Trump Has Given Putin a Chance to Win a War of Attrition. Will the Kremlin be able to take advantage of it?

A new Russian offensive is set to take place, as efforts to draw Russia into negotiations have failed. The offensive will unfold against the backdrop of three unfavourable factors for Ukraine, all linked to the policies of Donald Trump’s administration: the imminent depletion of American arms supplies to Ukraine, Trump’s reluctance to exert additional economic pressure on the Kremlin, and the expansion of Russian-Chinese military cooperation in drone development and Russia’s overall drone capabilities.

According to calculations by Deepstat.хyz, which tracks troop movements based on data from the OSINT project DeepState, Russian forces significantly increased the pace of their offensive in April. It remains unclear whether this is due to a shift in the balance of power on the battlefield or a seasonal factor—combat intensity and troop movements tend to be lower during the winter and muddy seasons. In total, the Russian army occupied 185 square kilometres in April, a third more than in the previous month, and by May, this had risen to 457 square kilometres—its largest advance since November last year. Roughly half of this territory (229 square kilometres) was captured near Toretsk and Pokrovsk. In May, the Russian army also made gains in the east of the Sumy region. In addition, Russian military correspondents, followed by Putin's press secretary Dmitry Peskov, spread information about the start of an offensive in the Dnipropetrovsk region; however, Ukrainian authorities have so far denied these claims.

Russian army advances in Ukraine, 2023–2025, sq. km

Overall, the pace of the Russian army's advance this year is twice as fast as in the first five months of 2024: around 635 square kilometres were captured last year, whereas in 2025, the figure has reached approximately 1,280. However, this change is not decisive. By the end of last year’s offensive, the Russian army had occupied around 4,000 square kilometres, which amounted to 0.6% of Ukraine’s territory. Doubling the pace is not a significant breakthrough.

The tactic of advancing in small groups, which Russian forces are using, allows for steady progress but does not enable a major breakthrough in the offensive. Military experts interviewed by The Washington Post remain sceptical about Russia’s current gains. Former head of the UK’s Joint Forces Command, Richard Barrons, stated that this summer will be the peak of Russia’s offensive operations, but that its forces lack the resources to break through Ukraine’s defensive lines. Dara Massicot from the Carnegie Endowment remarked that even a sudden advance of 5–10 kilometres would not enable Russian forces to breach the front line, as they lack the manpower and equipment needed for such a breakthrough.

Objectives

The objectives of Russia’s offensive remain the same as last year. In fact, these goals were first declared by Russian military officials back in May 2022: the occupation of the entire territory of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. Early last year, these objectives were further specified, with the campaign aiming to capture cities in northern Donetsk Oblast: Pokrovsk, Kramatorsk, and Sloviansk. However, the Russian army failed to approach any of these cities last year.

In addition to capturing territory in these two regions, Russia’s real objectives also include establishing a buffer zone along the border with Russia in Sumy Oblast, according to Pavlo Palisa, Deputy Head of President Zelensky's office. However, as the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) points out, at the beginning of 2024, Russian command also planned to seize the remaining part of Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Today, Dmitry Peskov announced plans to create a buffer zone in the Dnipropetrovsk region.

However, the pace of military advances in open terrain is not particularly significant by itself. More important is the capture of medium and large settlements and control over transport infrastructure. At present, Russian forces have approached Pokrovsk, but taking the city will likely be a difficult task. In order to advance towards Kramatorsk, the Russian army’s first target will be the capture of Kostiantynivka, which it is now capable of attacking from three directions, according to a Ukrainian expert. The ability of Russian forces to seize these fortified locations will be the key indicator of the potential success of the offensive. Over the past year, Russian forces have captured only four medium-sized Ukrainian settlements: Avdiivka, Selydove, Vuhledar, and Kurakhove. The battle for Avdiivka took around four months, while capturing Selydove and Kurakhove required approximately two months each. At this pace, the Russian army would need just over two more years to completely seize Donetsk region. 

The Kremlin is also planning large-scale offensive operations along the borders of the Sumy and Kharkiv regions to divert Ukrainian forces away from Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka, The Washington Post reports. Meanwhile, The Economist, citing testimony from captured Russian officers, states that the summer campaign is being positioned by military command as a 'final push' aimed at breaking Ukraine’s morale.

However, Pavlo Palisa from President Zelensky’s office believes that Putin does not intend to stop at the conquest of Donbas. In 2026, if the current campaign succeeds, his goal will be to occupy all Ukrainian territory east of the Dnipro River, as well as to seize Odesa and Mykolaiv.

Balance of power: drones

Minimal changes to the front line despite enormous losses (primarily on the Russian side) have already led to comparisons between the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the final stages of the First World War. However, this is a typical dynamic of a 'war of attrition.' The balance of power and the intensity of hostilities are largely determined by the pace of manpower recruitment on both the Ukrainian and Russian sides, as well as the relative strength in drone warfare, while the significance of heavy military equipment is diminishing against the backdrop of intense drone engagements.

Military analysts agree that the success of Russia’s offensive will largely depend on whether it can alter the balance of power in drone warfare. Last year, the 'drone wall' effect helped halt Russian advances and compensated for Ukraine’s shortage of manpower (→ Re:Russia: A Wall of Drones Vs. Hordes of Motorcycles). Jack Watling, a military analyst at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), states that the 'wall' created an impenetrable zone 15 kilometres deep from the frontline.

To reduce the effectiveness of the 'drone wall,' the Russian army has intensified strikes against UAV operators and Ukrainian radar stations that support drone interceptors. Russia's ability to shift the balance in drone warfare is aided by its expanding cooperation with China and the trilateral alliance of Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing, which coordinates developments in this field. As a result, Ukraine is now lagging in the technological race, according to Maria Berlinska, head of the Kyiv Centre for Air Reconnaissance and one of Ukraine’s leading drone experts. Furthermore, during its summer offensive, the Russian army intends to focus on combined drone and missile strikes to weaken Ukrainian air defences, demoralise civilians, and drain the industrial base, writes The New York Times. Russia will soon be capable of launching up to 1,000 Shahed drones daily, Berlinska claims. The drone onslaught could also facilitate the Russian army’s efforts to capture larger settlements.

Balance of power: the living and the dead

A key factor in Russia’s offensive is its ability to replenish manpower at the same pace, ensuring forces capable of capturing enemy positions. Experts from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Seth Jones and Riley McCabe, note that the Russian military’s assault tactics have led to exceptionally high casualties. When a Russian unit detects Ukrainian positions, it is ordered to attack, allowing commanders to map out the location for subsequent strikes using artillery, drones, or glide bombs. Following this, fresh waves of troops are sent in to capture the positions.

According to the BBC and Mediazona, which track officially confirmed deaths, at least 45,287 Russian servicemen were killed last year in the war. This is almost three times higher than in the first year of the invasion (17,890) and significantly more than in 2023 (37,633). Their estimates typically account for 40 to 60% of actual losses. ISW calculations indicate that in 2024, the Russian army lost 420,000 troops (killed and wounded) while capturing 4,168 square kilometres over the year. Thus, each square kilometre of Ukrainian territory seized cost the Russian army an estimated 102 soldiers. Jones and McCabe estimate that Russia’s total losses have reached 950,000, with approximately 250,000 killed.

Analysts at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Juri Klaville and Michael Gjerstad, assess that by the end of December 2024, Russia’s troop presence in Ukraine stood at up to 617,000 personnel, including lightly wounded soldiers. Russia continues to sustain its manpower influx through contractual recruitment. However, according to Janis Kluge from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), the recruitment rate slowed by summer (based on Finance Ministry data on enlistment bonuses across 37 Russian regions). His calculations suggest that between 1 January and 27 May, 175,440 contract soldiers joined the Russian army. The recruitment rate peaked in April at around 1,400 contracts per day but declined to 900 by mid-May. Kluge attributes this to reduced financial incentives: by May, after a surge in regional enlistment bonuses between late 2024 and early 2025, payments had stabilised at approximately 1.1 million roubles; in several regions, the size of the payments was even reduced.

The same pattern was observed in the middle of last year, when the rate of recruitment of contract soldiers fell to about 700 per day, according to Kluge. This was insufficient to compensate for Russian battlefield losses, which at the time were estimated at approximately 30,000 per month (→ Re:Russia: Budget for Military Buildup). If the current downward trend in recruitment rates continues, Russian regions will likely be forced to increase enlistment bonuses for contract soldiers again by summer, the expert suggests. This is highly probable, as the intensity of losses during the summer campaign reduces motivation to sign contracts. The influx of contract soldiers in spring may have been linked to peace negotiations and the expectation of an imminent end to hostilities.

However, the other side of this 'competition' is the rate of manpower recruitment in Ukraine, where the situation appears far more critical. ISW points out that, in addition to low mobilisation rates, there are serious issues with the morale of new recruits. However, unlike the Russian army, Ukraine is not required to launch offensives, which helps balance out the difficulties in recruitment.

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More than a dozen officials interviewed by The Washington Post stated that the scale of Moscow’s economic and military difficulties this year gives the West an opportunity to exert more effective pressure on the Kremlin and force it to scale down active offensive operations for economic reasons. Seth Jones and Riley McCabe from CSIS are urging the US to strengthen military support for Ukraine, including supplying weapons and intelligence to complicate the Russian army’s advance, as well as tightening sanctions on Russia’s energy sector and its exports of minerals, metals, and agricultural goods, placing even greater pressure on the Russian economy. However, the Trump administration refuses to use economic leverage against Moscow and appears more inclined to reduce military support for Ukraine, giving the Kremlin hope for the success of its current offensive.

The outcome of this new phase of the war of attrition will largely depend on Ukraine, but also on the intensity of European support for Kyiv.