The immediate impact of sanctions was less severe than expected, creating a sense of euphoria within the Russian government and among many economic stakeholders. However, the medium-term consequences are beginning to intensify, while the unrealistic nature of certain import substitution plans becomes increasingly apparent. This is particularly true in the civil aviation sector.
Russian airlines managed to retain most of their aircraft. Nonetheless, some estimates suggest that due to maintenance and repair difficulties, up to a quarter of the fleet has already been lost. In 2024, Russian carriers are projected to serve the same number of passengers as in pre-war 2021, a figure 13% lower than in pre-pandemic 2019. A significant decline in passenger volumes is expected in 2025-2026 due to a shortage of aircraft. At the same time, accident rates are rising. Open sources indicate that the frequency of incidents has more than doubled compared to 2019.
In the spring of 2022, the Ministry of Transport adopted an obviously unrealistic aviation development strategy, aiming for full fleet modernisation with domestically produced aircraft by 2030. However, as of now, the industry has not delivered a single new Superjet or MC-21, nor even a single modernised Tu-214. This summer, authorities finally acknowledged the disconnect between the strategy and reality, and the need for a radical overhaul.
An additional obstacle to implementing the strategy has been the heavy losses sustained by the Russian Air Force. The military aviation sector is unable to replenish its fleet quickly and has prioritised the diversion of essential components for defense needs.
The revised strategy is likely to focus on the production of the MC-21, originally marketed as a 'killer' of Boeing and Airbus. However, its future remains uncertain due to escalating production costs. A realistic outlook for the coming years includes reduced passenger traffic, the preservation of the existing fleet through 'cannibalisation' (removing parts from old aircraft), and cabotage agreements with Kazakhstan, allowing Kazakh carriers to operate domestic routes within Russia.
The idea that Russia has weathered the impact of Western sanctions is nothing more than a fantasy and a fabrication of Russian propaganda. While the sanctions did not trigger a macroeconomic crisis or cause irreparable disruptions in supply chains, they are increasingly exerting a cumulative effect. Products that Russian industries cannot manufacture are being imported through parallel mechanisms. However, the protracted impact of sanctions is gradually becoming apparent and, over the coming years, will persist as a significant backdrop and a decisive factor for several industries. Thus, the sanctions affect the economy in two phases: an initial shock, followed by a gradual descent into technological stagnation and diminishing capabilities over time.
The situation varies significantly across sectors, and the dynamics of 'failures' and patchwork solutions depend on global market conditions in each area. For example, as previously discussed, Russian telecommunications companies have faced minimal challenges in maintaining their existing infrastructure (→ Re:Russia: How Sanctions Work). The sanctions have forced operators to abandon pre-war plans for deploying 5G networks. While the absence of 5G will have long-term consequences – such as limiting the adoption of autonomous vehicles – current needs are adequately met by 4G networks.
In other sectors, however, the outlook is less favorable. A prominent example is civil aviation.
Russian airlines have managed to retain most of their fleets (thanks to the forced privatisation of leased aircraft) and have established rudimentary maintenance and repair capabilities. Some basic components for Boeing and Airbus planes are reportedly being manufactured in Russia. For instance, according to Izvestia, a joint venture between Aeroflot and Rosatom was set to begin producing air conditioning, power supply, and lighting systems, as well as emergency, oxygen, and fire safety equipment in August. For critical and hard-to-source spare parts, ‘cannibalisation’ – removing functional components from one aircraft to service another – has already been implemented and is expected to expand. This practice was officially legalised early last year. Kommersant recently reported that Aeroflot is purchasing five cargo Boeing planes from ATRAN Airlines to use them as spare parts for its subsidiary, Pobeda. Complex maintenance tasks requiring specialised facilities and expertise are being outsourced to Iran, a regional leader in aviation accidents (→ Re:Russia: Flight Against Sanctions).
Despite these challenges, the volume of civil air traffic has decreased significantly but not catastrophically, primarily due to reductions in international flights. Compared to 2019, when 128.1 million passengers were transported, 2022 saw a 26% drop to 95.2 million, improving to an 18% decline in 2023 with 105 million passengers. In pre-war 2021, airlines carried 111 million passengers; 2023 figures are 95% of this value. However, since the first half of 2021 was still under the shadow of the pandemic, 2019 serves as the more accurate benchmark. From January to October 2024, 95.7 million passengers were transported, a 6.2% increase compared to the same period in 2023. Extrapolating this growth suggests that 2024 will match the 2021 total but remain 13% below 2019 levels. However, according to the forecasts of the State Research Institute of Civil Aviation, passenger volumes are expected to decline significantly in 2025-2026 due to aircraft shortages – falling to 95 million and 91 million, respectively. By 2026, this would represent a 30% reduction compared to 2019.
Rosaviatsia and the Interstate Aviation Committee claim that flight safety in Russia has not decreased. But this is apparently not the case. According to Novaya Gazeta Europe, open sources reported over 180 incidents in 2023 involving aircraft after takeoff—compared to approximately 100 in 2019, when there were 20% more flights. This marks a 2.2-fold increase. By 2024, the number of reported incidents surpassed 200, a 2.3-fold increase from 2019. Half of these failures were related to engines (30%) and landing gear (20%), with frequent issues also arising in hydraulic systems, brakes, and navigation systems. TThe most fragile aircraft are Russia's domestically developed Superjets, which accounted for 56 incidents in 2024 alone. One of the most notable was an emergency landing at Antalya airport in late November, accompanied by an onboard fire. A similar number of incidents – 56 – involved Boeing planes. However, Russian airlines operate roughly twice as many Boeings as Superjets.
Experts interviewed by Novaya Gazeta Europe attribute the rise in accidents to a 'compromise on part quality and inspection thoroughness' forced upon airlines. Aircraft are also being used more intensively than before. In mid-2024, Rosaviatsia stopped publishing data on the fleets of Russian carriers. According to expert assessments cited by Novaya Gazeta Europe, up to a quarter of the total fleet has been lost due to maintenance and repair challenges. In particular, as Kommersant recently discovered, half of the newest Airbus A320neo and A321neo aircraft (66 in total) are grounded, as no secondary market for spare parts exists. This is another example of how sanctions operate – forcing reliance on outdated models by circumventing restrictions and addressing shortages.
In the spring of 2022, the Ministry of Transport outlined an aviation development strategy that envisioned Russian airlines transitioning to 100% domestically produced fleets by 2030, requiring the production of 994 aircraft. This plan was unrealistic from the outset. Even before the war, Russia produced only 120 aircraft annually across all types, including military planes and helicopters, according to aviation expert Vadim Lukashevich in an interview with Novaya Gazeta. Despite the grand vision, progress has been nonexistent. By late 2024, no new Superjets, MC-21s, or even modernised Tu-214s had been delivered. An audit conducted by consultants from Sberbank and Gazprom Neft revealed that airlines only expressed demand for the MC-21, deeming the Superjet and Tu-214 unnecessary. As Kommersant has written, the auditors concluded that the production of the MC-21, marketed as a 'killer' of the Boeing 737 and Airbus A320, remains uncertain.
By the end of 2024, the industry has yet to deliver a single new Superjet or MS-21, or even a modernised Tu-214. First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov tentatively stated that the industry would 'attempt' to initiate production in 2025. However, even if MC-21 production starts, the prospects for this so-called 'killer' of Boeing and Airbus remain murky. An audit conducted by Sberbank and Gazprom Neft revealed that the aircraft's production costs would be at least 30% higher than originally estimated. So far, according to Reuters calculations, approximately 1.5 trillion rubles have been spent on implementing the strategy, according to Reuters. The auditors estimate that an additional 4 trillion rubles would be required to continue producing the MC-21 at the planned scale. The heads of Yakovlev and Tupolev, key manufacturers of civilian aircraft, were recently dismissed, but such changes are unlikely to resolve systemic issues. The past two years have made it abundantly clear that the 2022 plans were reckless fantasies, driven more by ideological posturing around import substitution than practical feasibility.
At the same time, a new and significant obstacle to achieving even minimal progress in civilian aviation is the massive losses sustained by Russia's military aviation fleet. Civilian aircraft production has stalled because defense enterprises are appropriating essential components, an industry worker told Kommersant. When the aviation development strategy was approved in 2022, anticipated losses for military aviation were significantly underestimated. However, Russia is now likely struggling to replace these losses, let alone expand its fleet of combat aircraft, suggests Michael Bohnert, an expert at the Rand think tank, in an article for Defence News. Citing data from the Oryx project, Bonert reports that Russia's Aerospace Forces have lost 16 fighter jets since the beginning of the year. Additionally, approximately 60 aircraft are approaching the end of their service life due to intensified use, accelerating the retirement of older models. This is equivalent to losing 26 brand-new aircraft, bringing total losses this year to at least 32. By contrast, Russia's annual production delivers only 20 new Su-30, Su-34, and Su-35 fighters.
Regardless of the objectives set in the revised aviation development strategy, it is increasingly evident that domestic carriers will continue to rely primarily on Boeing and Airbus aircraft. A striking indicator of the failure of these overly ambitious plans is the Russian government's negotiations with Kazakhstan about cabotage agreements, i.e. allowing Kazakh companies to operate domestic flights in Russia.