Two types of Anti-Western Sentiment: How Russians' views on Russia's place in the world differ from Putin's views

A poll conducted by FOM in September of this year allows us to significantly clarify our understanding of how Russians view their relationships with 'foreign countries' and to what extent their views align or differ from the official Kremlin doctrine and those personally held by President Putin.

Respondents were asked several questions about how Russia should structure its relations with the outside world. When asked under what conditions Russian culture would develop better – if the country had fewer 'foreign films, TV shows, and foreign music' or more – 59% of those surveyed chose the 'fewer' option, indicating a preference for cultural isolationism. Only 26% opted for 'more'. Clearly, in this case, 'foreign' predominantly refers to Western cultural products. However, the ratio is almost the reverse among younger people (ages 18-30): only 35% prefer 'less foreign content’, while 50% favour Western music and TV shows. Higher education increases the percentage of foreign culture enthusiasts in both younger and older age groups.

Anti-Western sentiment also emerges in the responses to another question: Does borrowing values and ideas from abroad typically harm or benefit Russia? Forty-nine percent chose 'harm', 29% chose 'benefit', and 22% were unsure. Age differences are significant here as well: among younger cohorts, 44% believe that borrowing values and ideas is beneficial, while 35% think it is harmful. Middle-aged respondents, those between 31 and 45 ('Putin's generation'), are the most convinced of the harmfulness of foreign values. Higher education does not necessarily make people more tolerant of borrowed values and ideas. Finally, on the question of whether Russia should consider the opinions of other countries regarding its domestic policies, we see a consolidated majority (66%) answering 'no', with only a quarter holding the opposite view. Unlike the responses to the first two questions, the appeal of the latter position does not increase among younger cohorts. In fact, there is a slight rise (up to 29%) among people over 60, who still remember when human rights issues were an important factor in foreign policy relations.

A different picture emerges, however, when it comes to borrowing technology and economic interaction. When asked whether collaboration between Russian scientists and 'scientists from leading foreign centres, and the exchange of ideas' is beneficial, 75% definitively answered 'yes'. Moreover, when asked what benefits the Russian economy more – 'when Russia is largely oriented toward the global market, buying and selling extensively' or the opposite isolationist approach – responses were two to one: 56% favoured the first option of open trade, and only 27% supported the isolationist view. Age differences here are not as significant (62% of young people favour openness, compared to 53% of the oldest age group), but there are substantial differences by income level: among low-income groups, support for economic openness drops to 47%, while among high-income groups, it rises to 64%. Frontier regions – Northwest Russia and the Far East – show the highest support for openness (68% and 63%, respectively), while the North Caucasus shows the least (41%).

Support for isolationist attitudes in Russian public opinion, September 2024, % of those surveyed

Amid the aggressive anti-Western and isolationist propaganda characteristic of today’s Russian public sphere and official media, these distributions appear quite moderate. According to surveys, the overall attitude towards the West is rather hostile: according to the Levada Centre, ess than 20% of respondents have expressed a positive attitude towards the US and the EU over the past year, while about 70% report a negative attitude. However, this hostility is not solely a result of wartime propaganda. The sense of distance from the West – which in the 1990s and even the 2000s seemed like a natural ally and point of reference for Russians – has been gradually growing over the last two decades. According to the same Levada Centre, the share of those who consider Russia a European country dropped from 52% in 2008 to 37% in 2019, and to 29% in 2021 (the share of those who personally consider themselves European declined less significantly – from 35% to 27%, meaning a quarter reduction, not by half).

However, as we see, the profile of Russian ‘popular’ isolationism and anti-Western sentiment is not sweeping but more selective. Essentially, most FOM respondents favour ‘independence’ and autonomy in the realms of political, cultural, and value identities while simultaneously supporting broad interaction with 'foreign countries' in scientific, technological, and economic exchange. There is reason to believe that 'foreign countries' in this context also include the West: in a recent survey by the Chronicles project, 50% of respondents said they consider the restoration of relations with Western countries a desirable event, and 65% said they favour the lifting of sanctions (→ Re: Russia: The Frustration of Loyalty).

In fact, this profile of anti-Westernism and understanding of 'pragmatic sovereignty' is typical today for many countries of the Global South, reflecting their developmentalist stance, which focuses on economic and technological advancement (→ Re: Russia: The Philosophy of ‘Middle Powers’). These countries limit their level of political cooperation with external forces, including the West, and follow an ideology of ‘sovereignty’ and a ‘special path’, while simultaneously engaging in intensive economic and technological interaction.

Against this backdrop, the actual policy of today's Russia and Putin's brand of anti-Westernism appear far more radical. The gradual maturation and radicalisation of this stance can be clearly traced, for example, in the evolution of Russian foreign policy doctrine. In its 2008 Foreign Policy Concept, Russia's European identity was still not questioned, and the emphasis on ‘civilisational’ differences was vague and muted: ‘Russia, as the largest European state with a multinational and multi-faith society and a centuries-old history, is ready to play a constructive role in ensuring the civilisational compatibility of Europe…’ By the 2013 Concept it was declared that the West had lost its global leadership both in politics and economics, and that global competition ‘for the first time in modern history has acquired a civilisational dimension’. Finally, in the 2023 Concept, Russia was proclaimed a ‘distinct state-civilisation’, engaged in a 'hybrid war' with the West.

This understanding of confrontation with the West as existential – resulting in the severance of economic ties and any form of cooperation – deviates greatly from the pragmatic developmentalism of the Global South. These countries, while not joining sanctions against Russia and avoiding direct political cooperation with the West, consistently prioritise maintaining economic ties with the West in the face of potential secondary sanctions.

In essence, the FOM survey shows that the Russian majority, or the average Russian, in their anti-Western and isolationist attitudes, aligns more closely with this moderate, pragmatic, anti-Western developmentalism of the countries of the Global South than with Putin's ideology of existential confrontation with the West. This crucial distinction is something that often eludes experts and policymakers.