Legitimate but Unpromising: Ukraine is entering a new political cycle in which the military will be popular and members of Zelensky's team unpopular

The end of sweater and t-shirt season

From the first day of the war, Volodymyr Zelensky became the face and symbol of heroic resistance to Russian aggression, whose initial plan had focused on suppressing the will of Ukrainians – a strategy that failed completely in this regard. Zelensky’s sweaters and t-shirts emphasised the extremity and uniqueness of the resistance, leaving no room for formalities and demanding similar efforts from the entire nation. This message and image were broadcast by media outlets worldwide.

As the war turned into a prolonged conflict, the level of societal mobilisation in Ukraine began to decline. However, Zelensky’s legitimacy, despite a gradual decline in his personal approval ratings, remained intact – largely due to his unique role as the key negotiator with the West regarding aid to Ukraine (→ Re:Russia: Extraordinary Legitimacy). This aid has been not only the foundation of Ukrainian resistance but also a source of hope for a favourable resolution to the war.

The effective collapse of the Western coalition in its previous form following Donald Trump’s election, as anticipated, has exacerbated the erosion of Zelensky’s image and political standing. This could lead to a political crisis, especially if the new US administration demands Zelensky’s loyalty to its plans, which may not fully align with Ukrainians’ own vision of acceptable war outcomes.

According to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), Zelensky’s trust ratings in December stood at 52% (down from 59% in May and September and 64% in February), while distrust was at 39% (compared to 35% in February and 37% in September). In eastern and southern Ukraine, the trust/distrust balance has become nearly zero, while in the west, it remains at 60 to 33%. KIIS notes that trust in Zelensky closely correlates with respondents’ levels of optimism: among consistent optimists, the trust/distrust ratio is 62 to 27%, while among consistent pessimists, it is nearly reversed. Over the past year, optimism has naturally declined significantly: in December 2023, the groups of consistent optimists and pessimists were 57% and 10%, respectively; by December 2024, according to the KIIS data, these figures had shifted to 37% and 16%.

Trust rating for Volodymyr Zelensky, 2019-2024, % of those surveyed

Volodymyr Zelensky has managed, to some extent, to maintain his 'international' legitimacy. He currently positions himself as a leader negotiating with Donald Trump, attempting to sway him toward Ukraine's side and secure the most favourable terms in a potential 'deal' with Vladimir Putin. As long as uncertainty and hope remain in this matter, Zelensky continues to embody that hope. In December 2024, 45% of those surveyed believed Trump’s rise to power brought peace in Ukraine closer. Nearly a quarter thought Trump would deliver a just peace, while almost a third anticipated an unjust one. Zelensky’s political fate largely hinges on how these opinion groups evolve.

‘Elections in spring’: has Ukrainian opinion shifted?

The constitutional terms of Ukraine’s president and other branches of power have expired, but new elections were postponed due to the state of emergency (extended by Zelensky’s January 14 bill for another three months). In early 2024, this postponement was seen as a relative consensus in Ukraine. In a poll organised by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in May last year, 72% of Ukrainians believed elections should occur only after the war ends, while 24% supported holding them sooner.

However, Zelensky’s declining ratings and growing public dissatisfaction with political leadership have made elections a hot topic by the autumn of 2024. ‘If there are no changes for too long, the system locks up like a pressure cooker and begins to self-destruct. Right now, you can feel the need to release some steam in both society and politics’, an anonymous MP stated in a conversation with Ukrainska Pravda. Rumours of ‘elections in the spring’ have been circulating in political corridors; in November, sources in the Ukrainian government were quoted by the Economist as saying that 25 May was the date after which elections could be called.

Recently, signs emerged that elections in Ukraine have become part of behind-the-scenes discussions in the Trump-Putin deal. In a December press conference, Putin stated he would negotiate with Zelensky only if the latter reaffirmed his legitimacy through elections, as his constitutional term had expired. This week, RBC-Ukraine reported that US pressure is the primary driver behind the push for elections.

However, Ukrainians remain skeptical about the feasibility of holding elections under current conditions. At the beginning of last year, a survey by the marketing research agency Active Group stirred significant debate in Ukraine, being interpreted as evidence of growing public desire to hold elections before the war's conclusion. The portal Obozrevatel reported that ‘54.3% of respondents believe elections can be held during wartime’. However, there is no basis for such a conclusion.

The results of Active Group’s December survey, conducted via online questionnaires, may indicate a weakening of the anti-election consensus, but only slightly. Respondents were presented with three options: holding elections as soon as possible during wartime (1), holding elections conditional on a temporary ceasefire or truce (2), or holding elections only after the war’s end (3). In December 2024, 20% of those surveyed favoured immediate elections without conditions, and an additional 9% considered shelter-based voting necessary – making a total of 29% in favour of wartime elections. Meanwhile, 24% supported elections conditional on a cessation of hostilities: temporary (10%), extended (8%), or under a truce (6%). A larger 39% believed elections should only take place after the war ends.In a similar Active Group survey conducted in October, using the same response scale, 24% favoured immediate elections, with another 10% supporting shelter-based voting (34% in total). Meanwhile, 19% supported elections during a ceasefire or truce, and 41% believed elections should only occur post-war. Between October and December, the share of supporters for wartime elections dropped by 5 percentage points (from 34% to 29%), while the group supporting elections during a ceasefire or truce grew from 19% to 24%. The share advocating for elections only after the war’s end decreased slightly, from 41% to 39%. This shift suggests that the increase in support for elections during a truce came mainly from those previously supporting immediate wartime elections rather than those in favour of postponement.

A survey conducted by the ‘Rating’ group at the end of September found that Ukrainians were most supportive of a referendum on peace settlement terms (54%), followed by potential parliamentary elections during wartime (46%), local elections (45%), and only 36% supporting presidential elections. Since February, the share of those favouring new parliamentary elections rose by 13 percentage points, while support for presidential elections increased by 6 percentage points.

In a September poll by the Razumkov Centre, 28% were in favour of holding elections under war conditions, 56% were against and 16% found it difficult to answer. Meanwhile, a November poll by the Centre for ‘Social Monitoring’ found that 33% of those surveyed considered elections during wartime acceptable, while 57% opposed the idea. Additionally, Ukrainians currently in the country largely reject the idea of electronic voting (57% opposed versus 38% in favour), which could potentially address the challenge of including millions of Ukrainians displaced abroad. However, among those displaced, electronic voting enjoys greater support (47% in favour versus 47% opposed).

In general, despite Zelensky’s waning support, increasing criticism of the government, and the desire of many in the political class to engage in an election campaign, the current moratorium on elections under martial law remains widely viewed by Ukrainians as legitimate.

Focus of hopes: heroes and anti-heroes

At the current stage, the systemic weakening of Zelensky's position is primarily reflected in the growing criticism of the president’s entourage, the government, and the parliamentary faction of the president’s party, Servant of the People.

According to the poll conducted by KIIS from 1-9 December, Servant of the People has the highest negative rating: 65% of respondents do not trust the faction, while 18% do (a net negative balance of –47 percentage points). This is the worst result among five factions. In December, the most positive balance belonged to Petro Poroshenko's European Solidarity faction (36% positive, 41% negative, net –5 percentage points). Next were Oleksandra Ustinova's Holos (29% positive, net –6 percentage points) and Yulia Tymoshenko's Batkivshchyna (25% positive, net –12 percentage points).

In an October survey by Active Group, respondents were asked to assess the contribution of various figures to Ukraine’s recent successes and failures. The worst ratings were attributed to the head of the president's office, Andriy Yermak (–39 points), Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal (–24 points), and Defense Minister Rustem Umerov (–19 points). Yermak also overwhelmingly topped the list of officials whom respondents would prefer to see dismissed. (The high negative ratings of Yermak and Shmyhal were confirmed by an October poll conducted by the ‘Rating’ group, though Umerov had a positive trust balance in that survey.) The main perceived failures of Ukrainian policy were fighting corruption (–75 points difference between positive and negative ratings), supporting the economy (–23 points), and organising mobilisation (–18 points). In contrast, the greatest perceived successes were the organisation of political, economic, and military aid for Ukraine.

Meanwhile, former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valerii Zaluzhnyi and current intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov emerged in the December Active Group survey as figures with the highest positive trust balance (51 and 40 points, respectively). Zelensky’s trust balance was neutral (0). This reflects not only assessments of individual figures but also a broader trend: the focus of Ukrainian society’s hopes has shifted toward the military. According to KIIS data, trust in the presidency fell from 64% in December 2023 to 45% in December 2024. Trust in the Armed Forces, however, remained almost unchanged despite setbacks in 2024 (92% compared to 96% the year before). Ukrainian sociologists note that the military, the so-called ‘party of frontline comrades’, currently holds the greatest political potential in Ukrainian society.

Valerii Zaluzhnyi, who was preemptively removed from his post and subsequently appointed ambassador to the United Kingdom, has emerged as a clear leader of public trust and a key figure of 'reserve legitimacy'. According to a late-November poll by the Centre for ‘Social Monitoring’, 27% of respondents would vote for him in a presidential election held this weekend, compared to 16% for Zelensky, 7% for Poroshenko, and 6% for Budanov. In a December poll conducted by the ‘Democratic Initiatives’ Foundation together with the sociological service of the Razumkov Centre, 24% expressed their intention to vote for Zaluzhnyi, 16% supported Zelensky and 13% backed Tymoshenko (according to this poll, however, Zaluzhnyi's position has slightly weakened compared to March, while Zelensky's position has strengthened).

The Centre for ‘Social Monitoring’ also asked respondents to name a second acceptable presidential candidate. Combining the two questions, Zaluzhnyi scored 42 points (27% primary support and 15% as a secondary choice), Zelensky scored 22 points, Budanov 18, and Poroshenko 10. In a December Democratic Initiatives survey, respondents were also presented with a hypothetical list of parties for parliamentary elections. In this scenario, a hypothetical 'Zaluzhnyi’s party' led with 16%, followed by Zelensky’s party with 14%, Tymoshenko’s with 13%, and Poroshenko’s European Solidarity with only 6%.

Zelensky’s position in potential future elections – now more likely to take place in early autumn – faces additional complications due to his earlier pledge to serve only one presidential term. According to RBC-Ukraine, Zelensky is leaning toward running again, while his team is trying to persuade Zaluzhnyi either to stay out of politics or to join the president’s party and lead its parliamentary list. However, the deep trends in public opinion, where Zelensky's party has lost its image as an agent of renewal and trust among voters has shifted toward the military, make such scenarios unconvincing. Zaluzhnyi’s non-participation in the elections, like his earlier dismissal from the military, would not bolster Zelensky's legitimacy. Conversely, Zaluzhnyi joining Zelensky’s coalition in a secondary role would undermine voters’ expectations for a new phase in Ukrainian politics – especially if Zelensky’s current entourage retains its influence.

Corruption remains at the centre of Ukraine’s civic agenda. The hope that Zelensky's team would be able to deal with this issue was linked to the meteoric rise in his popularity in the last election, while disappointment on this issue caused Zelensky's ratings to plummet on the eve of the war (37% trusted Zelensky at the time, while 52% did not; see chart above). In 2024, amid declining civic mobilisation, the administration’s inability to address corruption again became a central grievance against the Zelensky administration. While there is little reason to believe that the military would succeed in tackling corruption in the next political cycle, it is unlikely that Zelensky could once again unite Ukrainians in 2025, especially in the context of an end to the war that will not look like a victory.