Between Moderate Xenophobia and Low Tolerance: The perception of migrants after the terror attack at Crocus City Hall

Between the personal and the stereotypical: moderate anxiety, xenophobia and social distance

After the terror attack at Crocus City Hall, the question of Russians' attitudes towards labour migrants from Central Asia has once again been brought into focus. Human Rights Watch has recorded an increase in the number of cases of xenophobic harassment of labour migrants by private individuals and officials. The Sova research centre has also noted a spike in attacks on migrants following the terrorist attack.

An ExtremeScan survey, conducted from 8-15 April, two weeks after the terrorist attack, was designed to measure several aspects of Russians' attitudes toward Central Asian migrants. First, the researchers asked respondents whether they would personally feel a sense of anxiety or antipathy if they encountered a migrant in various social roles: 1) a utility worker or taxi driver, 2) a doctor or nurse, 3) a neighbour, or 4) a family member of an acquaintance or relative. These questions were formulated in accordance with the Bogardus social distance scale and the hypothesis of a direct link between social distance and willingness to accept the ‘other’: the smaller the social distance, the less willingness to admit people of a different nationality into their circle. Thus, the hypothesis suggests that those who are willing to see people from Central Asia as utility workers or taxi drivers are more numerous than those willing to see them as family members of close acquaintances. In addition, these questions allow us to assess the level of prejudice when it comes to the professional qualities of migrants: as most of them are forced to engage in unskilled labour, society forms a stereotype about their inability to engage in activities that require high levels of qualification and responsibility (doctors, nurses).

According to the survey results, it can be said that anxiety and antipathy towards migrants in Russia — even after the terrorist attack — are at a moderate level. The majority of those surveyed (60%) believe that they would not experience these emotions towards migrants in any of the proposed situations. Only 8% of respondents foresee negative emotions in all four situations, and one in three respondents (34%) thinks they will experience these emotions in at least one of the proposed situations. The average negativity score across the sample is 19%. At the same time, labour qualifications do not matter: whether it is utility workers, drivers, or doctors, just over 20% of respondents harbour negative emotions towards individuals from Central Asia. Increased prejudice against labour migrants in professions requiring high qualifications is not identified from the data, i.e. the second hypothesis was not confirmed.

However, the first hypothesis is also not confirmed; on the contrary, the data demonstrate reverse causality — the smaller the social distance, the less negativity or concern towards migrants from Central Asia. If 21% of respondents would experience these emotions towards a janitor, only 14% would towards a close family member of the respondent.

‘Would you experience anxiety or antipathy if you encountered a migrant from Central Asia in the following social roles?’, % of those surveyed

So, if a person enters the inner circle, they already, by virtue of this circumstance, evoke trust. For example, if someone has established a good rapport with a doctor at their local clinic, the doctor's ethnic background does not matter much. If a hypothetical Tajik or Kyrgyz individual moves into the same stairwell and is a ‘good person’, they invoke trust regardless of his origin. And, if they became a member of the family, it means, probably, that they have passed a certain ‘filter’, thus reducing the anxiety associated with their presence. This trust in informal relationships established in the here and now is provided primarily by the length of time the ‘stranger’ has been in the inner circle. For example, a stranger who waits for a bus with you late in the evening, after 20 minutes of such waiting, evokes far more trust than they did when they first arrived at the bus stop. Informal contact holds more significance than formal institutions and markers of social status.

Thus, Russians' trust in their environment, which compensates for generalised distrust and low trust in institutions, proves to be stronger than xenophobia, which is displaced from the interpersonal to the generalised level. The attitude towards a janitor from Central Asia is significantly worse than to a person inside the inner circle: the former is perceived as an abstract stereotypical character, while the latter is perceived as a concrete person with whom the respondent maintains communication.

Institutional level: Perception of migrants and ‘picture of the world’

Transitioning from the interpersonal level of communication to the institutional level of perception of labour migration issues reveals a more complex picture.

However, the level of support for discrimination based on nationality was relatively low. Direct discrimination (‘Should Russians in Russia have more rights than people of other nationalities, or should all citizens of the country have equal rights?’) is supported by 17% of those surveyed, at least on a declarative level, while four out of five respondents (79%) support equal rights. Anxiety and antipathy towards migrants from Central Asia in all four social roles are directly linked to a willingness to infringe on the rights of representatives of non-Russian ethnic groups. About 40% of those who feel anxiety or dislike migrants would support discrimination against non-Russian ethnic groups if they were utility workers or taxi drivers (39%), doctors or nurses (38%), neighbours (36%), or spouses of a relative or a friend of the respondent (39%). However, it is important to note that the group of those experiencing such feelings is not particularly large (20-30%).

‘Should Russians in Russia have more rights than people of other nationalities, or should all citizens of the country have equal rights?’, % of those surveyed

Moreover, the results of the survey showed that migrant labour is valued quite low by Russians. One in three respondents (35%) stated that the benefits of labour from Central Asian migrants outweigh the problems, and only a quarter (26%) acknowledge instances of their rights being violated. 40% of those surveyed believe that there are more problems than benefits from migrant labour, and an equal proportion says that there is no discrimination against migrants in Russia. Overall, this suggests that Russians are not fully aware of the importance of migrant labour for the Russian economy and, accordingly, are not inclined to think about the problems migrants face.

‘In your opinion, are migrants’ labour and civil rights violated in Russia or not, are they discriminated against or not?’, % of those surveyed

‘Do you think that migrants from Central Asia are more beneficial or more harmful for Russia?’, % of those surveyed

Among those who believe that the problems caused by migrants outweigh the benefits, the average level of negative emotions towards them stands at 34% (compared to 9% among those who believe that they bring more benefits). Thus, negative emotions and the ‘underestimation’ of migrants are directly related. On the other hand, the average rate of negativity towards Central Asian migrants does not differ between the groups who recognise and do not recognise the existence of discrimination against migrants. Apparently, denying the discrimination of migrants is not a sign of xenophobia but rather a way to maintain a comfortable perception of social reality.

The questions about the benefits of migrant labour and whether they are discriminated against in Russia were generally highly politicised, that is respondents appealed to a certain normative worldview when answering them. The camps of supporters and opponents of the incumbent authorities represented in the survey results were fairly consistent in their answers to questions about support for Putin, the fairness of elections and attitudes towards intervention in Ukraine. Opponents of the current government are twice as likely as its supporters to talk about violations of migrants' rights in Russia (48% of Putin's supporters vs. 24% of his opponents) and one and a half times as likely to talk about the benefits of migrants for Russia (43% of non-supporters vs. 32% of supporters). Meanwhile, loyalists are twice as likely to assert that migrants' rights are not violated and are less inclined to attach importance to their role in the labour market.

‘Are migrants’ rights violated in Russia?’, % of those surveyed who support the following opinions and statements 

On the other hand, somewhat surprisingly, among opposition-minded Russians, there are slightly more supporters of special rights for Russians, i.e. discrimination against migrants (23% among opponents of the ‘special military operation’ and 15% among its supporters) and the average level of negativity towards Central Asian migrants is slightly higher (22% among those who are sure that the presidential election was rigged versus 19% among those who believe that the election was fair). In other words, supporters of the establishment of special rights for Russians are not consistent in their political views. Within the camp of opposition-minded Russians, two groups can be discerned: one includes supporters of liberal-humanistic values advocating for interethnic tolerance and against discrimination, while the other comprises those who do not support the president and military actions, not due to ideological disagreements with the Russian leadership, but apparently because they blame the president and his policies for the deterioration of their financial situation. Among those who have experienced such deterioration, there are more who oppose the incumbent government (29% do not support the president, compared to the sample average of 10%) as well as those harbouring negative feelings towards migrants from Central Asia. 

Some conclusions: moderate xenophobia and low tolerance

Thus, the level of xenophobia — dislike of migrants from Central Asia — even after the terrorist attack in Crocus City Hall, from a sociological point of view, can be defined as moderate. The average indicator of negativity across the sample as a whole is 19%. This attitude towards migrants has remained relatively stable in recent years. If we add to this group those who experience a more moderate or situational negativity (in one of several proposed situations), we can conclude that cautious and/or negative attitudes are characteristic of approximately one-third of Russians.

The results obtained are consistent with the data from similar studies conducted by other sociological centres using other survey methods. Thus, according to a FOM poll conducted in February 2022 at people’s place of residence, a quarter of Russians (25%) feel dissatisfied and worried about migrants from Central Asia. Approximately the same percentage (24%) would have a negative attitude to living in proximity to them, and 50% believe that their entry into Russia should be restricted, i.e. regulated. Moreover, in the FOM survey, almost equal groups considered migrants to bring more benefit (29%) or more harm (30%), with a large proportion undecided. A 2021 Levada Centre local opinion poll found a negative attitude towards migrants from Central Asia among a quarter of Russians. This includes 26% of respondents who believe they should not be allowed into Russia at all, and an additional 25% who think they should only be allowed for a limited period.

An ExtremeScan survey indicates that men are generally more tolerant of migrants than women: men have a lower average negative attitude towards migrants than women (16% vs. 22%), are more likely to recognise the benefits of migrants (38% vs. 32%) and lower support for infringing on the rights of non-Russians (13% vs. 20%). Among all age groups, young people are the most tolerant of migrants. Russians aged 18-29 are, on average, less likely to feel anxiety or antipathy for Central Asians (13%), less likely to agree to infringe on the rights of non-Russians (12%) and are more likely to recognise the existence of discrimination against migrants (39%). People with higher levels of education are also more tolerant of migrants: they believe that Central Asian migrants bring more benefits (38% vs. 32% among those without higher education), and they are significantly less likely to believe that Russians in Russia should have more rights than people of other nationalities (13% vs. 21%).

Residents of Moscow and St Petersburg express greater concern about Central Asian migrants: the average negative attitude towards them in the capitals is 24%, compared to the sample average of 19%. At the same time, residents of the capitals are more likely to talk about violations of migrants' rights (30%) as well as the benefits of migrant labour (40%), and do not stand out in terms of support for ethnic equality. 

Russians who have experienced a decline in their financial situation, as already mentioned, are less tolerant towards migrants. They are more likely to harbour antipathy or anxiety towards such arrivals (23%) compared to those whose financial situation has improved (15%). Russians facing worsened financial conditions are twice as likely as those with improved conditions to advocate for greater rights for Russians compared to other ethnicities: 22% versus 11%.

Another important factor influencing Russians' level of anxiety about Asian ethnic groups is anxiety about the future in general. In groups where there are fears of new terrorist attacks, mobilisation, technological disasters, abuses by law enforcement personnel, diseases, epidemics, and so forth, the level of anxiety and antipathy towards migrants (21-24%) is twice as high as those who rule out the possibility of such events in the near future (11%). As we can see, anxiety about ‘migrants’ is integrated into the general background of anxieties.

However, all these fluctuations fall within a relatively insignificant range of deviations from the average figures mentioned above. Additionally, the reduction of social distance reduces the level of distrust — interpersonal communication helps alleviate ‘stereotypical’ negativity. Russians' trust in their environment, which compensates for generalised distrust and low trust in institutions, is stronger than xenophobia, which is displaced from the interpersonal to the generalised level. At the same time, support for direct discrimination against non-Russians, expressed in the restriction of their rights compared to the rights of Russians (17% of those surveyed are in favour of this), is close to the average level of distrust/anxiety towards migrants.

With a relatively low level of hostility and wariness, Russian society does not have a definite stance on the extent to which migrants are necessary for the Russian labour market and, consequently, on whether there is a need to protect their rights. Opposition-minded Russians hold positive opinions on these issues almost twice as often as Russians who are loyal to the government and more receptive to the ‘official’ point of view. Moreover, the latter group constitutes the majority of respondents. This circumstance suggests that ‘suspicion’ towards migrants is to some extent fuelled from above.