On Trump’s cap, the abbreviation MAGA – Make America Great Again – ought to be replaced with MADA – Make America Decline Again. Trump’s slogan has turned into its complete opposite. The first months of his time in the White House marked a sharp turn towards the 'decline of America' in the eyes of the surrounding world.
The proportion of people who trust the United States and believe that America will play a positive role in the world in this decade is falling rapidly. Trust in American democracy, in the country’s ability to handle international issues, and in the US economy is also in decline.
The US is losing trust most rapidly among its traditional allies and the world’s most developed nations, both in Europe and in Asia. Trust in the US is also decreasing in Latin America.
Perceptions of America’s ability to act as a global leader and international arbiter are closely tied to perceptions of Donald Trump himself. Two-thirds of those surveyed by the Pew Research Center across 24 countries view him as incompetent, arrogant, and dishonest, compared to just a third who hold the opposite opinion.
Evaluations of the American economy’s prospects are somewhat less influenced by Trump personally and present a rather paradoxical picture. Of the eight countries where a majority believes that the US retains leadership in the economic race, five are in Asia, whereas in developed European countries, most respondents believe that China is already in the lead.
As expected, China has become the chief beneficiary of Trump’s image-damaging policies. Several surveys show a sharp rise in trust towards China alongside a dramatic collapse in trust towards the United States.
Global attitudes towards the United States deteriorated sharply in early 2025, following Donald Trump’s return to the White House, according to a Pew Research Center survey conducted between January and April 2025 among over 28,000 people in 24 countries. The proportion of respondents with a favourable view of the US declined in 15 countries over the course of the year. In 10 of those, the drop was particularly steep, ranging from 15 to 32 percentage points: Mexico (–32), Sweden (–28), Poland (–22), Canada (–20), the Netherlands (–19), Spain (–17), Kenya, South Korea, and Germany (–16 each), and Japan (–15).
In Australia, France, Indonesia, Italy and Brazil, the United States’ approval rating has dropped by 8–11 percentage points since spring last year. In six countries, the change in perception was minimal, while in Israel, Nigeria and Turkey, the US rating actually increased by 6–7 points. However, even with this rise, Turkey remains among the most negative towards the US: only 25% of respondents there express a favourable opinion of the country. The only nation with a lower figure is Sweden (19%).
Overall, in eight of the surveyed countries, no more than a third of respondents have a positive view of the US; in another eight, that figure lies between a third and half; and in the remaining eight, it is higher than 50%. The strongest approval comes from Israel (83%) and Nigeria (78%). In 2024, in the same group of countries, between 40% and 50% of respondents in eight countries had a favourable view of the US; in ten countries, that share was 51% to 70%; and in five countries, above 70%. (The only exception was Turkey, where only 18% trusted the US.) The shift has been dramatic. On average, across the sample, approval fell by 10 percentage points. The front of global anti-American sentiment has widened, with the most significant losses occurring among traditional allies, developed OECD countries in both Europe and Asia, where the average drop was 14 percentage points. It is also important to note that the survey was conducted mostly before 2 April, the date when Trump launched a tariff war with America’s trading partners. This move undoubtedly further damaged the country’s international standing.
On the whole, the decline in positive views of America directly correlates with negative attitudes towards Trump himself. Roughly a third (34%) of people across the surveyed countries say they trust him to handle international affairs, while nearly twice as many (62%) express a lack of confidence. Among OECD countries (ten in Europe plus Canada, Australia, Japan and South Korea), Trump’s trust ratings range from just 15% to 22% in seven countries, from 32% to 38% in six others, and only in Hungary do 53% say they trust him. In contrast, in the Global South, half of the ten countries surveyed show trust in Trump ranging between 40% and 80% (Israel, Nigeria, Kenya, India, and South Africa). In three more (Brazil, Argentina, and Indonesia), around a third express confidence. Despite low levels of trust in Mexico and Turkey (8% and 16% respectively), Trump generally enjoys higher trust levels in the Global South, largely because he fits the more accepted archetype of a 'strong leader'.
Indeed, in five of the second group of countries (Nigeria, Israel, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico), three-quarters or more of respondents describe Trump as a strong leader. In the remaining five, that figure ranges from 52% to 65%. Among OECD nations, fewer than half of respondents in four countries see him as a strong leader, while in eight countries the figure ranges between 50% and 75%. Conversely, in 13 OECD countries (with the sole exception of Hungary) between 75% and 93% describe Trump as arrogant and conceited. In the Global South, only three countries view him this way. Among all OECD countries surveyed, only two have a majority who describe Trump as capable of solving complex problems (Hungary and Greece), and just one (Hungary) sees him as sufficiently qualified for the presidency. Across the entire sample, a median of 28% consider Trump honest; in OECD countries, this figure falls to around 21%.
On average, trust in Trump is 13 percentage points lower than in Joe Biden, with this gap particularly stark in OECD nations. Trump outperforms Biden only in Greece and Hungary within this group. Interestingly, across nearly all countries, with the exception of Canada, Trump’s second term is viewed more favourably than his first. In all 24 countries, positive sentiment towards Trump has a clear gender divide: on average, 13 percentage points more men than women view him favourably. Unsurprisingly, political orientation is also a major factor. The stronger the presence of right-leaning views in a country, the more positively Trump tends to be perceived.
Thus, within the OECD group, the countries most strongly opposed to Trump are Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, France, Australia, and Canada. The most favourable or at least tolerant views towards him are found in Hungary, Greece, and Italy. In the Global South, Trump enjoys the most support in Israel, Nigeria, Kenya, and to some extent, India. The most anti-Trump sentiment is found in Turkey and Mexico, followed at some distance by Argentina. Attitudes towards Trump also correlate with perceptions of American democracy: the more anti-Trump a country is, the more negatively it views the current state of US democracy. Conversely, the stronger the presence of right-wing views in a country, the more positively that country tends to view American democracy.Notably, more than 70% of respondents in eight anti-Trump OECD countries believe that the United States is currently gripped by an intense internal partisan and ideological conflict.
Perceptions of the American economy’s potential are less directly tied to how Donald Trump is viewed personally. And here, the picture is rather paradoxical. In only eight countries is there a prevailing belief that the American economy is the strongest in the world, and the majority of these countries are in Asia. Among European nations, such an opinion is common only in Sweden. Conversely, in twelve countries where the largest segment of the population believes that China has the strongest economy in the world, eight are developed European nations. This reflects a clear scepticism towards the strength and future of the American economy among America’s traditional allies.
The Pew Research Centre survey data is fully consistent with the results of an online Ipsos survey conducted between 21 March and 4 April across 29 countries. The proportion of respondents who believe that the United States will have a positive influence on world affairs over the next decade has declined in 24 of those countries over the past six months. On average, across the entire sample, this figure dropped from 60% to 46% (in the remaining five countries, perceptions remained largely unchanged). Interestingly, even within the United States itself, belief in America’s positive global role has fallen by the same 14 percentage points, from 77% to 63%. Among the eleven countries showing the lowest levels of confidence in the US (19–39%), nine are European, alongside Canada and Australia.
As expected, the primary beneficiary of Trump's accelerated American decline is China. Nearly half (49%) of respondents in April believed China would exert a positive influence on global affairs, compared with 39% in October 2024 and 34% in October 2022. As such, China has now overtaken the United States in this regard. This is a stark contrast to 2023, when the US led by 25 percentage points. Other countries also improved their standing: Saudi Arabia rose to 45% (from 37% in October 2024), Russia to 34% (from 27% in October 2024 and 23% in October 2022), and even Iran saw a modest increase to 26% in April, up from 20% in October 2024. During Trump’s first presidency, belief in the US had also declined, from 68% in 2015 to 48% in 2018, but from a higher starting point and without such a sharp concurrent rise in trust towards China.
China also outpaces the United States by 5 percentage points in another global online survey, the Democracy Perception Index. By April 2025, the US had plummeted to a net score (positive minus negative assessments) of –5, a fall of 22 points since the previous year. China, by contrast, had reached a score of +5 in 2024 (up from a neutral balance in 2023) and then +14 in the most recent poll. China received mostly positive ratings in all regions except Europe. However, even within Europe, the US now ranks below China in terms of negative perceptions. In Germany, the US scored –44 compared to China’s –41; in Canada, –47 versus –35; and in Spain, –42 against –13. Overall, China now outperforms the United States in 19 European countries.
Populism, a devaluation of values, arrogance, and inconsistency, all hallmarks of Trump’s persona and policies, are alienating the US from its traditional allies, while simultaneously diminishing its influence in the eyes of the broader world, including the Global South. Despite boasting of his ability to resolve issues that the previous administration could not, Trump is ultimately inflicting a devastating reputational blow on the United States. Whether the country will ever recover from it remains uncertain.
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