Ukrainian Rally in the Oval Office: How public opinion in Russia and Ukraine is reacting to the pro-Russian drift of Trump and his team

Russian public opinion under the influence of Putin and Trump’s narratives

Even before and immediately after Trump’s election, certain hopes for ending the war were tied to him in Russian public opinion, fueled by his boastful campaign statements. Participants in Russian focus groups emphasised that 'Trump can be negotiated with' and welcomed his return to the White House, notes Denis Volkov, director of the Levada Centre. In a November survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 61% of Russian respondents believed that with Trump’s return, achieving peace in Ukraine would become more likely. At the time, however, TTrump’s position did not yet appear so overtly pro-Russian, and these expectations coexisted with skepticism until early February. At that point, only 27% of Russians considered Trump’s stance to be closer to Russia’s, while 18% held the opposite view, according to a survey by FOM, conducted between 31 January and 2 February.

However, February's events – Trump's call to Putin (12 February) and the talks in Riyadh (18 February) – significantly raised expectations and instilled considerable optimism. The meeting in the Saudi capital was positively assessed by the overwhelming majority (85%) of those surveyed in a Levada Centre poll conducted in the last week of February. Some sociologists believe that Trump’s sudden pro-Russian turn contributed to the increase in the share of Russians supporting the continuation of military actions to achieve all of Russia’s invasion goals and the decline in those advocating for a swift peace settlement, even at the cost of certain concessions (→ Re:Russia: Three Parties and a Swing Group).

Russians also largely embraced Trump’s framing of the end of the Ukrainian conflict as a superpower deal in which Ukraine plays only a passive role. When asked who should be at the negotiation table besides Russia, 70% of those surveyed by the Levada Centre named the United States, while only half (49%) mentioned Ukraine, and just 29% included EU countries. In this regard, Trump fully aligned with Russian propaganda narratives portraying both Ukraine and Europe as lacking agency. In a poll conducted by the ‘Chronicles’ project from 5-13 February, respondents were asked to evaluate world leaders’ influence on the peace negotiation process: Vladimir Putin unsurprisingly received the highest average score (4.65), with Trump ranking second (3.66), followed by China’s Xi Jinping (3.04). Only after them, with a significant gap, came Volodymyr Zelensky (2.1), whose influence appeared barely higher than that of Emmanuel Macron (1.8). In response to the same question in an ExtremeScan poll conducted in late February, Trump’s rating rose to 4.3, narrowing the gap with Putin’s (4.8), while other leaders’ scores remained almost unchanged.

The Oval Office scandal was met with restrained enthusiasm by Russian propaganda and government officials. The Russian state media created the impression that Trump’s objectives were converging with Russia’s declared goals in the conflict, fostering expectations of reduced or halted US military aid to Ukraine and hopes of Washington facilitating Zelensky’s removal from power, according to a review by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This narrative helped increase public mobilisation in support of the war, which Russia portrayed as nearing a long-awaited victory. At the same time, according to the outlet Verstka, state-controlled media were instructed to create a 'positive atmosphere' around Russian-American negotiations, emphasising Putin’s diplomatic skills while avoiding direct praise for Trump. Instead, Trump was depicted as someone wise enough to 'respond to Russia’s outstretched hand.' This framing would allow the Kremlin, in the event of negotiation failure, to shift blame onto the West for obstructing a possible resolution. Notably, this suggests that Moscow and Washington have not made significant progress in their talks, and the Kremlin is preparing for the possibility of their collapse, viewing it as both likely and acceptable.

By the end of February, according to ExtremeScan, the share of Russians who believed Trump was siding with Russia in the Ukraine negotiations had risen to 43%, while only 10% thought he sympathised with Ukraine. At the same time, only 20% of Russians expressed trust in Trump, while 74% distrusted him. Twice as many respondents (34%) said that good relations with Eastern and Southern countries were more important for Russia than with Western nations (17%). Thus, while Trump’s approach to the Ukraine conflict fit well into Kremlin propaganda, state media also effectively reinforced Russian public skepticism toward Trump, who remains perceived as part of the collective West – Russia’s primary geopolitical rival.

Ukrainian rally in the Oval Office

In Ukraine, expectations regarding Trump’s return to the White House were initially marked by concern but not outright despair. According to a November ECFR poll, Ukrainian opinions were nearly split: 39% believed Trump’s return would increase the chances of peace, while 35% thought it would decrease them. However, this question may not be entirely relevant for Ukraine as the real issue is what kind of peace it would be. By December, a different Ukrainian poll found that 45% of those surveyed thought Trump’s presidency would bring peace closer, though only 23% believed such a peace would be fair for Ukraine, while 35% felt that Trump’s return would weaken Ukraine’s position in peace talks (→ Re:Russia: Legitimate but Unpromising). However, in another poll, with data collected at the end of 2024, 54% of Ukrainians said Trump's arrival would be more favourable for Ukraine. This result could have been influenced by President Zelensky's early contacts with Trump prior to his inauguration.

However, in February 2025, Trump abandoned his initial strategy of pressuring both sides and instead made sweeping concessions to Russia while seeking closer ties with the Kremlin. This dramatically changed the situation. Throughout February, Trump’s attacks on Zelensky triggered an immediate backlash within Ukrainian society, according to data from a poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). A poll conducted between 4-9 February showed Zelensky’s trust rating at 57% and distrust at 37%, which was already an improvement from the December low of 52% trust versus 39% distrust. However, in the next survey (14-28 February), conducted largely after Trump and his team launched their first wave of attacks on Zelensky – where Trump misled Americans about Zelensky’s approval rating and labelled him a 'dictator' – the figures shifted to 66% trust versus 30% distrust. In a 1-4 March survey, conducted immediately after the Oval Office scandal, trust in Zelensky reached 68%, while distrust fell to 27%. Thus, Trump’s attacks effectively restored all of Zelensky’s lost support from 2024, bringing his net trust rating (the difference between positive and negative assessments) to +41%.

Dynamics of trust in Vladimir Zelensky in Ukrainian society, 2019-2025, % of those surveyed

Two waves of telephone surveys conducted by the ExtremeScan project among Ukrainian respondents on 20-26 February and 1-4 March, i.e. before and after the Oval Office scandal, demonstrate that the scene played out there led to a further mobilisation of Ukrainian society, which sided with its president.

Even before the scandal, most respondents in the first wave of the survey (49%) believed that Trump was on Russia’s side, while only 15% thought he supported Ukraine. By early March, this gap had widened to 72% versus 8%. Meanwhile, trust in Trump among Ukrainians, which was already lower than among Russians at 15%, dropped further to just 8%. At the same time, an overwhelming 78% of those surveyed said that Zelensky handled the scandal correctly, while only 16% believed his actions harmed the country. 60% of Ukrainians saw the scandal as a deliberate provocation by Trump’s team aimed at denying Ukraine military aid, while another 28% – though less inclined toward conspiracy theories – still believed that Trump’s team would not have supported Ukraine regardless of Zelensky’s actions. Only 7% of Ukrainians agreed with the Trumpist interpretation, blaming Zelensky for the breakdown of negotiations and claiming that his behavior damaged bilateral relations.

As a result, approval of Zelensky’s foreign policy rose by another 4 percentage points (from 80% to 84%), while Ukrainian respondents consistently rejected all of Trump’s initiatives. For example, 77% opposed holding elections before the end of hostilities, with only 22% in favor. It is worth noting that, according to late 2024 polls, support for this idea had temporarily increased to around 29–36% (→ Re Russia: Legitimate but Unpromising). Trump’s provocations triggered a backlash. Furthermore, only 38% supported a resource deal, which would exchange US military aid for rights to develop Ukraine’s natural resources, while 59% opposed such an agreement. Finally, 70% of those surveyed identified relations with Europe as strategically crucial for Ukraine, whereas only 13% prioritised ties with the United States.

The growing resolve of Ukrainian society, turning it into a true 'rally around the flag' moment, is illustrated by the data from a poll conducted by Gradus Research on 1 March, i.e. the day after Trump's team attempted to publicly reprimand Zelensky. 46% of those surveyed expressed confidence that Ukraine could continue fighting Russia even if US aid were reduced or cut off, though more than a third (36%) believed this would be impossible.

These shifting public sentiments will inevitably influence Ukraine’s delegation in today’s negotiations in Riyadh. As we previously noted, Zelensky’s legitimacy under Biden was largely based on his ability to secure military aid for Ukraine. After Trump’s victory, he repositioned himself as a leader who, despite all obstacles, could still win Trump over. The Oval Office incident has now re-mobilised Ukrainian society politically and returned Zelensky to his familiar heroic role as a symbol of a nation fighting to preserve its sovereignty against a ruthless leviathan, a role now played not only by President Putin but also by President Trump.