Munich Discord: The Munich Security Conference will bury the old world order, but no consensus on a new one will be found

Lost in the margins

The agenda of the Munich Security Conference has been muddled by vague reports of Donald Trump’s conversation with President Putin and Trump’s sudden initiatives, including his claim that preliminary contacts between American and Russian diplomats regarding a settlement in Ukraine would take place on the sidelines of the conference. However, the former president struggled to specify who would participate in these talks and in what capacity. Russia has no official representatives at the conference, leaving Trump’s exact meaning unclear. Additionally, the precise format of the previously scheduled meeting between Ukrainian President Zelensky and US Vice President Vance remains uncertain.

Meanwhile, the statements made by Trump and his team regarding Moscow over the past 24 hours have ranged from the possibility of Russia rejoining the G8 if an agreement is reached to providing Kyiv with nuclear weapons and sending US troops to Ukraine should Russia reject the agreement. Such a broad spectrum of positions suggests that behind-the-scenes negotiations between Trump’s team and the Kremlin lack concrete details or real progress.

The fundamental problem with Washington’s overall negotiating framework with Moscow likely lies in the contrast between Trump’s desire for a swift and dramatic deal and the nature of the leverage available to him, which can only yield results in the medium term. Trump lacks the tools to crash the Russian economy within weeks or even months, just as strengthening Ukraine’s defence capabilities to a level where continued warfare becomes untenable for Putin would take significant time. Given Russia’s economic challenges, prolonged conflict could become a major burden for Moscow – but not immediately.

On one hand, this negotiation deadlock stems from Trump’s populist approach to resolving international conflicts. On the other hand, it reflects a deeper characteristic of the current state of global affairs. After three years of war, the Western coalition, including the US, has failed to provide an effective response to Putin’s aggression against Ukraine or to ‘put Putin in his place’. This reality represents a fundamental shift in how all participants perceive the existing world order.

Understanding these new geopolitical realities is precisely the main topic of discussion at the Munich Security Conference.

Competition between uni-, bi-, multi- and non-polarity

The conference’s annual flagship report on global security challenges is titled with a single word – Multipolarisation. The authors note that the world is in a transitional state, creating immense uncertainty and a vacuum of stability. Even the nature of the current global order – whether it is uni-, bi-, multi-, or non-polar – remains subject to fundamental disagreements, with no single viewpoint emerging as dominant.

Some analysts argue that the world remains unipolar, with the US as its only true superpower. The US still accounts for nearly 40% of global defence spending (China, the second-largest military spender, lags far behind), maintains the most extensive alliance network, and operates at least 128 military bases in over 50 countries. The US dollar remains the dominant global currency with even the BRICS Development Bank primarily conducting transactions in dollars

Other experts argue that the world has entered a new bipolar era, where there are now two superpowers: the United States and China. The size of China’s economy no longer allows the US to be considered the world’s sole dominant power. Some analysts even believe that China will eventually become a more formidable competitor to the US than the Soviet Union ever was. China has already surpassed the US in GDP when measured by purchasing power parity (PPP), and when calculated in PPP terms, its military spending is not as far behind that of the United States as it might seem. The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy describes China as ‘the only competitor intent on changing the international order.’

Finally, a third group of experts insists that the world is already multipolar, with several influential powers – such as Brazil, France, Germany, India, Japan, and Russia – having roughly comparable capabilities. These ‘middle powers’ can independently shape global events, and their policies are not fully subordinated to any single hegemon. The authors of the Munich Report argue that multipolarity is particularly evident in the economic sphere: BRICS countries surpassed the G7 in PPP-based GDP as early as 2018, and with the addition of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE, the BRICS bloc now accounts for 40% of global trade and 40% of crude oil production and exports. Some experts suggest that any nation controlling a crucial resource or playing a key role in a specific field – such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey – should be considered a pole in the global order.

According to a survey conducted for the annual Munich Security Index across G7 and BICS countries (BRICS without Russia), among those surveyed in all countries, 32% believe the world remains unipolar (the US), 35% believe the world is becoming bipolar (the US and China), and 25% view the influence of ‘middle powers’ as making the world multipolar. The belief that the US remains the world’s sole superpower is especially strong in India, Japan, and the US itself, where 38-45% of respondents hold this view. In contrast, only 23% of respondents in France and Italy share this perspective. Conversely, the notion that the world has entered an era of bipolarity is most prevalent in China (49%) and Europe (46-47% in France and Germany). However, Japan and India – China’s regional rivals – are the least willing to acknowledge its superpower status, with only 23-25% supporting the bipolarity concept.

Finally, the idea of a multipolar world, i.e. where ‘middle powers’ play a significant role, is most popular in Brazil, South Africa and Italy (31-35%), while in Japan it is supported by 9%, in Germany – 16%, in France – 21% and in the UK – 22%. Ultimately, perspectives on global order depend on regional and geopolitical contexts. Different countries' strategic rivalries shape their perceptions of the emerging world order, and no single vision has become dominant or universally accepted. This lack of consensus is perhaps the clearest illustration of what the authors of the Munich Report mean by ‘multipolarisation’.

Bloc and non-bloc thinking

Geopolitical and regional confrontations and rivalries are only the first and basic level of polarisation. Beyond them, ideological divisions emerge, shaping how nations envision the future world order.

Perhaps the broadest point of agreement is that liberal ideas and the ideals of the liberal world order are in retreat, losing their former dominance. In this sense, the era that began with the end of the Cold War, which was once seen as the period of the unquestioned victory of liberalism, is fading into history. However, opinions on what this means and what will replace it differ significantly.

The most traditional perspective holds that the liberal order must be defended. Many proponents of the bipolar world theory see today’s global structure as shaped by a fundamental clash between democracy and authoritarianism. According to the V-Dem Institute, in 2023, 42 countries were moving toward autocracy and only 18 toward democracy, with 71% of the world’s population living under autocratic regimes (compared to 48% in 2013). From this perspective, Putin’s war in Ukraine is part of a broader crusade by an ‘axis of autocracies’ – including Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and Pyongyang – against nations striving for democracy. This view has been strongly supported by Ukraine, the Biden administration, and many of Ukraine’s European allies.

However, this concept faces challenges, partly because liberal ideals themselves are increasingly questioned within liberal democracies. A significant portion of society believes that the liberal order has led to the relative decline of the West while unfairly benefiting rising powers, particularly China. Donald Trump embodies the view that, while the US bears the lion’s share of the global burden in maintaining order, other countries simply take advantage of this system. As the authors of the Munich Report write, ‘Trump’s victory in the US presidential election buried the long-standing foreign policy consensus that had existed since the end of the Cold War – namely, that liberal internationalism was the best strategy for advancing American interests’. This shift could even lead the United States, after 80 years, to abandon its role as Europe’s security guarantor, a position it assumed after World War II.

The Global South and many ‘middle powers’ also reject the idea that the central conflict of our time is between democracy and autocracy. Even among democratic countries in the Global South, there is an understanding that their domestic political systems will remain far from Western democratic standards for the foreseeable future. These nations prioritise their own economic success and competitiveness over adherence to abstract democratic norms. Calls for bloc-based thinking, which would require nations to subordinate their individual interests to an ideological camp, are viewed with scepticism and irritation. Conversely, within BRICS, democracies and autocracies coexist comfortably, as political systems and human rights interpretations play a secondary role compared to economic mutual benefit.

It is worth noting that, during the Cold War, the world was also divided between two major blocs and the ‘non-aligned’ countries. The key difference today is the growing influence of the non-aligned group and the fact that, even within the Western bloc, non-bloc thinking is gaining popularity.

Ambivalent multipolarity

As support for unipolar and bipolar worldviews declines – including within Western nations – the concept of multipolarity also struggles to gain universal acceptance, largely due to widely varying interpretations of its actual meaning and implications.

According to surveys cited in the Munich Report, both elites and the general population in the Global South tend to view a multipolar order more favorably than those in G7 countries. For optimists, multipolarity represents a way to counterbalance Washington’s influence, reform international institutions to be more inclusive of non-Western nations, and strengthen collective international law, thereby reducing the West’s ability to impose rules at will. It is also seen as a way to promote greater tolerance for global cultural and political diversity.

For pessimists, however, multipolarity signifies chaos, leading to the rise of ideologically diverse power centers and the risk of an arms race, including nuclear weapons. Without dominant stabilising forces or effective mechanisms of enforcement, they fear this could ultimately result in a war between the world’s leading powers.

In addition, many in both the Global South and the West believe that for ideological proponents of multipolarity like Russia and China, the concept serves primarily as a tool to limit US influence in order to expand their own power. For example, the Kremlin envisions a multipolar order as a forum of superpowers – civilisational states – that act as patrons to weaker nations within their respective spheres of influence. For the same reason, the Indian elite and public opinion are divided between supporting multipolarity, which they see as benefiting India, and preserving US hegemony, which serves as a counterweight to China's ambitions. In both economic and military competition, India currently perceives itself as the weaker party in its rivalry with China, making US dominance strategically appealing.

Thus, it is now widely acknowledged that the old order is outdated, weakened, and likely beyond repair. However, this does not mean that the outlines of a new world order have become any clearer. It seems increasingly likely that this state of uncertainty and polarised interests will serve as a prelude to a significant crisis, one that will ultimately simplify the complexity of competing poles and define the contours of a new world order or balance of power. But this redefinition is unlikely to happen in Munich – even if Trump’s unknown envoys somehow manage to locate Russia’s mysteriously present representatives at the conference.