Three Parties and a Swing Group: How Russians view scenarios for the end of the war

Opinion polls, which were such a hot topic in the first year and a half of the war, have now largely faded from the news agenda. Three years of war have demonstrated that neither mobilisation, nor the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ incursion into Russian territory, nor Prigozhin’s mutiny, nor reports of significant Russian losses have led to substantial shifts in public sentiment, as reflected in mass surveys. War-related shocks, such as those mentioned, trigger spikes in anxiety (→ Re:Russia: The War of Attrition’s Kursk Battle), but do not change the broader narrative and the general mood. The landscape remains one where repression and militant obscurantism coexist with dissatisfaction over the war and the rupture with the West, patriotism and fear of defeat, as well as a deliberate detachment from political issues and a declarative loyalty ('We can’t change anything, so there’s no point in debating it').

Recent events – particularly the sharp changes in relations with the US – have heightened various expectations within Russian society. However, developments are unfolding so rapidly that they have not yet resulted in stable shifts in public opinion. Still, survey data indicates that in people's minds, the end of the war appears closer. In January 2024, 34% of those surveyed believed the war would last no more than a year; by July 2024, this figure rose to 40%, and by January 2025, it reached 43%, according to data from the Levada Centre. What sentiments and expectations shape how the average Russian views the possible scenarios and outcomes of the war?

A new regular survey conducted by the Levada Centre at the end of February shows that while an overwhelming majority (76%) still believe the war will ultimately end in a Russian victory (compared to 77% in January 2024 and 71% in January 2023), the share of those in favour of peace negotiations instead of continued fighting has reached its highest level since the war began. In January-February 2025, 60% supported negotiations versus 31% opposing them – doubling the advantage of pro-negotiation respondents. In January-May 2024, this ratio averaged 50% to 40% in favour of negotiations; by late 2024, it was 55% to 36%. This suggests that while the shift is significant, it is also a continuation of an established trend. Among those advocating for negotiations, half cited the high number of casualties as their main motivation.

75% of those surveyed said they would support a decision by Putin to halt military actions 'this week'. Notably, this number is higher than the percentage of those explicitly in favour of peace talks, meaning that some who previously supported continuing the war or were undecided would still accept its cessation if ordered by Putin. Additionally, 28% of those surveyed would support ending the war even if it required returning the 'annexed territories' to Ukraine. However, 17% opposed halting military actions altogether, and 64% rejected territorial concessions. However, on the issue of returning territories to achieve peace, 15% firmly support it, 13% lean toward supporting it, 20% lean against it, and 44% are firmly opposed. This means that while nearly half of those surveyed are steadfastly against territorial concessions, for 33%, this issue remains open to discussion. This distribution has remained stable across five surveys since May 2023: between 14% and 16% consistently support Putin’s decision to exchange territory for peace, while 38% to 44% (averaging 42%) are firmly opposed, and 33% to 37% (averaging 35%) are somewhat ambivalent (16% compared to 19%).

When asked whether Russia should make certain concessions to Ukraine for the sake of a peace agreement, 30% said yes – 10 percentage points higher than in surveys conducted between February 2023 and September 2024. Consequently, the share of those opposing any concessions has dropped from 70% to 60%. However, some conditions remain unacceptable to most respondents: 80% reject Ukraine joining NATO, 77% oppose returning the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, and 71% are against ceding Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. At the same time, only 39% oppose the deployment of peacekeeping forces along the front line. Unlike previous questions, this one did not directly link concessions to the end of the war, making respondents more demanding in their conditions.

Two main groups emerge from this data: the 'party of victory at all costs' (slightly under 20%) and the 'party of concessions', which includes those open to territorial compromises (around 30%). The third group (about 40%) prioritises ending the war under conditions favourable to Russia but may be flexible in accepting peace terms if they are endorsed by Putin.

Despite the growing desire to end the war, surveys indicate a certain militarisation of public consciousness. For the first time since the early 2000s, a January Levada Centre poll (conducted in collaboration with the Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs) found that a majority of Russians prefer to see their country as a great power that is feared and respected (55%) rather than as a nation with a high standard of living, even if it is not among the world’s most powerful (41%). For two decades, supporters of the second view had outnumbered proponents of the first by a ratio of 1.5 to 1. The only exception was the 'Crimean euphoria' of 2014-2015, when the two perspectives briefly aligned. Even then, however, the preference for a high standard of living quickly regained its lead and reached a 2-to-1 margin in 2020-2021.

‘What would you like Russia to be like today?’, 2003-2025, % of those surveyed

When asked what matters most to the power of the state, 55% of Russians surveyed chose military strength, while 45% prioritised economic power. This stands in stark contrast to the responses of Americans, where the distribution is 26% versus 73% in favour of economic strength, according to another part of the joint survey. A similar pattern emerges in the next question: 37% of Russians surveyed believe that too many resources have already been allocated to the war, 9% think that not enough resources have been dedicated, while the largest group (46%) believes that the amount allocated has been just right. The latter two groups together form the militarist majority in the surveyed sample. However, as with other questions, this majority is dominated by loyalists rather than those advocating for war until complete victory.

Swing Party

Two polls conducted in early February by the Chronicles project and the Russian Field project (both conducted via phone, unlike the Levada surveys) show slightly different trends. In both, the share of those favouring peace talks and an end to hostilities has actually declined.

Data from the Russian Field survey (conducted 2-9 February) indicates that a majority of respondents still believe the battlefield situation is favourable for Russia, just as they did throughout the second half of 2024. In 2023, an average of 56% considered the war to be progressing successfully, whereas in 2024-early 2025, this figure ranged from 69% in May to 61% in February. However, compared to autumn 2024, the share of those supporting a transition to peace talks has dropped by 8 percentage points (from 53% to 45%), while the share of those willing to sign a ceasefire agreement without preconditions before entering negotiations has declined by 5 percentage points (from 61% to 56%). In November, 30% 'would not support' such a sequence of actions, whereas today that number has risen to 36%. (It should be noted that support for peace negotiations in Russian Field surveys is consistently 5-7 percentage points lower than in Levada Centre polls.) These figures suggest a link between the willingness to negotiate and the subjective perception of battlefield developments: the worse the situation appears, the greater the willingness to negotiate, and vice versa.

Similarly, the results of the ‘Chronicles' project survey (5-13 February) found that support for withdrawing troops from Ukraine and beginning peace talks without achieving the stated goals of the 'special military operation' fell from 50% to 41%, while the share of those opposing such a decision increased from 31% to 46%. However, looking at a longer trend of Chronicles surveys, the previous distribution (50% supporting withdrawal and 31% opposing) was observed only in the September 2024 poll – shortly after the Ukrainian breakthrough in the Kursk region. Before that, from early 2023 to early 2024, around 40% supported ending the war and withdrawing troops, while opposition fluctuated between 33% and 47%.

‘If Vladimir Putin decides to withdraw troops from Ukraine and starts negotiations for a ceasefire without achieving the original goals of the 'military operation', would you support such a decision?’, 2022-2025, % of those surveyed

In other words, much like in the Russian Field survey, this surge likely reflects a shift in the perception of the situation: after the incursion into the Kursk region, assessments became more pessimistic, and achieving peace through Russia’s battlefield advantage began to seem less realistic. This strengthened the 'immediate peace party'. However, as Russian authorities successfully repelled the incursion and normalised the occupation of part of the Kursk region, the demand for a 'quick peace' declined again.

A similar explanation likely applies to another shift recorded by the Chronicles survey: in September 2024, 43% of those surveyed considered military spending the budget's top priority, but by February 2025, that number had dropped to 36%. However, looking at a longer trend, we see that before the September survey, in the four previous polls, between 25-33% of respondents prioritised military spending (with an average of 27.5%). The spike in September 2024 could also be linked to the initial shock of the Kursk incursion, which exposed Russia’s military weaknesses. Conversely, the February decline in these concerns, as seen in the Russian Field survey, suggests a renewed perception that Russia is doing reasonably well on the battlefield.

But, in general, it is important to note that this shift concerns a relatively small group of about 7-10% of those surveyed who 'swing' between the 'victory party' and the 'peace party' depending on their perception of battlefield conditions and Russia’s chances of success. Meanwhile, larger groups remain stable in their positions. Thus, data from the three surveys indicate four key factions based on their stance toward ending the war: the hardline 'victory party', which rejects any peace agreement until the 'objectives of the Special Military Operation' are met (just under 20%); the ‘peace party’ which accepts or even welcomes concessions to Ukraine (around 30%); the ‘swing party', which shifts between the 'war party' and the 'peace party' based on subjective assessments of battlefield developments and Russia’s prospects for victory (around 10%); and the ‘loyalist party’ (roughly 35-40%)which prefers ending the war under conditions favourable to Russia – conditions that will ultimately be determined by Putin.

The invisible party

However, there is another crucial factor to consider – one we highlight every time we analyse surveys conducted in today’s Russia. In an authoritarian and repressive environment, sociological surveys do not function in the same way as they do in a pluralistic and non-repressive society. A wealth of classical sociological research has explored this, identifying multiple mechanisms of authoritarian distortion, from Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann's ‘spiral of silence’ to Timur Kuran's ‘falsification of preferences’. The latter, in particular, explains the direct link between 'preference falsification' and the phenomenon of unexpected revolutions: in a repressive climate, public opinion data is distorted, and sudden external changes (shocks) can reveal that the true balance of societal preferences is vastly different from how it previously appeared.

Recent Russian surveys consistently reveal a recurring indicator that suggests potential distortion in the data. Specifically, in the Russian Field survey discussed above (as well as in several other polls → Re:Russia: Pro-War Spring), respondents who belong to the 'peace party' report being afraid to participate in surveys 2.5 to 3.5 times more often than those aligned with the ‘war party’. The very premise of sociological surveys is based on the assumption that the distribution of responses within the sample accurately reflects that of the general population. This means we must either assume that all those who fear participating in surveys still ultimately agree to take part, or acknowledge that pro-peace respondents are indeed less likely to participate than pro-war respondents. If the latter is true, then the relative size of the two factions in surveys is distorted in favor of the non-repressed and state-approved viewpoint. It is likely that this effect leads to the systematic overrepresentation of the 'loyalist party' in survey results.

‘Are you afraid to take part in sociological polls about events in Ukraine?’, February 2025, % of the number of those surveyed