Unpopular War: Russian opponents and non-opponents of the invasion of Ukraine. Part 2

'Integrators', 'isolationists', 'the oppressed', and 'activists'

The proportion of declarative opponents of the war, i.e. those who respond negatively to direct questions about their support for the war in mass surveys, has remained virtually unchanged since the beginning of the invasion, ranging from 11% to 18% according to various measurements. However, these figures are not very informative because, due to repression and social pressure from those around them, many people are simply not willing to answer such questions negatively.

Those we call opponents are both similar to and different from the declarative opponents of the war who participate in mass surveys. We consider opponents of the war to be those who consistently expressed dissatisfaction with the war and did not justify it in their communication with us. In this sense, they are similar to declarative opponents. However, unlike the latter, many of 'our' opponents would not be so candid when answering a direct question about their support for the war on record. Therefore, the group we describe here is larger than the 10-20% of war opponents represented in mass survey data, though its exact size under current circumstances is impossible to determine.

We divided the war opponents we encountered during our fieldwork into several types: 'integrators', 'isolationists', 'the oppressed', and 'activists'. They consume different media content, build relationships with others and social institutions differently, and criticise the war in different ways. Of course, based on qualitative data, it is impossible to judge the size of each group, but we can nonetheless make assumptions about their scale, which we will do.

Integrators are those who, for various reasons, decide to continue living in Russia and be part of Russian society. They do not support the war but do not express their views openly and, importantly, do not break ties with war-supportive relatives and social circles. Feeling their inability to influence the situation, they prefer to hear less about the war, reduce their media consumption, and try, in their own words, to ‘live a normal life’. We encountered many opponents of this type in our fieldwork, especially in small towns across all three regions of the study, where there is less diversity of opinions and environments than can still be found in the capitals. We believe this is a fairly common way of existence for war opponents outside of major cities. (Other researchers have also written about the trend of war opponents integrating into the loyal or apolitical majority.)

For example, Maria, a resident of the village of Udurg in Buryatia, was very distressed by the news of the invasion, but over time she started following war news less ('if I watch every day, I feel like my psyche won't handle it'). Eventually, she came to the conclusion that she 'doesn't trust any politicians', neither pro-Russian nor pro-Ukrainian, and stopped taking a too 'categorical' stance in arguments with her loved ones, not wanting to quarrel with them:

When it all started, I was probably depressed for six months: I didn't want to do anything, everything seemed pointless, it was scary. Perhaps what's scarier than this is getting used to it… But at least I love my country. I love my land, I love my small homeland, I love my places because I grew up here, I have many friends and acquaintances here. My family even has different opinions about it. I used to be categorical, arguing. But now there's no point in showing it, because I still love them, and to feud over this? Create a civil war within my family? I don't want that (interview, female, 30 years old, education worker, Udurg, October 2023).

She remains silent about her negative attitude toward the war, explaining that 'we live in such a society… where you can't speak openly'. Working in an educational institution, she regularly encounters fundraising for Russian mobilised soldiers organised by her colleagues. Initially, she refused to participate, but later she started to agree, hoping that the money would go to 'our brothers' and not directly to the war. In other words, she integrates into the state-loyal society of Udurg while remaining an opponent of the war.

Pyotr, a transport worker from Krasnodar, is sinking into deeper despair as the war drags on. He believes that one must adapt to a reality that cannot be changed. Pyotr reduces his consumption of war news to avoid being 'on edge' (interview, male, 41 years old, transport worker, Krasnodar, October 2023), maintains communication with his pro-war relatives, and even participates in fundraising to help acquaintances mobilised to the front. However, this does not lead him to justify the war.

Unlike opponents who integrate into the new reality, isolationist opponents surround themselves with people holding anti-war views. They tend to see pro-war individuals as uneducated or 'brainwashed' by propaganda, in other words, they stereotype them. Isolationists, despite continuing to live in Russia for various reasons, dream of leaving the country – this also sets them apart from the previously described war opponents. However, like those who integrate into the new reality, isolationists complain of war fatigue, reduce their consumption of political news, and try to live ordinary lives. Since not everyone has the opportunity to isolate themselves within a 'bubble' of like-minded individuals, it can be assumed that this group's size is smaller than the previous one.

Pasha, an anti-war resident of Cheremushkin in the Sverdlovsk region, stopped communicating with pro-war acquaintances and relatives who, in his view, do not understand or try to understand what is happening. Over two years, he has formed a circle of anti-war friends. Pasha left for Kazakhstan with his wife and children after the mobilisation was announced in the autumn of 2022, but returned because his job is in Russia. However, he still dreams of leaving the country permanently. Even so, he tries to live as 'normal a life' as possible until he can potentially leave.

Notably, despite the differences between isolationist opponents and those who integrate into the new reality, both groups, in some sense, deliberately depoliticise themselves, abandoning their previously habitual (before and at the start of the war) regular consumption of political news. Both groups feel that they cannot influence the situation and conclude that there is no point in rehashing it over and over. They feel exhausted by their own powerlessness and seek to shield themselves from the war as much as possible to ‘live a normal life’.

I realised that it's very hard for me to work because I'm constantly thinking about other things, constantly on Telegram, constantly distracted, making many mistakes. So I have a choice: either I worry a lot, worry so much and can't do anything to change the situation – because one person really can't change the situation at all—and lose my job. Or I work and then devote less time and energy to this issue (interview, female, 46 years old, education worker, Krasnodar, November 2023).

In the first months of the war, many opponents forced themselves not to 'get used' to the war, to read political news, and not to lose their ability to be horrified by it (we wrote about this in our first analytical report). However, over time, this stance has changed to the opposite. Two years later, in their attitude towards distancing themselves from heavy, depressing news, many war opponents converge with those apolitical Russians who justify the war: both groups are unhappy with what is happening but do not feel capable of influencing anything and therefore prefer to withdraw.

Oppressed opponents, as the name suggests, cannot overcome this depressed state. Unlike the integrators and isolationists, they continue to consume information about the war from liberal media and, in a sense, never return to ‘normalcy’. They do not isolate themselves from their pro-war relatives, maintaining connections with them, but they also cannot fully integrate into the 'larger' society. They dream of leaving Russia but do not see realistic opportunities to fulfil this dream. These are people who have lost their old place in the world but have not found an alternative. In a sense, this is a transitional state that is difficult to endure for long: over time, such opponents may either resign themselves and integrate into society, find like-minded people and become isolationists, or leave. Therefore, this group seems even smaller than the previous two.

Finally, anti-war activists are those who are involved in anti-war activism. They surround themselves with anti-war individuals, often fellow activists, and continue to actively consume news about the war. They do not try to return to ‘normalcy’, but unlike the other groups, they view the situation with optimism, believing that the war and the Putin regime are not permanent and that their activities are bringing about a better, happier Russia. Of course, it is very difficult to estimate the size of this group, but in any society, even the most democratic, activists make up a small minority while simultaneously playing a very important role. In our fieldwork, where we aimed to speak with ‘ordinary’ people, we encountered only one activist, but there are separate studies dedicated to anti-war activism in Russia (for example, we recommend reading this report).

Cruelty and senselessness: gradations of ‘misunderstanding’

During the research, we rarely asked our interlocutors directly why they thought war was justified or unacceptable. Nevertheless, justifications and criticisms of the war emerged in various contexts without direct or leading questions.

A Levada Centre poll conducted in March 2024 showed that the most popular argument for ending military actions and moving to peace negotiations was that people are constantly dying because of the war, both on the Russian and Ukrainian sides (this option was chosen by as many as 49% of respondents). In our conversations with opponents of the war, this type of criticism also appeared most frequently: 'How can you be happy about war, about combat actions where houses are destroyed, people lose their property, their loved ones?' (interview, male, 41 years old, transport worker, Krasnodar, October 2023). Interviews and informal conversations reveal that the argument about the inadmissibility of military actions due to their casualties is part of a broader type of war criticism – a sort of moral and ethical critique. Most opponents argue that war is not just about the deaths of innocent people but is a barbaric act, something that fundamentally should not happen in the modern civilised world.

As we demonstrated in our previous analytical report, this attitude was characteristic of a significant number of Russians in the first days and weeks of the war. However, over time, some of them began to convince themselves, not without the help of pro-government media, that such a view is naive and childish, as wars supposedly happen everywhere and always. Many of today's war opponents are those who have managed to maintain this 'naive' view over the course of the two years of war.

I primarily say that this is wrong. This should not be allowed at all in the 21st century. I thought this should be consigned to history. How is it possible in such a time, with so many interesting things in life, to commit such mediaeval barbarism? (interview, female, 53 years old, accountant, Ulan-Ude, October 2023).

It is important to emphasise that the opponents' position is characterised by recognition not only of the brutality of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but also of its senselessness. For example, Pyotr from Krasnodar said in an interview:

I don't understand why the fighting has been going on for so long to date. I don't understand. There are practically no special changes on the news feeds, but the fighting is going on. I don't understand why this operation has been going on there for so long and people are suffering casualties. I don't understand why (interview, male, 41 years old, transport worker, Krasnodar, October 2023).

It is telling that in a short fragment, he uses the phrase 'I don't understand' four times, making it the main critical argument against the war. He doesn't stop there and disputes one of the most common arguments justifying the war that Russians regularly hear from both pro-government media and their relatives (‘We are not attacking, but defending ourselves’).

We are not foolish people; we understand that Ukraine itself, as Ukraine, is not capable of even dreaming of attacking a country the size of Russia. It simply isn't feasible—it's absurd to think that a child would attack an adult uncle and win. That's natural, of course. I think there was no chance at all that Ukraine had the brains to attack Russia. It would have been suicidal (ibid).

This type of war criticism often emerged in our informal conversations with Russians. For instance, our researcher in the Krasnodar Krai regularly engaged in conversations with taxi drivers, most of whom justified the war in one way or another. However, one of her interviewees unexpectedly remarked in response to a question about whether he had received a draft notice: 'Why would I need that? People are dying... I don't want to. And who am I supposed to defend against? I just don't understand. Defend against whom?' (ethnographic diary, Krasnodar, October 2023). To label a taxi driver as an opponent of the war based on a brief conversation is certainly insufficient – as we demonstrate above, most who justify the necessity of war also complain about its various aspects, especially regarding mobilisation. However, it is significant here that dissatisfaction with the ‘incomprehensibility’, the senselessness of the war – this attitude unites opponents of the war with the apolitical segment of its non-opponents. What sets them apart is a register of 'misunderstanding': if opponents of the war express it persistently, with indignation, sometimes with anger, then the apolitical informants justifying the war speak of its senselessness hesitantly, as if still trying to find meaning in it. Nevertheless, this stance itself can potentially play a key role in the development of the anti-war agenda in Russia – potentially uniting a significant portion of Russians with varying views on what is happening.

In our materials, of course, other types of war criticism are encountered, but much less frequently than the first two. For example, some opponents explain their dissatisfaction with the war by pointing out that it prevents the resolution of internal country problems or, worse yet, creates new problems. Instead of increasing pensions, developing education and healthcare, the state is spending resources on war, leading to new economic problems, causing brain drain abroad, and polarising Russian society.

Interestingly, in the first months of the war, its opponents, along with criticising the senselessness of the so-called special military operation, were outraged by the inadmissibility of attacking a 'fraternal' people or, conversely, condemned the invasion of a 'foreign', independent country (we wrote about this in our first analytical report). Now, these arguments from opponents of the war are almost unheard of – as if over these one and a half to two years, Ukraine has become too different to remain 'fraternal' and simultaneously too entangled in Russian foreign policy to remain 'foreign'. War is changing Russian society, and its opponents living in Russia see the world differently now compared to how they did in the first months of the invasion of Ukraine.

Choosing sides: isolation, collaboration and complicity

Representative opinion polls now being conducted in Russia show that a person's social environment is directly related to their perception of the war. For example, surveys demonstrate that those who consider the 'military operation' successful are predominantly surrounded by those who share their views, and vice versa. Qualitative data also corroborates this trend: often our interviewees – opponents of the war – either find themselves among like-minded individuals or systematically create such an environment by cutting ties with those who supported the invasion of Ukraine. As explained by one informant, referring to her colleagues, 'Here I have a circle of researchers, articulate people, everyone understands, we share the same narrative, the same viewpoint' (interview, female, 34 years old, science and education worker, Krasnodar, October 2023).

In small towns distant from the capital, people rarely found themselves among like-minded individuals at the start of the war, so they usually had to limit communication with their former friends:

By and large, I have removed such [war-supporting] people.I know they're rooting for it, discussing it, but I try not to associate myself with it, it's them there, not me. I don't participate in that (interview, male, 42 years old, construction worker, Cheremushkin, September 2023).

The ‘special military operation’ is a good litmus test. In principle, I've seen who acted how in this situation and who took sides. Because many people, in my eyes, have completely taken sides. They have basically shown their true colours... I don't know, I just try to limit contact with such people (interview, male, 34 years old, journalist, Novonekrasovsk, November 2023).

It is noteworthy that those who isolate themselves from the pro-war part of society are more inclined than others to attach negative labels to their opponents. As at the beginning of the war (as we wrote in our first analytical report), they consider fellow citizens justifying the war as uneducated individuals susceptible to propaganda. ‘This is purely a zombified person, so to speak, in terms of propaganda’, remarks a student from Buryatia about one of them (female, 27 years old, master's student, Ulan-Ude, October 2023). Another explains her attitude towards her opponents in a little more detail:

Why don't I argue with them? From their conversations, I understand that their knowledge is superficial, in other words, they have no real depth of knowledge. People know history very superficially, people understand the situation very superficially. The quality of education in these years has... It's just zero. People think in patterns (interview, female, 53 years old, accountant, Ulan-Ude, October 2023).

However, other opponents of the war, sensing that it will be a long-standing part of Russian reality, somehow accept this reality. While remaining opponents of the war and the regime, they try to empathise with those who do not share their views but are also suffering from the war in one way or another. For example, Batod, an opponent of the war from Ulan-Ude, reflects on convincing those who have lost loved ones due to the 'special military operation' of its criminality – it's inhumane. He continues:

But then gradually, understanding came to some people that they need to continue living. And what about me with these people? And what about me with these people—to build, to continue. And what about me with these people... And suddenly something will happen to me, I'll turn to them. And they'll turn to me, and so on, and so on... However paradoxical it may sound, yes, humanity... In this sense, I see that there is more humanity (interview, male, 29 years old, education sector worker, Ulan-Ude, October 2023).

The desire of some opponents of the war to understand their fellow citizens, despite their differing views on the war, and to maintain humane relationships, strengthens over time. Like in the early months of the war, these individuals avoid disputes with close ones but simultaneously try to find new grounds for forming 'positive' connections. Ultimately, many opponents of the war feel that they are in the same boat as Russians justifying the war, and it is with them, rather than those who have emigrated, that they will inevitably share all its negative consequences.

Some opponents of the war also criticise the simplistic, black-and-white view of the situation in Russia, according to which everyone who is in the combat zone or helps the mobilised automatically becomes a collaborator in Putin's criminal war. Interestingly, in this way, they challenge not only the view of Russia often attributed to anti-war emigrants but also their own perspective at the onset of the war.

As an opponent of the war, Georgy, an education sector worker from Ulan-Ude who declined to speak on record, laments the 'bipolarity' of the anti-war view of Russia, where 'there are enemies and there are friends'. In real life, he says, he has encountered those who signed contracts before the war and couldn't break them with the onset of the 'special operation', as well as those who were conscripted against their will, lacking resources and knowledge for evasion, let alone resistance. Once he himself was asked to deliver a solemn speech in honour of an anniversary of a military event. He wanted to refuse, but his superiors threatened problems. He delivered the speech during a city event but tried to remain neutral, avoiding evaluative judgments in support of military actions.

But most interestingly, for a person with anti-war views like himself, is the readiness to join the army out of solidarity with fellow countrymen. ‘Sometimes there is simply no choice – not to go to the front’, Georgy says.He tells the story of his colleague who was sent to the front despite having a severe form of diabetes. His loved ones, including Georgy, tried to ‘protect him’, but nothing could be done. Later, the colleague died, 'and that was it, he was gone'. 'It was possible to flee from Russia in September 2022, after the mobilisation was announced, or in March 2022, after the start of the war, but now it's too late', concludes Georgy. Because, he argues, if one were to do so now, how could they 'look people in the eye', how could they continue to live in this republic? The experience that people, even those with anti-war sentiments, go through in Russia and in emigration, according to Georgy, is completely different (ethnographic diary, Ulan-Ude, October 2023).

Georgy, while opposed to the war, feels the need to share its consequences with his less fortunate compatriots. While many apolitical non-opponents of the war are willing to join the army due to their inability to resist fate ('what can you do', 'if called up, I'll go'), opponents like Georgy view this option as a conscious moral and ethical choice. We may disagree with the logic or values behind this choice, but we must understand that it is based on an anti-war rather than a pro-war stance, albeit one shaped in a society where war is perceived as an inevitable part of a new order.

This is why other opponents of the war may demand benefits from the state if someone close to them dies at the front, or provide material and non-material assistance to servicemen they know. The latter often results from social pressure—as confessed by one of our interviewees during an informal conversation in Cheremushkin, ‘if you don't want to participate in this, then you are kind of considered not a good person’ (ethnographic diary, Cheremushkin, September 2023). That said, many opponents of the war see nothing wrong with such actions as long as they do not directly sponsor the war:

The only thing I did was once – I took a box of painkillers. But I made sure that these painkillers would go to people who lost their arms or legs, those who 100% won't return there (interview, male, 34 years old, director of a private firm, Krasnodar, October 2023).

So not everyone who assists the mobilised supports the war, and some are its opponents altogether. However, they live in a society where their loved ones, often against their will, find themselves in the combat zone without experience, uniforms, or medication – and they cannot always stay on the sidelines.

Some opponents of the war who are adapting to the new reality are doing so not only because they feel powerless to change it, but also because they are thinking strategically about their future in a post-war Russia in which people like them may have to go into politics. Therefore, they need to maintain loyalty to their country, meaning, for example, even if they disapprove of what is happening, not to fight against it:

I believe that if they do not plan to engage in politics and do not associate themselves with Russia, then they have the right to do so [fight on Ukraine's side]. But if they intend to return to the country, then it is also a crime. I think it can't be done. You can hypothetically launch a copter that would bomb somewhere in the Belgorod region, at some grandmother who is not involved in the war. Therefore, citizens of Russia should not fight against Russia. This does not relieve Ukraine of its right to defend itself – it is inviolable, they must do it, but without the participation [of Russians] (interview, male, 34 years old, director of a private firm, Krasnodar, October 2023).

Ultimately, many war opponents living in Russia insist that if we care about the future of our country, it is better to accept the war as part of this reality in order to have the opportunity to change something for the better rather than reject everything happening in Russia and bid farewell to it forever:

In terms of leaving, I think that there should still be people here who can and are willing to do something to improve life here. If you can somehow help your city, however pompous it may sound, and your country, it's better to do it here, because, as sad and cynical as it sounds, life goes on. And a lot of people still need help. That is, somehow make their lives better, reach out to those who can be reached. If you leave, except for some publicism or polemics, you are unlikely to be able to influence what is happening (interview, male, 46 years old, advisor to a director of a private company, Krasnodar, October 2023).

In one way or another, two years after the war began, it has become a norm for Russian society. However, this norm is not a moral-ethical norm. In other words, Russians do not begin to consider the war right, necessary, or a positive event, and war opponents do not begin to justify it, even partially. Transforming war into a norm simply means that now it is an integral part of a new order, something unpleasant but at the same time routine and unavoidable, to which even anti-war Russians are forced to adapt and get used to it.

Private and public perspectives of the war’s opponents and non-opponents

Diverse testimonies and data indicate that, firstly, there are far more people with ambiguous, contradictory attitudes towards the war than staunch supporters or opponents, and secondly, their numbers are increasing over time.

Intuitively, one might assume that the key difference in perception of the war between those who justify it and its opponents should be that the former always defend the war and the latter always criticise it. However, this is not entirely true. On the one hand, two years after the war began, some of its opponents have integrated into the new Russian reality: they have not ceased to condemn the war but have simultaneously begun to view the behaviour and reasoning of some justifying Russians with understanding. On the other hand, non-opponents of the war are dissatisfied with what is happening in the country and the war itself, and in certain situations express this dissatisfaction. But unlike staunch opponents of the war, depending on the context, they switch between criticising and justifying the war. Nevertheless, there are similarities and differences in what exactly war opponents and non-opponents are dissatisfied with and how they express their dissatisfaction.

As at the beginning of the war, its opponents today criticise the Russian invasion from the perspective of morals and ethics. They call the war a crime and barbarism, unacceptable in the 21st century. Such criticism is fundamentally alien to non-opponents of the war. Moreover, if they hear such statements from their interlocutors, they begin to justify Russia's actions.

The point is that, socialising in a depoliticized society and an authoritarian state, they do not feel connected to the socio-political life of the country and do not see the opportunity to influence the actions of the authorities in principle. However, they certainly share universal morality – the notion that wars and killing innocent civilians are bad. Therefore, when they hear that Russia is waging a criminal war and killing people in Ukraine, they may take these accusations personally. Feeling as though the accusations against them are unjust, as they did not choose the war and cannot stop it, they begin to deny the very nature of the crime: Russia did not start the war, we were defending ourselves from the threat of NATO, and in general, wars happen everywhere.

However, non-opponents of the war also criticise the ‘special operation’ from a moral perspective, but in a very different way – through complaints about the war-induced violations of norms generally accepted within Russian society. For example, they may express dissatisfaction with the fact that the wife of a mobilised soldier who died at the front bought an overpriced car with the money she received, or that a young husband and father voluntarily went to the front to earn money, leaving his newborn child at home. These discussions and criticism of the actions of acquaintances ultimately turn into criticism of the war: ‘life is more valuable than money’, our interlocutors say, so why go to war ‘for unclear reasons’.

In general, apolitical non-opponents of the war judge it much more often than its staunch supporters and opponents based on personal experience of encountering its consequences and manifestations. For example, for opponents of the war it has long been obvious that ‘television lies’ – they excluded television from their media repertoire many years ago. For the more apolitical non-opponents, this fact became especially apparent during the war, as personal testimonies of acquaintances – residents of eastern Ukraine or those mobilised to the front – contradicted the official television narrative of events. Against the backdrop of personal testimonies, the propagandistic narrative began to seem false and hypocritical to them. 'What they say on TV is all bullshit', they assert, because in reality, people are thrown into fire unprepared, and huge losses are concealed. This prompts non-opponents to question the very purpose of the war: why are 'our boys' dying? However, this questioning, critical statement about the conflict does not lead them to assert that the entire 'special operation' is a mistake.

The feeling of the senselessness of war, thus, is also common to its staunch opponents and many apolitical individuals who generally justify the war. However, for opponents of the war, its senselessness serves as one of the reasons for criticising the 'special operation' as such: if there is no convincing explanation for why the war is needed, then it is not needed at all. The logic of non-opponents, however, is different: on the one hand, the obvious harm that the state waging war inflicts on its own citizens and the country as a whole makes them pay attention to the hypocrisy of the propaganda narrative about the military conflict and question its official justifications. But, on the other hand, facing accusations of unmotivated military aggression against Russia, that is, against not abstract 'elites' and 'those who started the war', but against that 'whole' to which they feel connected, they try to find meaning in what is happening, which is hidden from them ('the authorities know what they are doing').

Russians with the most diverse views on the war formulate complaints regarding its economic and social consequences. However, again, apolitical Russians justifying the war more often start from their personal encounters with specific problems. Pensions do not increase, prices rise, utilities tariffs rise, authorities send 'our boys' to the front without preparation and equipment, and ask us, ordinary citizens, to provide all this for them. Or: 'boys' come back without hands and legs, but there is no proper medical care in the city.

Opponents of the war, on the other hand, formulate similar criticism on a more abstract level: social and infrastructural problems around them remain unresolved, while the state spends money on military actions. In other words, summarising much of the above, opponents of the war (as well as its staunch supporters) tend to reason about what is happening at the level of moral and political principles, whereas apolitical Russians justifying the war only occasionally move to this level, which is driven by very specific personal experiences of the reality of wartime.

We do not use the word ‘sometimes’ in vain: indeed, in isolated cases, the reasoning of non-opponents of the war has the potential to reach a more generalised, political level. For example, justifying the war, they often defend 'Russia', some, albeit indefinite, generalised 'we', which is accused 'from the outside' of military aggression. Abstract Russian (but not Russian!) identity thus begins to play a greater role for some of them. Similarly, complaints about very specific household problems that they or their close ones encounter because of the war can lead to a – for now rhetorical – question about its meaningfulness as such.