An Hour Before Dawn: Russia failed to capitalise on the advantage it had at the start of this year's major offensive in Ukraine

Change of tone: achievements and losses

The launch of a major offensive by the Russian army in the Kharkiv region amid acute ammunition shortages and severe mobilisation problems in Ukraine, triggered a wave of almost panic-stricken comments from Western military analysts in May of this year. One of the leading military experts at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI), Jack Watling, assessed the prospects of war for Ukraine as ‘grim’. Military analysts Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, in an article for The New York Times, described the situation as 'serious', as Russia threatened to tie up Ukrainian resources around Kharkiv, exposing the front in other areas. Carnegie Foundation expert Dara Massicot, in an interview with The New Yorker, noted that 'things are going badly for Ukrainian forces' and suggested that ‘the situation will get worse before it gets better’.

However, by early July, military experts had changed their tone. Michael Kofman, on the War on the Rocks podcast, stated that Russian forces were achieving 'very minor successes'. After returning from another trip to Ukrainian positions, during which he visited Kharkiv and Donbas, he concluded that the overall situation for Ukraine was 'improving'. He believes that the failures of the Russian army near Kharkiv are primarily due to the fact that this attack was poorly prepared. The offensive began not in June, as planned, but in May, to get ahead of the rotation of Ukrainian troops. However, the training of the servicemen had not been completed. When Ukraine moved reserves to Kharkiv, Russian forces were literally crushed, the front was stabilised within one to two weeks, and ultimately, the Russian army could not create a buffer zone to shell Kharkiv with artillery and secure Belgorod from strikes by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Kofman concludes.

Another objective of the Kharkiv operation was to divert Ukrainian reserves from other front sectors, and in this respect, he believes, it was partially successful, opening up space for the Russian army to advance in Donbas and ‘gradually creating the problem that Ukrainian forces are now facing’.

Military expert Doug Livermore, in a commentary for the Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), calls Russia's spring offensive a failure. By early June, after an attempt to break through Ukrainian defences near Volchansk, the Kharkiv campaign had stalled due to fierce Ukrainian resistance and logistical problems exacerbated by Ukrainian strikes on supply lines in the Belgorod region. After 40 months of intense fighting, Russian forces still rely on outdated tactics and continue to face issues within the military structure, including poor planning and coordination, weak logistical support, and low troop morale. Meanwhile, the command structures of the Ukrainian army have demonstrated much greater flexibility on the battlefield.

Importantly, the Russian army's losses during the spring-summer offensive were almost a third higher than the figures from last year's peak, according to data analyst Ragnar Gudmundsson. In May, they amounted to 38,900 men (compared to 30,400 in December 2023), in June losses stood at 35,100. Equipment losses in May and June amounted to 4400 units per month, and in the first half of July – 2500. As noted by Doug Livermore, since the beginning of the invasion, Russia has lost almost 3,200 tanks, as well as several thousand units of armoured vehicles and artillery pieces, including most of the modern battle tanks (T-90M and upgraded T-72B3M), seriously depleting Soviet stocks of T-72 and T-64. Carnegie Foundation expert Dara Massicot, in a thread on X (formerly Twitter), directly blames the failures of the Russian army on Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, who, through constant attacks, ‘burns men and equipment to maintain sustainability in the short term, creating long-term weaknesses'. However, it is likely that Gerasimov is only reacting to the pressure that is being exerted on him at the political level.

Objectives and results: political successes are better than military successes

Retired Australian Army General Mick Ryan assesses the Russian army's spring-summer campaign in terms of achieving its tactical, strategic and political objectives. The first such objective, according to Ryan, was to neutralise Ukraine's ability to launch strategic strikes against Russian targets. This goal has not been achieved: the Ukrainian Armed Forces are still capable of attacking strategic targets in Russian territory, including oil processing and export facilities, air bases, as well as radar and air defence installations. Ryan writes that US restrictions on the use of ATACMS against targets in Russia hinder the Ukrainian Armed Forces more significantly than Russian defences do.

Another Russian goal, he argues, is to weaken Ukrainian tactical and operational reserves, command and control systems, and logistics. Although the Russian army has achieved limited success in depleting Ukrainian forces, its own high losses are steadily undermining the manpower and firepower superiority it had in the first half of 2024. Similarly, the Kremlin has not succeeded in capturing new territories: since the beginning of 2024, the Russian army has taken control of about 513 square kilometres, which, according to Ryan, means the loss of more than 360 Russian soldiers for every square kilometre captured.

Moscow has fared relatively better in its hybrid campaigns aimed at undermining the cohesion of Ukrainian society. For this purpose, in November 2023, Russia launched the Maidan-3 disinformation campaign with a budget of up to $1 billion and likely orchestrated a plot to assassinate President Zelensky. Ryan also considers strikes on the energy infrastructure to be a hybrid attack, which had a greater impact on the lives of Ukrainians.  However, these actions did not lead to a significant division in Ukrainian society. Finally, Russia's last goal is to attract as many allies as possible on the international stage (→ Re:Russia: Erosion of Clarity). However, these efforts have not yet resulted in a significant reduction in military and economic aid to Ukraine from Western countries

Overall, Mick Ryan believes the Russian army has two more months for an offensive, but it is significantly weakened by losses and has likely missed the last strategic opportunity to achieve significant battlefield successes that Moscow could use to intensify political and diplomatic pressure for peace negotiations.

Holding out for two months

However, the remaining two months of this year’s campaign pose an ongoing challenge that should not be underestimated, other experts warn. The most dangerous situation by mid-July was near Pokrovsk, located on a key road connecting several Ukrainian-held cities. Capturing this road would significantly complicate the defence of the Ukrainian Armed Forces across Donbas, especially around the strategically important city of Chasiv Yar. Earlier, the Ukrainian army was forced to abandon positions in the east of this city, once again highlighting Russia’s superiority in manpower and the Ukrainian Armed Forces' shortage of certain ammunition, including air defence systems.

Michael Kofman considers the offensive near Chasiv Yar one of the main military objectives of the Russian army, as capturing this city opens opportunities for advances on Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Pokrovsk. For Moscow, these cities hold not only military but also important political significance: the Kremlin cannot claim control over the region without controlling its largest cities. It is therefore surprising, Kofman continues, that Russian forces did not fully capitalise on the results of the Kharkiv offensive. The gap between the offensive in Kharkiv and the start of the active offensive on Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk was almost a month. As a result, the Russian army failed to effectively utilise its battlefield advantage.

However, Russian forces continue to advance very slowly on several fronts. The next two to three months will be the hardest for Ukraine this year, Michael Kofman continues in his podcast on War on the Rocks. Kyiv must prevent a major Russian breakthrough and a collapse of the front. Kofman considers the likelihood of this low but it still remains.

Ukraine has begun receiving ammunition from allies and has made significant progress in building fortifications and mobilising troops. Kofman said he could not disclose data, but the volume of army reinforcements is now 'several times greater' than before the new mobilisation law took effect. Nonetheless, the shortage of personnel remains, and it will take most of this year to solve the problem. 

However, the Russian army is also facing staffing problems: Russian assault groups, which once consisted of 15 people, are now down to eight or even three to six men. Meanwhile, the Russian army is quickly adapting to the changing battlefield situation. Due to the Ukrainian Armed Forces' shortage of short-range air defence, Russia has sharply increased the use of medium-range drones that penetrate more than 50 kilometres beyond the front line and suppress Ukrainian artillery. Russian guided bomb strikes have also become more accurate, exerting a strong psychological impact on the defence. Additionally, over the past year, the Russian army has learned to find, fix, and strike targets in tactical and operational depth more effectively and quickly. Russian strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure have also become more precise and sophisticated, the expert notes. Mick Ryan agrees that Russian forces demonstrate an ability to learn on the battlefield, having conducted several successful simultaneous attacks along the entire front line.

Dangerous prospects: war of attrition-2 and the Trump factor

According to Kofman, the front line will finally stabilise by autumn-winter, but the strategic situation will remain unchanged. It will become clear that both sides have nearly exhausted their ability to change the front line. While, previously the term 'war of attrition' referred to the availability of military resources on the battlefield, the focus will now be on the damage that each side can inflict on cities, people, and infrastructure necessary for economic activity, the expert notes. In this sense, the ability to strike targets on Russian territory is of great importance for Ukraine, as Russia has already caused significant damage to Ukraine's energy infrastructure and will continue to do so in the future. In this regard, Kyiv should also be given the ability to ‘inflict pain and damage to Russian critical infrastructure so that it does not end up in a position where it has to negotiate from unfavourable positions'.

Dara Massicot agrees with this viewpoint and suggests allowing the Ukrainian Armed Forces to use American long-range weapons to strike training bases and troop concentrations, as well as repair shops, ammunition depots, and certain air bases on Russian territory. In her assessment, hitting such targets does not meet the criteria that Russian nuclear doctrine describes as triggering a retaliatory nuclear strike. Michael Kofman agrees that strikes of this kind have a potentially escalatory effect, but considers it an acceptable risk and urges ‘assessing the trajectory you're on in a war and deciding what you're willing to do'.

Ukraine's prospects on the battlefield also depend heavily on the political environment in the United States, which is already posing difficult strategic challenges for Ukraine's political and military leadership, Kofman says. At the moment, Kyiv has limited military resources provided to it by the current presidential administration, and whether this assistance will continue after the US presidential election is unknown. This raises the question for Kyiv: should it use the weapons it has received now to inflict as much damage on the enemy as possible, or should it conserve its resources to prepare for a possible suspension of military aid this winter.

Although the Russian army is likely to continue to make some gains over the next few months, the worst-case scenario on the frontline in Ukraine looks to be avoided this year, Kofman says. Dara Massicot adds that, by now, the Russian army has used about 70-80% of its military equipment reserves, which it is not able to replenish quickly enough, so if fighting continues at the current intensity, it could burn through all its strategic reserves within two years. However, for this scenario to materialise, the Russian army's losses would need to remain at the same level as this summer, and this is only possible if Kyiv continues to receive the same amount of military aid as it is receiving now. Mick Ryan agrees: If Trump's victory in November does not lead to a dramatic reduction in military support for Ukraine, Russia will likely not get another chance to strike a decisive blow in this war like it has in the past six months.