Russian wartime repressions entered a phase of systemic stabilisation. Their scale remains consistent – about 60 new politically motivated cases each month – while the severity of persecution has intensified. For instance, if politically motivated prosecutions in 2022–2023 resulted in imprisonment in only 35% of cases, by 2024 this figure rose to 70%. The proportion of convictions involving actual prison sentences also grew noticeably, with the length of sentences increasing sharply.
During the initial phase in 2022-early 2023, repressions were largely 'demonstrative and educational' in nature: the authorities sought to suppress anti-war sentiment and acclimate citizens to new standards of oppression. This tactic achieved a measure of success. In 2024, however, the scale of prosecutions for anti-war statements declined significantly, while cases based on pseudo-anti-extremist and pseudo-anti-terrorist charges expanded again.
Charges of 'calls for terrorist activity' are now used to prosecute statements supporting Ukraine. Meanwhile, accusations of affiliation with extremist organisations have become a tool for targeting individuals from various ideological and philosophical platforms that the regime deems hostile. Authorities have invented fictitious extremist organisations, such as the 'International LGBT Movement', to criminalise support for certain ideas and values.
Another significant flow of criminal prosecutions involves charges of espionage, treason, and related offences. By 2024, cases of this type had reached a steady rate of about 30 new cases per month. However, assessing the credibility of these cases is nearly impossible due to their secrecy. They encompass genuine supporters of Ukraine, instances of commercial bribery, and partially or wholly fabricated cases designed to meet the state’s demand for visible results in combating such crimes.
This trend also manifests in the authorities’ ongoing efforts to 'blur' and expand the definitions of criminal acts and in the harshness of penalties for minor actions, such as transferring a few hundred rubles to Ukraine. The institutional inertia in this category of cases is particularly concerning, as it coincides with a trend toward partially justifying Stalinist repressive practices.
Finally, increased pressure on public figures through legislation on 'foreign agents' and 'undesirable organisations' highlights the regime’s desire to exert stricter control over this sphere, especially as some of its actors have relocated beyond the reach of Russian law enforcement. The trends observed in 2024 suggest the likelihood of a mass wave of criminal cases in the coming year targeting those who disseminate or consume content created by the independent segment of Russia's public sphere.
In 2024, the repressive machinery of 'wartime Putinism' fully transitioned from its reactive phase to a mode of systemic stabilisation. The scope of politically motivated repressions remains largely unchanged compared to 2023, but the severity that began to increase in 2023 has now become the norm. This severity is evident in the high proportion of cases resulting in imprisonment, the demonstrative harshness of sentences, and the widespread use of torture and torturous conditions imposed on the persecuted. While 'military' charges – such as spreading 'false' information and 'discrediting' the army – are becoming less prevalent, the application of pseudo-anti-extremist and pseudo-anti-terrorist charges has expanded once again. These charges are designed to form the foundation of systematic persecution of dissent. At the same time, the weight of repressive espionage accusations and pressure on 'foreign agents' is growing. These trends are reflected in a detailed report by OVD-Info on politically motivated repression in Russia in 2024.
In 2022 and early 2023, the establishment of the repressive apparatus of the new version of the Putin regime – 'wartime Putinism' – was largely reactive. The authorities were focused on suppressing anti-war sentiment within a society ideologically unprepared for a prolonged war and shocked by its reality. The regime had to respond to this resistance and to the 'unfamiliar boldness' of many ordinary Russians, who had not been active opponents of the regime before the war. Repressions against anti-war statements were primarily carried out under two articles hastily added to the Criminal Code in early March 2022: Article 207.3 ('false information' about the military) and Article 280.3 ('discrediting' the military). These measures aimed to silence the anti-war segment and reinforce a 'forced consensus' of loyalty to the war.
These repressions were largely 'educational' in nature, intended to accustom society to the new norms. For example, most prosecutions were initiated under an administrative article on 'discrediting' the army (Article 20.3.3 of the Administrative Code). According to ‘Mediazona’, 5600 such cases were initiated in 2022. Moreover, while criminal cases under military-related articles were initiated more frequently, convictions were less common, and only a small proportion (35%) resulted in actual prison sentences. Demonstratively harsh sentences were handed down, but these were largely symbolic, targeting public figures whose cases attracted media attention, such as the sentences of deputy Alexei Gorinov and politician Ilya Yashin.
In 2023, the repressive profile began to change. On one hand, there was a slight decline in the number of new politically motivated criminal cases (approximately 15% by year-end) and in criminal cases for anti-war statements (around 20%). Administrative cases for anti-war statements also halved. This decrease reflected the success of the 'educational' repressive cycle: citizens had internalised the new rules, emigrated, or been imprisoned. At the same time, the number of imprisonments rose by almost 1.5 times (from 306 to 429), with 60% of new criminal cases involving deprivation of liberty. There was also an increase in convictions resulting in actual prison sentences.
All of these trends were solidified in 2024. However, the data for 2024 remains incomplete – not only because the OVD-Info report reflects events up to December 9 but also because information about some cases reaches human rights defenders with a noticeable delay. As a result, the total number of repressions in 2024 could increase by 10-15%, bringing it on par with or slightly below the 2023 figures. This indicates that the numerical scope of politically motivated criminal prosecutions remained approximately at the 2023 level, 15-20% lower than in 2022. The pace of repression remains stable, at about 60 new politically motivated prosecutions per month. However, the proportion of cases resulting in imprisonment among the criminal repressions known as of early December rose to 70%, meaning that 7 out of 10 individuals were sent to prison. This aligns with the Kremlin's vision of an 'effective level of repression' – visibly harsh yet not excessively widespread (→ Re:Russia: Effective Level of Repression).
As of early December, OVD-Info, which has compiled a unique database of political repression, estimates that nearly 3000 people (2976) are currently being persecuted in Russia for political reasons. Of these, 34% are already serving sentences, and another 13% are in pre-trial detention. Additionally, about 425 people have been released from detention over the past three years after completing their sentences for political cases.
What has notably changed over the past year is the repertoire of charges and articles used for political repression. Although the data for 2024 is incomplete, certain key trends are evident. Chief among these is a sharp decline in the number of cases related to 'anti-war' articles. The war has become routine, and attitudes toward it, as well as public behavior practices on this dangerous topic, have been established and normalised. This does not mean that more people accepted the war over the past year. Rather, the desire to speak out on the subject and the urge to influence others' opinions have significantly diminished. This contributes to the persistent impression that Russians live as though the war does not exist. According to a September survey conducted by the Chronicles project and the ExtremeScan group (data available to Re:Russia), 13% of respondents expressed a desire to discuss the war more, 14% were satisfied with the current level of discourse, and 42% wished to talk about it less.
For individuals who persist in opposing the war, authorities now employ charges of 'justification of terrorism'. This charge is more severe and ideologically laden, designed to highlight Ukrainian Armed Forces’ strikes on Russian territory, including incidents resulting in civilian casualties. In November, former Moscow municipal deputy Alexei Gorinov, already imprisoned, received an additional sentence under this charge. In a private conversation about the Crimean Bridge explosion, he remarked: 'Well, it was blown up. It’s war. Crimea is their territory'. Other high-profile defendants under this article include the director of the play ‘Finist, the Brave Falcon’, Yevgenia Berkovich, and playwright Svetlana Petrychuk. The Putin regime uses 'terrorism-related' charges as a striking example of 'repressive populism': terrorism is perceived by the public as a grave societal threat, making crackdowns on it seem more legitimate – even when the definition is excessively broad.
Perhaps the pinnacle of legal cynicism under Putin has been the criminalisation of activities associated with various 'communities' that are politically declared 'extremist' or 'terrorist'. In 2023, 209 convictions were handed down under the article on organising an extremist community, with 156 more in 2024. Initially, these charges were largely used against members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, followed by employees of FBK (Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation) and its regional offices. Over time, these 'organisational' articles have increasingly become a universal tool for suppressing dissent of any kind. Once an organisation is designated as extremist or terrorist, individuals can face prosecution not only for association with it but even for showing sympathy for its symbols or goals.
Thus, in 2024, cases related to extremist community activities targeted groups such as the VKontakte public page Antifa United and the Anti-Torture project, according to OVD-Info experts. Organisations designated as extremist included, among others, the Interregional Public Movement 'I/We Sergei Furgal', the Tatar National Party 'Renaissance', and the Omsk Civil Association. To institutionalise this practice, Russian authorities have begun inventing fictional organisations with specific ideological orientations, labeling them extremist or terrorist, and thereby criminalising certain beliefs. For instance, a fictitious 'Anti-Russian Separatist Movement' was declared extremist along with 55 of its 'structural subdivisions'. Similarly, the 'Forum of Free States of Post-Russia' and its alleged 172 'structural subdivisions' were labeled terrorist. Three of these subdivisions were also previously classified as part of the 'Anti-Russian Separatist Movement'. These fabricated networks enable the regime to criminalise discussions about decolonisation, regionalist initiatives, and movements advocating for individuals like convicted Khabarovsk Governor Sergei Furgal. Similarly, the 'International LGBT Movement' was entirely fabricated and declared extremist.
Thus, the repressive practices of 2024 reveal a significant thematic and functional shift – from targeting primarily anti-war stances in 2022 and early 2023 to persecuting individuals with a variety of viewpoints, ideologies, and belief systems. The regime is working to more clearly define its ideological boundaries and, most importantly, the zones of unacceptable views and positions deemed hostile. In the rationale for these repressions, the term 'extremist' increasingly functions as a synonym for 'politically and ideologically hostile to the regime’s doctrine and declared values.'
Another emerging class of wartime repression, not included by OVD-Info among politically motivated cases, highlights two key aspects of the current climate: the increased active resistance of certain societal groups against the regime, and the veil of secrecy and terror surrounding these repressive actions. These cases involve charges tied to 'state security' (e.g., espionage, treason, collaboration with the enemy, sabotage, etc.).
Between 1997 and 2021, only 170 individuals were convicted under espionage and treason charges. However, since 2022, this number has surged to 536, with annual convictions steadily increasing. This year alone, 359 people received prison sentences for espionage, and four were subjected to forced psychiatric treatment. This dramatic rise was facilitated by amendments to Article 276 of the Criminal Code ('Espionage') in July 2022, adding provisions criminalising the collection and transfer of 'information against the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.' Additionally, a new Article 275.1 ('Collaboration with a Foreign State or Organisation') was introduced.
Currently, the FSB initiates criminal cases under treason and espionage charges (Articles 275, 275.1, and 276) daily, compared to fewer than 10 annually before 2014, according to ‘First Division’. This creates a secondary stream of repressions averaging 30 cases per month, in addition to the broader politically motivated repression affecting approximately 60 people monthly.
The severity of sentences under 'espionage' charges has also escalated. In 2024, nearly 60% of those convicted for espionage or treason received prison terms of 10-15 years, while 11% were sentenced to 15–20 years. This trend reflects a 'race to severity,' as noted by 'The First Department': even minor actions, such as a monetary transfer to Ukraine of 200-300 rubles, can result in 12-year prison sentences. Such precedents encourage judges to issue even harsher sentences for more serious offences. Assessing the substance and credibility of many cases is nearly impossible due to the secrecy surrounding them. However, to all appearances, this influx consists of three segments: genuine ideological collaboration by Russian citizens with Ukrainian intelligence or military forces, commercial recruitment and, to a greater or lesser extent, fabricated cases by security agencies seeking rewards or fulfilling quotas.
According to OVD-Info, in 2024, at least 123 people were detained for allegedly helping the Ukrainian army, of whom 49 are accused of passing information to Ukrainian security forces, 26 of attempting to leave to fight on the side of Ukraine or otherwise assisting the Ukrainian armed forces, and 22 of financing the Ukrainian army. In addition, in 2024, 124 people (including 18 minors) were charged with arson or planning it: of these, according to official data, 68 defendants acted for payment and 26 used arson to protest against the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The most common targets of arson were railway infrastructure (85 cases) and military enlistment offices (24 cases). Sentences for arson range from 4 to 26 years, with maximum sentences given to those accused of terrorism, sabotage, treason, or participation in terrorist organisations. While some individuals may have ideological motives or refused plea deals, most 'sabotage' cases involve individuals incentivised by promises of payment.
One way or another, the infrastructure for dealing with ‘spies’ and ‘saboteurs’ is expanding. The surge in treason and espionage convictions has been facilitated by an increase in courts handling such cases. Before 2022, nearly one-third of espionage trials occurred in Moscow, given their ties to state secrets. After the invasion of Ukraine, Moscow and St. Petersburg saw just 80 convictions out of 536. Meanwhile, at least 201 people were sentenced in the occupied territories, and another 75 in the regions bordering the conflict, including the Rostov, Belgorod, Kursk, Voronezh, Bryansk and Krasnodar regions.
This regional expansion appears tied to pressure for higher 'KPIs' (key performance indicators), such as clearance rates. To meet these targets, relevant agencies push for the use of 'flexible' legal articles that dilute the definition of criminal acts. For example, in December 2024, the State Duma passed amendments, introducing Article 276.1, criminalising 'assisting the enemy in activities knowingly directed against Russia's security.' This institutional momentum risks becoming self-perpetuating: increased funding fuels higher KPIs, which in turn demand a growing stream of cases. Simultaneously, a new ideological narrative is emerging to reinterpret Stalinist repressions. The regime's official stance now partially rehabilitates these repressions, framing them as legitimate efforts to uncover 'traitors' and collaborators (→ Re:Russia: Rehabilitating Repression).
In 2024, 150 individuals and organisations were designated as 'foreign agents,' bringing the total list to 895 entries.New additions to the 'foreign agent' list are announced extrajudicially every Friday, often with little concern for plausible justification. The rationale for these designations is increasingly political, with the largest categories of new designees being media outlets (54), political groups (32), artists (16), and research organisations (13), according to OVD-Info. While the monthly rate of new designations slowed from 18 in 2022-2023 to about 12 in 2024, pressure on those labeled as 'foreign agents' has intensified. The number of administrative cases filed against 'foreign agents' reached 692 in 2024, second only to the 1234 cases in 2021, and significantly higher than the 453 cases in 2023 and 397 in 2022.
Unlike the 'educational' wave of 2021, intended to enforce compliance with the law and restrictions, the current wave has a different purpose. Amendments introduced in 2022 allow repeat administrative offences under the 'foreign agent' laws to escalate to criminal charges. In 2024, there were 150 politically motivated criminal cases against 'foreign agents' by December, down from 227 in 2023 and 188 in 2022. At least 32 individuals faced charges under Article 330.1 of the Criminal Code ('Evasion of Obligations as a Foreign Agent'), with 29 of these cases initiated in 2024. High-profile targets included musicians Monetochka (Elizaveta Gyrdymova) and Oxxxymiron (Miron Fyodorov), as well as politician Lev Shlosberg. The spike in administrative fines in 2024 is likely a prelude to a wave of criminal cases in 2025. In addition, at the end of December, Russia adopted a new law requiring ‘foreign agents' to use special accounts, effectively barring them from earning money legally in Russia. This is part of a broader trend to restrict the constitutional rights of 'foreign agents' extrajudicially.
The 'foreign agent' designation is increasingly a tool of 'soft' repression aimed at silencing the independent Russian-speaking public sphere – journalists, intellectuals, and outspoken experts. It complements criminal enforcement while serving as a gateway to harsher measures. New legal restrictions further limit opportunities for these individuals to monetise their activities in Russia, acting as a form of reprisal against public figures and journalists who have relocated abroad. These measures also aim to curtail their ability to manage property still in Russia.
In contrast to the slowdown in new 'foreign agent' designations, the pace of organisations labeled as 'undesirable' surged in 2024. 65 new entries were added – almost matching the combined total of 69 from 2022 and 2023. Among the ‘undesirable’ organisations that have appeared in 2024, the most are media outlets (11), social and educational organisations (9), as well as anti-war initiatives and human rights and research projects (8 each). At least 168 administrative cases were filed under Article 20.33 of the Administrative Code ('Participation in the Activities of Undesirable Organisations') in 2024, along with 16 criminal cases under Article 284.1 of the Criminal Code ('Carrying Out Activities of an Undesirable Organisation'). While 'undesirable' status targets the independent public sphere like the 'foreign agent' designation, its primary goal is to disrupt communication between relocated infrastructure and those still within the reach of Russian law enforcement. This expansion poses a growing threat to the latter group, laying the groundwork for criminalising the consumption of content produced outside government control.