA Analytics

Unpopular Populism: Trump's ratings in American polls are falling, but not as dramatically or quickly as liberals would like

On the eve of his 100th day in office, Trump has almost become the most unpopular elected leader of the United States at this stage of a term, although in some polls he still fares better than his 2017 self.

Polls show that Trump’s approval ratings have significantly worsened over the course of April, after he launched his tariff saga, which caused shock not only around the world but also within the American economic and business establishment.

That said, public opinion polls tend to understate Trump’s popularity, and therefore these results should be treated with a degree of caution. The gap between those who express a favourable view of Trump and those with an unfavourable view currently stands at –6 percentage points; however, on the eve of the election, it was even worse.

Nevertheless, the trajectory of public support for Trump, a populist leader seeking to revolutionise both domestic and foreign policy, is a matter of critical importance. The first 100 days indicate growing irritation with Trump, yet not as widespread or swift as his opponents might hope.

The most sensitive area for Trump is the worsening perception and expectations among Americans regarding the economy. This reflects declining trust in his economic strategy, previously regarded as his strongest suit and, for many, a counterbalance to the more unconventional elements of the 47th president’s political views.

By contrast, anti-immigration policies remain Trump’s core pillar of support among his voter base and the broader American public. In this area, approval and disapproval ratings are nearly balanced, whereas in other domains, the negative gap reaches 11–18 points. Americans are generally unsupportive of Trump’s efforts to expand executive power and his disregard for judicial decisions.

Finally, Trump’s foreign policy ratings are deteriorating, especially with regard to his stance on the Russia–Ukraine conflict. The negative approval gap here exceeds 20 points. Among young people and non-white Americans, two-thirds of respondents disapprove of his approach. Trump’s anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian rhetoric has some traction with Republicans but fails to resonate not only with Democrats but also with independent voters.

Trump against Trump

By the end of the first 100 days of his second presidency, Donald Trump had already become, according to some polls, the most unpopular elected US leader at this point in office in the last 80 years. Until recently, he generally outperformed his own approval levels from 2017. According to the RealClearPolling average from 7–27 April, 45.3% of Americans approved of Trump’s presidency, while 52.4% disapproved. Out of 17 April surveys, only three showed a positive approval-disapproval spread, while in the three most recent polls – ABC News/Wash Post, NY Times/Siena and CNN – the negative gap ranged from 12 to 14 percentage points, with disapproval levels between 54% and 57%.

Presidents typically enjoy a significant honeymoon period during their first hundred days, with much higher-than-average national sentiment. On 27 January 2025, just a week after Trump’s inauguration, polling averages showed a positive spread of 6.2 percentage points: 50.5% approval versus 44.3% disapproval. However, approval began to fall within the first few weeks of the new presidency, while disapproval spiked for the first time in mid-February. By 12 March, the figures had levelled out. A further negative shift occurred in the final week of March, with the approval deficit reaching –2.1 percentage points (47.6% vs 49.7%), growing to –4.1 by 20 April, and eventually widening to –7.1. The New York Times polling aggregator painted a similar picture, though with a slightly larger negative gap by the end of April (53% disapproval to 44% approval). According to both aggregators, it was Trump's April tariff offensive that triggered the decline in his ratings.

Donald Trump is a populist leader who rose to power on the back of a vibrant, grassroots base of loyal supporters, often in opposition to elite and mainstream media consensus. Upon taking office, he began what he presented as a genuine revolution in US domestic and foreign policy, claiming a mandate from voters. For Trump, popularity and actual voter support are of far greater importance than they might be for a conventional president. His grip on the Republican Party, despite frequently diverging from traditional Republicanism and the views of many prominent Republicans.

The question of whether Trump truly holds a mandate from voters for such radical policies remains a matter of debate throughout the first hundred days of his presidency. His recent victory, following his defeat in the 2020 election, numerous accusations, and legal proceedings, was undoubtedly an exceptional event and, electorally speaking, appeared paradoxical in many respects. On the one hand, Trump did not secure a majority of the popular vote, receiving 49.8%, only 1.5 percentage points ahead of Kamala Harris. By comparison, Biden had a +4.5 point lead in 2020, Obama had +7.2 and +3.9 in 2008 and 2012 respectively, and Bush had +2.4 in 2004. At the same time, Trump received 14.5 million more votes than he did in 2016, though still 4 million fewer than Biden in 2020. Meanwhile, he won all seven swing states (where Republicans and Democrats have nearly equal chances of winning), albeit by narrow margins, as well as 85% of all congressional districts. Around 90% of districts demonstrated a pro-Trump shift between 2020 and 2024, meaning he improved his result in most of them. Thus, his electoral advantage can be described as broad but thin – weak in terms of vote margin and overall share, yet strong in terms of the widespread shift in voter sentiment in his favour.

Moreover, the extent of Trump’s advantage over Harris in the election came as a surprise to most analysts and forecasters. This is why current assessments of Trump’s popularity or unpopularity should be approached with caution. According to RealClearPolling, when asked 'Do you have a favourable or unfavourable opinion of Donald Trump?', in late April 2025 an average of 45.3% gave a favourable response, while 51.3% responded unfavourably. Yet on 4 November 2024, the day before the election, the figures were actually slightly worse: 44.9% versus 51.9%. Therefore, the current numbers do not in themselves indicate that Trump would lose if an election were held today. It is highly likely that many of Trump’s supporters are less willing to take part in polls than his opponents. Some American sociologists directly claim that many of their colleagues are repeating the same mistakes they made during the campaign and still 'don’t know how' to measure trust in Trump. In the latest readings from Rasmussen Reports, from which this statement originated, Trump’s approval balance stands at –4 percentage points.

The central intrigue surrounding Trump’s ratings during the first hundred days of his presidency lay in how voters would respond to the radicalism of his policies: would it alienate his moderate supporters, or would it inspire and mobilise them? On the whole, the answer is that Trump’s ratings are worsening, but not as rapidly or catastrophically as might be expected, given the cascade of scandals and the level of outrage directed at him in the liberal media.

Key themes: the economy, migrants, the courts, the war in Ukraine

The most sensitive area for Trump is the noticeable decline in public assessments and expectations regarding the economy, reflecting disappointment in his policies. The economy remains, in principle, the most important factor for American voters in judging a president. Trump's economic populism combines protectionist and classically liberal ideas in the eyes of many, especially his educated supporters. It is precisely his economic platform that gives him an advantage over left-wing Democratic candidates and offsets the eccentricity of many of his other political views.

Economic policies and promises have consistently been seen as Trump’s strong suit in his recent election campaigns, researchers at the Pew Research Center note. In both 2020 and 2024, Americans rated his ability to handle economic issues more highly than they did Joe Biden’s or Kamala Harris’s. In 2020, 53% of respondents believed Trump could make the right economic decisions; in the summer of last year, it was 54%; and immediately after the 2024 election, 59%. However, by April 2025, this figure had dropped to 45%. A SSRS poll commissioned by CNN recorded confidence in Trump’s economic policy at just 39% — the lowest figure of his entire political career.

Almost half of Americans surveyed by the Pew Research Center stated that Trump’s policies were weakening the US economy compared to its state under Biden (with 37% holding the opposite view), while 45% said they expected economic conditions to worsen within a year (up from 37% in February). According to RealClearPolling, Trump’s approval rating on the economy shows a negative spread of –13 percentage points (42% approving versus 55% disapproving).

Among Trump's more educated supporters, promises in the sphere of the economy were the central factor in the appeal of his programme. Among the less educated, however, the main hallmark of Trump’s brand was the radicalism of his anti-immigration policies. It is in this area that Americans, although still deeply polarised, retain the highest level of trust in Trump’s agenda. According to a Pew Research Center poll, 48% approve of Trump’s anti-immigration actions, while 52% disapprove. The RealClearPolling aggregator shows similar figures: 48.2% approval and 49.6% disapproval. However, in questions of this kind, people’s reluctance to express their true views on immigration usually results in significant bias. Therefore, it can be reasonably assumed that actual support for Trump’s anti-immigration policy is higher than what pollsters are recording.

Trump receives negative net ratings across all other areas of presidential competence, according to the Pew Research Center’s April survey. These range from an 11-point deficit (in areas such as trade deal negotiations, tax policy, and executive branch effectiveness) to an 18-point deficit (in healthcare policy). Only 33% believe Trump is capable of uniting the nation, while 67% do not.

Trump's desire to de facto expand the powers of the executive branch, which is a common trigger for personalised autocratisation (→ Re:Russia: State Capture), is causing at least some concern in American society. According to the Pew Research Center, 51% of Americans believe Trump is abusing presidential powers, while only 27% think otherwise. In the conflict between Trump and federal judges over migrant deportations, an overwhelming majority of respondents (83%) side with the judiciary, affirming that the US president must comply with court decisions, according to a Reuters/Ipsos poll. This view is shared by 96% of Democrats, 83% of Republicans, and 81% of independent voters. An ABC News/Washington Post/Ipsos poll found that 62% of Americans believe federal judges are not obstructing the president’s work and are acting within their authority.

Finally, the RealClearPolling aggregator records middling figures for attitudes toward Trump’s foreign policy: in April, 40.6% approved and 54.1% disapproved. Public assessments of Trump’s foreign policy have significantly worsened during the first hundred days of his presidency. In a Pew Research Center survey conducted just after the presidential election, 53% expressed confidence in Trump’s ability to make the right foreign policy decisions; by late April 2025, this figure had dropped to 44%. Among Republicans, trust in Trump’s foreign policy fell particularly sharply, from 88% to 78%.

According to a New York Times/Siena poll, 40% of Americans overall support Trump’s efforts to resolve international conflicts, while 54% do not. This negative balance of around 14 percentage points reflects the general split between Trump’s supporters and opponents in April’s polls. However, with regard to his stance on the Russia–Ukraine military conflict, the figures are markedly worse: only 35% support Trump’s position, while 56% oppose it – a 21-point negative gap. Among men, 42% support Trump’s pro-Russian stance, whereas among women, only 28% do. Among young people (under 30) and non-white Americans, two-thirds disapprove of Trump’s policy on the war. Among independent voters, the ratio is 31% in support versus 61% opposed.

Thus, when it comes to the Russia–Ukraine conflict, the unpopularity of Donald Trump’s pro-Russian course is significantly higher than the unpopularity of his actions in other areas. Americans, on the whole, sympathise with Ukraine and hold a very negative view of Vladimir Putin. At the end of March, the share of Americans who believed the US was not providing enough support to Ukraine rose to 46%. This is a one-and-a-half-fold increase compared to the previous survey in December 2024, according to a Gallup poll. However, in an April Pew Research Center poll, only 44% responded that Americans bear a responsibility to help Ukraine in its confrontation with Putin, down from 50% at the end of last year. This decline was due to Republican voters, among whom the share giving a positive response dropped from 36% to 23%. In response to another question, 59% said they believed Zelensky was committed to achieving peace in Ukraine, 47% said the same of Trump (while 41% expressed doubt), and only 19% said so of Putin. Therefore, the Oval Office spectacle staged by Trump’s team had a very limited impact on Americans. Any pressure on Ukraine in the Kremlin’s interest, or Trump’s withdrawal from peace talks and cessation of support for Ukraine, would trigger a wave of outrage in the United States.