The topic of Ukraine's potential defeat in the war with Russia has become a hot topic of conversation this week for the world's media, think tanks and even politicians. Western confusion after the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the summer of 2023 and the blocking of the aid package for Ukraine by Republicans in the US Congress have led to a significant shift in the balance of power, which there is little time to correct.
Western strategic assessments have been wrong twice. First, the degree of recovery of the Russian army was underestimated: it was able to offer much more effective resistance to the Ukrainian counteroffensive than anticipated, while the forces accumulated by Ukraine through Western arms supplies have been inadequate. Then, in the autumn, when the situation was described as a 'military stalemate' after the failed counteroffensive, the Russian army's ability to build up forces for a counteroffensive was again underestimated. In a report in early December last year, we wrote that without new Western supplies, the Ukrainian army could hold the front until spring, but by the end of the year, the conflict could end in its defeat (→ Re: Russia: Routine Catastrophe).
Speaking before congressmen on Thursday, CIA Director William Burns said, 'If you don't approve aid to Ukraine now, Kyiv could lose the war by the end of the year'. Conversely, he said, if aid is allocated, the momentum it creates 'both practically and psychologically' will help Ukraine make it through 2024 by 'undermining Putin's belief that time is on his side' (as quoted by Politico). The latter judgement is consistent with the view of a number of experts that Russia is now at the peak of its ability to build up weapons and manpower capabilities, while by the beginning of 2025, the West will already have deployed enough arms production to aid Ukraine. As a result, the balance of power will shift at that moment (→ Re: Russia: Year of Resilience).
Burns' panicked assessments are intended to convince congressmen and the American public of the need for a new US aid package for Ukraine on the eve of the next congressional vote (→ Re: Russia: Between Two 'Nos'). However, these assessments are by no means exaggerations. And it's not just about the blocked package supported by Trump's allies. EU countries, which promised in March 2023 to supply Ukraine with 1 million rounds within a year, have only fulfilled this obligation by 30% and are not agreeing to supply Kyiv with the number of Patriot air defence systems they have in service to protect it from Russian attacks. Deliveries of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine have been postponed several times and now may not begin until the summer. As a result, the balance of resources in the war of attrition makes the scenario outlined by Burns almost inevitable, although it may happen with some delay.
According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the Russian army has shifted from positional to manoeuvre operations on the battlefield, building up an advantage in several parts of the front. The Ukrainian armed forces’ lack of air defences has allowed Russian aircraft to bomb Ukrainian defensive positions for the first time since the beginning of the war, while the Ukrainian side's lack of artillery shells has allowed the Russian army to use armoured columns for the first time since 2022 without fear of disproportionate losses of equipment. In mid-April, NATO Commander of the US European Command Christopher Cavoli told the House of Representatives that the Russian side was firing five times more shells than the Ukrainian armed forces on the battlefield, and that the ratio would increase to 10 to 1 over the next few weeks. Since the beginning of the year, Russian forces have seized more than 360 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory, ISW notes.
General Richard Barrons, former commander of the Joint Forces Command, believes that in 2024 there is a 'serious risk' of a military defeat of Ukraine during a major summer offensive by the Russian army. During this offensive, says Jack Watling, an expert at the British Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the Russian army could aim to capture either Donbas or one of the major cities close to the front line — Zaporizhzhia or Kharkiv. These targets are far apart, making it difficult for the Ukrainian command to prepare for their defence. In Watling's view, even if Moscow does not make significant territorial gains during the summer offensive, it could crush Ukraine's willingness to resist and convince its Western supporters that there is no point in continuing the war, which aligns with Moscow's strategic goals.
In a column titled 'Ukraine is heading for defeat,' Politico Europe quoted high-ranking officers of the Ukrainian armed forces as saying that morale in the Ukrainian army has been undermined by shortages of ammunition and soldiers. These sentiments were strongly influenced by the heavy defeat at Avdiivka at the end of February: the Russian army achieved this victory with the help of extensive use of precision-guided munitions, while the Ukrainian armed forces lost a number of combat-ready formations there. Russia's large-scale strikes on Ukraine's energy infrastructure have also had a demoralising effect on society, with the sector losing more than 8 GW of capacity. According to some estimates, the energy deficit in the country may reach 4 GW by the beginning of the heating season, forcing millions of residents of cities in the south and east of Ukraine to evacuate.
Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada approved a new mobilisation law in April, having refused to pass it months earlier. At the same time, according to the head of the Ukrainian president's office, Andriy Yermak, large-scale mobilisation does not have the support of the population. This is also indicated by sociological surveys conducted in Ukraine at the beginning of the year: faith in the Ukrainian armed forces' ability to retake the occupied territories is declining; among respondents aged 18-29, the current level of mobilisation is considered excessive by about 30% of those surveyed and insufficient by just 20% (→ Re:Russia: Counter-mobilisation). All this leaves open the question of how successful the new conscription campaign, which starts on 18 May, will be in Ukraine.
ISW analysts note that a Russian victory in Ukraine would have devastating consequences for NATO. The Ukrainian army is the second largest in Europe after the Russian army, and even helping it to at least hold the current front line would be a critical deterrent to Russian military expansion. Conversely, the capture of significant territory in Ukraine would allow for the mobilisation of its defence and industrial potential for a confrontation with the West. In this scenario, ISW writes, for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania, as well as the Baltic states, would be vulnerable to a ground attack from Russia, forcing NATO to redeploy forces to defend such a vast region.
However, the scenario of expanded direct Russian aggression still does not appear to be realistic in the short term, according to George Beebe, former Director of Russia analysis at the CIA. Russia has neither the resources nor the will to seize all of Ukraine's territory. However, even seizing the territories that Moscow is counting on would look like its victory in the war and would have dire political consequences. According to The Economist, by providing moral, military and financial aid to Kyiv for two years, America and Europe have put their credibility in the world at stake.
Ukraine's defeat would convince critics of the liberal model that democracies are incapable of defending their interests, and it will give new impetus to the aggressive revisionism of authoritarian countries, weakening the Western coalition and its weight in the eyes of the Global South. This will hit the EU especially hard, as it has not only provided large-scale financial and military support to Ukraine, but also decided to start the process of its European integration. The failure of the European strategy in the 'battle for Ukraine' will provide new arguments to Euroscepticism and will have a devastating effect on the mood in eastern EU countries. It would be the West's biggest political defeat and put it in its most vulnerable position since the eve of World War II, when the strengthening of competing aggressive powers coexisted with a lack of unity and will in a coalition of democracies.