The signing of the so-called mineral deal between Washington and Kyiv on 30 April attracted far less attention than the failure to sign a similar agreement at the end of February, which was overshadowed by a scandal in the Oval Office. However, the version that was ultimately signed includes a clause that could significantly alter the course of events surrounding the Ukrainian settlement.
Over the three months from early February to late April, the much-touted and hotly debated deal underwent several transformations, at various times appearing to be a tool for exerting pressure either on Moscow or on Kyiv. In its final form, it represents an agreement to establish an investment fund by Ukraine and the United States, referred to as the Reconstruction Fund, intended to serve as a mechanism for the joint development of Ukraine's mineral resources.
The final version of the agreement was prepared at the end of April, after Washington’s separate negotiations with the Kremlin reached an impasse. The wording in the preamble of the document became tougher, stating, specifically, that the fund's goal is to rebuild Ukraine's economy, which was devastated as a result of Russia's full-scale invasion.
Most importantly, Chapter 6 of the document includes a clause stating that any future arms deliveries and military assistance to Ukraine will be regarded as the United States’ contribution to the joint fund. This potentially creates an entirely new framework for military cooperation between the US and Ukraine, while also giving Donald Trump the opportunity to present renewed military aid not as a return to Joe Biden’s policy, which he has fiercely criticised, but rather as a fundamentally new format aligned with both US geopolitical goals and economic interests.
Now, after three days of suspense, Vladimir Putin has ultimately rejected the proposed scenario of a meeting between the three presidents in Istanbul to sign a ceasefire agreement. This leaves the key question: is the White House prepared to activate the 'mineral bomb', or will it continue along the path of persuasion and appeasement towards Moscow? This is now the central intrigue.
The conclusion of the long-suffering ‘mineral resources deal’ between the US and Ukraine on 30 April caused much less excitement than the failure to sign a similar document on 28 February, which was accompanied by a public scandal in the Oval Office of the White House.
The version of the agreement that was not signed in February, although hailed as a major diplomatic success for Kyiv, did not include any security guarantees from the US for Ukraine, nor any firm commitments to invest in the Ukrainian economy. As such, it appeared more as a diplomatic gesture than a document of strategic significance for bilateral relations. As noted in our earlier commentary, in essence, the document could be interpreted as a form of bondage, a chimera or some version of a Marshall Plan, depending on the intentions of the American side. At the very least, it differed considerably from the initial drafts and no longer required Ukraine to acknowledge a $500 billion debt to the United States or to repay it through revenues from the sale of rare earth metals, which the country may not even possess.
The history of the first deal was deeply entwined with the diplomatic thriller orchestrated by Donald Trump's team during the early months of his presidency. The initial reports of a potential 'rare earth metals deal' with Ukraine seemed to serve as a means of pressuring Vladimir Putin, whom Trump was trying to draw into talks about ending the war in Ukraine. Later, Trump abruptly declared that he expected the deal to result in Ukraine compensating the US to the tune of $500 billion for allegedly received aid. By that point, Washington’s separate negotiations with the Kremlin appeared to be making progress, and the 'mineral deal' began to look more like a tool of pressure on Kyiv rather than Moscow. President Zelensky refused to sign the document twice, holding out until it was revised into a more acceptable form by the end of February. Ultimately, however, it was the American side that chose not to sign it.
After that, the entire saga repeated itself from the beginning. In March, the White House presented Kyiv with a new version of the agreement, which, according to a senior Ukrainian official quoted by The Washington Post, 'read as though Ukraine had gone to war with the United States, lost, been occupied, and now had to pay reparations forever'.
Ukraine, with the help of international advisers brought in to ease tensions with American officials, worked on an alternative version, which was the one that was ultimately signed. The final text turned out to be largely similar to the version that had failed to secure signatures in late February. It provides for the creation of a 'Reconstruction Investment Fund', in which both parties will participate equally (50/50) – this applies not only to investment, but also to management and future revenues from natural resource extraction. Ukraine contributes proceeds from the sale of licences for new development projects, while the US contributes capital.
Otherwise, the 'mineral agreement' predictably contains little in the way of specifics. Serious discussion of developing new deposits will require geological exploration. Importantly, the agreement applies strictly to new resource sites – those already being exploited are excluded from the document. The agreement covers all natural resources, and the annex lists 57 raw materials, including oil and gas, as well as all 50 'critical minerals' identified by the US Geological Survey list (with a note that this list may be expanded in future).
In this context, the most logical focus seems to be the extraction of hydrocarbons rather than rare earth metals (there is no reliable data that Ukraine has sufficient reserves of the latter). Among potential investment targets, Ukrainian gas fields appear to be the most attractive. According to NATO data, cited by Bloomberg, Ukraine’s subsoil contains approximately 5.4 trillion cubic metres of natural gas, of which 1.1 trillion are proven reserves. However, it remains unclear how the idea of increasing gas production in Ukraine aligns with the fact that the United States is simultaneously expanding its own gas exports to Europe, while also lobbying for the resumption of Russian pipeline gas supplies (→ Re:Russia: Gas Temptation).
One of the key provisions of the agreement concerns the involvement of third parties. It specifies that if any of its terms conflict with Ukraine’s European integration processes, the parties are obliged to amend them accordingly. Furthermore, American companies are not granted automatic preferential treatment in the allocation of licences to develop Ukrainian subsoil. Rather, the agreement merely states that they must not be placed at a disadvantage compared to companies from other countries.
All of this, however, remains hypothetical for now. Yet the most significant development, as astutely observed by Colby Badhwar, a columnist at the Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), is that US authorities have changed how they present the deal. Initially framed as a repayment of debts Ukraine had supposedly accumulated during the war, the agreement is now officially titled the Agreement on the Establishment of the US–Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund, with the stated aim of restoring Ukraine’s economy, damaged during the 'full-scale Russian invasion'. Previously, the US had avoided using such language. In February, Washington refused to support a UN resolution condemning Russian aggression. In a White House statement released after the signing of the agreement, it was stated: 'This partnership makes it clear to Russia that the United States is engaged in the game and invested in Ukraine’s long-term success'.
It is worth noting that the final version of the agreement was ready for signing by the end of April, at the point when White House negotiations with the Kremlin, mediated by Steve Witkoff, had reached an impasse (→ Re:Russia: Three Hundred Days in Search of a Silver Bullet). This circumstance evidently influenced not only the more assertive tone of the agreement’s preamble, but also the inclusion in Chapter 6 of a clause regarding potential military cooperation between the US and Ukraine. It states: 'If, after the effective date, the US government provides new military assistance to the government of Ukraine in any form (including the transfer of weapons systems, ammunition, technology, or training), the US partner’s equity contribution shall be deemed to increase by the estimated value of such military assistance'. In other words, any military deliveries to Ukraine are now to be considered part of the US contribution to the fund and, therefore, reimbursable through future profits from the sale of Ukrainian mineral resources.
This may be seen as a major diplomatic success for Ukraine, argues Nigel Gould-Davies, an expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Kyiv not only resisted onerous terms and preserved 'sovereignty over its natural resources located on its territory,' but also managed to ensure that the agreement paved the way for renewed arms supplies, just as existing stocks are beginning to run low. This clause fundamentally reshapes the framework of US–Ukrainian military cooperation. In practical terms, it enables Donald Trump to present the resumption of arms supplies to the American electorate not as a return to Joe Biden’s policy, which he fiercely criticised, but as an entirely new format aligned with both the geopolitical goals and economic interests of the United States.
In this way, the Trump administration has planted a delayed-action charge within the mineral deal. Now, after three days of suspense, Vladimir Putin has ultimately rejected the proposal for a summit in Istanbul involving the three presidents to sign a ceasefire agreement. This leaves one pressing question: is the White House prepared to activate the 'mineral bomb', or will it continue along the path of persuasion and appeasement toward Moscow? This now forms the central intrigue.