Two and a Half Europes: The Ukrainian question and the future of the continent through the lens of European public opinion

On the ruins of transatlanticism

A YouGov poll conducted from 25 February to 4 March in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy (with approximately 8,000 respondents) reveals a strong wave of European consolidation in rejecting Donald Trump and his pro-Russian stance on Europe and Ukraine. As a perceived adversary and source of danger for Europe, Trump trails Russian dictator Vladimir Putin by only 10-15 percentage points. In the UK, 80% hold an unfavourable view of Trump, compared to 89% for Putin. In France, the figures are 72% and 82%, respectively; in Spain, 75% and 89%; and in Italy, 63% and 77%. For comparison, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is viewed favourably by 71% of Britons, 49% of French respondents, 48% of Spaniards, and 34% of Italians (though in Italy, Zelensky's unfavourable rating stands at 49%). Meanwhile, Putin is seen as a threat to European peace and security by 89% of respondents in Britain and 74% in Italy, while Trump is viewed as a threat by 78% of Britons (in what was once the US's closest ally) and 58% of Italians.

Unfavourable assessments of Zelensky, Trump and Putin in European public opinion, % of those surveyed

While support for NATO membership in major European countries has risen since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and remains relatively high (66% in the UK, 45-46% in Spain, France, and Italy), confidence in the US fulfilling its Article 5 obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty, i.e. coming to Europe’s aid in the event of an attack, is declining. Only a minority of Europeans (about 20-25% in the UK, 30% in France, 35% in Spain, and 40% in Italy) believe the US would assist the Baltic states and Poland if they were attacked by Russia. Confidence in US support for their own countries is slightly higher – around 40% in Spain, France, and the UK, and 55% in Italy.

Residents of European countries themselves have also grown noticeably colder toward the idea of providing military assistance to the US in case of a conflict with Russia. Since last year, support for such aid has dropped from 60% to 42% in the UK, from 51% to 36% in France, from 44% to 30% in Spain, and from 34% to 27% in Italy. However, the willingness of London, Paris, and Madrid to defend other NATO allies has remained stable or even increased.

This shift in European public opinion is not merely a reaction to recent events or actions by the Trump administration but is largely rooted in the hostility that emerged during his first presidential term. Europeans are more sceptical than any other region in the world about Trump's return to the White House, according to a European Council on Foreign Affairs (ECFR) poll conducted shortly after the American election. Trump's attacks on Europe have triggered a transactional response: over the past 18 months, the proportion of Europeans who see the US as an 'ally that shares our interests and values' has dropped significantly, while the share of those who view it as a 'necessary partner for strategic cooperation' has risen. By the end of 2024, only 22% of Europeans saw the US as an ally, while 51% regarded it as a pragmatic partner, according to an ECFR survey of 14 European countries. Another 11% of respondents viewed the US as a 'rival' or even an 'adversary' in a state of conflict with Europe.

This transformation is evident even in traditional strongholds of Atlanticism, such as Poland and Denmark, where the percentage of people considering the US an 'ally' has fallen from 50% to 31% and from 54% to 30%, respectively, since April 2023. In historically more sceptical countries like Germany and France, the pro-alliance camp has shrunk from 34% to 19% in Germany and from 22% to 14% in France. As a result, in Europe’s major continental powers (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) only an average of 16% still see the US as an ally. Meanwhile, in Germany, nearly a quarter of the population (23%) now views the US as a rival or adversary, an increase of 6 percentage points over the past year and a half. In France and Switzerland, about a fifth of respondents (19% and 18%, respectively) share this view.

Transatlantic relations have rarely been entirely smooth, but for decades, they were sustained by the momentum of postwar unity and the Cold War era. The current transformation, however, represents a historic (though not instantaneous) shift that is not driven solely by changes on the American side.

The further development of US-European relations could become even more dramatic, as these tensions now intersect with domestic political divides within Europe. The worsening perception of the US is largely concentrated among supporters of Europe’s mainstream political parties, such as Germany’s CDU, SPD, and the Greens, Spain’s PSOE, and France’s Renaissance party led by Emmanuel Macron, according to ECFR’s survey.

Among radical right-wing parties, however, the picture is different. Traditional right-wing groups, such as France’s National Rally, have followed the broader European trend: their positive perception of the US has declined by 4 percentage points, while negative views have increased by 5 points. At the same time, supporters of Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) and other 'new right' movements have warmed significantly toward the US with Trump’s return. Seeing him as the 'enemy of their enemies,' they sympathise with many of his ideological positions. Among AfD supporters, 66% now view the US as either an ally or a partner – an increase of 13 percentage points since 2023. Some experts at ECFR even suggest the possibility of a new ideological transatlantic alliance in the spirit of Trump’s 'Make America Great Again' movement. Its contours were outlined by US Vice President J.D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference. However, the tariff war that Trump has declared on Europe significantly reduces the likelihood of such an alliance and instead fuels growing European anti-American sentiment.

The Ukrainian question: three Europeans and values with no defenders

While all European countries have shifted toward supporting an end to the war through negotiations, and the number of those who believe in Ukraine’s victory has dwindled to a mere 10% (according to ECFR surveys across 14 European countries conducted at the end of 2024), Europe remains deeply divided on the Ukrainian issue.

In Southern and Southeastern Europe, there is a far more pragmatic and conciliatory stance toward Russia, leading to a distancing from Ukraine’s interests and a lack of perception of Ukraine as a frontline against Russian autocracy. Countries that typically fall into this camp in various surveys include Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Slovakia, Hungary, Austria, and, to a lesser extent, Italy (for more details → Re: Russia: United but Divisible). On the opposite end of the spectrum are the countries of Northern and Northeastern Europe – the UK, Scandinavia, Denmark, the Netherlands, the Baltic states, and Poland – showing significantly stronger determination in supporting Ukraine and countering the Russian threat. Germany and France lean toward this group but with noticeably lower levels of resolve; public opinion in these two countries remains split between these positions. This division is also reflected in a recent YouGov poll, where the UK represents the northern European stance, while Italy exemplifies the southern approach.

Donald Trump’s openly pro-Moscow 'peace-making' efforts have strengthened emotional support for Ukraine in Europe, at least in its major countries. Amid worsening relations with the US since late 2024, the share of those who wish for Ukraine’s victory has increased: from 62% to 67% in the UK, from 43% to 50% in France, from 48% to 52% in Germany, and from 29% to 34% in Italy. The most significant surge has been in Spain, where support for Ukraine’s victory has risen from 38% to 57%. At the same time, Europeans widely agree that the current level of aid to Ukraine is insufficient to prevent a Russian victory (about 60% of respondents share this view). However, only a clear minority is willing for their own country to increase assistance to Kyiv: 24% in the UK, 17% in France, 18% in Spain, and just 9% in Italy.

Support for Ukraine in European public opinion, % of those surveyed

Europeans largely see Trump’s potential deal with Putin as a de facto partition of Ukraine, where the country becomes a bargaining chip in great power relations. Among those surveyed by YouGov, the prevailing view is that Moscow and Washington will agree on the terms of peace in the coming months, even if Ukraine does not accept them (48-58% share this belief). Around two-thirds of respondents think that any peace agreement will include Russian control over part of Ukraine's territory. Approximately 40% of Italians, 50% of French respondents, and over 60% of Spaniards and Britons believe the deal will favour Russia’s interests and consider it unfair (55% in the UK, 47% in Spain, and 39% in France). Only in Italy are opinions evenly split, with 31% approving and 31% disapproving of such an agreement.

However, the willingness to oppose an unjust peace is low. A majority believe Ukraine will have to accept an unfavourable, imposed agreement (47% in France, 58% in Italy, and 49% in Spain). Only in the UK does the largest faction (40%) believe Ukraine should reject such terms. In the UK, 59% think Europe should continue military aid to Ukraine; of these, one-third believe Ukraine should be pushed toward a peace deal, while two-thirds think it should not sign an unfavourable agreement. In Spain, 52% support continued aid under any scenario, while 20% believe Ukraine should reject an unfair peace. In contrast, support for ongoing military aid in any scenario is significantly lower in France (42%) and Italy (36%). The share of those who believe Ukraine should refuse to sign a disadvantageous deal is only 8-15% in these countries.

‘If the US signs a peace agreement with Russia without Ukraine's participation, allowing Russia to retain control over some occupied territories, and Ukraine refuses to accept the terms, what should Europe and the UK do?’, % of those surveyed

At the same time, in all countries surveyed, the majority believe that Europe is not capable of replacing the US as the main provider of military aid. Only a third of respondents in the UK and Spain hold the opposite view, while in France, Germany, and Italy, this number drops to just a quarter. The idea of sending peacekeepers to Ukraine is supported by 50% of respondents in the UK, Spain, and France, but only 36-37% in Italy and Germany.

In other words, in four of the five largest European countries (excluding Italy), the 'just peace' camp for Ukraine continues to dominate over the 'peace at any cost' approach (→ Ivan Krastev, Mark Leonard: Peace vs. Justice). Europeans recognise that a just peace depends on the resources Ukraine’s allies are willing to invest. However, the faction willing to pursue such a peace through increased efforts is relatively strong only in northern Europe and Spain, while such determination is lacking in southern (Italy) and central European powers (France, Germany). This divide is also reflected in attitudes toward Ukraine’s NATO membership: a clear majority in the UK (62%) and Spain (57%) support it, while in Germany, 46% oppose and only 36% are in favour. In France and Italy, public opinion is nearly evenly split on the issue.

Effectively, three distinct factions have emerged in Europe regarding Ukraine. Beyond the division between the 'peace at any cost' and 'just peace' camps, there are two subgroups within the latter: those who believe Europe must and can fight for a just peace and those who see this as unrealistic and irrational (a view dominant in Germany and France). Overall, most Europeans see Trump’s deal with Putin as unjust but feel powerless to oppose it and defend their vision of justice.

The great hesitant power

The war in Ukraine and Washington’s 'betrayal' have confronted Europe with a dual challenge, one for which European public opinion has yet to fully form a response. On the one hand, central and northern European countries are increasingly aware of the systemic nature of the Russian threat. 65% of Britons believe that, despite Trump’s deal, Russia will attack Ukraine again, while 60% think Russia will launch a direct attack on Europe within the next decade. In Germany and France, about 50% share the first concern, and 45% the second, according to a YouGov survey. Italy is again an outlier, with only about 30% of respondents expressing these fears.

However, European public opinion remains fragmented and inconsistent when it comes to deciding how to respond. For example, in France, support for creating a pan-European army remains at late 2010s levels (55%), while in Spain and Germany, it has grown only slightly: from 58-59% in 2019 to 62-63% in March 2025. The UK, by contrast, is undergoing a rapid shift: after Brexit, support for a European army fell to 25% by 2020 but has now risen to 43% in the latest survey. In Italy, the trend is the opposite: support has continued to decline, from 57% in 2019 to 50% in 2022 and 45% in 2025. The idea of increasing defence spending has also gained traction only in certain countries. Currently, 45-46% of respondents in the UK and Germany believe their defence budgets are too small, compared to 39% in France, 32% in Spain, and just 11% in Italy.

Two major obstacles stand in the way of European rearmament or the creation of a European Defence Union: the opportunistic stance of southern and southeastern Europe and the lack of determination among central European powers. Europe's separation from the US is not a problem because of any deep-rooted commitment to Euro-Atlanticism or sympathy for America but rather due to Europeans’ deep uncertainty about their own capabilities and a fundamentally sceptical outlook on Europe’s future.

They view the EU in a darker light than respondents in most of the rest of the world, a recent ECFR global poll showed. An overwhelming majority in Brazil, India, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa believe that the EU will gain significantly more influence in the world over the next decade. In contrast, within the EU itself, only 29% share this expectation. In the European 'core' countries (Britain, Germany, France, Switzerland, and Italy) only 15–25% of respondents hold this view (meanwhile, 42% of Europeans believe in the near-term rise of US influence, and 54% expect China's influence to grow).

A total of 42% of Europeans think Europe can compete on equal footing with powers like the US and China, while an almost equal number (43%) doubt this. However, confidence in Europe's strength is significantly lower in the 'core' countries of France, Germany, Switzerland, and Britain (32-37%), while the highest confidence is found in Europe's periphery, in Estonia, Portugal, Romania, and Spain (50-58%). Finally, an average of 37% of Europeans do not rule out the possibility of the EU breaking apart in the future, a strikingly high figure. In the 'core' countries, this number rises to 40%. As a result, the apparent parity between those who believe 'Europe can become a great power' and those who do not does not reflect the true balance of forces: in the countries that could drive European separation, only about a quarter of the population believes in the EU’s future as a global power.

Based on two key questions – whether Europe can become a global power and whether the EU risks disintegration – ECFR analysts have identified four distinct camps among EU citizens. ‘Euro-optimists’ still make up the largest group, averaging 29% across 14 surveyed countries. They believe that the EU is already a great power on par with the US and China and that it is unlikely to collapse in the next 20 years. The highest proportion of 'Euro-optimists' is found in Estonia, Spain, Denmark, and Portugal (between one-third and 40% of respondents), while the lowest is in Switzerland, Bulgaria, and France (18-20%). In Germany, Poland, and Italy, the figure stands at 25%. 'Euro-optimists' dominate the voter bases of Macron’s Renaissance, Spain’s Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) and People's Party (PP), as well as Germany’s Green Party.

‘Europessimists’ (22%), on the other hand, do not see the EU as a global power comparable to the US and China and expect its eventual collapse. Predictably, this camp is most prevalent among voters of far-right parties such as AfD, National Rally, Law and Justice, Orbán’s Fidesz, and Spain’s Vox. In the 'core' countries, around 26-27% fall into this category – roughly the same as the proportion of 'Euro-optimists' (24-25%).

The third camp, the ‘eurorealists’ (17%), do not consider the EU’s collapse likely but also do not see it as a great power. However, unlike 'Euro-pessimists,' they believe the EU's strength could grow in the future, and Europe has a chance to become a force comparable to the US and China. Like 'Euro-optimists,' they often support continued European aid to Ukraine, regardless of the circumstances. The largest share of 'Euro-realists' is found in Denmark (30%), while in the 'core' countries (France, Germany, the UK, and Italy), their numbers range from 15-19%.

Finally, another party, the ‘Euromortalists’ (10%), are the mirror image of the 'Euro-realists'. They believe that while the EU has the potential to become a great power alongside China and the US, it is extremely vulnerable and cannot bear the burden of a great power in its current form. Their scepticism is not about Europe's potential in principle but rather about the present structure of the European Union.

ECFR experts argue that European leaders must focus on winning over 'Euro-realists' and 'Euro-mortalists' since, together with 'Euro-optimists,' they could form a broad majority that values a united and politically and militarily independent Europe – one that, unlike today, would be capable of defending its values in the future.

***

European politicians and public opinion have been caught off guard by the 'betrayal' of the United States and are unprepared to resist the Ukraine deal between Putin and Trump, despite the fact that this 'agreement' sharply contradicts their notions of justice and European values.

However, within Europe itself, two distinct poles and three camps have emerged – not only in their perception of this issue but also in their stance toward 'traditional' European values as a whole. Commitment to these values is stronger in the north and northeast of Europe, as well as in Spain, while it is significantly weaker in the southeast and south of the continent. The two key countries at the centre of Europe – France and Germany – occupy an intermediate position, supporting a values-based approach on the one hand while exercising extreme caution when it comes to taking practical steps to defend it on the other.

At the same time, the Ukrainian question, in the context of the abrupt shift in US policy, has already become part of the broader issue of Europe’s new self-definition. The continent now faces the challenge of redefining itself within a drastically changed geopolitical landscape. Whether a majority can emerge in the fragmented European public sphere to support a new European geopolitical strategy, or whether Europe is headed for even deeper and more severe divisions, remains an open question.