Peculiarities of Hybrid Mobilisation: The commercial contract has become not only the main way of replenishing the front with manpower, but also the primary tool of social stabilisation in times of war
Replenishing manpower for the front through commercial contracts has proven to be one of the main institutional discoveries of Putin's regime during the war. In essence, it has not only become an alternative to the highly unpopular mobilisation in society, but also an important buffer for social tensions associated with the war. Although the quality of the army gathered in this way is rather low, and the average age is high, the Russian command has found a front-line niche for it as 'cannon fodder', which traditionally plays an important role in Russian military strategy.
Recruitment through an effective commercial contract reflects the most important feature of the new, military modification of Putin's regime – a model of hybrid mobilisation in which war is both the main factor of domestic, foreign and economic policy and at the same time does not imply a corresponding mobilisation of society. It does not lead to significant costs for society on the one hand, and does not require ideological unity or genuine sympathy for the war's goals on the other.
The one-time payment introduced in late summer 2023 upon signing the contract became an attractive tool for those seeking to improve their financial situation or invest in their family's future. However, since then, the authorities have been forced to triple the payment amount. The current average one-time payment, including regional bonuses, amounts to 1.119 million rubles, and the estimated average annual income for a contract soldier is between 3.5 and 5.5 million rubles. Thanks to these measures, the authorities have managed to maintain a recruitment rate of about 30,000 people per month, which roughly corresponds to the estimated monthly rate of casualties (dead and wounded) during the active phase of Russia's offensive in the spring and summer of this year.
Around 40% of Russians believe that the main motivation for signing the contract is financial gain, a quarter think it is patriotic feelings, and another 30% believe both motivations are present. The model of hybrid mobilisation allows not only the regime but also society to flexibly shift between different interpretations of what is happening, existing simultaneously in both ideological and pragmatic (non-ideological) spheres of evaluation.
For the relatives of the deceased and wounded, high payouts relieve the social motive of their grief, the sense of injustice, and the state's responsibility, thus mitigating protest emotions. For society as a whole, the contract model is an alternative that reduces the fear of total mobilisation. At the same time, the dual attitude toward the mobilised frees society from the feeling of moral responsibility for the dead and wounded: these war victims are seen as the result of a conscious choice made by the contract soldiers and their families, who exchanged their lives and health for a tangible financial investment.
The economics of hybrid mobilisation
The replenishment of manpower for the front through commercial contracts has become one of the best institutional discoveries of Putin's regime during the war. Although the quality of the army assembled in this way is quite low, the Russian command has found a frontline niche for it as ‘cannon fodder’, which traditionally plays an important role in Russian military strategy.
This successful project, among other things, reflects a key feature of the new, military modification of the Putin regime – the model of hybrid mobilisation, in which war is the main factor in internal, external, and economic policies, while simultaneously not implying the corresponding mobilisation of society. It does not lead to significant costs for society on one hand, and does not require its ideological unity or genuine sympathy for the war's goals on the other.
The Russian authorities did not immediately find the optimal balance of material incentives. A socially effective threshold for material compensation for losses — injuries and deaths — was quickly established. Payments of over 7 million rubles for the dead and 3 million for the wounded were announced in early March 2022. As we have previously noted, when setting these compensations, the Russian authorities were likely guided by a study conducted by Sberbank in the late 2010s to determine the amount of insurance payments. According to the study, the subjective assessment of the ‘price of life’ by Russians ranged from 2.4 to 13.3 million rubles depending on income level (→ Re:Russia: Grave Loyalty). This amount was meant to reconcile the average Russian with the state: in this case, the death of a relative remains a personal tragedy but is stripped of any sense of social injustice and does not become a reason for social outrage. However, such a payment does not serve as an incentive to sign a contract, as the benefits arise only in the case of death or injury, i.e., in a purely negative scenario.
An effective incentive was not even the monthly income from the contract itself (by the end of 2022, the norm was 150-170 thousand rubles, according to Fontanka.ru, and by 2023-2024 it had increased to 190-240 thousand rubles), but the one-time payment for signing the contract – a sort of advance payment for risk and ‘bondage’. TThe payment allows the family to immediately solve urgent material problems or create a foundation for the future, after which, with the benefit already received, they can hope for the favour of fate and a successful completion of service. This model was initially intended to quell dissatisfaction with the ‘partial’ mobilisation of the fall of 2022. At that time, a monthly payment of 50,000 rubles was established for mobilised men in Moscow (600,000 rubles per year), then, in early November 2022, a federal payment of 195,000 rubles was introduced by a decree from Putin. It seems that its gradual implementation helped reduce the intensity of the mobilisation controversy, and later the one-time payment became a tool for recruitment and an alternative to full mobilisation.
At first, the influx of volunteers for commercial contracts was extremely weak: according to the calculations of ‘Important Stories’, only 26,000 people signed such contracts in the first half of 2023. The situation improved when regional governments began contributing additional funds to the federal amount. By the end of summer 2023, the total amount of the average payment for signing a contract had already reached around 390,000 rubles, or $4,000, and by June 2024, it increased to 480,000 rubles, or $5,000 (→ Re: Russia: People versus Drones). However, in the last six months, its growth has sharply accelerated: at the end of July, the one-time federal payment was doubled (from 195,000 to 400,000 rubles), and at the same time, the Kremlin demanded an increase in regional payments. As a result, according to data collected on the portal gogov.ru portal, the average amount of regional payments has grown to 746,000 rubles, and the average total one-time payment has reached 1,119,000 rubles, or $11,000 (taking into account additional municipal payments that apply in some regions). Thus, over the past six months, the average payment has increased by two and a half times, and in a year, it has tripled. A total of 27 Russian regions now offer one-time contract payments ranging from 1 million to 2 million rubles, and 14 regions offer more than 2 million; in the Belgorod region, they are already paying 3 million rubles.
Such rapid growth in payments indicates both a decrease in the influx of contract soldiers at 'old prices' and extremely high losses during the offensive. The publication ‘Verstka’, which obtained statistics from Moscow's contract signing points, shows that the flow of recruits fluctuated significantly: at the end of summer 2023, about 3,000 people were recruited per month in Moscow, but by the winter of 2023-2024, this dropped to 2,000, and by the beginning of summer 2024, to 1,000. In early August 2024, Moscow introduced a one-time payment of 1.9 million rubles, and the influx sharply increased. Today, Moscow advertises the contract, promising an annual income of 5.2 million rubles (1.9 million is the one-time Moscow payment, 600,000 is the monthly Moscow bonus, 400,000 is the one-time federal payment, and 2.3 million is the monthly salary). If we refer to the average payments across Russia, a contract soldier’s income would be 3.6 million rubles per year. That means a contract soldier could earn $52,000 by signing a contract in Moscow, and $36,000 on average in other regions. In the first case, this income is five times higher, and in the second case, it is 3.5 times higher than the annual income from the average monthly salary (1.028 million rubles). If the contract soldier dies during the year, the family’s income will range from 11 million to 19 million rubles.
There are no exact figures on the number of contract soldiers recruited in this way. In April 2024, the Ministry of Defence stated that it had enlisted 640,000 people from civilian life for the war, but Important Stories, together with the Conflict Intelligence Team, concluded based on budgetary data that one-time payments were made to 426,000 people (these figures likely include the transfer to contracts of various categories of servicemen – mobilised individuals, former prisoners, etc.). In the first half of 2024, according to the authorities, 190,000 contracts were signed (an average of 32,000 per month), while ‘Important Stories’ estimates the number at 166,000 (27,000 per month). The difference is not fundamental; Western intelligence agencies also estimate around 30,000 contract soldiers are recruited per month. These recruitment rates, however, barely cover the monthly losses of killed and wounded soldiers, which are also estimated to be around 30,000 per month (according to the British Defence Secretary, in October 2024 the losses reached 46,000 people). However, without these recruits, the Russian offensive would be impossible or would require another round of mobilisation.
Sociology of the hybrid: Motivations of contract workers and attitudes towards them
In a remarkable essay by journalist Oksana Gerasimenko, based on conversations with visitors and staff at a recruitment centre for contract soldiers in Moscow in August of this year, several distinct types of people seeking to sign a contract and their motivations are highlighted: alongside 'patriots,' excited about the invasion of the Kursk region, who also often mention financial problems, there are 'failures' (people with certain social deprivations) seeking to change their lives, individuals with criminal records who want to erase their past through military service, as well as middle-aged fathers of families who come with their children and wives with the conscious decision to improve their family's situation and invest in their children's future (e.g., buying an apartment, providing education). Often, within this group, the assessment of the 'special military operation' (its 'justice' and necessity) can be rather restrained. In general, the officially promoted high status of a war participant, the rhetoric of civil patriotism, and the financial factor complement each other in varying proportions.
These observations are supported by statistics. According to a study by the BBC and Mediazona, which tracks the names of soldiers killed in the war, the average age of a killed Russian soldier is rapidly increasing. In the first three months of the war, the typical deceased soldier in the Russian army was a 21-year-old contract soldier serving in elite units, as noted by BBC analysts. By 2023, the typical deceased was a 34-year-old prisoner who went to the front straight from the colony. Now, it is a contract soldier, and the average age of the dead in 2024 is already 38. Units formed from new contract soldiers are ineffective, and the command views them as expendable, as explained in detail by the former head of the self-proclaimed DNR Alexander Borodai to his interlocutor in a famous intercepted telephone conversation. This is confirmed by data from the BBC and Mediazona, which notes that new contract soldiers are sent to the front literally 7-10 days after signing the contract, often dying very quickly.
The fact that the possibility of being sent to war became a constant topic of discussion in families in rural Russia by the end of last year was noted by ethnographers from the Laboratory of Public Sociology (→ Re:Russia: Parallel Cheremushkin). However, at that time, the one-time advance payment had not yet reached such significant sizes and did not play such a crucial role. According to a nationwide survey by the Levada Centre conducted at the end of October this year, 40% of Russians would approve of a family member or close person signing a contract to ‘participate in the “special operation”,’ while 42% would not approve. However, it should be remembered that under the conditions of war and repression, the sample may be skewed in favour of more loyal contingents, and those surveyed may give answers that they believe to be socially acceptable.
Among the men surveyed, 48% would support a close person signing a contract – signing a contract is seen as one of the stereotypes of masculine self-assertion or masculine self-rehabilitation. Among women, the same percentage would oppose it, but one-third (34%) would support it. In terms of age, the highest support for sending a relative to sign a contract comes from respondents aged 55 and older (51%), while among the younger generation, around 30% support it (27% in the 18-24 age group and 33% in the 25-39 age group). In the 40-54 age group, 36% support it. Among those who believe that the country is on the right path, approve of Putin, and often watch television, almost half (48%) support sending a relative to sign a contract, while among those who view the situation critically, only 18% do. Unfortunately, the Levada Centre combines answers for those who indicate ‘defending the motherland’ and ‘for children, for the family’ as motivations for a positive attitude toward the contract (in total, this broader option was chosen by 40% of those surveyed), even though these are, in reality, different, complementary motivations. In any case, adjusting for possible skew, these data indicate that the discussion of the military contract as an option has become widespread, in contrast to the volunteer model that the authorities promoted during the ‘mobilisation’ period in late 2022-early 2023.
In a survey conducted in September by the Chronicles project and the ExtremeScan research group, sociologists, in contrast, distinguished between patriotic and mercantile motives of those going to war, asking respondents the question, ‘Do you think that most of those who are volunteering to go to the front today are primarily solving their material problems or fulfilling their civic duty?’ 37% of those surveyed chose the first answer, 24% chose the second, and 29% believed that both motives were present. From a slightly different perspective, it can be said that nearly 40% of those surveyed consider the mercantile motive to be the main one for those signing contracts, two-thirds (63%) acknowledge that it is at least present, just over half (53%) are sure that the ‘patriotic motive’ is at least present in the decision to sign a contract, and about a quarter consider it the main one. These assessments give us a scale of attitudes toward the contract (and indirectly, the war) and show its skew toward the mercantile pole.
Among the young people surveyed by the Levada Centre (18-29 years old), one in two believes that people go to war almost exclusively for mercantile reasons. However, there are also more who attribute exclusively patriotic motives to contract soldiers (30%); with age, the proportion of those who believe both motives are present increases. Those who see the predominant mercantile motive in contract soldiers are generally more critical of the situation in the country, Vladimir Putin, and the ‘military operation’; among them, there are more who support an immediate halt to military actions and concessions to Ukraine. When asked directly about support for the war, 30% of those surveyed answered positively, while 26% answered negatively (in the overall sample, the respective figures were 49% against 12%). Finally, half of those whose material situation has worsened in the past year (52%) and those who rate their income as low (49%) see the material aspect of the military contract as the main motivation. Predominantly idealistic motives for contract soldiers are acknowledged by only 22% of these respondents, but as income rises and their assessments of their own material situation improve, this share grows to 30%.
When asked about the possibility of going to the front themselves, 15% expressed willingness to volunteer (i.e., to sign a contract). Among those under 30, 6% would be willing, while among those aged 50 to 60, 27% would be ready (the question was not asked of women or people over 60). Similarly, 27% of those who rate their income as low also expressed willingness to go to war. This group makes up 18% of the sample, so the low-income group willing to go to fight is about 5% of the men under 60 in this sample. In the high-income group, 11% expressed this willingness. Interestingly, the low-income groups are both the least idealistic and the most likely to sign a contract, while high-income groups ascribe more significance to the ideological motive, but are the least likely to sign a contract.
At the same time, society is well aware that the contract is an alternative to mobilisation, meaning that contract soldiers are going to war ‘instead of us’. This can explain why, despite the rather restrained assessment of the motives of contract soldiers, there is broad consensus in society regarding benefits for those who have served as contract soldiers. The provision of such benefits (in housing and utilities, loans, university admissions for children) is approved by the overwhelming majority of people surveyed – 88%. This opinion is less shared by those who do not support the ‘military operation’ in Ukraine and do not approve of Vladimir Putin, but even among them, the majority support the benefits (about 60%).
In contrast, a completely opposite view is observed regarding the practice in Putin’s Russia of exempting those heading to the front from criminal liability: only 20% of respondents in a Levada Centre survey support this exotic measure, while 63% oppose it, with the rest undecided. Among those who believe that people going to war are primarily motivated by material concerns, younger respondents, and those who view the war negatively or avoid answering the question, the share of those disapproving of this practice reaches 77-92%. Conversely, those more tolerant of ‘criminal mobilisation’ include active supporters of the war, individuals whose lives have improved over the past year, and people with high incomes (26-35%). This practice largely remains a legacy of the ‘mobilisation’ approach to war that the authorities employed during its ‘Prigozhin’ phase, an approach that appears to many Russians as an anomaly and an attack on ‘civilian life’.
These findings indicate that hybrid mobilisation has become not only an effective tool for recruiting manpower for the front but also a mechanism for mitigating social tensions and conflicts surrounding the war. For the families of the deceased and injured, generous payouts alleviate the social drivers of their grief, such as feelings of injustice and the state’s responsibility, thereby reducing protest sentiments. For society at large, the commercial contract serves as an alternative that lessens fears of mass mobilisation. Simultaneously, the ambivalence toward contract soldiers allows society to avoid moral responsibility for the casualties and injuries they endure: these losses are framed as the result of deliberate choices by the contractors and their families, trading life and health for substantial financial compensation. The hybrid mobilisation model enables both the regime and society to shift flexibly between different interpretations of the conflict, coexisting within both idealistic and pragmatic frameworks of understanding.