Effective Level of Repression: Since the start of the war, around 15,000 people in Russia have been affected by criminal and pre-criminal repression

Criminal prosecutions: the effective level of repression

Since the start of the war, at least 1850 people in Russia have been subjected to politically motivated criminal prosecutions, according to the OVD-Info ‘Political Repression’ database (data is collected manually, with human rights activists knowing the specific defendant in each criminal case). According to Re:Russia's calculations, the most common tool for repression has been articles specially introduced into the Criminal Code to criminalise anti-war protests and statements: Article 207.3, 'spreading false information about the armed forces' (250 cases), and Article 280.3, 'discrediting the army' (184 cases). Together, these two articles have been used to initiate 434 criminal cases (24%).

The second most common category involves the group of vague terrorist-related articles (Article 205 and its derivatives), with 361 individuals charged under these laws. Notably, in 215 cases, the charges involved Article 205.2, 'calls for terrorist activities' (often related to emotional comments on social media). Following this is a group of cases under similarly vague 'extremist' articles (Article 282 and its derivatives), with at least 315 cases. Altogether, these three groups account for 60% of prosecutions.

During the three summer months, OVD-Info recorded 119 new politically motivated criminal cases. This is fewer than in the previous three months (156) and lower than the monthly average since the start of the war (55 cases per month). However, as new information comes in, these numbers may increase. Overall, the trend in politically motivated criminal cases for the first eight months of 2024 is similar to last year: 415 cases from January to August this year, compared to 416 during the same period in 2023, according to OVD-Info.

Politically motivated criminal prosecutions, 2003-2024, number of cases per year

Politically motivated criminal prosecutions, 2021-2024, number of cases per month

Of the 119 new summer cases, 27 involved 'extremist' charges, 25 'terrorist' charges, and 23 were new 'anti-war' charges (Articles 207.3 and 280.3), meaning these categories accounted for 63% of all cases. According to OVD-Info, 35 people were placed in custody, and three were sent for forced psychiatric treatment (Vladimir Putin seems nostalgic for the late Soviet practices of forced psychiatry). Thus, approximately a third of the cases resulted in people being deprived of their freedom. In total, since the start of the war, OVD-Info has recorded 355 instances of people being taken into custody and 55 instances of forced psychiatric treatment.

It is, of course, important to note that the OVD-Info database is incomplete. Furthermore, publicity in the context of wartime repression often harms the defendants, so they often try to keep the fact that a case has been initiated quiet. There are also cases where authorities apply pressure by threatening to open a case, which ultimately does not get initiated. Nevertheless, the OVD-Info database is undoubtedly representative and accurately reflects the 'public background' of repression. As we can see, the current level of repression is maintained by initiating around 55 cases per month, with 25% of defendants being deprived of freedom (about 15 people per month).

The statistics on administrative prosecutions are broader, but they show a clear downward trend. A total of 9355 cases have been opened under Article 20.3.3 of the Administrative Code (‘discrediting the army’) since 24 February 2022, according to OVD-Info analysts in their review ‘Persecution for Anti-War Views’. Of these, 8079 cases were initiated in 2022-2023 (an average of 367 per month), 917 cases in the first five months of this year (183 per month), and 359 cases during the summer months (120 per month). The total number of detentions for anti-war positions has also drastically decreased: in 2022, there were 18,910 such cases, in 2023, there were 274, and since the beginning of this year, only 30 such detentions have been recorded, according to OVD-Info data. This trend reflects the effectiveness of the dense repressive environment created by criminal prosecutions, which forces the well-informed public to adapt to the current level of political pressure.

Elements of terror: ‘wartime prisoners’

An important aspect of repression is the demonstrative cruelty of the law enforcement system. Physical and psychological pressure on detainees, as well as torture, have essentially become the norm.

OVD-Info analysts highlight a special category of ‘wartime prisoners’ – those convicted or prosecuted for sabotage, intentions to defect to Ukraine, or alleged ties to the Ukrainian side, among other charges. In such cases, there is an element of terror, meaning their primary goal is to intimidate the population. This is reflected in both the weak evidence used in the charges and the lengthy prison terms handed down by courts in such cases.

In July, at least nine people were convicted for arson attacks on railways, notes OVD-Info. The longest sentence, 19 years, was given to Igor Lushko from Novosibirsk, who allegedly, under the orders of the 'Freedom of Russia' legion, set fire to a railway 'power supply facility' and filmed a military base. In Sverdlovsk Oblast, eight teenagers were detained for attempting to burn railway relay cabinets in exchange for a reward allegedly promised by 'handlers' from Ukraine. Significant prison terms are also being handed down to residents of occupied territories for attacks (or attempted attacks) on infrastructure. For example, in July, Sergey Yerzhov from the Dnipropetrovsk region was sentenced to 18 years in prison for blowing up a gas pipeline near Yalta in 2023.

In June, Alexander Batsenyn from Khabarovsk was found guilty of treason (Article 275 of the Criminal Code) and sentenced to 12 years in a high-security prison for transferring 779 rubles to the ‘Russian Volunteer Corps’. In June, art teacher Daniil Klyuka from the Lipetsk region, received the harshest known sentence on charges of transferring funds to Ukrainian organisations: 20 years in prison, with the first five years served in a regular prison and the remainder in a high-security colony, along with a fine of 500,000 rubles. Russian authorities are also severely punishing attempts to join the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In July, three sons of Igor Ashcheulov, a priest from Lipetsk, who intended to join the 'Freedom of Russia' legion, were sentenced to 17.5 and 17 years in prison, respectively.

Ukrainian prisoners of war face the harshest repression. Released Ukrainian soldiers report extreme torture and abuse in Russian prisons. In July, Russian authorities announced the death of Alexander Ishchenko, a driver in the Azov Regiment, while in pre-trial detention in Rostov-on-Don. A forensic examination conducted in Ukraine determined that Ishchenko died from a chest trauma caused by 'force from a blunt object'. Ishchenko was one of 25 soldiers from the Azov Regiment captured and facing trial in the Southern District Military Court in Rostov-on-Don. Prosecutors are seeking prison sentences for them ranging from 16 to 24 years.

Pre-criminal repression: tools and dynamics

In addition to direct criminal prosecutions, tools of pressure and a form of 'warning' that involve partial restriction of rights include measures such as designating individuals and organisations as 'foreign agents', 'undesirable organisations', or banning organisations as 'extremist'.

The designation of individuals and organisations as 'foreign agents' has become a routine process. The Ministry of Justice adds three entries to the list almost every Friday. Since the start of the war, 516 entities have been added to the list (before the war, from 2013, the Ministry had designated only 343 'foreign agents'). The list grew by 408 entries from March 2022 to the end of 2023, and another 108 'foreign agents' were identified in 2024, including 41 during the summer months. Thus, the pace of identifying 'foreign agents' has slightly decreased – from 18 per month in 2022-2023 to 14 per month in 2024.

This type of repression is aimed both internally – against those living in Russia – and externally – against those who have left the country. The authorities are constantly expanding unconstitutional practices that deprive 'foreign agents' of civil rights. In March, Vladimir Putin signed a law banning advertising on 'foreign agent' platforms, which caused a sharp decline in revenues for related journalism and blogging projects. In mid-June, a bill was introduced in the State Duma to prohibit advertising on 'extremist' and 'undesirable' platforms, which would also limit the ability to advertise on sites like Facebook and Instagram. In May, a law was passed prohibiting 'foreign agents' from participating in elections as candidates, observers, authorised representatives, or trusted persons of candidates (in July, St Petersburg authorities refused to register Anna Karulicheva for municipal elections after the Ministry of Justice added her to the 'foreign agents' registry just before her registration). In June, the State Duma also proposed a bill banning 'foreign agents' from engaging in activities related to public oversight of government bodies.

Along with these systemic measures, a key focus of the authorities is the criminalisation of 'foreign agents' by initiating criminal cases against them. OVD-Info reports that at least 20 individuals designated as 'foreign agents' have become subjects of criminal cases for failing to comply with 'foreign agent' obligations. Even those not included in the registry can now be considered violators of this law: in June, OVD-Info reported three cases where people not listed in the registry were prosecuted for failing to report themselves. Criminal cases against 'foreign agents' abroad aim to exert psychological pressure and block their ability to manage property and accounts remaining in Russia.

Additional opportunities for criminalising 'foreign agents' have emerged with the approval of an August bill allowing administrative protocols to be drawn up against Russians abroad under articles for 'discrediting' the army and insulting Putin. These amendments to the Administrative Offences Code (KoAP) were first proposed in 2023 by the State Council of Tatarstan, arguing that activists conduct anti-Russian activities abroad. Since Russia's legal system allows for pretrial mechanisms in political cases, repeated administrative protocols can lead to the initiation of criminal cases with all corresponding consequences.

Equally relentless are the efforts of the deputies and the Kremlin to expand repressive practices and restrictions regarding 'undesirable' organisations. The trend is accelerating. Before the war (starting from 2015), 53 organisations were declared 'undesirable', but during the war, an additional 136 were added. Of those, 69 were in 2022-2023, and 67 in 2024 alone. Thus, the pace of adding to the registry has tripled – from three to nine organisations per month. The authorities are clearly in a phase of creative inspiration. In August, a law was signed that allows any organisation involving foreign governments to be declared ‘undesirable’. Repression based on ‘undesirability’ has harsher consequences for both participants in the organisations and for outsiders accused of interacting with or assisting them. Administrative cases under Article 20.33 of the KoAP for participating in an 'undesirable' organisation's activities are being initiated against journalists from 'undesirable' media outlets and even for giving interviews to such publications. Repeat administrative cases within a year may lead to criminal prosecution, as in the case of Grigory Melkonyants, co-chair of the election monitoring group ‘Golos’.

Finally, the Ministry of Justice's list of 'extremist' organisations has expanded by 21 positions during the war – from 90 to 111: 14 in 2022–2023 and seven in the first eight months of 2024. At the same time, three ‘extremist’ organisations — ‘Omsk Civil Association’, ‘People's Council of Citizens of the USSR/RFSR of the Amur Region’, ‘People's Council of the RSFSR/SSR of the Kemerovo Region’ and the non-existent 'Anti-Russian Separatist Movement' and its 55 'structural subdivisions', including the Free Russia Foundation, 'Free Buryatia', 'Free Yakutia’, and the German Society for Eastern European Studies. The list of ‘extremists’ may soon begin to expand even faster: the State Duma has proposed including people who are charged with crimes ‘motivated by hatred', which is a clause present in laws against vandalism and spreading ‘fake news’.

Thus, in addition to actual political criminal prosecutions (1850 cases since the start of the war), the threat of criminal prosecution is also created through administrative protocols under 'political' articles (9350 cases), as well as through three tools of pre-criminal repression: declaring individuals and organisations 'foreign agents', including NGOs in the registry of 'undesirable' organisations, and banning them as 'extremist', all of which restrict citizens' civil rights and place them under the threat of criminal prosecution. It is impossible to accurately estimate the number of people affected by this repression, but it is obvious that we are talking about several thousand people. A particularly noteworthy innovation is the practice of adding non-existent organisations, such as the 'International LGBT Movement and its structural subdivisions' and the mentioned 'Anti-Russian Separatist Movement', to the list of 'extremist' organisations. This Kafkaesque inversion potentially allows law enforcement to declare any citizen holding corresponding views as a member of an 'extremist' organisation.

The described types of pre-criminal repression during the war may have affected, by the roughest estimates, about 15,000 people and should be viewed as analogous to 'preventive measures' from late Soviet-era repressive practices (→ Re:Russia: Soviet and Non-Soviet).