Divided Opinion: Trump's chaotic peacemaking appeals almost exclusively to Russians

This past August proved to be rich in political and diplomatic developments. Early in the month, Trump unexpectedly shortened the deadline of the ultimatum he had issued to Russia and, on 6 August, announced an additional tariff on Indian exports to the United States, aimed at punishing India for purchasing Russian oil (→ Re:Russia: Excess oil). However, shortly afterwards, a summit in Alaska was swiftly arranged, news of which shocked politicians and observers alike. No less shocking were the summit’s results. After two hours of talks between Putin and Trump, the remaining programme of the summit was cancelled, and the presidents’ joint press conference effectively did not take place. Despite statements by Trump himself and members of his administration that the meeting marked progress towards peace, as well as Putin’s remarks about a reached mutual understanding, the nature of this progress and this understanding remains unknown to this day.

Regardless of what truly drives Trump’s diplomatic strategy, it is also important to understand how this chaotic peacemaking is perceived by public opinion in Russia and in the West. What impression have his recent steps and the Alaska summit left? To what extent and in what way does Trump’s approach to negotiations and the conflict in Ukraine influence public sentiment and the level of support for Ukraine in the US and Europe?

Russia

In Russia, Trump’s diplomatic sprint has led to an almost sensational turnaround in public opinion. From March 2022, i.e. from the very beginning of the war, until the end of 2024, the share of those surveyed by the Levada Centre who expressed a positive attitude towards the US hovered around 17%, while an average of 71% declared a negative view. This distribution – the worst in the history of bilateral relations – reflected the narrative of the Russian authorities, according to which the war in Ukraine is effectively a proxy war with NATO countries and the US. However, in the latest poll, conducted between 19 and 27 August, shortly after the Alaska summit, 48% reported a positive attitude towards the US, while the share of negative assessments dropped to 30%. The drift towards a softening of public opinion regarding the US, however, had already begun in February 2025, immediately after Trump entered the White House – the ratio then was 30% positive to 51% negative. By May it was already 37 to 47. In the August survey, the balance of positive and negative assessments not only turned positive but immediately reached +18 percentage points. The last time a similar picture was observed was in July 2013.

Thus, a twelve-year history of hostility towards the United States has been completely overturned in just six months. However, sharp swings in public opinion on matters concerning foreign policy and relations with other countries are far from rare. They underscore the dependence of such opinion on the media mainstream and the government’s stance, as well as the high level of conformity among survey respondents. Over the past twelve years, as shown in the graph, such shifts, where between 20% and 40% of those surveyed rapidly changed their view of the United States, have occurred five times. Twice, following the attacks on Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 and the West’s harsh reaction to them, this 'swing group' shifted its attitude towards the United States to the negative, and three times in the opposite direction. All three of the latter instances were linked to Trump: first, after his arrival in the White House at the start of 2017, then in connection with the Putin–Trump summit in Helsinki in July 2018, and now, after Trump’s second arrival in the White House and the meeting in Alaska. However, the two previous 'turnarounds' proved to be relatively short-lived.

Dynamics of attitudes towards the US in Russia: percentage of those surveyed expressing positive and negative attitudes towards the US, % of those surveyed

At the same time, expectations of improved relations with the United States are now at their highest: 51% of those surveyed are hopeful (after the Helsinki summit, this figure was only 30%). Meanwhile, 40% do not expect relations to improve, and when asked whether the summit would lead to an end to the conflict in Ukraine, 53% responded positively and 37% negatively. Notably, the sceptical group includes both those who condemn the war and are critical of Putin and his policies, and those who, on the contrary, believe that military action should continue until full victory is achieved. In the longer-term trend, it can be said that, in addition to the 'swing group' that shifts its attitude towards the United States depending on the prevailing climate, over the past 20 years there has been a group with a consistently favourable opinion of the US (15–20%) and another with a consistently negative one (25–30%).

One way or another, Russians have turned out to be perhaps the most receptive audience for the Alaska summit.

United States

Whereas in Russia the defining feature of public opinion on international matters and Trump’s diplomacy is the presence of a 'swing group' that shifts its views depending on the position of the Russian authorities, in the United States it is the extreme polarisation of party views on Trump and his actions. Typically, what is approved by 75% of Republicans is categorically disapproved of by 75% of Democrats. It should be noted, however, that such intense polarisation is observed specifically in evaluations of Trump, not in attitudes towards Ukraine. The American majority remains pro-Ukrainian. Between two-thirds and three-quarters of Democrats, and between 30% and 50% of Republicans, hold pro-Ukrainian positions to varying degrees. Among non-partisan respondents, pro-Ukrainian and anti-Trump views also predominate.

Thus, in a Gallup poll conducted in the first half of August – that is, before the Anchorage summit – 67% of those surveyed expressed pessimism regarding the possibility of a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine, while 78% were pessimistic about the ability of the United States to broker such an agreement. 73% were concerned that any agreement would be excessively pro-Russian, and 87% feared that Russia would break it regardless. Distrust towards Russia and Putin is evidently the strongest factor underpinning pro-Ukrainian sentiment.

However, in assessments of the practical aims of American policy, the mechanism of polarisation begins to take effect. While 66% of Americans are convinced that neither side is winning and that the war is at a stalemate, 52% still believe the main task of the United States is to help Ukraine regain the territories it has lost, whereas 46% consider that the task is to secure peace as soon as possible, even at the cost of ceding territory. Among Democrats, the split between these two views was 80 to 20%, while among Republicans it was 30 to 70%. Although the proportion of those holding the first view is considerably lower than at the start of the war, when it was supported by 80% of Democrats and 50% of Republicans, it remains high enough to limit Trump’s ability to compel Ukraine to make territorial concessions. Any peace secured on such terms would not be seen by Americans as Trump’s 'achievement'.

The share of those who believe that the United States is providing insufficient assistance to Ukraine also rose sharply (back in March) and remains at that level — 46%, according to Gallup. This is even higher than in August 2022. From October 2023 to the end of 2024, on average around 30% held this view, while 35% considered the assistance excessive. These figures refute Trump’s argument that Americans no longer wish to pay for the war out of their own pockets. In the Gallup survey, almost one in two Americans considers it necessary to increase spending on supporting Ukraine. This trend is corroborated by several other US surveys, though less pronouncedly so, in particular a telephone poll by the Pew Research Center telephone poll and an online poll by The Economist/YouGov.

Assessments of the level of support currently provided to Ukraine by the US, August 2025, % of those surveyed

Data from an American survey by the Pew Research Centre conducted in the first half of August also indicate that most Americans do not trust Trump’s policy on the Russia–Ukraine issue. One-third consider his stance pro-Russian, although in the March survey this figure was 43%. Thus, American society has partly registered Trump’s tougher rhetoric towards Putin in the summer months. Meanwhile, since March the share of those who believe that the United States is obliged to help Ukraine defend itself against Russian invasion has increased by six percentage points, from 44% to 50%. As the data show, this growth has occurred mainly among Republican supporters: 35% of them now believe the US has this obligation, compared to 23% in March.

In an online poll conducted by The Economist/YouGov at the end of August, 79% of Democrats, 61% of 'independents' and 54% of Republicans declared their sympathies lay with Ukraine. At the same time, attempts by the Trump administration to adopt a neutral stance, attributing at least part of the responsibility for the conflict to Ukraine itself and to President Zelensky, found support among 10% of Democrats surveyed, 20% of independents and 30% of Republicans. The Alaska meeting is approved by 41% and disapproved by 38%. In the assessments of Trump’s policies and practical steps in this area, we observe party-political polarisation, and the balance of opinion is largely determined by the positions of independent respondents, which generally break 2 to 1 against Trump. Thus, overall, 32% of those surveyed believe the Anchorage summit was a step towards peace, while 42% consider it fruitless; among independents, the ratio is 24 to 46%. 35% of respondents approve of Trump’s 'peace' policy direction, while 45% disapprove; among independents, the split is 25 to 49%.

The continuing pro-Ukrainian tilt in American public opinion is also evident in the online survey by The Harvard CAPS/Harris Poll, conducted online on 20–21 August. There, 40% of those surveyed judged the Anchorage summit successful, and 60% unsuccessful. Meanwhile, regarding the alternative summit in Washington, where Donald Trump was joined by Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders, the distribution of assessments was more favourable – 50 to 50%. Ratings of this summit were higher across all three groups: Republicans, Democrats and independents. This appears to be largely linked to the fact that the central issue of the second summit was security guarantees for Ukraine. Almost 70% of those surveyed believe that the United States should provide Kyiv with direct security guarantees if it makes concessions to end the war. This position is supported by 76% of Democrats, 67% of Republicans and 65% of independents. At the same time, about 60% believe that Trump is still not tough enough on Putin, with this view held by 43% of Republicans and 58% of independents. Regarding Zelensky and Ukraine, 33% consider Trump’s actions insufficiently tough (down from 37% in July), 29% consider them too tough, and 38% consider them adequate.

Europe

Unfortunately, no large-scale surveys covering a significant number of European countries were conducted during the summer months. However, individual country-level polls provide fragments of a picture that does not differ significantly from the American one in terms of the level of pro-Ukrainian sentiment, but, unsurprisingly, shows a far more critical attitude towards Donald Trump.

For example, 53% of those surveyed in Germany believe that Ukraine should be prepared to cede to Russia the territories it has occupied, according to an August survey by the Market Research Institute (FORSA), conducted on behalf of RTL Deutschland (RTL/ntv Trendbarometer) from 8 to 11 August 2025. 39% are against such concessions. However, in a ZDF-Politbarometer survey conducted by the Mannheim Research Group Elections on 11–13 August, 42% of those surveyed supported the idea of Ukraine relinquishing part of the occupied territories to end the war, while 45% favoured continuing the fight to liberate them. In a YouGov online poll conducted in the UK also in the first half of August, 45% of those surveyed supported continuing to back Ukraine until it regains the captured territories, while 31% favoured encouraging an early peace agreement, even if it meant ceding territory.

Thus, in both European and American societies, there is no clear majority in favour of either position – peace or territory. Support for continuing the fight for the territories may have a slight edge. However, it is evident that public opinion regards abandoning the fight for the territories in exchange for peace as unjust and is unlikely to support handing over additional territories to Russia – those it has not yet even managed to seize.

Peace or territory: Western public opinion on the priority goals in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, % of those surveyed

While there is no consensus within German society on the issue of peace versus territories, there is near unanimity regarding Trump’s ability to succeed in a peacekeeping mission and achieve a ceasefire. In the Trendbarometer poll, 73% do not believe in a positive outcome of the negotiations, while in the Politbarometer poll this figure rises to 84%. Only 14% of Politbarometer respondents believe that Putin is genuinely interested in such an outcome. Even more than in the United States, Germans are convinced of the pro-Russian tilt of Trump’s policy, according to a survey conducted by Civey for Welt TV ahead of the meeting in Alaska. 63% of its participants doubt that Trump unequivocally supports Ukraine in the negotiations, while 55% are convinced that the decisive role in the talks belongs to Putin, and only 15% attribute it to the American president.

The aforementioned YouGov online poll in the UK clearly reflects the mixture of resolve and helplessness in Western public opinion regarding the Ukrainian issue. On the one hand, 65% of those surveyed believe that European countries are doing too little to prevent a Kremlin victory in Ukraine. At the same time, there is no clarity about what Europe and the UK could do to increase this support. 70% support additional sanctions against Russia, 58% support sending more weapons, and 52% favour deploying additional troops to Eastern Europe to protect NATO’s eastern borders. 45% support providing assistance to domestic political opponents of the Russian leadership. However, only 28% support sending troops to Ukraine, while 51% are opposed. Even participation in coordinating airstrikes on Russian targets is supported by 33%, while 41% are against such indirect involvement in the conflict.

A majority of those surveyed believe it is highly likely that a deal on Ukraine will be struck between the United States and Russia behind the backs of both Ukraine and the Europeans. At the same time, two-thirds believe that even if such a deal is concluded, Putin will attack Ukraine again within the next ten years.