18.12.24 Polls Review

Protest Message: A third of Russians have noticed overseas opposition rallies – and that is not insignificant


A survey by the Levada Centre conducted in late November in Russia reveals that one-third of those surveyed are aware of the Russian opposition rally held in Berlin on 17 November. This is a relatively high result given the Kremlin's tight control over domestic media and the repressive climate surrounding public opinion.

Of those surveyed, 13% viewed the march positively, 23% negatively, and half were neutral. These distributions are similar to how Russians assessed democratic opposition rallies in 2021. In the context of heavy informational and propaganda pressure, expressing 'neutrality' could signify either a disengagement from political agendas or a reluctance to join in condemning protesters. Meanwhile, younger cohorts are significantly less aware of the march than older groups and are less likely to sympathise with the protesters.

The most recognisable leaders of the democratic opposition, with awareness levels between 65-70%, are Yulia Navalnaya, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Grigory Yavlinsky, and Garry Kasparov. However, the proportion of respondents expressing trust in them is minimal – not only among regime loyalists but also among potentially disloyal groups. This highlights the limited relevance of these opposition figures to the broader public.

Overall, the survey indicates that protest marches and rallies remain an effective format for spreading the opposition’s message within Russia. However, the trio of Navalnaya, Yashin, and Kara-Murza, who have become symbolic faces of the protest movement, lack sufficient political weight and are primarily seen within activist circles.

To amplify their voice, new leaders might consider broadening the 'protest platform' by inviting other opposition figures with high recognition, as well as public opinion leaders such as writers, artists, and other prominent figures. This approach is especially important as it would symbolically demonstrate an expansion of the protest agenda from an activist focus to one that represents broader civic concerns.

The Russian opposition abroad has announced a new march on 1 March under the slogan ‘Putin, stop killing’. The march will mark three tragic anniversaries: the start of the war in Ukraine and the murders of Boris Nemtsov and Alexei Navalny. Meanwhile, a recent Levada Centre survey shows that Russians are relatively well-informed about the previous opposition march held in Berlin and other European cities on 17 November.

According to the survey, a third of respondents (34%) had heard about the event. While this is far below the awareness levels for opposition protests in Moscow, Khabarovsk, and other cities during 2019–2021 (65–80%, also according to the Levada Centre), it is significant given the Kremlin's near-total control over domestic media and the repressive climate surrounding public discourse. This data suggests a meaningful penetration of information about the activities of the exiled opposition.

However, this awareness skews towards older age groups: 47% of those aged 55+ knew about the march, compared to only 25% among respondents aged 18-39. Those who consume information primarily from television or YouTube were also more informed (41% and 38%, respectively, representing opposite ends of the loyalty spectrum to the regime). Interestingly, more respondents who believe the country is 'on the right track' were aware of the march (36%) than those who hold the opposite view (31%). This indicates that some of the awareness is likely derived from state-sanctioned narratives.

Notably, the 17 November march was addressed by the official Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, who reiterated the regime's standard authoritarian narrative that opposition members abroad are 'detached from the country'. Nonetheless, public assessments of the Berlin march in the Levada survey align with typical responses to democratic opposition protests: 14% expressed a positive view of the event, 23% a negative one, and 51% remained neutral. These results are similar, or even slightly less favorable, compared to reactions to pro-Navalny protests in 2021, where negative opinions outweighed positive ones by a factor of 2–2.5. In the context of ideological and informational pressure, 'neutrality' in such surveys often reflects not just disengagement from political agendas but also a reluctance to align with the official stance condemning 'traitors'.

‘How do you feel about the people who participated in these protests?’, 2019-2024, % of those surveyed

Awareness of the opposition rally within different socio-demographic groups correlates with more positive attitudes toward the event. Among those aged 55 and older, 21% viewed the rally favorably, as did 17% of YouTube users and 16% of television viewers. Support was also higher among economically disadvantaged respondents (20%), whereas the most hostile group was the audience of Telegram channels. In Russia and beyond, Telegram tends to attract a more conservative rather than progressive-democratic activist audience (→ Re:Russia: Telegram from the Kremlin and its readers. Among those relying on Telegram for news, 27% expressed negative attitudes toward the rally.

These specific figures should be interpreted cautiously, as they likely reflect a conservative bias among survey participants. However, they highlight significant trends: first, a notable level of general awareness among Russians about opposition events abroad; second, lower awareness – and consequently, lower levels of sympathy – among younger generations. Only 9% of respondents aged 18–39 expressed approval of the protests, less than half the percentage of those aged 55 and older.

The Levada Centre's findings on attitudes toward opposition politicians reflect a landscape shaped by authoritarian opinion climates and comprehensive state media control. The highest recognition levels were recorded for figures like Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov (85%), who benefits from favorable state television coverage. Other highly recognised figures (65-70% recognition) include Leonid Slutsky (a frequent presence on television), Grigory Yavlinsky, Yulia Navalnaya, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and Garry Kasparov. In the next tier of recognition (40–55%), figures include Zakhar Prilepin, Pavel Grudinin, Boris Nadezhdin, Ilya Yashin, Maxim Katz, and Igor Girkin. It is worth noting that two of the opposition's most recognised leaders, Boris Nemtsov and Alexei Navalny, were assassinated in the last decade. Similar recognition levels for major opposition figures were reported in a separate telephone survey conducted by independent researchers.

Expectedly, systemic opposition figures prominent on television enjoy relatively higher approval ratings (20-40%). In contrast, only 6-7% of respondents expressed trust in leading figures of the democratic opposition. These trust figures were consistent across respondents who were more or less loyal to the regime, suggesting that opposition figures remain politically irrelevant even among segments of society with potential demand for alternatives. The state’s negative portrayals of democratic opposition leaders have resulted in anti-ratings of 45-55% among all respondents and around 40% even among those who believe the country is on the wrong path.

The relatively high awareness of opposition activities and the significant recognition of opposition leaders indicate the potential for a more meaningful and prominent opposition presence in the Russian media landscape. According to a recent JX FUND report, the audience for relocated Russian media continues to grow despite increased government efforts to suppress them within the Russian internet segment. Independent and opposition media outlets, as well as public figures on YouTube, are also seeing audience growth, albeit at a slower pace, as evidenced by a closed YouScore ranking.

The emergence of a trio consisting of Yulia Navalnaya, Ilya Yashin, and Vladimir Kara-Murza as prominent opposition figures, along with a reduction in internal conflicts within the opposition, has created a more favorable environment for broadening the opposition's presence. Over the past two years, internal strife led to disillusionment among many activists with the Russian opposition and the activities of organisations like the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) (→ Mikhail Turchenko, Margarita Zavadskaya: Russian Wartime Migrants). However, the political weight of this new trio remains insufficient. Its most recognisable member, Yulia Navalnaya, currently engages in political activities sporadically and lacks significant visibility in the Russian-language media space. To amplify their voice, the new leaders might consider expanding the 'protest platform' by inviting other opposition figures with high recognition, as well as public opinion leaders such as writers, artists, and other prominent public figures. This approach is particularly important because it would symbolically signal a shift from an activist-centric agenda to one that embraces broader civic concerns.

Within the relocated opposition, there is a division between two distinct 'anti-war' discourses, as outlined by Russian opposition politician Yulia Galyamina in an article for Re:Russia. While one of them broadcasts a Ukrainian-European view that ties the potential collapse of Putin’s regime to a military defeat and the reconstitution of the Russian state. It holds not only the regime but also the Russian population broadly accountable for the war. The other narrative focuses on engaging open and potential opponents of war and dictatorship within Russia, framing Russian citizens more as hostages than as accomplices to Putin’s crimes. The tension between these perspectives is encapsulated in a heated debate over the Russian tricolor flag. One faction views it as a symbol of Russian military aggression, while the other seeks to dissociate it from 'Putinism', emphasising its historical role as a symbol of democratic Russia and resistance to the communist dictatorship in the early 1990s.

In general, as the survey indicates, protest marches are effective as informational events, enabling the opposition to assert its agency even within Russia. However, this format requires well-thought-out messaging, the expansion of the 'opposition choir', and a more systematic and diverse presence in the media space between protests.