28.03 Polls Analytics

No One Believes Trump: In both Ukraine and Russia, citizens do not trust his peacekeeping initiatives, but hope to use them for their own purposes

According to Ukrainian sociologists, nearly four-fifths of Ukrainians support Trump’s initiative for a 30-day ceasefire.

However, most see this support as a tactical move aimed at unlocking American aid and demonstrating that it is not Kyiv but Moscow that rejects a truce. This perspective aligns closely with the negotiation strategy of Volodymyr Zelensky.

Only one-fifth of respondents believe that a ceasefire could be a meaningful step toward ending the conflict. However, if the ceasefire were accompanied by some form of security guarantees for Ukraine, support would rise to over 60%.

Around 80% of Ukrainian respondents reject the Kremlin’s ultimatum demands, such as abandoning Western aid or officially recognising territorial losses. Additionally, a majority – though a much smaller one, at 56% – oppose Ukraine adopting a neutral, non-aligned status. Meanwhile, more than 80% believe that Ukraine should and can continue resisting aggression even if American aid is completely cut off, relying solely on European support.

In Russia, according to surveys, public opinion on the ceasefire initiative is divided, with roughly equal groups supporting and opposing it.

Attitudes toward Trump himself are contradictory: on the one hand, about half of respondents believe he seeks to resolve the conflict, but an even greater number think that his proposed conditions would be unfavorable for Russia. This ambivalence aligns with the ‘official line’ conveyed through the media. Two-thirds of Russians see Trump as a cunning and deceitful figure.

At the same time, surveys by the Levada Centre and Russian Field recorded a sharp improvement in public sentiment toward the US: about a third of Russians now view it as a mostly friendly country. This surge suggests that such perceptions are highly influenced by mainstream media narratives and that deep-seated, 'existential' hostility toward the West is characteristic of only a minority of Russians.

Imaginary Ukrainian consent

77% of Ukrainians surveyed by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) between 12 and 22 March support a 30-day ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia – an initiative proposed by Donald Trump, which Volodymyr Zelensky was forced to accept under the threat of losing aid, and which Moscow has already rejected. However, these findings remain significant in understanding social attitudes in Ukraine.

First and foremost, the apparent consensus among Ukrainians in favor of a truce is highly misleading. The 77% figure is an aggregate of three distinct groups that chose different answers. This includes 12% who support the ceasefire as a means to unblock American aid – essentially a reluctant, tactical agreement. Another 47% see it as a way to demonstrate that it is Russia, not Ukraine, that opposes peace – meaning they also perceive it as a strategic manoeuvre. Only 18% genuinely view the 30-day ceasefire as 'a step toward a real end to the war on terms acceptable to Ukraine.'

Thus, 59% (supporters of the first two positions) effectively align with Zelensky’s stance, as he also considers a temporary ceasefire an ineffective strategy and sees the proposal as a tactical move. Beyond these three groups, an additional 7% (a relatively small proportion) view accepting the ceasefire as an act of desperation due to the difficult situation at the front, while another 10% see it as a mistake that weakens Ukraine’s position or brings it closer to capitulation. In other words, while nearly four-fifths of respondents (77%) support the idea of a ceasefire, only one-fifth (18%) believe in its potential to end the war.

This logic is also reflected in responses to another KIIS question. If the ceasefire is not accompanied by security guarantees, 62% of respondents consider it unacceptable. In such a scenario, 28% see it as difficult but tolerable, and only 4% fully accept it. However, if the ceasefire agreement is accompanied by expanded military aid (including weapons), support rises from 32% to 56%; if it includes Ukraine’s NATO membership, support climbs to 58%; and if it involves the deployment of European troops in Ukraine, approval reaches 60% – interestingly, making this option more 'reliable' than NATO membership itself. Finally, 82% of KIIS respondents believe that if US aid is cut off, Ukraine should and can continue fighting with the support of its European allies (as mentioned in the KIIS survey response options).

Unsurprisingly, KIIS respondents reject Russia’s ultimatum demands, such as halting Ukraine’s mobilisation, ending Western military aid, and stopping intelligence sharing (79% oppose these conditions). A survey by the Razumkov Centre conducted in early March showed similar resistance to other Kremlin-imposed peace conditions, including ceding all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions to Russia and recognising them as Russian territory, with 83% opposing these demands. However, one condition – Ukraine adopting a neutral, non-aligned status – was rejected by a less unified majority: only 56% opposed it, while 22% found it acceptable, and another 22% were undecided.

KIIS also asked whether respondents considered elections feasible after a ceasefire agreement, receiving an overwhelmingly negative response (77% opposed). In the Razumkov Centre poll, 38% said elections could be held immediately after martial law is lifted, while 34% believed they should be postponed for another six months.

KIIS sociologists always include a disclaimer that, under wartime conditions, the margin of error in sociological surveys may be higher than standard, meaning that polls might reflect a shift toward officially approved opinions (this contrasts with Russian sociologists, who never make such disclaimers and instead go to great lengths to argue that war and repression do not affect respondents' behavior). This suggests that while the data may contain some bias toward officially approved views, they remain relevant if the surveys are conducted properly and professionally. Notably, both KIIS and Razumkov Centre polls have documented shifting attitudes toward Zelensky and other pressing political issues depending on the circumstances. Therefore, while Ukrainian society may not be as monolithic as it appears in surveys, it remains broadly united in supporting Zelensky’s strategic manoeuvres in negotiations with Trump.

A cunning and sly supporter of peace

Russian society’s attitude toward Trump’s ceasefire proposal is far less significant. In this situation, Zelensky appears as a democratic leader of a country at war, i.e. a politician who, in difficult negotiations with Washington, must constantly consider how his position will be perceived domestically and what mobilising or demobilising effect it will have. Vladimir Putin, on the other hand, is not constrained by Russian public opinion, which has accepted that he acts as a dictator and is willing to adapt to his decisions as long as they do not excessively affect the majority’s interests.

A nationwide telephone poll conducted by Russian Field from 13-20 March showed that 40% of Russians supported Trump’s 30-day ceasefire proposal, while 44% opposed it. Among young people, the ratio was 58% in favor versus 18% against, indicating a more anti-war stance and a greater perception of the ceasefire as a step toward ending the war. In contrast, among those over 45, the ratio was reversed, with 33% supporting it, while 55% were against it. Notably, even among those who believe that Russia should move toward peace negotiations with Ukraine rather than continue military actions, only 62% supported the ceasefire. This suggests that the rest see it as an insufficient step.

Attitudes toward Trump in the Russian Field survey were highly ambivalent. On the one hand, 44% believed he was genuinely seeking to resolve the conflict, compared to 28% who thought he was not. This result is similar to responses in a poll by FOM in early February, where 38% believed Trump wanted to end the conflict quickly, while another 38% believed he did not. At the same time, 49% of Russian Field respondents thought that any peace deal proposed by Trump would be unfavorable for Russia, while only 22% believed the opposite. This ambiguity mirrors the duality in the Russian official stance on Trump – viewing him as someone who weakens America while simultaneously treating him with suspicion.

Another FOM poll conducted in early March showed that Russians overwhelmingly perceive Trump as 'a cunning and deceitful man' (66%), with only 13% believing he is honest and sincere. Moreover, 85% think he is solely focused on benefiting his own country – a perspective that likely aligns with the views of the Russian leadership.

One surprising finding in the Russian Field survey was the distribution of opinions on the United States: 29% of respondents saw the US as a friendly country or even an ally, 41% considered it unfriendly, and 15% viewed it as an enemy. Among young people, 50% held a positive view of the US, while 33% saw it as unfriendly. This shift aligns with a February Levada Centre poll, which recorded a sharp improvement in Russian sentiment toward the US At that time, 30% expressed a positive opinion of the US, compared to 51% with a negative view, whereas the long-term average since the start of the war had been 18% and 71%, respectively. Interestingly, the same Levada poll found that 56% of Russians had a negative view of Germany, while 61% had a negative view of the EU. Traditionally, Russian hostility toward the West has positioned the US as the 'ultimate villain' and Europe as a 'wayward sheep,' but now these roles appear to have reversed.

This rapid shift in attitudes toward the US highlights two key factors: first, the strong influence of mainstream media narratives and propaganda on public opinion; and second, the fact that viewing the conflict with the West as an 'existential struggle' is characteristic of only about 30–40% of the Russian population in the medium term.

In general, attitudes toward Trump and his peace initiatives in both Ukraine and Russia appear pragmatic and largely similar: both sides hope to use the American 'peacemaker' for their own interests and fundamentally do not trust him.