The Dilemma of Resistance: Ukrainians are not ready to relinquish sovereignty over the territories they have held after three years of war, polls show

No illusions: Ukrainians' view of the war after the failure of the ‘Trump plan’

The failure of Donald Trump's peacemaking efforts in the Russia–Ukraine conflict has sparked a fresh shift in public opinion across Ukraine. Ukrainians' readiness to bear the burden of war 'for as long as it takes' is once again on the rise, driven by growing disappointment in Trump and his ability to end the war on terms acceptable to Ukraine, according to a recent poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS).

Between May 2022 and May 2024 (across four measurements), 71–73% of Ukrainians consistently stated their readiness to endure the conflict indefinitely, while only 17–24% said they were prepared to endure for another six months to a year. This pattern began to shift in the autumn of 2024. By October, the share willing to fight 'as long as it takes' had dropped by nearly 10 percentage points from May, to 63%. By March 2025, it had dropped by another 10 points to 54%. Meanwhile, the proportion stating a time horizon of six months to a year rose modestly to between 24% and 28%, but the number of respondents unable to answer jumped sharply (from an average of 7% to 17%).

In October 2024, this trend likely reflected growing war fatigue and increased pessimism amid a Russian offensive that had entered its most intense phase in the preceding months. It also coincided with a new wave of mobilisation within the country (in October, it was extended until February 2025). The 'Trump factor,' with the former president having declared during his election campaign that he could end the war in a single day, also had an influence, though it was unlikely to have been decisive at that point. By March 2025, expectations linked to Trump likely remained, although relations between Volodymyr Zelensky and Washington had hit a low point following a scandal in the Oval Office.

In the latest poll (late May–early June), the trend reversed: the share of those ready to endure the war for a long time rose to 60%, while the proportions of those prepared to withstand another six months to a year, and those unsure how to respond, dropped slightly to 26% and 14%, respectively.

‘How long are you willing to endure the war?’ 2022–2025, % of those surveyed

It is generally believed that older people are more willing to endure the hardships of war, while the younger generation, on whom much of the burden actually falls, are less resilient, note analysts at KIIS. However, the poll somewhat corrects this assumption: the age group most fatigued by the war appears to be those aged 40–49. In this cohort, only 52% say they are prepared to endure the war for as long as it takes, 28% would tolerate another six months to a year, and 20% are unsure. Among younger respondents (aged 18 to 39), the breakdown is 59%, 33%, and 8% respectively. Among older age groups (50+), the proportion of the most resilient rises to 64%. Nevertheless, overall, the generational gap in attitudes towards the war is not as pronounced as it is in Russia (→ Re:Russia: Conditional Peace). In regional terms, the east traditionally feels the brunt of the war most acutely: here, 51% are ready to fight for as long as necessary.

One way or another, the poll indicates that the failure of negotiations and Trump's withdrawal from the process, which has made another year of Russian offensive inevitable, did not have a demoralising effect on Ukrainian public opinion. The mobilising effect of the new round of resistance can be assessed more accurately in the next wave of polling.

Zelensky between Trump and Ukraine: red lines of concession

Ukrainians' views on acceptable terms for peace remain unchanged, according to responses to other questions in the same KIIS poll. As noted by the institute’s director, Anton Hrushetskyi, although the proportion of Ukrainians supporting negotiations with Russia rose from 29% in January 2023 to 57% in May 2024, an overwhelming majority still firmly rejects 'peace at any cost.' Ukraine is not, at present, ready to capitulate.

Some 82% of respondents reject the Russian plan, which includes legal recognition of the loss of occupied territories and restrictions on Ukraine’s military sovereignty (see Table 1). In the country’s south and east, attitudes toward the plan are only marginally more tolerant, but even there it is supported by only a small minority. A clear majority of those surveyed (61%) also reject the April ‘Trump plan’ (which offers no US security guarantees, recognises Crimea as Russian, and calls for the lifting of all sanctions against Russia), although nearly 30% now consider it acceptable. The European-Ukrainian plan is supported by 51% (12% enthusiastically; 29% see it as flawed but acceptable), while 40% are opposed. In central and southern Ukraine, there is a 'strong' majority in favour of this plan (56% and 69% respectively), but in the south and west, supporters and opponents are roughly evenly split. This is unusual, as polling figures from southern Ukraine are typically closer to those from the east. It appears that the south, particularly Odesa and Mykolaiv, feels especially vulnerable to the next potential Russian invasion, and regards half-hearted security guarantees that exclude US involvement as unconvincing.

Table 1. Attitudes towards hypothetical peace plans in Ukrainian public opinion, May 2025, % of those surveyed

Table 2. Attitudes towards hypothetical peace plans in Ukrainian public opinion by region, May 2025, % of those surveyed

Compared with the first two years of the war, Ukrainian public opinion has become significantly more tolerant of 'territorial concessions'. However, willingness to consider them is critically dependent on how the term is defined, as shown by another set of questions from the latest KIIS poll. In 2023, around 10% of respondents were open to such concessions; by October 2024, that figure had risen to one-third, and by spring 2025, to 38%, while 52% still rejected the very idea of concessions. Yet when it comes to the official, legal recognition of Russian occupation, 68% reject such 'concessions', and only a quarter (24%) deem them acceptable. If the issue is Russia’s demand for the handover of territories it has not yet occupied, only 15% consider this acceptable, while 78% reject it outright. The only variant seen as acceptable by a substantial proportion of respondents is 'de facto recognition of occupation without de jure recognition': this is acceptable to 43%, while 48% are opposed. This compromise enjoys the greatest support in the western (50% in favour, 42% opposed) and eastern (56% in favour, 34% opposed) regions of Ukraine. In the centre and south, opposition is stronger: 54% are against this option, while 37–40% are in favour.

Meanwhile, by spring 2025, Donald Trump is clearly not perceived in Ukraine as a 'neutral third party'. Back in December 2024, 54% believed his election would benefit Ukraine, with 21% thinking the opposite. But by March–May 2025, a clear majority (72%) hold a negative view of Trump’s impact, according to the latest KIIS polling. 58% of respondents believe Washington is growing weary of supporting Kyiv and is putting pressure on Ukraine to make concessions, while Europe is still viewed as Ukraine’s only reliable ally – an opinion held by 64% of respondents.

Thus, the KIIS polls conducted in late May to early June clearly indicate that Zelensky’s position in potential talks with Moscow and in behind-the-scenes negotiations with the US administration, where Trump has expressed dissatisfaction with his lack of flexibility, is not a result of the Ukrainian president’s personal intransigence, but rather a reflection of the balance of forces in Ukrainian public opinion. Accepting even the American version of a peace plan (let alone the Russian one) would likely lead to a sharp drop in trust towards Zelensky (which grew significantly during the spring → Re:Russia: Ukrainian Rally in the Oval Office), social division, and political destabilisation. By contrast, continued resistance remains the preferred option, and the choice of Ukrainian society, not merely Zelensky himself. Polls show that after three years of resistance, Ukrainians are not prepared to give up sovereignty over the territory they have managed to defend, even at the cost of further territorial losses. At least, not for now.