Rightward Tilt: The European Parliament elections will lead to significant consequences despite only a moderate weakening of the centrist coalition

Between now and Sunday, 375 million voters will cast their ballots for members of the European Parliament. According to the latest polls, this will result in the formation of the most ‘right-wing’ European legislature in its history, that is, since 1979. According to calculations by Politico based on pre-election party rankings in EU countries, the two largest far-right factions in the European Parliament — the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and Identity and Democracy (ID) will collectively receive 144 seats. Another 16 seats may go to Alternative for Germany, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban's Fidesz party will get 10 seats, six will go to Poland's Confederation, France's Reconquista will get five, and Bulgaria's pro-Russian far-right Renaissance party will end up with three. Thus, the total number of far-right MEPs in the new composition may reach 184. 

This is only 26% of the 720-seat European Parliament, but more than what the centre-right European People's Party (EPP) of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is expected to receive, according to forecasts. Similar calculations are provided by The Economist, which estimates that parties belonging to ECR and ID will each receive 10% in the upcoming elections, with another 5% going to various small right-wing parties, while the ruling EPP is expected to have 22% in the new parliament. According to the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), the new composition of the European Parliament is likely to see a decrease in the representation of the far-right factions not only in the two main political groups — EPP and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), but also in the centrist ‘Renew Europe’ (RE) and the ‘Greens/European Free Alliance’ (G/EFA) alliance.

All commentators and analysts agree that the extreme right-wing MPs are unlikely to be able to form a united faction in the European Parliament and influence the elections of the President of the European Commission and European Commissioners due to their differences. However, the rise in popularity of the right exposes the problem of weakening positions of mainstream parties in the leading EU countries. In France, the ID rating has increased by 5 percentage points over the past six months to 34%, five times higher than the EPP. In Italy, ECR leads in polls with a rating of 27%, followed by the Social Democrats S&D with 21%, while the EPP has only 9%. In Spain, EPP is still in the lead (36%), but its ratings have declined in recent months. In Germany, EPP's popularity is growing (30%), but it is followed in second place by the far-right ID (16%). Europe is not in danger of a right-wing coup, but a right-wing tilt is evident and will have serious consequences.

The rise of right-wing representation and deeper fragmentation of the European Parliament will also affect the functioning of EU executive bodies, The Economist notes: disputes over the new leadership of the European Commission and the main direction of further EU development may continue until the end of the year. Ursula von der Leyen expressed her desire to extend her mandate for the next five-year term. Five years ago, she managed to obtain a mandate thanks to the votes of centrists, but their coalition will shrink in the new composition of the parliament. In order to guarantee re-election, von der Leyen has begun negotiations to form an alliance with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni — her party, ‘Brothers of Italy’, is part of the ECR. This, however, angered von der Leyen's centre-left partners, who threatened not to support her candidacy, according to Politico.

According to ECFR estimates, the sharp increase in the representation of the far right in the new European Parliament will affect the structure of all future coalitions. For example, a large centrist coalition (ERR + S&D) may have 42% in the new parliament instead of the current 45%, and a supermajority coalition (ERR + S&D + RE) could get 54% instead of the current 60%. The probability of forming centre-right and centre-left coalitions will also decrease, but the share of votes for right-wing coalitions will increase (for example, the share of the coalition uniting the right-wing ECR and ID factions with the centrist EPP will increase to 49% from the current 43%). 

The decisions adopted by the European Parliament are usually the result of the formation of ad hoc coalitions on different issues. Thus, experts at ECFR note that, in the work of the current parliament, the coalition of centrist parties (EPP + S&D + RE) made most of the decisions on the budget, culture and education, foreign policy, internal market and consumer protection, as well as transport and tourism. While parties on the left of the political spectrum (S&D + RE + G/EFA + left-wing GUE/NGL) dominated decisions on civil liberties, justice and home affairs, employment, environment, and women's rights and gender equality, and right-wing parties (EPP + RE + ECR and sometimes ID) played a key role on agriculture, industry and research, and international trade. Therefore, the reduction in the votes of centrists, while not critical, in practice may lead to a shift in the balance of power in many specific areas.

The increase in the number and influence of right-wing parties will lead to initiatives aimed at further EU integration receiving less support, while ideas of greater freedom for national governments will receive additional reinforcement. ‘A less integrated EU will not be able to take advantage of economies of scale (as the US or China do), and this is considered one of the key drivers of low productivity growth in Europe’, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) notes.

Another consequence of the reshaping of the European Parliament will be the blocking of decisions on issues where the main initiative previously belonged to the left. This may lead to a tightening of EU policy on migration and asylum, as well as a softening of the position towards countries that deviate from the rule of law principles in their domestic policies (like Hungary now and Poland previously). Moreover, changes in the balance of power will make centrist factions (primarily the EPP), which dominate the top positions in EU executive structures, more inclined to normalise relations with authoritarian-leaning parties and governments, and therefore less inclined to take tough measures to protect the rule of law, according to experts from CSIS.

But the most serious consequences await environmental policy: the majority of decisions in this area were made thanks to the slight majority of votes from centre-left parties, which is likely to be unattainable in the new composition of the European Parliament. This will significantly undermine the Green Deal policy and call into question the EU's planned achievement of climate neutrality by 2050. The reshaping of the European Parliament will also affect the national policies of EU member states, as predicted by both the ECFR and CSIS in their forecasts.

Despite the fact that the topic of ending the war in Europe has been adopted by a number of far right parties and actively promoted by Russian propaganda (→ Re:Russia: Pre-Election Pacifism), it is not expected that there will be a shift in support for Ukraine, according to the majority of commentators and analysts. The pro-Ukrainian position is based on a broad consensus among parties across the spectrum, including some far right parties such as Giorgia Meloni's party. However, changes in voter sentiment, with some frightened by the prospect of escalation, may influence their position. However, Europe's main problem at the moment is not the choice of a principled line on supporting Ukraine and countering the threat from Russia, but the development of mechanisms for this support and strengthening the EU's military capabilities.

Although defence and security issues fall within the competence of the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council, the European Parliament has already demonstrated its ability to influence decisions in this area. For example, in April, it refused to approve the audit of the budgets of the European Council and the Council of Ministers for 2022 until additional Patriot air defence systems were provided to Ukraine. The European Parliament also approves the EU's seven-year and, within it, annual budgets.It was during parliamentary discussions that the proposed increase in defence spending was reallocated in 2022 in favour of other areas, particularly agriculture.

The paradox is that the EU's defence and security situation today is not just an ordinary issue, but a critical one. Europe does not have sufficient military potential either to effectively assist Ukraine or to adequately respond to threats from Moscow. The solution to this problem is possible only through non-trivial and revolutionary measures – through a significant increase in military spending, the establishment of the post of EU Commissioner for Defence and issuing joint debt obligations to finance specific programmes (including support for Ukraine), according to the experts from CSIS. In other words, it is only possible through decisive steps to increase the degree of European integration in this sphere. Without this, the declared goals of supporting Ukraine and strengthening European security will remain declarative, exposing the Union's weakness.

The current elections will not lead to a decisive shift in the EU's foreign policy, but far-right parties have succeeded in sharpening the debate on these issues, resonating with public concerns. The increase in representation of far-right parties in the European Parliament will contribute to further polarisation in this area, according to CSIS experts.

The problem, however, is also that the current rightward shift is probably far from reaching its peak. According to surveys analysed by Politico, the greatest support for Eurosceptics comes from young voters. In France, for example, 32% of voters under the age of 25 are inclined to vote for the Rassemblement Nationale led by 28-year-old Jordan Bardella; Belgium's pro-independence Vlaams Belang party for Flanders has the support of 32% of men under the age of 27; in Finland, the nationalist Finns Party has the support of a third of voters under the age of 44. From this we can conclude that the current shift of the European Parliament is part of a long-term trend. In this regard, the situation in the EU differs significantly from that in the United States, where Donald Trump primarily enjoys popularity among older voters.