Nuclear Inferiority Complex: Escalation rhetoric through the prism of the Cold War experience

Ideology or geopolitics?

If we had asked ourselves 10 or 15 years ago whether the current situation in the world was similar to the Cold War, most historians and political scientists would have answered no. Today, many are talking about a new Cold War. To understand this comparison, it is important to define what that phenomenon was. In my opinion, it was a confrontation characterised by the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides. Conflicts between major players became indirect and were fought in third countries, as both sides believed that a direct clash between superpowers would escalate into a nuclear war.

The United States and the Soviet Union had different perceptions of what the Cold War was. For the American side, it was primarily an ideological confrontation between capitalism and socialism. The ideological aspect was significant for the Soviet Union as well. However, the struggle for global influence and a place in the world hierarchy was incredibly important for the Soviet Union. In fact, the geopolitical issue – the quest for recognition of the USSR as one of the world leaders – was, in my opinion, more important for Soviet leadership than ideological confrontation.

Historian Odd Arne Westad believes that the Cold War was about the confrontation between two models of modernisation – socialist and capitalist. Today, differences between development models exist but do not appear as fundamental as they did then. One could say that the US and China are now competing less over ideology and development models and more over their positions in the world. While the US seeks to maintain its place at the top of the hierarchy, China and Russia are trying to improve their positions relative to the US and undermine the hierarchy itself. In this sense, there are similarities between today's confrontation and the Cold War, but there are also differences.

How far can this comparison be taken today? Can we, for example, view Russia and Ukraine as proxy regimes of China and the US, respectively, as historian Niall Ferguson suggested in one of his columns shortly after the invasion? For him, the second Cold War is a mirror image of the first, with the difference being that the main adversary of the West back then was the Soviet Union, with China as a secondary player, whereas now it is the other way around. In this perspective, the conflict in Ukraine resembles the Korean war – the first major proxy war of that era.

Proxy countries or independent actors?

In my opinion, the very notion of 'proxy countries' should be approached with caution, as it essentially implies a lack of sovereignty of non-superpower states. Of course, proxy conflicts of great powers, such as the wars on the Korean Peninsula, in Vietnam, or in Angola, were fought on the territories of small and poor countries. Their leaders had to consult with the leadership of the supporting powers – the USSR and the USA – on key issues. But even then, these countries had the ability to pursue independent policies. For example, the leaders of North Vietnam, despite their obvious ties with China and the USSR, often acted contrary to the advice they received from Beijing and Moscow. Leaders of small countries, both then and now, play a significant role in advancing their national interests. This is even more true for Russia. Its political weight and strategic independence are still considerable due to its possession of nuclear weapons. What Russia is doing in Ukraine undoubtedly benefits China, but it does not mean that Russia is acting on orders from Beijing.

The differences between the two historical periods can be emphasised by returning to the example of the Korean War. Korea was divided into South and North in 1945 as a result of World War II. Over time, Soviet authorities installed their protégé, Kim Il Sung, in the North, while the Americans installed theirs, Syngman Rhee, in the South. The unification of the two parts of the peninsula was declared a goal by both new states, which was enshrined in the constitutions of both Koreas adopted in 1948. Kim immediately began calling for the expansion of his power over all of Korea, but he needed Stalin's support. Stalin, however, feared US involvement in the conflict and did not authorise it.

It was only at the end of January 1950, after another proposal by Kim to begin the 'unification process', that Stalin approved this. He reasoned that the US had not dared to challenge the new Chinese authorities militarily, and would now be even more cautious because the Soviet Union had become a nuclear power and had signed a treaty of alliance with China. Finally, as can be seen in the new documents I have published, Soviet intelligence, citing its sources, also convinced Stalin that America would not react in any way to a possible attack by the North on the South.

Nevertheless, the Americans entered the war, albeit several months after it began. As a result, Kim Il Sung's army nearly suffered complete defeat. The necessity of Chinese troop involvement became evident. If the so-called Chinese volunteers had not crossed the Yalu River and engaged in combat, North Korea would have been defeated.

Unlike Kim, Putin did not need to consult anyone or secure support to launch a 'special military operation'. Yes, in February 2022, on the eve of the invasion, he travelled to Beijing and had talks with Xi Jinping. But, as far as we know from various sources, the Chinese side was not informed of the plans to attack Ukraine. It is also inconceivable that Putin would request China's support for Russia's military actions. Additionally, it is clear that if Russia starts losing the war, China will not send its army to help its northern neighbour.

Intentions and capabilities: the basis for nuclear blackmail

Nuclear blackmail is always a factor in international politics, even if leaders do not resort to it directly. The presence of nuclear weapons is inseparable from nuclear blackmail because it forces consideration of the adversary's capabilities rather than intentions. This was understood by US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. In 1979, he wrote to President Jimmy Carter: 'In the past, we could dismiss Soviet intentions because Soviet capabilities were limited. Today, even limited Soviet plans cause increasing concern due to their enhanced capabilities.' From the American perspective, it did not matter what the Soviet Union actually did: its power seemed an unacceptable threat in itself. In Washington, this perception of threat undermined the policy of détente with the USSR. Soviet leaders appeared to the American leadership as strategic adversaries, regardless of their friendly assurances.

The key factor here was the 'nuclear revolution' of the 1950s. The Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons in August 1949. Subsequently, both sides added thermonuclear weapons to their arsenals and gained the ability to strike each other with ballistic missiles. This completely changed the dynamics of international relations and international politics. Therefore, it is impossible to agree with those who say that the current situation resembles the pre-World War I world. At that time, countries did not possess anything comparable in destructive power to nuclear weapons.

With the acquisition of nuclear weapons, both sides – directly or indirectly – used them to blackmail the adversary. Starting in 1945, during the discussion of post-war agreements, the American side emphasised that the US was a nuclear monopolist. During the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur, commanding American forces in Korea, proposed the use of nuclear weapons, but he did not find support from President Harry Truman.

Nikita Khrushchev discovered the possibilities of nuclear blackmail in 1956, during the Suez Crisis. The Soviet Union then made a series of statements and threats against Britain and France. The advance of Israeli forces on Egypt, supported by Britain and France, was indeed halted. This happened due to pressure on London from Washington, but Khrushchev drew a completely different lesson from it. He decided that the 'imperialist retreat' had been brought about by Soviet threats, that this card had played well and could now be used everywhere. He tried to do this in 1957 during the Syrian Crisis, when he threatened to strike Turkey, and then in 1958 during the Taiwan Strait Crisis, when he promised to support China in case of conflict with the US President Dwight Eisenhower, who had commanded Allied forces in Europe during World War II, received several proposals from the military to use nuclear weapons but rejected them all.

One of the most famous episodes of the Cold War is the Berlin Crisis, which ended with the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. In November 1958, Khrushchev issued an ultimatum to the Western powers, demanding they withdraw their troops from West Berlin and make it a demilitarised free city. He reasoned that West Berlin was deep within East Germany, controlled by the USSR. In the event of war, defending this small territory was impossible. Khrushchev could not believe that the US would be willing to enter a nuclear war for the sake of West Berlin, and yet he was not completely convinced of this. And even while raising the stakes on the Berlin issue in 1961 and trying to force President John F. Kennedy to sign a treaty with East Germany, Khrushchev still feared that Kennedy would take the irrational step of starting a nuclear conflict. 

Psychological game and the limits of escalation

According to Khrushchev's memoirs, in the summer of 1941, Nikolai Vashugin, commander of one of the tank units, reported to him, then a member of the military council of the Kyiv Military District, that he had lost the army, and then shot himself in front of Khrushchev. Khrushchev used this episode as an example of human irrationality when discussing the Berlin Crisis. Politicians may think that entering a nuclear conflict is madness, but the factor of human irrationality cannot be ruled out. The fear of even the minimal possibility of a nuclear conflict ultimately stopped Khrushchev from escalating nuclear blackmail. He attempted to use it again during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, failed, and subsequently, fearing nuclear war, sought rapprochement with the Americans, which was later continued by Brezhnev during the détente period.

The American side also resorted to nuclear blackmail in 1973 during the Arab-Israeli War. In October 1973, Egypt launched a military operation against Israel. After some initial successes by the Egyptian army, Israel counterattacked. Leonid Brezhnev and Henry Kissinger, then US Secretary of State, agreed on a ceasefire, but Israel continued its military actions. Brezhnev then informed US President Richard Nixon that if the US did not stop Israel, the Soviet Union would ‘take unilateral steps’. In response, the Americans raised the readiness level of the armed forces, including nuclear forces, to DEFCON 3 – during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the readiness level was raised to 2 (DEFCON 1 being the use of nuclear weapons). Thus, in response to blackmail by the USSR, the Americans also played the nuclear card. Neither side intended to continue the confrontation as this was the era of 'détente'.

Brezhnev rarely resorted to threats and avoided doing so publicly. Putin's statements more closely resemble the tactics of Khrushchev, who used the nuclear card more often.However, Khrushchev had wartime experience and believed that human rationality could not be relied upon. In Soviet history, I cannot recall anything similar to the 'psychological operation' recently staged by Putin and Sergey Karaganov at the St Petersburg Economic Forum. Karaganov argued that it was necessary to return the 'nuclear safety catch to the international system' by climbing the 'escalation ladder' and being ready to use nuclear weapons. Putin responded that there was 'no need' for this ‘yet’. Perhaps this was an attempt to show that there are even more radical views in the Russian elite than Putin's, and things could be even worse than they are now. However, like Putin's other speeches, this spectacle makes it impossible to judge whether the Russian leader is ready for a full-scale nuclear confrontation. 

The dream of condominium and spheres of influence 

Soviet leaders always had more desires than capabilities. They envisioned the Soviet Union as a superpower, co-governing the world on equal terms with the United States. Ideology was significant for the regime's self-identity but did not play a decisive role in advancing Soviet interests globally. Above all, Soviet leaders needed recognition of their role as an equal global power to the United States. Nothing was more important to them than high regard from US leaders regarding their global significance. Essentially, Soviet leaders acknowledged the US's right to give such recognition. This is confirmed by hundreds of quotes from their private conversations, including during meetings with foreign guests. This was especially characteristic of Brezhnev, who held Nixon in high esteem and believed that, with Nixon, he could effectively rule the world together.

The formula 'to rule the world together' is how Kissinger interpreted Brezhnev's words during a 1973 conversation between the American Secretary of State and the Soviet leader in Zavidovo. They were talking in one of the hunting lodges from which Brezhnev would shoot wild boars. He shared with Kissinger the idea that the US and the Soviet Union needed to run the world together. Brezhnev sought a joint 'condominium' with the US following the Yalta scenario, that is, a situation where the US would recognise the Soviet sphere of interest and the Soviet Union would recognise the American sphere of interest, with both making key global decisions jointly.

Russian politicians inherited this often unfulfilled aspiration for a significant role in the international hierarchy from their Soviet predecessors. Putin wanted American leaders to recognise his sphere of interest. His invasion of Ukraine likely stems from his belief, based on the West's response to the annexation of Crimea, that such recognition already existed. He believed that Ukraine ‘legitimately’ belonged within Russia's sphere of influence and that there would be no excessive reaction to the invasion of a neighbouring country.

Perhaps Putin thought that the reaction would be similar to the West's response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 – noisy but not overly confrontational. It was after that ‘special military operation’, which solidified Soviet dominance in Eastern and Central Europe, that Brezhnev managed to construct the idea of détente.

I do not rule out that Putin might have reasoned in a similar way. He might have thought that the Americans would eventually recognise his 'right' to Ukraine and Russia would then be able to reach a new level of relations with the US. I think he still believes that he can forcefully impose himself on Ukraine and achieve recognition from Washington, which would be the prelude to a ‘second Yalta’. At the same time, the gap between intentions and opportunities in today's Russia is much larger than in the Soviet Union. Most likely, Putin realises that he will not be able to form a 'condominium' with the US naturally: his power will not be sufficiently recognised. That is why he is seeking to raise Russia's weight in Europe and the world by force. He believes that recognition as the 'main enemy' will legitimise his great-power aspirations. The weakening of the US and the West fuels these hopes.