Polls indicate that significantly more Russians, on average seven times as many (26-37%), consider a Trump victory more beneficial for Russia compared to a Harris win (4-5%). As is often the case with foreign policy issues, these preferences are largely shaped by mainstream media narratives. Throughout the thirty years of post-Soviet history, Russian attitudes toward the United States have followed media campaigns: negative peaks occurred during periods of heightened tension but quickly subsided once relations normalised.
In 2016, Russians also favoured Trump, though less enthusiastically: 35% saw his victory as favourable for Russia, compared to 13% for a Clinton win. Over Trump’s presidency, however, Russian media grew disillusioned with him, and by 2019, the share of those with a negative view of Trump was four times greater than his supporters (51% vs. 13%). By the 2020 election, sentiment had improved, but the Russian media did not express a clear preference for Trump over Biden. As the current campaign nears its conclusion, positive versus negative views stand at 36% to 20%.
The pro-Trump sentiment among both 'ordinary' Russians and the elite is driven by one key reason: Trump is promising to end the war in a way favourable to Russia. For both groups, Trump is seen as a lifeline, a potential way to escape the military and sanctions stalemate. Notably, business leaders and executives are especially hopeful for his victory.
Nevertheless, the stakes placed on Trump’s win are so high in Russia that if it does not happen, it will likely leave a significant negative impact on both public sentiment and the elite.
Despite Vladimir Putin repeatedly declaring during the American presidential campaign that a Democratic candidate's victory would be more favourable for Russia, commentators often interpret these statements as examples of Putin's trolling. Meanwhile, American intelligence and analysts monitoring Russian influence groups’ cyber activities worldwide are convinced that Russia is working to secure Donald Trump's victory. Alongside this, Russia aims to polarise American society and undermine trust in the electoral process as a whole.
The Kremlin’s support for Trump is also reflected in Russian public opinion surveys. According to a Levada Centre poll conducted between 26 September and 2 October, 79% of Russians are aware of the American election campaign (19% are closely following it, while 60% have heard something about it). Furthermore, in early October, 26% of respondents in a FOM poll and 37% in the Levada Centre poll believed Trump’s victory would be more beneficial for Russia, compared to only 4% and 5%, respectively, who favoured Kamala Harris. However, a substantial portion – 50% of FOM respondents and 46% of those surveyed by the Levada Centre – felt that the identity of the next US president would make no difference to Russia. Trump enjoys, on average, a sevenfold advantage in perceived favorability.
In 2016, Russians also had a preference for Trump, though it was less pronounced: 35% thought his victory was preferable for Russia, compared to 13% who favoured Hillary Clinton. Four years later, in a similar Levada Centre poll, Trump’s advantage had narrowed: only 16% considered his win better for Russia, versus 9% who leaned toward Joe Biden. This result reflected the Kremlin's (and, consequently, the Russian public's) disappointment with Trump’s presidency.
Public opinion data from FOM illustrates this evolving sentiment. In 2017, the balance of positive and negative views of Trump was neutral. By 2019, negative views were four times more prevalent than positive ones. As the 2020 election approached, opinions of Trump improved slightly, though the balance remained negative. In the summer of 2024, the share of positive views of Trump surpassed negative ones for the first time since 2017, and by September, the positive ratings increased further, as the share of negative assessments declined.
At the same time, Kamala Harris remains largely unfamiliar to Russians: two-thirds of those surveyed by FOM in October had heard her name for the first time. Among the third of respondents who knew something about Harris, 20% (of the total sample) had a negative opinion of her, while only 3% held a positive view – a nearly sevenfold difference. Perceptions of Harris reflect the stereotypes spread by her critics: 4% of the entire sample described her as 'stupid, inadequate, uneducated,' and another 4% mentioned traits like 'cheerful, giggly.' Even Vladimir Putin highlighted Harris’s laughter in his ironic remarks, hinting at her perceived weakness as a stateswoman.
There is no doubt that these preferences are shaped mainly by Russian state-controlled and censored media, which significantly influence public opinion on foreign affairs. This influence is evident in the long-term trends of Russians' attitudes toward the United States: sharp deteriorations in opinion coincide with periods of heightened tension between the two countries, often marked by targeted media campaigns. However, once the topic faded from the focus of federal media, the balance of views quickly improved, although it rarely returned to previous levels.
The influence of state-controlled media is also evident in recent survey data. According to the Levada Centre, among older age groups (55+), who are more reliant on television as a source of information, 28% are closely following the US elections, compared to just 12% among younger groups (18-39 years). FOM’s data reflects a similar trend. Among those paying close attention, 52% consider a Trump victory preferable, while only 10% favour a Harris win.
However, engagement (awareness of the campaign) primarily impacts how many respondents believe it does not matter who wins (the less engaged, the more indifferent). Pro-Trump sentiments (among those with a preference for one candidate) are evident across all age groups, and are even stronger among younger people, since a greater proportion of them think the outcome is significant for Russia. Among those aged 18–39, 41% believe it would be better for Trump to win, and 42% think the outcome doesn’t matter; in contrast, among those aged 55+, only 34% prefer a Trump victory, while 47% are indifferent. Support for Kamala Harris is slightly higher among those who closely follow the campaign and those who get their news from YouTube (around 10% prefer Harris).
While about half of the respondents believe the election result will not change US-Russia relations, 33% expect relations to improve if Trump wins, while only 9% anticipate a deterioration. Conversely, if Harris wins, 30% expect relations to worsen, and only 6% foresee improvement. When asked why a Trump victory would be better for Russia, FOM respondents (26% gave this response) most frequently cited Trump’s promise to end the war in Ukraine, to stop funding and supplying arms to Ukraine (10% of the sample), and his 'friendly attitude toward Russia and Putin' (9%).
Like the Kremlin, which views Trump’s potential return to the White House as an opportunity to end the war in Ukraine on favourable terms (similar to those articulated by Republican vice-presidential nominee J.D. Vance) and to open negotiations with the US over Russia's geopolitical standing, Russians see Trump as a potential saviour from the military and sanctions stalemate. A recent survey by the Chronicles project and ExtremeScan group reveals that 50% of those surveyed wish to restore relations with Western countries (→ Re:Russia: The Frustration of Loyalty). Notably, according to the Levada Centre, entrepreneurs and managers are especially hopeful for Trump's election. Numerous reports from Moscow, including coverage by The Washington Post citing insider sources, also highlight the Russian elite's high hopes for a Trump victory.
Both the Russian elite and ordinary Russians are less aware of other views held by Trump and his advisers regarding Russia – for example, their desire to 'bring down' oil prices and weaken Russia's ties with China. Similarly, they are unaware that another Russian partner, Iran, considers a Trump victory to be an extremely unfavourable scenario. Conversely, Putin's inner circle is likely aware that Trump will demand something in exchange for the 'Ukrainian gift', but they hope that freezing the conflict will be the first step of his presidency, and that the implementation of long-term plans may never materialise. After all, even if Trump wins, he will only serve another four years, as he did last time, and Russia can use those years as a breather, just as it did previously.
In any case, the stakes for Trump's victory are so high in Russia today that if it doesn't happen, it will leave a heavy impact on both society and the elite.