The Russian Black Sea Fleet has been forced out of Sevastopol by Ukrainian strikes. But it is not safe in Novorossiysk either. Therefore, since the autumn 2022, Russia has been rapidly implementing a project to establish a naval base in Ochamchire, in Abkhazia, which is de facto under its control. This project will significantly change the balance of power in the region. By basing its navy in close proximity to the Georgian ports of Poti and Batumi, Russia will gain significant leverage over Georgia's maritime communications, including the organisation and expansion of the Middle Corridor, a Trans-Caspian trade route from China to Europe bypassing Russia. In the near future, the Kremlin will exert pressure on Tbilisi to engage a non-European consortium to build a deep-water port in the Georgian town of Anaklia. Thus, Russia has an increasing influence on Georgia's foreign policy choices, consistently limiting the potential and instruments of its European integration. The construction of a new base for the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Abkhazia will become a long-term factor consolidating the soft Russian protectorate in Georgian foreign and, to a large extent, domestic policy.
An unexpected consequence of the war in Ukraine was Russia losing its Sevastopol base for its Black Sea Fleet. According to Ukrainian sources, since the start of hostilities, Kyiv has managed to destroy one-third of its ships, the number of which was estimated at 80 before the war. This eventually forced the command to withdraw most of the fleet to Novorossiysk. However, even here its ships are not safe. Russia is seeking a safer harbour for its fleet and plans to establish a permanent naval base in the Abkhazian port of Ochamchire. An agreement to this effect was signed with the Abkhazian authorities last autumn. The new base will be located 500 kilometres further south-east than the current location of the fleet and, accordingly, from the Ukrainian coast.
According to Abkhaz sources, the base could be operational as early as this year. As noted by the BBC, satellite images show that dredging and construction work has been underway at the site since 2022, which should allow the port to accommodate larger vessels, similar to those Russia uses to strike targets in Ukraine and Syria. Russia will be able to use the base to strike Ukrainian targets, and it, in turn, will become a legitimate target for Kyiv — despite being on Georgian territory under international law (as already stated by Volodymir Zelensky).
However, the significance of this event is much broader. The rapidly developing Russian naval project will significantly alter the balance of power in the region and sharply increase the risks for Georgia and its dependence on Moscow. The new base effectively consolidates Moscow's control over 20% of Georgia's internationally recognized territory, represented by Abkhazia, and is located in close proximity to the Georgian ports of Poti and Batumi. In essence, Russia gains the potential to control Georgia's maritime communications, as the country lacks its own navy, and a powerful lever of influence to restrain the country's plans for Euro-Atlantic integration, as noted in an article by Georgian experts published by Ponars Eurasia.
The expansion of the Russian military presence near Georgian ports will also be an important factor in the implementation of projects to expand the Middle Corridor, a Trans-Caspian transport route from China to Europe that runs through Azerbaijan and Georgia, bypassing Russia. Since the start of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the significance and international prospects of the route have increased dramatically. In the first five months of 2023, transit of goods from China to Europe along the Middle Corridor increased by 77% compared to the same period in 2022.
A new Georgian deep-water port at Anaklia, just 35 km from Ochamchire, is also part of the corridor expansion programme. Currently, the port of Poti remains the backbone of the Middle Corridor, which is to be expanded to double its capacity. However, its narrow entrance is inferior to the capacity promised by the Anaklia port project, according to Radio Free Europe. Georgia intends to retain a 51% stake in the port, having identified its private partners following a tender launched at the end of March. The Georgian authorities will most likely have to choose between Chinese-Singaporean and Swiss-Luxembourg consortia. In Russia, there have long been concerns and speculations about the Anaklia port, a Eurasianet report notes: Moscow refers to it as an 'American project' that would allegedly create the possibility of the presence of US submarines in the region. In this context, it can be expected that the Kremlin will either obstruct the project altogether or coerce Georgian authorities to make a choice not in favour of the European consortium.
Thus, Russia is increasingly exerting its influence over Georgia's foreign policy choices by consistently limiting the potential and instruments of its European integration. Georgia and its elites feel virtually defenceless against a possible Russian invasion. These fears, in turn, strengthen the domestic political position of Bidzina Ivanishvili and his party, balancing between the course of European integration and 'mutual understanding with Moscow' (→ Re: Russia: The Homophobes’ Dream). In these circumstances, the construction of a new base for the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Abkhazia, in close proximity to Georgian ports, becomes a long-term factor consolidating the soft Russian protectorate in Georgian foreign and, to a large extent, domestic policy.