The Frustration of Loyalty: Russians want the war to end quickly, but without it appearing as a defeat for Russia

Between ‘ending’ and ‘defeat’

According to the data from the September survey conducted by the Chronicles Project and the ExtremeScan research group, direct support for the war (‘I support the “military operation” in Ukraine’) has dropped to 48%. This is the lowest level since spring 2022. Meanwhile, the percentage of respondents who said they do not support the ‘special operation’ increased by 4 percentage points compared to January, reaching 13%. Additionally,the proportion of those who were uncertain or refused to answer this question grew from 35% to 39%. A unique aspect of the Chronicles’ polls is that respondents are offered four answer options: ‘I support’, ‘I do not support’, ‘I find it difficult to answer’ and ‘I do not want to answer’. As we have previously noted, a significant number of respondents are aware that saying ‘I support’ carries a normative implication, yet they choose to avoid this response (→ Re:Russia: Pro-War Spring); in the September poll, nearly 40% of those surveyed fell into this category (it should be noted that in conditions of repression and war, people critical of the political course and the war in Ukraine may be underrepresented in the sample, as they are more likely to avoid participating in the polls).

Moreover, there was a 10 percentage point increase in the share of people who responded positively to the question: ‘If Vladimir Putin decides to withdraw Russian troops from the territory of Ukraine and starts negotiations for a truce without achieving the initial goals of the military operation, would you support or not support this decision?’ For a long time, the percentages of positive and negative responses were nearly equal (about 40%), but now the gap has widened to 16 percentage points (49% in favour, 33% against). If the question is phrased without specifying that the goals of the ‘military operation’ have not been achieved by the time negotiations begin, support for Putin’s decision to withdraw troops and start negotiations rises to 61% (with 25% opposed).

‘If Vladimir Putin decides to withdraw Russian troops from the territory of Ukraine and start negotiations on a truce without achieving the initially set goals of the “military operation”, would you support or not support such a decision?’ 2022-2024, % of those surveyed

A similar question posed by the Levada Centre is framed in a neutral manner: ‘Do you think military actions should continue now, or should peace negotiations begin?’ – without specifying any conditions. Since this question was first asked in October 2022, an average of just over 50% of respondents have supported negotiations, while about 40% have favoured continuing military actions. In the last four months, the average stands at 54% in favour of negotiations versus 37% for continuing the conflict (→ ‘Levada Centre: Conflict with Ukraine’).

To explore the ‘conditions for peace talks’ further, in September, Levada Centre sociologists asked a clarifying question in two versions. In the first, respondents were asked if they would support a decision by Putin to end the conflict in Ukraine ‘this week’. A total of 72% responded positively, while 20% were against it. At the same time, 76% of respondents in September also answered positively to the Levada Centre's direct question about supporting the war. This means that the majority of those who support the war would also welcome its immediate end (approximately 50% of all respondents). This highlights the contradictory nature of this majority's stance: ‘We support the war, but we wish it would end immediately’.

The second group of respondents was asked if they would support Putin’s decision to immediately end the war and return the ‘annexed territories’ to Ukraine. Only 31% responded positively, while 60% were against this. In the previously discussed question from the Chronicles survey, the withdrawal of troops from Ukraine is also mentioned (which essentially implies the return of occupied territories), but there it appears as a Russian peace initiative rather than a concession or retreat. Thus, it can be said that of the more than 70% of Russians who say they support the war but also want it to end immediately, about 40% want the war to end without it looking like a defeat or retreat for Russia.

Levada Centre pollsters also asked respondents if they would be willing to make concessions to Ukraine in order to achieve peace. Even though over 70% would like the war to end ‘this week’, only 20% are willing to make concessions to Ukraine to achieve that.

The war appears to provoke a mix of unspoken and frustrating emotions among Russian respondents, as shown by another question from the Chronicles/ExtremeScan survey: ‘Would you like to talk more with relatives, friends, or colleagues about what is happening on the front, in the “special operation” zone?’ A total of 42% said they would prefer to talk about it less, and 22% responded, ‘I don't want to talk about it at all’. This reflects both the distancing of two-thirds of respondents from the official and pro-war ‘Z-patriot’ discourse, as well as the lack of an acceptable mode for discussing the war in Russian public space (→ Yulia Galyamina: Five Discourses Around The War).

Between normalisation and militarisation

In the spring of 2024, support for the war (as assessed by a series of questions) increased slightly due to hopes that a successful Russian offensive would lead to its conclusion by the end of the year (→ Re:Russia: Pro-War Spring). By autumn, these hopes seem to have faded, reflected in the growing demand for peace noted earlier. In addition, there is increasing fatigue from the war’s costs.

Almost half (47%) of the respondents to the Levada Centre's survey chose the option that the ‘special military operation’ has caused more harm than good. Interestingly, this response (‘more harm’) prevails across all age groups: among the younger age group (18–39 years), it stands at 53% versus 21%, while in the ‘pensioner’ group aged 55 and older, the ratio is 44% to 34%. When asked a follow-up question regarding the nature of the harm caused by the war, 52% of those who said the war causes more harm cited ‘loss of life, casualties, and grief’ without specifying the side of the conflict. Meanwhile, 21% referred to ‘losses among soldiers’ and 18% mentioned economic costs. Among those who see benefits from the operation, a quarter (26%) mentioned ‘returning territories, new territories, more people’ (which amounts to only 7% of the overall sample).

The gradually increasing criticism of the war coexists with high loyalty among respondents to the Putin regime. In the Chronicles/ExtremeScan survey, 78% of respondents and 84% in the Levada Centre survey in September expressed approval of Putin as president. Moreover, when asked if Putin could make mistakes, 54% responded affirmatively, while 40% said ‘it is unlikely.’ 

At the same time, Russian citizens are well aware that Putin's agenda and course diverge significantly from what they themselves consider optimal. The Chronicles/ExtremeScan survey posed questions to respondents about what events they would like to see happen over the year and whether they believe these events will actually occur. The difference between desires and expectations demonstrates a gap between citizens' preferences and their perceptions of Putin's course. For example, only 22% consider a new wave of mobilisation desirable (these are the Z-patriots, consistent supporters of the war), while 42% believe it is likely. A peace treaty with Ukraine involving mutual concessions is viewed as desirable by 63% of respondents, but only 36% see this scenario as likely. Additionally, 85% would like the authorities to focus primarily on addressing internal socio-economic problems, but only 51% believe this will happen. Interestingly, compared to the previous January survey, the percentage of those who would like sanctions lifted increased from 55% to 65% (though only 33% consider this likely).

Gap in agendas: ‘Which of the listed events would you like to see happen in the coming year?’/‘Which of the listed events will happen in the coming year?’, September 2024, % of those surveyed

The political programme of Russian citizens is more peace-oriented and reveals their desire for normalisation (for example, as in the previous Chronicles survey, every second person would like to restore relations with Western countries). Overall, the average discrepancy between what is desired (the course preferred by respondents) and what is expected (the course of the Russian authorities as perceived by citizens) amounted to 23 points. Among those who believe that Putin can make mistakes (the majority – 54% of respondents), the discrepancy is 30 points, but even among those who think Putin does not make mistakes, the average discrepancy with his course across all questions is 13 points.

However, in one area, public opinion has consistently aligned more closely with the positions of the Russian authorities over the past year. In the first half of 2023, the proportion of those who believe that budget expenditures should primarily be directed toward the social sector significantly exceeded the proportion of those who considered military spending a priority (47% vs. 31%). However, since the autumn of 2023, this opinion has begun to change, and in the latest survey, the proportion of those prioritising military expenditures has surpassed that of supporters of social spending.

‘In conditions of budget deficit, in your opinion, where should public funds be spent first – on the armed forces or on the social sector?’, 2023-2024, % of those surveyed

It seems that the rather unsuccessful course of military actions for Russia and the persistent propaganda claims that Russia is at war with the West have created a sense of insecurity and threat to the country’s security among Russians. This is indicated by another paradoxical result from the Chronicles/ExtremeScan survey. When asked, ‘What should Russia prioritise in peace negotiations with Ukraine – retaining new territories or preventing Ukraine from joining NATO?’ only one in four (26%) chose "retaining new territories" as a priority, while almost one in two (46%) prioritised preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. (However, in the September Levada Centre survey, over 70% of respondents rejected the possibility of conceding ‘annexed’ territories as well as concessions regarding NATO membership when asked about compromises with Ukraine.)

This result, on one hand, again confirms the observation that Russians are relatively indifferent to new territorial acquisitions, which is the focus of Putin's attention. In Levada Centre surveys from 2016 to 2022, only 25% of respondents expressed a desire for the so-called DPR and LPR to join Russia, while the rest preferred their independent existence or retention within Ukraine. On the other hand, the survey data indicate that the Kremlin has managed to instil fear in the population regarding NATO's ‘approach’ and create a sense of insecurity. However, it is also important not to overlook a more practical aspect: increased military spending may appear to respondents as an alternative to mobilisation.

Conclusions

The picture of Russians' attitudes toward the war in Ukraine is much more complex than a simple division of opinions along the lines of ‘support’ vs. ‘opposition’ The September surveys from Chronicles/ExtremeScan and the Levada Centre allow for the following key conclusions:

— While most Russian citizens do not so much support the war with Ukraine as remain loyal to it, the demand for its swift conclusion and the onset of peace continues to grow.

— The perception of the costs of the war is becoming sharper, as indicated both by responses to direct questions about costs and by the increasing number of those wishing to lift Western sanctions.

— At the same time, against the backdrop of a strong desire for the war to end, Russian citizens reject the prospect of not only military but even symbolic defeat for Russia; the likelihood of such a scenario enhances their loyalty to the war and to Putin.

— Russian citizens are largely distancing themselves from both the official and Z-patriotic discourses regarding the war, and in the absence of suitable alternatives, they prefer not to talk about it at all.

— The high loyalty of respondents to Putin coexists with an awareness of the differences between his political course and the agenda that appears optimal to the majority of citizens.

— A factor contributing to pro-militarist sentiments is not so much the desire to acquire and retain new territories but rather an intensified sense of insecurity and threat to the country’s security, influenced by propaganda and military failures.