In The Midst of a Quiet Revolution: The independent judiciary’s unprecedented crackdown on corruption in Ukraine risks triggering a political crisis

A quiet revolution

Corruption scandals continue to rock Ukraine. After the Verkhovna Rada and President Zelensky’s office failed last July to curtail the powers of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), the activities of these bodies have entered a new phase. The July attack on the anti-corruption agencies, an attempt to legally restrict their independence by effectively placing them under the prosecutor general, was, as is now clear, pre-emptive in nature. Its purpose was to prevent investigators from reaching the upper echelons of government and individuals directly close to the president. The attack was preceded by NABU issuing a formal suspicion notice to Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Chernyshov and searches at the premises of former deputy head of the Presidential Office Rostyslav Shurma. However, the failure of this attack, as a result of pressure both from within Ukraine and from abroad, but above all from European institutions and governments, opened the way for an unprecedented campaign of investigations targeting the Presidential Office, its inner circle and other Ukrainian officials.

As early as August 2025, NABU uncovered a kickback scheme involving military contracts, at the centre of which was an MP from the presidential faction. In November 2025, Timur Mindich, a businessman close to Zelensky, became the target of a joint operation by NABU and SAPO codenamed ‘Midas’, and the ensuing scandal led to the resignations of Justice Minister Herman Halushchenko and Energy Minister Svitlana Hrynchuk. The next victim of the snowballing scandal was the all-powerful head of the President’s Office, Andriy Yermak, who was forced to step down. In February 2026, Halushchenko was detained, and in May, Yermak was named as a suspect. In January 2026, the head of the Border Guard Service, Serhii Deineko, found himself at the centre of an investigation into cigarette smuggling, whilst the leader of the opposition faction, Yulia Tymoshenko, was caught making systematic payments to members of her faction in exchange for voting ‘the right way’. In August, charges were also brought against the deputy head of the President’s Office, Iryna Mudra (Operation ‘Forrest Gump’). Then, on 7 September, Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko resigned after NABU exposed a network of fraudulent call centres, for which the Prosecutor General’s Office had been providing legal defence (Operation ‘Carthage’). Kravchenko accused the director of NABU, Semen Kryvonos, of forging official documents, and on the night of 14 September fled the country.

This, therefore, amounts to an anti-corruption campaign unprecedented in the history of Ukraine and perhaps across the post-Soviet space, systematically breaking through the system of mutual protection at the highest levels of the executive and prosecutorial authorities. A situation in which, over eighteen months, the head of the Presidential Office and three of his deputies, the deputy prime minister, the head of the Border Guard Service, the justice minister and the prosecutor general have become subjects of investigations can reasonably be described as a kind of anti-corruption revolution, comparable in its consequences to the Maidan in terms of its scale.

Independent anti-corruption bodies were established in Ukraine as early as 2014–2015 as part of the implementation of the demands of the Euromaidan. They constitute parallel organisational structures for investigation and prosecution support, which are separate from the general law enforcement system. In 2018, a separate anti-corruption court was also established (→ U4: Ukraine’s High Anti-Corruption Court), which completed the establishment of a system of specialised, autonomous justice modelled on the experience of a number of countries (→ OECD: Specialised Anti-Corruption Institutions), in particular the experience of combating corruption in Poland and Romania, which is relevant to the Ukrainian case (→ OECD: Combatting High-level Corruption in Eastern Europe) .

The Ukrainian anti-corruption campaign appears all the more unprecedented because it is unfolding amid an ongoing war and the associated suspension of electoral procedures. Ukraine needs to create mechanisms for renewing political power in circumstances in which elections cannot be held, explains a Kyiv-based source familiar with the situation who spoke to Re:Russia. Investigations by independent anti-corruption bodies are, in effect, one such mechanism. Yet the key questions today are whether Ukraine’s political system can withstand this level of stress and how legitimate the current authorities will remain in the eyes of citizens. The elected institutions that embody this authority remain President Volodymyr Zelensky and the current composition of the Rada.

The President and his entourage: Zelensky’s three pillars

Opinion polls have long shown that corruption is viewed by Ukrainians as a central problem of domestic politics and the principal challenge facing Ukraine and its European future. In an April 2026 poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), respondents were asked: ‘Which do you consider a greater threat to Ukraine’s development, Russia’s military aggression or corruption in government bodies?’ The first option was chosen by 39% of those surveyed, while the second was chosen by 54%. KIIS experts, however, note that the question is somewhat artificial and stress that, when respondents are presented with a list of current challenges facing Ukraine and Ukrainians, the war ranks first at 65%, while corruption was mentioned by only 29% of those surveyed under this ‘list-based’ formulation of the question.

In SOCIS surveys, corruption also traditionally ranks first among responses to the question, ‘What is having a negative impact on the situation in the country?’ (49%), ahead of ‘constant drone and missile attacks’ (47%) and ‘the decline in living standards’ (39%). This in itself points to a high degree of politicisation in Ukrainian society. Moreover, in the latest wave of the poll, Zelensky came first among those whom respondents primarily blame for the continued high level of corruption (57%). A year ago, in September 2025, 49% gave this assessment, while in June 2025, when the conflict between NABU and the Presidential Office began, the figure was just 31%. This shift is a direct result of the anti-corruption campaign that has been under way for almost a year and a half.

At the same time, a KIIS poll, conducted at the beginning of August, recorded a moderate decline in trust in Zelensky, with 55% saying they trusted him and 40% saying they did not. Almost the same result was recorded in February 2026 (53% versus 41%), whereas from May 2025 to January 2026 and from March to May 2026, the ratio remained at around 61% versus 34%. Notably, in the latest poll, Zelensky's figures in Kyiv were worse than the national average, with 51% expressing trust and 42% expressing distrust. In the rankings of politicians by trust, Zelensky is behind Zaluzhnyi and Budanov, and in some polls, also Fedorov. The SOCIS poll shows that Zelensky has a high negative rating: 21% of respondents say they would not vote for him under any circumstances. As a result, in a hypothetical presidential election ‘next Sunday’, Zelensky narrowly defeats all the main contenders in the first round, but loses by a substantial margin to the three candidates mentioned above in the second.

These figures demonstrate that, although Zelensky still retains a significant core of support, his domestic political capital has to a large extent been exhausted in the eyes of voters, while society is dominated by a demand for new faces. At the same time, some analysts argue that the problem is not only Zelensky's personality. In the early stages of the war, he came to embody public mobilisation and the perceived need to consolidate and centralise power under martial law. During this period of ‘rally around the flag’ effect, trust in the presidency as an institution was almost as high as trust in the army (Figure 1). However, the ‘rally’ period ended in 2024, and trust in the presidency fell back to normal levels (→ Re:Russia: After the Rally). Zelensky took pride in the centralised system of governance he had established, and until a certain point this model was perceived by the public as necessary in wartime circumstances, writes Atlantic Council expert Adrian Karatnycky in Foreign Policy. However, the corruption revelations of the past year have undermined this image and eroded trust in Zelensky's model of leadership.

Figure 1. Trust in government institutions in Ukraine, 2019–2026, % of those surveyed

Other Ukrainian analysts go further, arguing that during the war a significant part of the military infrastructure was built from the bottom up through volunteer movements and networked horizontal interactions. These networks have their own autonomous legitimacy within Ukrainian society, which has now come into conflict with the legitimacy of Zelensky's vertical. This ‘political generation gap’ was reflected, in particular, in the recent conflict between Zelensky and Fedorov (→ Burkovskyi, Haran: Imagining Ukraine’s Political System After the War). This is one of the most important fault lines in current Ukrainian politics, reflecting a new configuration of forces.

At the same time, Ukrainian society remains broadly in the same position for now: no elections should be held until the war is over, as indicated by KIIS polls (Figure 2). Since May 2025, that is, during the period of the anti-corruption offensive by the autonomous justice bodies, Ukrainian public opinion on this issue has not changed radically. The share of those supporting immediate elections has increased by a modest 3 percentage points, while the share supporting elections after a ceasefire has risen by 10 percentage points. Ukrainian commentators argue that Mikhail Fedorov's call to reconsider the position on elections was not supported by a majority of those who consider themselves opponents of Zelensky, or even by some of his own supporters. This means that, for the foreseeable future, Zelensky remains in the eyes of Ukrainians a guarantor of the unity of the state authorities and the army in confronting Russian aggression. This goes a long way towards explaining the restrained reaction in the ‘ratings’ to the anti-corruption campaign, whose impact falls heavily in the immediate vicinity of the president.

Figure 2. Attitudes towards the possibility of holding elections in Ukraine, 2025–2026, % of those surveyed

After the ‘Mindichgate’ scandal, in November 2025, Zelensky’s approval ratings fell noticeably, but his opposition to the Trump–Witkoff ‘peace plan’ and the dismissal of Yermak subsequently led to their recovery, explains Ukrainian political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko. After the second wave of ‘Mindichgate’ in spring 2026, the resilience of his ratings was supported by Zelensky's ‘letter’ to Putin and the relatively favourable situation on the front. It is therefore possible to identify several ‘pillars’ of Zelensky's legitimacy: his role as Ukraine's representative of interests on the external front, his role as commander-in-chief responsible for resistance to Russian aggression, and, finally, the domestic political dimension. Failure on the latter front has not yet led to the collapse of the legitimacy structure as a whole. Moreover, by balancing Fedorov's dismissal with that of Syrskyi, Zelensky reaffirmed his position as the responsible arbiter on the ‘military’ front. Finally, Zelensky appears to have learned a lesson from last year's confrontation with NABU and the reaction of Ukraine's European allies, and does not intend to repeat the mistakes of last summer. He therefore refrained from defending Prosecutor General Kravchenko after charges were brought against him, notes Ukrainian commentator Milan Lelich. Zelensky himself is protected from investigations, as these are prohibited by the Ukrainian constitution.

The uniqueness of Zelensky's position at present lies in the fact that, having lost a significant part of his team and governing vertical, including Yermak, Mudra, Kravchenko, Fedorov and Syrskyi, he has not yet lost his legitimacy in the eyes of Ukraine's political establishment, despite the fact that his authority has been weakened and the governing vertical has been eroded. In other words, he appears to be facing a crisis of governance, but not yet a crisis of legitimacy.

Crisis in the Rada: parliamentary resistance and international assistance

However, Ukraine's political crisis is far from exhausted and may well not yet have reached its climax. Zelensky's former associates who have found themselves at the centre of investigations will defend themselves, while Zelensky will have to restore effective governance and, where possible, rebuild trust across a number of areas, including the front, arms procurement, relations with external donors and the situation in the Verkhovna Rada.

The Verkhovna Rada is also gripped by a crisis triggered by the anti-corruption revolution. As of January 2026, 41 members of the current parliament had been charged with corruption offences, according to the head of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, Oleksandr Klymenko. That is roughly one in ten elected representatives. At least five more have since been formally charged in the case concerning payments for votes, in which more than 17 members of the presidential faction, Servant of the People, have been questioned. MPs are currently particularly concerned by the dismissal of the Prosecutor General, fearing that, given the fate of his predecessor, the new prosecutor will automatically approve procedural actions proposed by SAPO, Milan Lelich reports, reflecting the mood among MPs.

The parliamentary crisis, however, has already been unfolding for more than six months. It is expressed primarily in the Rada's obstruction of agreed legislation needed to unlock loans from international organisations that are conditional on the adoption of specific reforms. Andrey Motovilovets, first deputy head of the Servant of the People faction, directly links this to MPs’ fear of anti-corruption bodies. He says the core of the pro-presidential faction has shrunk from 180 to 111 MPs, making it impossible to consolidate sufficient votes to pass important legislation.

Indeed, Ukraine's reform agenda and its relations with international organisations have been in deep crisis for several months, with significant implications for the disbursement of conditional assistance. The second budget tranche of the EU's Ukraine Support Loan (USL), scheduled for September, is effectively blocked: Kyiv has fulfilled only four of the 12 conditions required for its release. A further 13 conditions must be met for the next tranche, and none has yet been fulfilled. Under the EU's Ukraine Facility programme, worth €50 billion for 2024–2027, Kyiv has already received more than €29.4 billion. The release of a further €4.8 billion in August has been blocked because 15 conditions have not been met, including six outstanding from 2025, which resulted in Kyiv receiving around €1.4 billion less than planned. The situation described by Re:Russia as early as May is, therefore, worsening (→ Re:Russia: To Accept or Not To Accept).

A similar picture can be seen across other international programmes. In February, the IMF launched an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) programme worth around $8.1 billion for 2026–2029. Kyiv received $1.5 billion under the programme in March, while a second tranche of $692 million is due in September. However, only two of the seven reforms required for its release have been completed. The prospects for the World Bank's $1 billion DPO-2 programme also look poor: 12 conditions must be met by the beginning of 2027, but none has yet been fulfilled. Overall, as of September, at least €9.1 billion in funding to Ukraine is blocked: €3.7 billion under the USL, €4.8 billion under the Ukraine Facility and $692 million under the EFF.

In a number of cases, the delays are due to objective circumstances, according to the authors of the independent Monitoring of IMF Programme Implementation and EU Assistance. The change of government in the summer resulted in several draft laws being automatically withdrawn, including legislation on the civil service, state aid to businesses, the High Anti-Corruption Court and the anti-corruption strategy, all of which are required for assistance under the Ukraine Facility programme, as well as a new Customs Code required for the USL loan. Another group of bills is being held up for political reasons. In June, for example, the Rada passed a law on digital platforms introducing a tax on income earned through them, as required by both the EU and the IMF. However, MPs introduced amendments that weaken financial monitoring requirements for politically exposed persons. Zelensky did not sign the law in this form, whilst the IMF criticised it as failing to meet FATF standards.

In total, at least 20 bills necessary for European integration or the receipt of international assistance are currently stalled in the Rada at various stages. Of these, six have passed only their first reading, 10 are stuck in committees or have failed to secure support, and four have not yet been introduced in parliament at all (see Appendix). Some of these initiatives have probably not been adopted because they are unpopular with voters. This applies in particular to the abolition of the tax exemption for parcels worth up to €150. Both the IMF and the EU are calling for the exemption to be abolished, but the Rada has twice rejected the relevant bill. Its adoption would bring an additional approximately UAH 10 billion a year into the Ukrainian budget, as well as unlock €3.7 billion in EU assistance and $692 million from the IMF. Yesterday, the bill was finally approved with some amendments at first reading. However, this does not necessarily mean that it will be given final approval soon. MPs argue that the measure would increase the cost of orders from local retailers for residents and harm assistance to Ukrainian soldiers, UNIAN reports. However, according to a KIIS poll, 48% of those surveyed support the Rada passing even unpopular laws necessary to maintain Western assistance, while 30% disagree.

The largest group of unadopted bills, however, concerns transparency in public administration. In December 2025, for example, a group of MPs introduced a bill aimed at ensuring the independence of the energy regulator, the National Energy and Utilities Regulatory Commission (NEURC), intended to bring about a ‘complete reset of the energy sector’ following the corruption scandal triggered by Operation Midas. The proposal sought to ensure the NEURC's financial and personnel autonomy from the government, including through the mandatory rotation of commission members within one year. However, a group of opposition MPs introduced an alternative reform bill that would reduce the powers of independent institutions and leave the selection of candidates for the NEURC board to parliament. As a result, neither bill has yet been considered by the Rada.

In August 2026, the Verkhovna Rada’s Committee on Law Enforcement blocked the consideration of five draft laws, at least until January. These were aimed at strengthening the fight against corruption, including expanding the powers of anti-corruption bodies and reforming the Office of the Prosecutor General and the State Bureau of Investigations. For example, the committee postponed consideration of a bill providing for the Prosecutor General to be selected through a transparent competitive process involving international experts, on the grounds that such a procedure ‘could be considered contrary to the Constitution’. Olga Savchenko, a committee member from Zelensky's Servant of the People party, proposed waiting for alternative reform proposals from the Cabinet of Ministers.

Thus, the unfolding crisis in Ukrainian politics should not be reduced to a confrontation between an autonomous anti-corruption judiciary and the President’s Office. It is considerably more complex: a significant part of Ukraine's business and political elite, embedded in both the executive and legislative branches of government, is resisting the anti-corruption revolution and the demands of international organisations. Resolving this crisis under wartime conditions and with electoral procedures blocked is therefore an exceptionally difficult task.

For now it is only clear that the unfolding crisis and the fallout from corruption investigations will significantly complicate Ukraine’s access to European funding for the coming year, particularly against the backdrop of the successes of far-right parties in Europe. A crisis within the pro-Ukrainian European coalition could follow on directly from this as early as this autumn.

Appendix. Bills stuck in the Verkhovna Rada