Regional Elites in the Era of the ‘Special Military Operation’: Evolution, current state and scenarios

Regional elites in today's Russia: do they exist at all and what do they influence?

Among those speculating about political changes in Russia’s near future, discussions about the moment when regional elites ‘raise their heads’ and become drivers of political transformation are quite popular. Nearly every event – a scandal or a local crisis – is often interpreted as a sign of this impending surge in regional political activity. Such speculations, however, completely overlook the fundamental changes in the political systems of Russian regions that have occurred since 2000. Instead, they rely on rudimentary memories of the strength and influence of regional elites in the 1990s, which are now firmly in the past.

The elites that analysts refer to in such scenarios no longer exist. Certainly, as a collection of individuals occupying significant political and economic leadership positions and possessing personal authority, elites do exist in the regions. However, in terms of qualitative characteristics, political roles, origins, authority, resources, and composition, they differ radically from the regional elites of the 1990s and early 2000s. Today, they are more akin to a group of frequently rotated officials who are administratively and economically dependent on the centre. They operate with significantly diminished economic resources and, in many cases, almost none at all.

The regional elites that controlled Russian regions starting in the early 1990s had the following characteristics:

• Personnel cohesion. Nearly 20 years of 'stagnation' (the term 'stagnation', referring to the Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko eras, primarily implies stagnation in personnel) had created tightly-knit nomenklatura conglomerates at the local level, bound by mutual obligations and a powerful system of informal connections.

• Possession of real power in their territories. By the mid-1990s, these elites held almost absolute power in most regions. This power was backed by direct legitimacy obtained from the population during a time when the federal centre was weak, preoccupied with internal conflicts, and thus inclined to court regional support.

• Control over economic resources. The period of initial property redistribution following the collapse of the USSR benefited local nomenklatura at the regional level. Starting in the late 1980s, administrative entrepreneurship flourished, and financial-industrial groups (FIGs) and oligarchic clans formed around local and regional administrations. These groups created supporting infrastructures, ranging from security forces (in the guise of private security firms and informal organisations) to local media holdings.

Of this list, none of these institutional foundations of regional administrative power – and consequently, the elites connected to it – remain. The cohesion, authority, and control over resources that once defined regional elites have all but disappeared.

Dismantling regionalism: destruction of personnel cohesion

The main instrument for eroding personnel cohesion has been the mass rotation of governors and the practice of appointing outsiders’ (known as varyagi, i.e. leaders brought in from outside the region.) Such practices had historical precedents at the regional level during the rule of Joseph Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev.

Since the abolition of direct gubernatorial elections in 2005 (the last election was held in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug on February 6, 2005), the rotation of governors accelerated sharply, with varyagi coming to dominate the gubernatorial ranks. Between 2005 and 2012, the gubernatorial corps underwent almost complete renewal. A total of 88 new governors were appointed, with some regions experiencing multiple changes in leadership. The Irkutsk region, for instance, saw four governors and one acting governor during this period. By the end of May 2012, only 16 governors who had been in office at the time of the new 'appointment system' introduction retained their posts.

This comprehensive renewal of the gubernatorial corps marked a qualitative shift in the role of governors: they transitioned from politicians to administrators and executors. Even in cases where previously elected governors retained their positions, their declining influence and loss of political independence became increasingly evident. Governors' dependence on local communities, including regional clans, financial-industrial groups (FIGs), and other elite networks, weakened significantly. The policy aimed to minimise personal ties to assigned regions and reduce obligations of any kind – political or economic – to local interests, aligning closely with the practices of the classic Soviet era.

During the initial wave of gubernatorial appointments in Putin’s second term (February 2005 – 7 May, 2008), 18 out of 29 appointees could be classified as varyagi. In the subsequent 'Medvedev wave' of mass replacements (7 May, 2008 – 31 December, 2011), 23 of 40 appointments were varyagi. In the series of appointments preceding the return of direct gubernatorial elections (January–May 2012), 11 of 19 appointees were varyagi. Altogether, during this period, 52 out of 88 appointments – nearly 60% – were varyagi.

Following the 2012 return of conditional elections – effectively a procedure of 'appointment' after a regional plebiscite where candidates controlled their own competition – the situation regarding 'rootedness' changed little. From 2012 to 2015, under Vyacheslav Volodin’s oversight of domestic policy in the Presidential Administration, the proportion of varyagi decreased to 46% (12 of 26 new appointments). However, during the mass replacement wave of 2016-2018 under Sergey Kiriyenko, varyagi accounted for nearly 80% of appointments (37 of 47). Between 2019 and 2024, the proportion remained similar, with 42 varyagi out of 52 appointees (82%). Among current governors (excluding the annexed regions of Eastern Ukraine), 48 out of 85 – 57% – are varyagi. At the same time, the average tenure of governors has shortened, with some appointees failing to complete even a single term.

Number of regional leadership changes; the data reflects appointments, elections and temporary acting governors, 2012-2024 (excluding the regions of Eastern Ukraine)

Rootedness of new governors in appointments, 2012-2024

The trend of deploying varyagi has gradually extended to lower levels of governance. As of 1 January, 2020, the total number of senior regional bureaucrats (heads of regional governments, deputy governors, chiefs of staff for regional administrations or governors, and regional finance chiefs) in Russia stood at 725. Of these, 187 (26%) could be considered varyagi to varying degrees. By January 1, 2023, the regional bureaucratic contingent had grown to 790, with 219 (28%) categorised as varyagi. The situation remained largely unchanged in 2023-2024.

At the same time, the composition of regional administrative elites is marked by extreme volatility. The peak period of replacements occurred between 1 July, 2018, and 1 July, 2019, when 51% of the senior regional nomenklatura (governors, their deputies, regional legislative speakers, and mayors of regional centres) underwent rotations. In contrast, the lowest rate of turnover in recent years was during the first year of the 'special military operation', between 1 January, 2022, and 1 January, 2023, when only 31% of senior officials were replaced. On average, the annual turnover rate for senior regional officials is about 35% of their total number, which is extremely high. This suggests that few senior regional bureaucrats in Russia during the 2010s and 2020s held their positions for more than three years. Such short tenures rarely allow officials to become significant, independent administrative figures or serve as focal points for consolidating interests.

However, regional dynamics vary significantly. Some regions demonstrate greater personnel stability (e.g., Kabardino-Balkaria, Adygea, and Vologda Oblast before the governorship of Georgy Filimonov), while others are highly unstable (e.g., Zabaykalsky Krai, the Jewish Autonomous Oblast before Rostislav Goldstein, and Ingushetia before Mahmud-Ali Kalimatov). The proportion of varyagi also varies. Some governors have made minimal changes to local administrative teams, either due to a lack of their own networks or an unwillingness to create them. Such cases may reflect the extreme technocratism of the governor or the cohesion of local elites, which appointees may find difficult to challenge. Conversely, abnormal personnel instability is typically linked to the absence of heavyweights or recognised leaders in the regional elite, the fragmented nature of the elite, or the governor's inability to attract the necessary personnel.

These exceptions, however, do not alter the overall picture. Regional bureaucratic elites no longer resemble cohesive teams of officials with long-standing working relationships and mutual understanding of each other's interests. Most appointees view their service in regional administrations as temporary, often transitioning to other roles in business, federal agencies, or other structures. This transient nature further undermines the development of strong, rooted regional elites capable of independently influencing governance.

Dismantling regionalism: the loss of real and economic power by governors

Four years before the abolition of direct gubernatorial elections, governors began losing some of their real governing powers. After the system was dismantled, the systemic weakening of regional elites accelerated due to the 'universal verticalisation' occurring on several fronts. Regional businesses were bought out and redistributed, becoming part of federal corporate verticals. The mandatory introduction of party-list elections for regional legislatures in 2003, combined with a ban on regional parties and coalitions, reinforced the vertical integration of party and electoral processes. And, regional executive authorities came under increased regulation and oversight by corresponding federal agencies, creating a ‘system of parallel verticals’.

Incorporated into these verticals, regional authorities lost much of their ability to act independently, focusing instead on implementing federal policies. Simultaneously, they became more autonomous from other regional institutions, including governors. This was especially evident in the case of regional branches of law enforcement and regulatory bodies – such as the prosecutor’s office, FSB directorates, internal affairs (and later, investigative committees), and tax agencies.

By 2000-2001, governors lost their ability to influence the appointment of regional law enforcement officials (e.g., internal affairs and prosecution). Informal influence over other security services had already been minimal. The second key vertical after law enforcement became the financial vertical, with the practice of coordinating appointments of regional financial officials with the Ministry of Finance becoming standard. During the late 2000s, federal influence expanded to include oversight bodies such as the Federal Antimonopoly Service, Rosprirodnadzor, and Rostekhnadzor, which had previously played little role in regional governance.

Within regional administrations, a process of 'managerialisation' began, eroding governors' personal control over their administrative teams. In the 1990s, governors had nearly complete freedom in personnel policy, forming personal clienteles in regional governments. By the 2000s – and especially after 2012 – they increasingly had to work with sectoral 'commissars' approved by relevant federal agencies. As a result, regional administrations shifted from cohesive teams to loosely connected managers, often more aligned with their Moscow-based superiors than the governor. In many regions, federal agency approvals for appointments effectively replaced confirmations by regional legislative assemblies.

With key officials in regional administrations reporting to supervisors in Moscow, governors transformed into high-ranking clerks (regional-level top managers) bearing political responsibility but with limited power. The executive hierarchy fragmented into numerous parallel verticals rather than converging at the governor.

An informal but widespread practice emerged where appointments of key vice governors for internal policy and regional political strategists required consultation with the Presidential Administration. This was particularly critical for technocratic governors without prior electoral experience or established political teams. The Internal Policy Directorate of the Presidential Administration often played a central role in these appointments, though in some cases, the president’s plenipotentiary in the relevant federal district took charge (e.g., in the Far East under Yury Trutnev). However, heavyweight governors with established teams could usually select their own preferred specialists without significant resistance. United Russia’s federal apparatus also attempted to influence this process until around 2012-2014, but its current role is minimal.

The practice of coordinating regional appointments with the federal centre continues to expand. In 2014, the Ministry of Industry and Trade introduced a non-mandatory agreement process for approving heads of regional industry departments as part of cooperation agreements in industrial policy. In May 2018, amendments to Article 83 of the Russian Forest Code gave Rosleskhoz (under the Ministry of Natural Resources) the right to approve regional ministers of natural resources and ecology. Subsequently, federal coordination became required for appointments of regional heads in construction oversight and education. In 2021, the Ministry of Health implemented mandatory approval for heads of regional healthcare departments. Each new requirement was justified by the need to enhance oversight and ensure the quality and effectiveness of the relevant activities.

In 2020, constitutional amendments solidified the loss of gubernatorial autonomy in personnel matters. A new clause in Article 132 declared that 'local self-government bodies and state authorities form a unified system of public power in the Russian Federation and interact to achieve the most effective solutions to tasks'. Building on this, Federal Law No. 414-FZ ('On General Principles of the Organisation of Public Power in the Subjects of the Russian Federation') explicitly allowed federal executive bodies to participate in forming regional executive bodies across nearly all areas of governance.

The growing 'managerialisation' of regional governance has led to situations where regional administrations host 'managerial landing teams' from various federal agencies, representing different verticals and often having complex relationships with each other. These micro-teams are frequently dispatched from Moscow, the Moscow Region, Tyumen, Tatarstan, and Krasnoyarsk, which have become informal 'talent factories' for regional appointments. The result is the rise of 'nomadic managers' who readily change regions and administrative teams.

Such strong federal intervention does not entirely preclude governors from forming their own teams. The degree of independence largely depends on the governor’s political strength and influence (strong political figures with significant freedom to shape their administrations include Sobyanin, Kadyrov, Minnikhanov and some others). Less powerful governors can assemble teams only in areas where federal agencies lack specific interests or preferred candidates. Finally, many technocrat governors, who view governorship only as a career stepping stone, have neither a team nor the desire to create one. But even heavyweight governors who manage to maintain some independence rely on connections within the upper echelons of federal executive power rather than support from regional communities.

The erosion of gubernatorial political independence and the forced integration of regional economies into federal business networks have undermined regional authorities’ control over local material resources – the foundation of regional economic clans. As a result, the phenomenon of ‘governors as regional oligarchs’ is also increasingly becoming a relic of the past. The phenomenon of local ‘court oligarchs’ who once supported governors’ political and PR projects, are also gradually disappearing

The federal centre has systematically worked to weaken local financial and industrial groups (FIGs) while encouraging the penetration of vertically integrated companies into regions across an increasing number of sectors – from oil and gas to major retail chains. This process has displaced prominent local players from key segments of regional markets, such as banking, construction, and retail. As a result, by the 2000s and 2010s, the regional economic elite lost much of its autonomy, transforming from a set of independent actors into top managers for external players. Following a gubernatorial change, local medium and large businesses were often required to demonstrate loyalty and refrain from interfering in political processes. While remnants of prior influence persist in certain regions (e.g., Tatarstan, Bashkortostan), these are isolated cases and bear little resemblance to the dynamics of the 1990s, when economic concerns strongly influenced regional political life. Regional governance has gradually shifted away from being a resource for economic enrichment and redistribution. Instead, it now serves as an administrative extension of federal departmental and corporate hierarchies.

Verticalisation inertia and possible scenarios

To summarise the current situation, regional administrations and governments – due to their institutional design – no longer represent their regions to the federal centre. Nor can they serve as focal points for consolidating local elite interests. Instead, they act as federal representatives tasked with standardised territorial management.

Representation of regional interests in these administrations is minimal and often confined to specific ethnic regions. Based on prior experience, the Kremlin approaches ethnic regions with particular caution to prevent conflicts or a drift toward extralegal actions. The federal centre prefers negotiations with entities it perceives as strong, especially those supported by cohesive ethnic or clan-based communities, ensuring mutual accountability and loyalty.

In addition, significant regional politicians or leaders are sometimes included in administrations for three primary reasons. First, when managing a challenging area requires not just a competent professional but also someone who commands respect and has extensive connections. Such qualifications are typically found in experienced local officials from previous administrations, municipal governments, or directorial roles. Second, governors may seek constructive relationships with local elites for political reasons, such as gaining support in legislative assemblies. In such cases, authoritative figures from local elites are needed within the administration. And third, governors, particularly those coming from federal administrative positions, often lack their own political and managerial teams and must rely on local talent. However, the inclusion of such specialists does not mean they become focal points for consolidating regional elites or represent their interests.

As regional administrations gradually lose their role as centres for consolidating regional elites, this function has partially shifted to legislative assemblies. In recent years, relations between governors and legislative assemblies have been particularly challenging in regions like Sevastopol, St. Petersburg, Buryatia, Karelia, Khakassia, the Khabarovsk Territory, and the Vladimir, Kirov, Murmansk, and Novosibirsk oblasts. New governors sometimes attempt to diminish local elite representation in regional parliaments. For example, mass turnover of deputies was pursued by Sergey Tsivilyov’s administration in the Kemerovo region, Alexey Tsydenov’s in Buryatia, and Oleg Kozhemyako’s and Valery Limarenko’s in the Sakhalin region. These efforts often involve promoting second- or third-tier business elites to replace political veterans. Despite these attempts, the institutional role of regional parliaments – such as approving administrative appointments – has continued to decline

Unlike in the 1990s and early 2000s, the dismantling of local self-governance has eliminated the potential for regional centres’ administrations to serve as crystallisation points for alternative elites. Today, the overwhelming majority of city mayors are selected through candidate evaluation commissions, with half the commission members representing regional authorities. This, coupled with the frequent rotation of municipal leaders, exacerbates the situation. Few mayors of regional centres remain in their roles for more than two or three years. These positions are typically filled by managerial administrators, often former regional administration staff, rather than politicians.

Thus, speculation about a potential rebellion by 'regional elites' appears disconnected from contemporary Russian realities. There are currently few, if any, figures capable of leading such a movement. Regional elites lack the political and economic foundation necessary to initiate transformational processes. The inertia built over 25 years of centralisation ('verticalisation') is unlikely to dissipate quickly.

This dynamic might change, but only after federal-level political transformation has begun. A revival of regional elite influence could also occur if federal authority weakens significantly, whether due to economic crises or deep internal elite conflicts. In such a scenario, influential local figures within regional administrations and parliaments could begin pursuing their own agendas, potentially triggering political ferment in the regions. However, this unrest is unlikely to quickly take on a political character.

The initial signs of dissent often involve 'soft sabotage', where bureaucracies test the strength of vertical control by failing to fully comply with directives. Federal responses to such deviations serve as markers of what is allowed. This soft sabotage can gradually intensify and even take on demonstrative forms if the response appears weak. According to regional experience, markers of sabotage at this stage may include the failure of agreed-upon candidates to secure positions in regional parliaments or voting against specific projects or amendments. Another common form of sabotage involves information warfare and the leaking of compromising materials sourced from within the administration. Only if this 'first-level' sabotage (the simplest and safest form) demonstrates opportunities for more overt resistance will tougher forms of dissent emerge, targeting entire reforms, legislative initiatives, or demands for the repeal of specific decisions or the dismissal of officials. However, the potential for anti-Moscow sentiment and calls for greater regional autonomy to take on organised political contours will only materialise after overcoming these two levels of federal control. For now, all of this remains far off, and the current system of regional governance may retain its stability for a significant period.

The main challenges for this system on the horizon of 2025-2030 in an inertial scenario are more closely tied to strategic personnel decisions that the federal centre will face. By conducting a large-scale replacement of governors between 2017 and 2020 (a total of 59 governors were replaced, almost 70%: 20 in 2017, 18 in 2018, 10 in 2019, and 11 in 2020), some of whom have already been replaced again, the federal centre created a problem for itself for the years 2027-2030. Nationwide, the term of office for regional authorities (both governors and regional parliaments) in Russia is five years, and rarely does a governor serve more than two terms. Thus, by 2027-2030, the first-wave technocrats will mostly no longer fit the category of 'young and promising'. Furthermore, someone who has worked in a region for 10 years establishes local connections and informal relationships, effectively ceasing to be an 'outsider' or a 'Moscow appointee'. This creates a somewhat different administrative reality and alters the nature of relationships between the region and the centre.

As of today, in 2027, the terms of 13 governors will expire, six of whom will be completing their second (or, in the case of Yevgeny Kuyvashev, even their third) term. In 2028, the terms of 20 governors will end, 16 of whom will be finishing their second or more terms. In 2029, another 24 governors will reach the end of their terms, with 16 also completing their second or more terms. Thus, between 2027 and 2029, faced with the need to replace at least 38 governors, the Kremlin will have to make a strategic decision: either preserve the system as it is or initiate a new wave of technocratic recruitment. The first scenario would mean a 'Brezhnevisation' of the system, essentially returning to a structure of entrenched governors and their teams. The second scenario involves mass rotation and rejuvenation, which could prove quite contentious (including raising the question of what to do with such a large number of retired officials).

The first scenario will present a challenge for the next generation of administrators (born roughly in the 1980s), whose career advancement opportunities will sharply decline. The second scenario will appear as ingratitude toward the previous generation (born in the 1970s), for whom career stagnation will occur as they approach the 60-year age mark. Over the past decades, the central government has managed to integrate the leadership of regional administrations into the broader federal elite. However, the issue of generational change within the administrative elite is always a sensitive matter, potentially provoking dissatisfaction and conspiracies from both those being phased out and those being held back. At the same time, Putin himself and many in his circle remain in various positions, despite having long passed the age of 70.

Another problem that may arise concerning the regions after the 2026 State Duma elections is the sharp reduction of systemic regional opposition representation in the federal parliament. Since the beginning of the 'special operation', systemic opposition has faced an acute crisis. The scope for permissible public criticism of the authorities has narrowed drastically, while the number of restrictions has increased sharply, resulting in an identity crisis for these groups. The ability of systemic opposition to 'channel' dissatisfaction at the regional level has been radically reduced, and their electorate has been demoralised.

This has led to a significant decline in the collective results of systemic opposition in the regional elections of 2022–2024, even in regions traditionally known for politically independent voting, which had always formed the foundation of their electoral base. Conversely, the results of 'United Russia' in those regions have sometimes been 20 percentage points higher than in previous similar elections. If this trend persists, the collective results of the systemic parliamentary opposition could drop sharply in the 2026 State Duma elections – leaving no electoral base to sustain four opposition parties in the parliament. In an extreme scenario, the 2026 elections might result in a three-party Duma, with very few seats within opposition party lists allocated to territorial groups. This would have highly negative consequences for the quality of public political balance in many regions and could further exacerbate political imbalances.

These challenges, however, are not critical but highlight the systemic issues that will arise as the hyper-centralised system, established over the past two decades, continues to 'age' inertially. Such a system may reveal its flaws during a prolonged or systemic economic crisis when the flow of resources from the federal centre downward needs to be reduced. In such circumstances, the lack of rootedness among governors and the absence of cohesion within regional elites will become weak points. Nevertheless, the system has learned to navigate short-term crises quite effectively, as demonstrated in 2015-2016, 2020, and 2022. In the absence of structural problems and a prolonged crisis, the activities of the regional political and economic nomenklatura, incorporated into the system of vertical controls (executive, corporate, etc.), do not pose a threat to the federal centre in the near future.