Expertise
Three and a Half Periods of Russian Life in Wartime
Over the three and a half years of the ‘special military operation,’ Russians' social attitudes have undergone several stages of change and have come full circle – from crisis assessments of their financial situation in autumn 2022 to an economic and consumer boom, which peaked in early 2024, and then to a new downturn in autumn 2025. By October 2025, the social sentiment index had already fallen significantly below the levels of autumn 2022.
The Narrative of The 1990s: Between personal experience, family memory and ideological myths
The contrast between 'Putin’s stability' and the 'turbulent nineties' has become one of the key narratives of Russian authoritarianism. And although the decade’s reputation in the minds of today’s Russians is largely shaped by personal experience and 'family narrative', their individual and family memories of that era differ from its broader sociotropic assessment, thus revealing the significant influence of the propagandist myth on public sentiment.
The School of Military Putinism: How Russian school education has changed during the war
The intense ideologisation of school education has become one of the central arenas where the transformation of Russia’s corrupt personalist dictatorship into an ideocratic (albeit still corrupt) regime is taking place. There is a simple explanation for this: young people are furthest removed from the ideals of ultraconservative militarism that underpin the regime’s new ideology, and therefore require intensified indoctrination.
The Shadow of Stalin: Why and How Russia is Memorialising the Tyrant Once Again
The remembrance of Stalin in today’s Russia is not the result of any deliberate policy. It originates from several grassroots and diverse initiatives, reflecting different aspects of the Stalin myth. These initiatives, however, resonate with two trends in Kremlin ideology of the late 2010s and early 2020s: the myth of ‘our shared great past’ and the tendency to marginalise the memory of Stalinist repressions.
A New Start: Regional policy and regional nomenklatura in Russia in the fourth year of the ‘SMO’
In mid-2024, the Kremlin began turning its attention back to regional politics after a pause taken at the start of the war. The new approaches may prove even harsher than before: the replacement of governors is now often accompanied by near blanket 'purges' of the local administrative elite. A new trend has emerged whereby the regional bureaucracies are being infiltrated by 'special military operation' participants, career military officers, or administrators who have worked in the 'new territories.'
From Hybrid to Mobilisation: The evolution of Russia's political economy model and the challenges of its military transformation
Over the past twenty years or so, a hybrid political-economic model has taken shape and operated in Russia, combining elements of a 'developmental state' and a 'mafia state', layered over the basic framework of a liberal market economy. The protracted war in Ukraine is pushing the Russian authorities towards a shift in the direction of a mobilisation model; however, such a transformation is a complex and perilous political manoeuvre, the success of which is far from guaranteed.
Somewhere Between Mauritania and Portugal: Possible Trajectories of the Putin Regime Through the Lens of Comparative Data
When discussing the future of Putin's regime, experts usually present it as a mechanical projection of the trends observed in the present. However, real history often unfolds along trajectories that appear unpredictable under this approach. Comparative data allow us to partially overcome this inertia of thinking. What do they say about the effects of wars on political regimes and the prospects for different types of personalist autocracies?
Train, Inner Circle, Kremlin: Russians' attitudes to the war in different communicative situations
In the perception of the majority of people surveyed, they live in a society where there is a greater diversity of opinions about the war than their direct responses to sociologists' questions might suggest. Moreover, a significant proportion of those surveyed view the polarisation of opinions on the ‘special operation’ not as a phenomenon limited to their immediate social circle but as a characteristic of Russian society as a whole, manifesting itself at various levels.
The 2025 Crossroad: Russian authorities will have to choose between two scenarios for the Russian economy
In 2025, the Russian authorities are faced with a fundamental decision: a choice between halting the expansion of state financing and allowing the economy to enter a prolonged period of poorly controlled inflation. The first scenario risks an economic downturn but would correct the existing imbalance; the second also leads to a slowdown in growth and a decline in living standards, but escaping from it would be much more difficult.
Alternative Globalisation: Will Russia become the flagship of a coalition of economic disorder?
Russia is becoming a global laboratory of resistance to sanctions pressure. A dangerous consequence of this is the formation of an economic model based on the abolition of intellectual property rights, opaque foreign trade, and the use of unconventional forms of international settlements. The institutionalisation of such a model threatens to become an alternative to the globalisation we once knew, standing in stark contrast to it.
Regional Elites in the Era of the ‘Special Military Operation’: Evolution, current state and scenarios
The assumption that regional elites might act as initiators of political change or the vanguard of dissent is based on an outdated notion shaped by the experiences of the 1990s. Little remains of their former cohesion and rootedness – today, they resemble more of a fragmented class of regional nomenklatura, dependent on the pervasive federal 'verticals' – bureaucratic, political, and corporate.
Talk, baby, talk: why Trump's intentions to enforce lower oil prices are unlikely to scare Putin
Trump has repeatedly stated that he intends to increase oil production dramatically to reduce global hydrocarbon prices. However, in reality, he has far fewer energy-related levers to pressure Putin than many would like to think. And Trump’s campaign slogan, ‘Drill, baby, drill’, is unlikely to have seriously intimidated the Russian president.
Time for Revenge: The pendulum that swung left has been pushed backwards by voters
Throughout his presidency, Trump will attempt to partially roll back the gains made by Democrats over the past decades; however, his reform plans are unusually ambitious for a Republican. Meanwhile, the polarisation of American society will have a significant impact on the situation in the country.
Five Discourses Around The War: A new map of the Russian public sphere
The majority of Russian citizens gravitate towards a discourse on war that is almost absent in the Russian public sphere. This is loyalist pacifism, where dissatisfaction with the war is combined with loyalty to Putin and the Russian government. The demand for public representation of this ‘silent majority’ will grow as the costs of the war increase – if this happens, an unexpected transformation of Russia's discursive landscape may occur.
From adaptation to mobilisation: The logic of changes in state-business relations in the context of war and sanctions
If macroeconomic conditions deteriorate, a revision of the principles of coexistence and interaction that have developed between Russian business and the state over the past two decades seems almost inevitable – even though these very principles have ensured that the Russian economy has been highly adaptable to the shocks experienced.
Unpopular War: Russian opponents and non-opponents of the invasion of Ukraine. Part 2
Researchers identify four types of opponents to the war: ‘integrators’',isolationists', 'the oppressed', and 'activists', noting that a common trend among them is to seek common ground and interaction with the surrounding atmosphere of acceptance of the war, which, however, does not turn them into its supporters.
Unpopular War: Russian Opponents and Non-Opponents of the Invasion of Ukraine. Part 1
The personal impressions accumulated by the average Russian about the course of the war and its impact on the life of the country partially undermine trust in official information and provoke more critical judgements about the military conflict and its consequences for Russia and Russian society. However, this criticism is not transformed into an anti-war stance.
Nuclear Inferiority Complex: Escalation rhetoric through the prism of the Cold War experience
Russia's current leadership has inherited from the Soviet rulers a sense of a lack of recognition of its right to be a global power. This tension defined Soviet policy during the Cold War — from Stalin's expansionism to Khrushchev's nuclear adventurism. Today's Russian leaders have largely replicated this model; however, the Kremlin's capabilities are much further removed from these global ambitions than they were during the Soviet era.
Parallel Cheremushkin: The Absence and Presence of 'War' in a Provincial Russian City
From the very beginning of the war, sociologists have faced the question of how to study public opinion under a repressive and militaristic regime. To understand how Russians feel about the war and adapt to the new military reality, researchers from the Public Sociology Laboratory have conducted an incredible immersion experiment – they travelled to three Russian regions, where they spent a month in participant observation mode, without publicising the subject of their study.
Protracted Military Putinism: How long it will last and how it will end. Realities and projections
The political regime that emerged in Russia as a result of the transformation of the war from blitzkrieg into a protracted conflict has overcome a period of vulnerability and instability. Protracted military Putinism should now be considered the baseline scenario, within which the regime is able to mitigate imbalances, endure significant deterioration of the economy and manage political risks. However, this does not mean that the regime has overcome threats and challenges.
Dynamics of Isolation in Conditions of Fragmentation: The results of two years of the sanctions experiment
The limited effect of sanctions against Russia has been determined by several factors: changes in the structure of the global economy, the effects of the logic of arbitrage, and the internal contradictions of the sanctions regime. Any further dynamics of the impact of sanctions will be cyclical: new tools of control will be created and new ways to circumvent them will emerge as a result. And, in the long term, everything will depend on the extent to which the Russian economy retains its market core.
Over the three and a half years of the ‘special military operation,’ Russians' social attitudes have undergone several stages of change and have come full circle – from crisis assessments of their financial situation in autumn 2022 to an economic and consumer boom, which peaked in early 2024, and then to a new downturn in autumn 2025. By October 2025, the social sentiment index had already fallen significantly below the levels of autumn 2022.
The Narrative of The 1990s: Between personal experience, family memory and ideological myths
The contrast between 'Putin’s stability' and the 'turbulent nineties' has become one of the key narratives of Russian authoritarianism. And although the decade’s reputation in the minds of today’s Russians is largely shaped by personal experience and 'family narrative', their individual and family memories of that era differ from its broader sociotropic assessment, thus revealing the significant influence of the propagandist myth on public sentiment.
The School of Military Putinism: How Russian school education has changed during the war
The intense ideologisation of school education has become one of the central arenas where the transformation of Russia’s corrupt personalist dictatorship into an ideocratic (albeit still corrupt) regime is taking place. There is a simple explanation for this: young people are furthest removed from the ideals of ultraconservative militarism that underpin the regime’s new ideology, and therefore require intensified indoctrination.
The Shadow of Stalin: Why and How Russia is Memorialising the Tyrant Once Again
The remembrance of Stalin in today’s Russia is not the result of any deliberate policy. It originates from several grassroots and diverse initiatives, reflecting different aspects of the Stalin myth. These initiatives, however, resonate with two trends in Kremlin ideology of the late 2010s and early 2020s: the myth of ‘our shared great past’ and the tendency to marginalise the memory of Stalinist repressions.
A New Start: Regional policy and regional nomenklatura in Russia in the fourth year of the ‘SMO’
In mid-2024, the Kremlin began turning its attention back to regional politics after a pause taken at the start of the war. The new approaches may prove even harsher than before: the replacement of governors is now often accompanied by near blanket 'purges' of the local administrative elite. A new trend has emerged whereby the regional bureaucracies are being infiltrated by 'special military operation' participants, career military officers, or administrators who have worked in the 'new territories.'
From Hybrid to Mobilisation: The evolution of Russia's political economy model and the challenges of its military transformation
Over the past twenty years or so, a hybrid political-economic model has taken shape and operated in Russia, combining elements of a 'developmental state' and a 'mafia state', layered over the basic framework of a liberal market economy. The protracted war in Ukraine is pushing the Russian authorities towards a shift in the direction of a mobilisation model; however, such a transformation is a complex and perilous political manoeuvre, the success of which is far from guaranteed.
Somewhere Between Mauritania and Portugal: Possible Trajectories of the Putin Regime Through the Lens of Comparative Data
When discussing the future of Putin's regime, experts usually present it as a mechanical projection of the trends observed in the present. However, real history often unfolds along trajectories that appear unpredictable under this approach. Comparative data allow us to partially overcome this inertia of thinking. What do they say about the effects of wars on political regimes and the prospects for different types of personalist autocracies?
Train, Inner Circle, Kremlin: Russians' attitudes to the war in different communicative situations
In the perception of the majority of people surveyed, they live in a society where there is a greater diversity of opinions about the war than their direct responses to sociologists' questions might suggest. Moreover, a significant proportion of those surveyed view the polarisation of opinions on the ‘special operation’ not as a phenomenon limited to their immediate social circle but as a characteristic of Russian society as a whole, manifesting itself at various levels.
The 2025 Crossroad: Russian authorities will have to choose between two scenarios for the Russian economy
In 2025, the Russian authorities are faced with a fundamental decision: a choice between halting the expansion of state financing and allowing the economy to enter a prolonged period of poorly controlled inflation. The first scenario risks an economic downturn but would correct the existing imbalance; the second also leads to a slowdown in growth and a decline in living standards, but escaping from it would be much more difficult.
Alternative Globalisation: Will Russia become the flagship of a coalition of economic disorder?
Russia is becoming a global laboratory of resistance to sanctions pressure. A dangerous consequence of this is the formation of an economic model based on the abolition of intellectual property rights, opaque foreign trade, and the use of unconventional forms of international settlements. The institutionalisation of such a model threatens to become an alternative to the globalisation we once knew, standing in stark contrast to it.
Regional Elites in the Era of the ‘Special Military Operation’: Evolution, current state and scenarios
The assumption that regional elites might act as initiators of political change or the vanguard of dissent is based on an outdated notion shaped by the experiences of the 1990s. Little remains of their former cohesion and rootedness – today, they resemble more of a fragmented class of regional nomenklatura, dependent on the pervasive federal 'verticals' – bureaucratic, political, and corporate.
Talk, baby, talk: why Trump's intentions to enforce lower oil prices are unlikely to scare Putin
Trump has repeatedly stated that he intends to increase oil production dramatically to reduce global hydrocarbon prices. However, in reality, he has far fewer energy-related levers to pressure Putin than many would like to think. And Trump’s campaign slogan, ‘Drill, baby, drill’, is unlikely to have seriously intimidated the Russian president.
Time for Revenge: The pendulum that swung left has been pushed backwards by voters
Throughout his presidency, Trump will attempt to partially roll back the gains made by Democrats over the past decades; however, his reform plans are unusually ambitious for a Republican. Meanwhile, the polarisation of American society will have a significant impact on the situation in the country.
Five Discourses Around The War: A new map of the Russian public sphere
The majority of Russian citizens gravitate towards a discourse on war that is almost absent in the Russian public sphere. This is loyalist pacifism, where dissatisfaction with the war is combined with loyalty to Putin and the Russian government. The demand for public representation of this ‘silent majority’ will grow as the costs of the war increase – if this happens, an unexpected transformation of Russia's discursive landscape may occur.
From adaptation to mobilisation: The logic of changes in state-business relations in the context of war and sanctions
If macroeconomic conditions deteriorate, a revision of the principles of coexistence and interaction that have developed between Russian business and the state over the past two decades seems almost inevitable – even though these very principles have ensured that the Russian economy has been highly adaptable to the shocks experienced.
Unpopular War: Russian opponents and non-opponents of the invasion of Ukraine. Part 2
Researchers identify four types of opponents to the war: ‘integrators’',isolationists', 'the oppressed', and 'activists', noting that a common trend among them is to seek common ground and interaction with the surrounding atmosphere of acceptance of the war, which, however, does not turn them into its supporters.
Unpopular War: Russian Opponents and Non-Opponents of the Invasion of Ukraine. Part 1
The personal impressions accumulated by the average Russian about the course of the war and its impact on the life of the country partially undermine trust in official information and provoke more critical judgements about the military conflict and its consequences for Russia and Russian society. However, this criticism is not transformed into an anti-war stance.
Nuclear Inferiority Complex: Escalation rhetoric through the prism of the Cold War experience
Russia's current leadership has inherited from the Soviet rulers a sense of a lack of recognition of its right to be a global power. This tension defined Soviet policy during the Cold War — from Stalin's expansionism to Khrushchev's nuclear adventurism. Today's Russian leaders have largely replicated this model; however, the Kremlin's capabilities are much further removed from these global ambitions than they were during the Soviet era.
Parallel Cheremushkin: The Absence and Presence of 'War' in a Provincial Russian City
From the very beginning of the war, sociologists have faced the question of how to study public opinion under a repressive and militaristic regime. To understand how Russians feel about the war and adapt to the new military reality, researchers from the Public Sociology Laboratory have conducted an incredible immersion experiment – they travelled to three Russian regions, where they spent a month in participant observation mode, without publicising the subject of their study.
Protracted Military Putinism: How long it will last and how it will end. Realities and projections
The political regime that emerged in Russia as a result of the transformation of the war from blitzkrieg into a protracted conflict has overcome a period of vulnerability and instability. Protracted military Putinism should now be considered the baseline scenario, within which the regime is able to mitigate imbalances, endure significant deterioration of the economy and manage political risks. However, this does not mean that the regime has overcome threats and challenges.
Dynamics of Isolation in Conditions of Fragmentation: The results of two years of the sanctions experiment
The limited effect of sanctions against Russia has been determined by several factors: changes in the structure of the global economy, the effects of the logic of arbitrage, and the internal contradictions of the sanctions regime. Any further dynamics of the impact of sanctions will be cyclical: new tools of control will be created and new ways to circumvent them will emerge as a result. And, in the long term, everything will depend on the extent to which the Russian economy retains its market core.