Between Two 'Nos': The threat of a Russian offensive is mobilising US public opinion in support of Ukraine, but not yet enough

The new turn in the debates in the US Congress involves dividing the unified bill on aid to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan into four separate bills, one of which, dedicated to common security issues, will contain provisions on banning TikTok in the US and on using frozen Russian assets, as simultaneously reported by Politico and The Hill. Meanwhile, the issue of strengthening the southern border is not included in the package, and there are currently no indications that the new configuration will unlock the resistance Trumpists have been offering to approve aid to Ukraine for over half a year. In this sense, the new plan put forward by Speaker Mike Johnson looks more like a tactical manoeuvre than a key to resolving the crisis.

Meanwhile, American public opinion demonstrates significant shifts regarding the issue of aid to Ukraine. Concerns about a potential Russian offensive this summer and the possible defeat of Ukraine have somewhat transferred to Americans, recent poll data from Gallup shows. The proportion of those who believe that the US is providing insufficient aid to Ukraine has increased by 11 percentage points compared to the previous survey.

In August 2022, six months after the war began, 38% of those surveyed believed that US aid to Ukraine was insufficient, 36% believed that the aid provided was adequate, and 24% believed that it was too much. There was a clear bias in favour of increasing aid, and in the autumn of 2022, the US administration increased it and began systematic weapons deliveries to Ukraine. By February 2023, the proportions of those who believed the aid to be insufficient and those considering it excessive had equalised at around 30%, while the proportion who believed it was adequate had risen to 40%. This ratio remained almost unchanged until June 2023; however, after the failure of the Ukrainian army's summer counteroffensive, public sentiment shifted unfavourably for Ukraine. The proportion of those who consider the aid excessive jumped to 41%, while those who considered it insufficient dropped to 25%. The situation appeared to be the opposite of what it was in August 2022. It was in October 2023 that Republicans began to block the allocation of a new aid package to Ukraine.

'When thinking about the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, do you believe that the USA is doing too much to help Ukraine, not enough, or enough?', % of those surveyed

Now, the proportion of those who believe that the aid is insufficient has increased significantly to 36%. At the same time, the proportion of those who consider the aid excessive has decreased less noticeably. While the shares of the two groups are again equal, as they were in 2023, the meaning of this equilibrium has completely changed. Back then, it reflected satisfaction with the level of aid: the largest faction (40%) believed that the aid was adequate. Now, on the contrary, this faction is the smallest (25% of those surveyed). Therefore, the current distribution indicates both an increase in concern among some Americans about the blockade of aid and an increased polarisation of opinions on this issue.

The belief that the aid provided is insufficient is primarily characteristic, of course, of Democrats. Among them, the proportion who hold this belief has increased from 38% in October, to 60% in the latest poll. Among Republicans, only 15% share this opinion (12% in October). However, among independent voters, the faction which believes that the aid is insufficient has increased significantly — from 25% to 34%. But, the group that believes that the aid is excessive is still slightly larger, at 39%. It is precisely this ratio that creates the picture of polarisation in the aggregated data.

The survey data does not suggest a decisive turning point in favour of Ukraine, but it does indicate a significant shift. This is confirmed by responses to another standard question in the Ukrainian pool: whether efforts should be made to end the conflict as soon as possible or to support the Ukrainians' intention to reclaim territories occupied by Russia, even if it entails a longer conflict. 55% of respondents continue to support the latter position — continuing the war to return territories (among Republicans, 45% hold this view, and among independents, 47%). This figure has remained almost unchanged since October (54%), but the decrease in the proportion of those sharing this position, observed throughout 2023 (66% in January and 62% in June), has ceased. The desire for a swift end to the war, even at the cost of territorial loss, essentially Trump's position on the Ukrainian issue, is shared by 43%. The growth of this group, which occurred in 2023 (from 31% in January to 43% in October), has also stalled

Thus, while the shift towards greater support for Ukraine is noticeable, the anti-Ukrainian stance of Republicans in Congress also reflects the opinion of a significant number of voters, and a change in the Republican position on the bill under public pressure appears unlikely in the near future. However, if Ukraine suffers a serious defeat in the summer, it may leave a strong impression on voters, who are likely to blame Republicans and Trump for it.

As the data shows, the proportion of those who would like to see revenge for Ukraine and who will perceive the advance of Russian troops and 'Trump's peace plan' as a victory for Putin, is much greater than the proportion of those advocating for increased military aid. This disparity is mainly driven by the position of a large portion of Republicans, who simultaneously support both 'defeating Putin' and limiting aid. In this regard, pro-Ukrainian views retain the potential for increased support: currently, only 23% of respondents believe that Russia is winning the war (12% believe Ukraine is winning, and 65% believe neither side is winning). The growing concern about 'Putin's victory' will lead to an increase in supporters of aid to Ukraine, as the threat of such a 'victory' becomes more evident to Americans than it is now.

The paradox also lies in the fact that support for Ukraine and its continued struggle against the Russian invasion coexists with mistrust in the Biden administration's ability to achieve any success on this matter. 49% of those surveyed said that they consider the Republicans' position in Congress regarding Ukraine to be more correct, while 44% sympathise with Biden's policies. This imbalance is driven by independent voters — 52% versus 39%. A similar ratio exists regarding the question of who would better handle resolving the Ukrainian issue: 50% would prefer to see Trump in the role of 'resolver', while 46% prefer Biden (among independents, this is 53% versus 45%).

Anti-Putin sentiments and support for Ukraine are more characteristic of Americans over 50, undoubtedly reflecting emotions from the Cold War era, according to a survey conducted in April by CBS News. A less significant majority of respondents express support for the US continuing to send weapons and military aid to Ukraine (53% versus 47%). Among Democrats, this figure is 75%, among independents, 50%, and among Republicans, 40%. Interestingly, among MAGA Republicans, this is 30%, and among non-MAGA, 45%.

It is striking that 31% of Republicans view Russia as a somewhat friendly country or even an ally, and roughly the same proportion view it as an enemy. This view is apparently directly related to the perceived weakening of support for the central doctrine of US foreign policy: responsibility for promoting and protecting democracy worldwide. 48% of those surveyed believe the country bears such a responsibility, while 52% do not. While two-thirds of Democrats endorse this tenet, only 40% of Republicans and 42% of independents do. During the Cold War, Republicans not only advocated for this position but sometimes even more vigorously than Democrats. The current shift, promoted by Donald Trump, explains the structural reasons for the breakdown of the bipartisan consensus in US foreign policy.