A War of Attrition in The Skies: Russia adapts missile and drone strike tactics, while Ukraine attempts to disrupt Russian missile production

A war of attrition in the air

The war in Ukraine has long been unfolding on two fronts: on the ground, where Russian forces are making slow advances in northern Donbas, and in the air, where Russia is similarly seeking to leverage its advantage in resources and technological capacity by exhausting Ukraine through large-scale missile and drone attacks on infrastructure and the civilian sector. In recent weeks, Russia has carried out a series of such strikes using this new tactical profile. These attacks have hit a large number of civilian targets across different parts of the country, while their scale and duration have increased significantly.

This tactic was first employed on 23–24 March as part of the largest air attack since the start of the war, notes the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). In total, 948 drones of various types and 34 missiles were used, including seven ballistic missiles. The majority of strikes were carried out during daylight hours, according to a statement by the Ukrainian Air Force. Among the targets of the attack was the Bernardine Monastery complex in Lviv, a UNESCO World Heritage Site. The next major strike occurred on 31 March–1 April, when Russia deployed 699 drones. A further large-scale attack of a similar profile took place on 15–16 April, when two waves involved the launch of 44 missiles, including 19 ballistic missiles, and 659 UAVs of various types, according to the same source. In Kyiv, the attack damaged 17 high-rise and 10 private residential buildings, a hotel, an office centre, a car dealership, a petrol station, and a shopping and entertainment complex. Four people were killed, including a 12-year-old child. In Odesa, during another wave of the same attack, nine people were killed and at least 19 were injured.

The American Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) notes in its review that in March, Russian attacks using Shahed drones reached a new level, characterised by record launch volumes, successive large-scale waves of strikes over the course of a single day, and targeting of sites across the entire country. The aim of this tactic is to exert systematic pressure on Ukraine’s air defence and infrastructure. Ukrainian drone expert Serhii ‘Flash’ Beskrestnov also believes that the increased duration of the attacks is aimed at identifying vulnerabilities in Ukraine’s air defence. Military expert Oleksandr Kovalenko describes the new strike tactic as ‘balanced terror’. In his assessment, Russia spent around ten days preparing for the record raid of 24–25 March, during which drone launches were, on the contrary, limited.

Scaling dynamics: drones

This turn of events comes as no surprise. In May last year, Ukrainian military intelligence claimed (in an interview with The Economist) that Russia was producing around 300 Shahed drones a day and intended to ramp up production to 500. In such a scenario, their ‘swarms’ directed against Ukraine would reach thousands of UAVs in a single attack. The March strike came close to that threshold. However, current estimates of Russian drone production appear more modest. In August, Vadym Skibitsky, deputy head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (GUR), estimated the total output of strike drones in Russia, including decoy drones, at just over 220 per day. According to Oleksandr Kovalenko, Russia produces a combined total of around 250 strike and decoy drones daily at the Kupol and Alabuga factories.

Calculations by Re:Russia, which are based on Petro Ivanyuk’s dataset ‘Massive Missile Attacks on Ukraine’, demonstrate the scaling dynamics. The average number of drones launched in the first half of 2025 was about 115 per day, rising to around 180 in the second half of the year and early 2026. Record-scale strikes in March and April pushed this figure to 240 drones per day. However, it remains unclear whether this represents a new level of attack intensity or the expenditure of stockpiles accumulated over several months, after which Russia may reduce the intensity of raids.

Dynamics of attack drone launches against Ukraine, 2025–2026, monthly, average per day

However, beyond production capacity, the scaling of drone attacks is constrained by the number of launch sites. According to data from RBC-Ukraine as of early 2025, Russia was launching Shahed drones from seven locations, namely the Chauda cape in Crimea and Navlya in Bryansk region, as well as airfields at Khalino in Kursk region, Oryol-Yuzhny in Oryol region, Shatalovo in Smolensk region, Millerovo in Rostov region, and Primorsko-Akhtarsk in Krasnodar region. At least two additional sites have reportedly been added more recently. Russian Shaheds are launched either from fixed platforms, a rail-mounted inclined launcher, or from mobile systems, typically a lorry-mounted container. In early 2026, the launch area for Shaheds at Shatalovo airfield was expanded to four fixed platforms and four mobile launch vehicles, enabling the simultaneous launch of at least 22 drones, as reported by the Militarnyi project.

Attacks from all Russian sites are conducted in waves, the duration of each of which varies by location. For example, at the Tsymbulova site in the Oryol region, over a hundred drones can be launched in a single wave, whilst in Primorsko-Akhtarsk, the figure is up to 25, reports the Dnipro Osint project. Taken together, this creates the technical capacity to carry out a coordinated launch of up to 1,000 drones, as Kovalenko notes. However, during the largest attack on 23–24 March, the Russian military required almost a full day to launch such a number of UAVs from multiple sites. This provides a further explanation for the increased duration of Russian strikes.

The missile component

However, the principal striking force in each attack is not drones but missiles. As Re:Russia’s calculations indicate, two distinct periods can be identified in missile launches over the course of 2025, mirroring the pattern observed in drone deployments. From January to May 2025, launch intensity stood at approximately 3.5 missiles per day, with a ratio of one ballistic missile to two cruise missiles. From June onwards, intensity increased markedly and, by autumn 2025, the peak of Russian strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, reached around 7.5 missiles per day, more than half of which, 4.4, were ballistic. However, over the past five months, missile launch intensity has declined, averaging 5.7 per day, and in April fell to 3.1, the level seen at the start of 2025, with ballistic missiles again accounting for only around one third.

Dynamics of missile launches across Ukraine, 2025–2026, monthly, average per day

Ballistic missiles (including those with characteristics similar to the S-300/400 air defence systems) have traditionally posed the greatest challenge for Ukrainian air defence, as their interception is only possible with scarce Patriot systems. As a result, the interception rate for Russian ballistic missiles between September 2022 and October 2025 did not exceed 25%, according to estimates by experts at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). By contrast, the interception rate for cruise missiles has remained consistently high at 70–85%, according to calculations by the OSINT project ‘Kyiv Dialogue’. Ukrainian Minister of Defence, Mykhailo Fedorov, stated during a ‘Ramstein’ format meeting on 15 April that the interception rate achieved by Ukrainian air defence stands at 80% for cruise missiles and 90% for drones.

Renowned missile analyst Fabian Hoffmann estimates the rate of Russian production of Iskander-M ballistic missiles at 25–33 per month. According to estimates by Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR), as of 1 December 2025, production exceeds 50 Iskander-M missiles per month, while output of Kinzhal ballistic missiles is above 10 per month. Among cruise missiles, Russia produces the largest numbers of Kh-101, at over 50 per month, Kalibr, at around 30, as well as Iskander-K and Oniks, at roughly 20, according to HUR.

The decline in the number of ballistic missiles launched in March appears to be linked to successful strikes by the Ukrainian armed forces on facilities within the production chain. This view is shared by a number of analysts, including Oleksandr Kovalenko. The most significant of these attacks were the strike on 21 February, when a Ukrainian Flamingo missile hit the Votkinsk plant, a key site in the production of ballistic missiles, including Iskander-M, and the 10 March strike using a Storm Shadow missile against the Kremniy El plant, the second-largest producer of military microelectronics in Russia.

During the attack on the Votkinsk plant, workshop No. 19, where galvanising and metal forming take place, was hit, but, as Fabian Hoffmann notes in a detailed analysis of this strike, even damage to a single workshop can disrupt multiple assembly lines, as the Votkinsk plant effectively operates as an industrial campus comprising dozens of interconnected production facilities.

As a result of the strike on the Kremniy El plant, assembly workshop No. 4 was destroyed, which in practice likely amounts to a complete shutdown of the facility, writes the Defence Express portal. Restoring even part of the production processes will take years, if possible at all. Electronics produced by Kremniy El are used in Iskander missile systems, Kalibr cruise missiles, Pantsir, S-300 and S-400 air defence systems, Topol-M and Bulava intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as in radar systems, electronic warfare equipment and drones, claims Lyubov Tsybulskaya, director of the non-governmental organisation Join Ukraine.

It is highly likely, therefore, that the increased use of drones in recent Russian air strikes is an attempt to compensate for Russia’s shortfall in missile stocks.

Winter is coming

Russia’s missile and drone threat is also being mitigated by Ukraine’s effective mid-strike campaign (→ Re:Russia: The Zone of Absolute Death), which has resulted in the systematic daily destruction of air defence assets. In total, since the start of the invasion, Russian forces have likely lost at least 1,300 air defence systems. In the absence of adequate air defence cover, it has become easier for the Ukrainian armed forces to strike Russia’s missile and drone capabilities. In April, at least two launch sites for Shahed drones came under attack: on 3 April, mobile launchers at Donetsk Airport were hit, and on 4 April, launch pads in Navlya and at the Khalino airfield were targeted. On 24 March, Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate destroyed a RussianBastion coastal missile system in Crimea, equipped with two Tsirkon hypersonic missiles, marking the first recorded loss of this system. According to Andriy Kovalenko, head of the Centre for Countering Disinformation, systematic attacks by Ukrainian drones on Russian chemical plants are also disrupting the logistics of production and delivery of Russian missiles to the front line.

However, the challenge posed by ballistics requires a systematic response. The chronic shortage of Patriot systems and interceptors has been exacerbated by the war in Iran, which has depleted the air defence arsenals of the United States and its allies (→ Re:Russia: The ‘Shahed’ Belt). Furthermore, President Trump has made it clear that he may halt arms supplies to Ukraine due to the refusal of European allies to participate in efforts to unblock the Strait of Hormuz. The inability to counter ballistic missile strikes remains one of Ukraine’s principal vulnerabilities. Russian attacks using such weapons brought Ukraine to the brink of a humanitarian crisis this winter (→ Re:Russia: Missiles, Not Manpower). By next winter, Vladimir Putin will undoubtedly begin preparing well in advance, and Ukraine is likely to face a renewed large-scale campaign of missile strikes against its energy infrastructure as early as this autumn. In February, Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged that ‘80% of Ukraine’s territory’ lacks air defence systems capable of shooting down ballistic missiles.

Two avenues for addressing this problem, which could prove effective in combination, are strikes on Russia’s defence industrial base, which would limit the scale of attacks such as those seen recently, and the development of a new air defence architecture. This year, Kyiv is expected to conduct its first tests of the European SAMP/T system against ballistic missiles, Zelensky has said. At the end of April, Germany announced a €4 billion military support package for Ukraine, the largest component of which is the delivery of several hundred PAC-2 GEM-T missiles for Patriot systems, valued at €3.2 billion. The package also includes 36 launchers for IRIS-T SL air defence systems worth €182 million, as well as €300 million in investment in Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. German IRIS-T systems have long been in use in Ukraine but have not demonstrated significant effectiveness against ballistic missiles.

Ukraine is also placing emphasis on its own developments. In April, Fire Point, the Ukrainian defence company producing the Flamingo cruise missile, and the German missile and air defence manufacturer Diehl Defence agreed to accelerate the development of a specialised anti-ballistic air defence system using European Freya components. Fire Point is also working on creating its own ballistic missile interceptor, which will cost several times less than the Patriot, said Fire Point’s chief designer Denys Shtilerman. Initial tests of the interceptor against ballistic targets are scheduled for late 2027.

The issue of air defence, however, is also a major challenge for Europe. Emerging missile and drone attack strategies render it critically vulnerable in the event of a potential conflict with Russia. Kyiv is seeking to leverage this reality to its advantage by proposing comprehensive strategies to European allies aimed at resolving both issues through the creation of joint consortia for the production of air defence missiles, Reuters reports.