A Wall of Drones Vs. Hordes of Motorcycles: Will Russia succeed in its 2025 campaign if no truce is reached?

Who won the 2024 military campaign?

One of the arguments in the behind-the-scenes negotiations between Russia, the United States and Ukraine over the past few months has been the question of a new Russian offensive in the spring and summer of this year. Will Ukraine be able to withstand it? In his efforts to persuade Volodymyr Zelensky to adopt a more accommodating stance, Donald Trump has repeatedly hinted that Ukraine may soon find itself in a worse position than it is currently. Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, flaunts his numerical advantage on the battlefield and behaves as though a military victory over Ukraine in the 2025 campaign is all but assured, and therefore he can make demands of Kyiv as if the Ukrainian army had already lost on the battlefield.

In reality, the situation is quite different. Looking solely at the results of Russia’s 2024 offensive, isolated from the broader context, it is clear that Russia suffered a defeat. This can be measured by the ratio of territory seized to losses incurred in manpower and equipment. As has been noted many times before, over the course of that offensive (January–December 2024), the Russian army captured roughly 0.5% of Ukrainian territory, or slightly less than 1% of the territory Kyiv controlled at the start of the previous year (→ Re:Russia: Cargo 200,000). At the same time, in 2024, according to the British military, Russian losses amounted to about 430,000 killed and wounded, and according to the BBC and Mediazona project, about 90,000 killed, including 45,000 confirmed through published obituaries. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimates that over the year, the Russian army lost more than 5,000 units of armoured equipment, while the OSINT project Oryx puts the figure at over 3,000. In other words, based on last year’s balance sheet, Russia is incapable of achieving military victory over Ukraine.

Moreover, Russia’s ability to establish effective control over areas of Ukraine that it has only partially captured, but already claims as its own, remains highly doubtful. Although the Russian army last year was almost exclusively focused on capturing the northern Donbas, data from the Ukrainian OSINT project War Mapper shows that in the past ten months, the proportion of that region under Russian control increased only from 58% to 69%. Importantly, Russia failed to seize any of the key cities in the northern Donetsk region.

In the Zaporizhzhia and Luhansk regions, there have been virtually no changes in the front line, with Russia controlling 72% of the former and 99% of the latter. At the same time, important factors beyond this strategic calculus include the exhaustion of Ukraine’s psychological and human resources, as well as the military aid provided by the United States at the end of last year.

In late 2024, alarmist reports about the state of Ukraine’s defensive lines gave rise to speculation that a collapse of the Ukrainian front might be imminent. However, in the six months since, these concerns have not materialised or gained further traction. As of early 2025, Russia was continuing to suffer heavy losses at the front, while the pace of its advance had slowed: in March, Russian forces captured 130 km of Ukrainian territory, according to calculations by Agenstvo based on DeepState data, or roughly 270 square kilometres according to War Mapper.

The 2025 military campaign: motorcyclists vs. drones

Amid spring consultations over potential negotiations, the Russian army has been demonstratively preparing for a new major offensive in 2025. According to Mykola Bielieskov, an expert at the Ukrainian National Institute for Strategic Studies, the main thrust of this offensive is likely once again to be directed toward Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka, the capture of which could pave the way for the occupation of the entire Donetsk region.

At the same time, the Russian army is building up forces along other parts of the front, including the Sumy and Kharkiv regions. Its numerical advantage in manpower enables it to pose threats across a broad front, stretching Ukrainian forces thin. This presents a significant challenge.

In addition, Russia is relying on tactical innovations designed to counter Ukraine's defence strategy. According to Ukrainian intelligence, Russian training centres are actively rehearsing assault tactics using motorcycles. Employing motorcycles in assaults allows attackers to cross a 1.5-kilometre field in just 3 to 5 minutes. Within that short window, FPV drone operators may not have enough time to prepare, launch, and successfully strike fast-moving targets. On the other hand, the loud noise of motorcycles makes it harder for the attacking side to detect incoming drones. Based on an analysis of videos published by Russia’s Ministry of Defence showing the use of motorcycles in pairs or small groups during offensive and defensive exercises, experts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) also conclude that the widespread use of motorcycles is likely to be one of the main tactical novelties of the spring–summer campaign.

In April 2025, the Russian army also began trialling another new offensive tactic in the Zaporizhzhia region: massed assaults involving hundreds of troops and dozens of armoured vehicles, according to Vladislav Voloshin, spokesman for the southern group of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In one such assault in the Orikhiv direction, between 320 and 350 soldiers were deployed, along with around 40 units of armoured combat vehicles, including three tanks, several infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and up to ten dune buggies. According to Voloshyn, these assaults may involve up to a battalion’s worth of forces. This is a stark contrast to Russian tactics over the past two years, which have mostly relied on small groups of five to seven soldiers. The logic appears to be that at least some personnel and equipment will break through the Ukrainian 'drone wall' and reach their targets.

However, the biggest challenge facing the Russian army remains the poor quality of its manpower and the shortage of combat-ready equipment on the front line, says renowned military expert Michael Kofman on the War on the Rocks podcast. This, he argues, is precisely why motorcycles, quad bikes and buggies are being used. However, this tactic does not allow for any serious breakthroughs and only increases the number of casualties, according to Kofman.

The decline in the effectiveness of Russian offensive operations is attributed by Kofman and other experts to the success of Ukraine’s defensive strategy. particularly its emphasis on drones and air defences as the backbone of its response to Russian assaults, despite Russia’s numerical superiority..

This approach has borne real results: last year, Russia failed to make any significant changes to the front line or to achieve its pre-offensive objectives. Vladimir Putin boasted that Russia's recruitment of manpower is twice as fast as that of Ukraine.

Yet this claim arguably works against him: although reliable figures on Ukrainian losses remain unavailable, it is clear that, in the face of frontal assaults countered by mass drone deployment, Russian losses are more than double those of Ukraine.

Ukraine’s strategy, known as the 'drone wall', involves establishing a 15-kilometre kill zone along the front line, monitored and defended by drones, thereby complicating the enemy’s efforts to concentrate troops for large-scale attacks. This was noted by David Kirichenko, an expert at the London-based Henry Jackson Society, in the Atlantic Council. At the heart of this strategy are FPV drones, which essentially serve the role of infantry: they account for 'well over half' of Russian battlefield losses, according to NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Christopher Cavoli, at a congressional hearing. Ukraine also operates a fleet of long-range drones capable of striking military bases, ammunition depots, air defence systems, and oil and gas infrastructure deep inside Russian territory.

In total, Ukraine could produce up to 4.5 million drones of various types this year, according to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence. Domestic FPV drone production in Ukraine had reached 200,000 units per month by early 2025, Kirichenko reports. Each of these drones costs between $500 and $750. This is four to six times cheaper than large-calibre artillery shells, according to The New York Times. While operating each drone involves four personnel (a pilot, a navigator, a weapons operator, and a relay drone pilot), recruiting soldiers for these roles is far easier than finding infantry replacements.

2025 military balance

According to Michael Kofman, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have not yet fully stabilised the battlefield situation, but a collapse of the front is not on the horizon either.

However, the true test for Ukraine’s military will come in the summer, he warns: Kofman fears that, as in the previous year, Russian forces may significantly intensify their pressure on the front in the second half of summer, potentially leading to more substantial territorial gains. Another prominent military analyst, Dara Massicot, speaking in the same War on the Rocks podcast, notes that the current stability of the front is largely due to the final deliveries of military aid and weaponry allocated during the Biden administration. If these supplies run out by late summer, Kyiv’s position could significantly deteriorate, she cautions.

One of the main risks facing Ukraine is Russia’s increasing use of missiles and precision-guided munitions, the production of which has grown four to five times since early 2022 and continues to rise, according to Kofman. Analysts from IISS, Giorgio Di Mizio and Michael Gjerstad, point out that to defend critical infrastructure against such attacks, Ukraine requires timely and sufficient deliveries of air defence systems and associated munitions. Even with currently planned shipments, Ukraine’s air and missile defence capabilities remain inadequate. They estimate that Russia can now produce over 2,000 Shahed- and Lancet-type loitering munitions per month and continues to import short-range ballistic missiles from Iran (Fateh-360) and North Korea (Hwasong-11A). Ukraine lacks sufficient means to counter this growing arsenal.

On the other hand, the worsening state of Russia’s federal budget in 2025 is also beginning to affect its war spending. There is growing strain within the current military expenditure framework between the cost of replenishing expensive manpower, procuring weapons, and sustaining the country’s strategic forces (→ Re:Russia: Budget for Military Buildup). If casualty and recruitment rates remain at 2024 levels, the government will need to allocate additional funding beyond what has already been budgeted. Morale among troops is also a significant issue: the vast sums paid to contract soldiers have fuelled rampant corruption among junior and mid-ranking officers. Given current casualty rates, contract soldiers are reportedly having to 'buy off' their commanders in order to avoid being sent into so-called 'meat assaults'.

Thus, should Russia persist in demanding maximalist conditions for a ceasefire, including the demilitarisation of Ukraine and restrictions on arms supplies from its allies (→ Re:Russia: The American Dream), and another military campaign becomes inevitable, both sides will face severe challenges. For Ukraine, continued US military support will be critical, particularly in the areas of intelligence, replenishment of air defence systems, and European assistance in providing conventional weapons and artillery shells. In addition, Ukraine’s primary defensive resource remains the 'drone coalition' with European nations, which significantly offsets the shortage of manpower. This drone-based warfare also requires constant innovation, as the enemy continually adapts to new technologies and tactics.

If these conditions are met, and Ukrainian troop morale holds, Russia is unlikely to achieve more than a repeat of its modest gains in 2024. This result would be both exhausting and demoralising for Moscow.