Between The New Trump and The Old Putin: The US administration's economic opportunism is forcing Europe to rethink its geo-economic and energy strategy
By promising the EU zero tariffs only in exchange for a sharp increase in imports of American energy resources, Donald Trump has effectively opened a second front of gas blackmail against Europe.
Over the past three years, the European Union has drastically reduced energy imports from Russia and prepared a concept for a complete phase-out of Russian energy resources by 2027. However, this plan was never published. And as of today, that appears to have been a wise decision.
Trump is demanding expanded commitments to purchase American gas, while suppliers insist on long-term contracts. All of this strongly resembles the energy disputes between Russia and Europe over the past two decades, except for one key difference: Russian gas was cheap, while American gas was expensive. Moreover, Europe is expected to see a significant decline in gas demand by the late 2020s.
Against the backdrop of open hostility from the Trump administration toward European interests and a rift in the Euro-Atlantic partnership, a complete rejection of Russian gas would make the EU overly dependent on US supplies, which could in the future become tools of economic or political blackmail.
Under the new circumstances, the old strategy has lost its relevance, and voices in favour of continuing energy trade with Russia, including pipeline gas, are growing louder across Europe.
However, economists and experts advise against fully resuming Russian supplies. Instead, they recommend restoring Russia’s share of EU gas imports to 25% – double the level expected this year. At the same time, these imports should be subject to tariffs. This strategy would allow Europe to both diversify its gas imports and preserve incentives to expand the share of renewable energy in its energy mix.
The trade war launched by the Trump administration on two fronts – against the EU and China – and the arbitrary nature of its economic demands are forcing Europe to reassess its geoeconomic priorities. The value of partnership with the US is declining, while Moscow and Beijing, in the context of Trump’s policies, appear to be more predictable counterparts, relationships with which help balance out Washington’s economic opportunism.
The second gas front
The revisionism and economic opportunism of Donald Trump's administration are forcing Europe to rethink its approach to energy policy. Until recently, phasing out Russian energy resources seemed to be the EU’s core strategy for minimising geopolitical risks. Today, however, that strategy is facing a new and unexpected challenge.
At the end of March, the European Commission was expected to present a 'roadmap' for Europe's gradual phase-out of Russian fossil fuels by 2027. However, the publication of the document was postponed. Media sources (such as Bloomberg) attributed the delay to an effort to remove from the agenda a topic that sparked fierce objections from Hungary and Slovakia, countries the EU was simultaneously trying to persuade to increase defence spending and provide additional aid to Ukraine (→ Re:Russia: European Unreadiness). But behind this familiar explanation lay a deeper reason: the new unpredictability of trade relations with the United States. If in the past Europe's political concern was dependence on Russian gas, now its main alternative supplier, the US, is demonstrating a willingness to use energy as a weapon.
At present, the US is demanding that Europe radically increase gas purchases. Donald Trump has explicitly stated that such purchases should be a precondition for lifting or easing tariffs on EU goods: 'We can get $350 billion in a week – but they need to commit to buying that much in energy.' According to Trump’s calculations, that figure equals the US trade deficit with Europe. According to the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR), the goods trade deficit is actually a third smaller ($236 billion) and drops to just $50 billion when trade in services is included. Regardless, using inflated figures, Trump wants Europe to pledge to offset this 'deficit' through energy imports.
This looks completely absurd. According to Eurostat, the amount Trump is demanding is only slightly less than the EU’s entire combined imports of oil and gas for 2024. In reality, US LNG imports are estimated at only $13 billion. The US also exports $57 billion worth of crude oil and around $4 billion worth of coal (approximately 25 million tons) to Europe. But scaling up US energy exports to the volume Trump demands is, of course, impossible. According to Kpler data cited by Reuters, average annual LNG exports from the US to Europe were about 15 million tons between 2018 and 2021, jumping to 55 million tons in 2022 and 2023. In 2024, volumes dropped to 43.8 million tons. This suggests the US is in fact pushing for long-term EU commitments to purchase American gas. This aligns with the interests of US gas suppliers who, as their market share in Europe grows, are increasingly pushing for long-term contracts to secure investment returns.
Surprisingly, the challenges Europe now faces in its gas relationship with the US strongly resemble the issues that once characterised its relationship with Moscow. For two decades, Russia insisted on long-term contracts, while Europe sought to increase the share of spot market purchases. The issue now is compounded by the fact that, according to European Commission forecasts, due to improved energy efficiency, greater use of renewables, and declining industrial demand, European gas consumption is expected to fall by 29% by 2030 and by 67% by 2040 compared to 2024 levels. As a result, experts from the Zero Carbon Analytics project calculate that by 2035, domestic energy production and existing supply contracts will exceed internal demand.
One way or another, economic blackmail is increasingly becoming the White House's calling card. The new US administration’s strategy of energy dominance involves aggressive expansion in energy trade. And rumors of a potential US-Russia deal to jointly sell gas to Europe via the Nord Stream pipeline are frankly alarming (→ Re:Russia: Gas Temptation). US LNG is becoming harder to view as a neutral commodity – at some point, it may turn into a geopolitical instrument. Tatiana Mitrova, a research fellow at Columbia University’s Centre on Global Energy Policy, acknowledges this in an interview with Reuters. Other experts interviewed by the agency also suggest that if the 'tariff war' continues, the US may even threaten Europe with LNG export restrictions.
Turning the tables: Russia as an alternative
Meanwhile, in 2024, the US became the third-largest gas supplier to the EU, accounting for 17% of the market, behind Norway (33%) and Russia (18%) (→ Re:Russia: Gas Temptation, calculations based on Bruegel data; similar figures are reported by Reuters). This year, Russian supplies are expected to drop by a third due to the end of pipeline transit through Ukraine, potentially reducing Russia's share to about 12% of European gas imports — assuming the lost volumes are replaced by other suppliers (→ Re:Russia: Waning Prosperity). In reality, at least part of the shortfall may be covered by other forms of Russian gas.
However, if Europe were to fully reject Russian gas on principle, the gap would need to be filled by increasing imports from the US. In 2024, Algeria and Egypt cut gas exports due to technical issues, while Nigeria was unable to increase output because of security threats in regions where its gas infrastructure is located, according to a report by the British think tank Ember. Qatar plans to significantly ramp up production, but it remains primarily focused on the Asian market. Additionally, the prospects for deepening cooperation with Qatar are limited by Europe's own regulatory stance: the state-owned company QatarEnergy may not meet the standards of the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, which includes not only environmental but also human rights criteria. Although the directive won’t take effect until 2027, Qatar’s Energy Minister Saad Al-Kaabi has already warned the EU that the country would halt gas exports if QatarEnergy is exposed to the risk of penalties. Moreover, Qatar also insists on long-term contracts, according to analysts at S&P Global.
In this new situation, where no option appears neutral or politically comfortable for the EU, the decision to hold off on a formal declaration of total disengagement from Russian gas seems entirely logical. As we previously noted (→ Re:Russia: Gas Temptation),this view is now supported in Europe not only by Hungary and Slovakia. Increasingly, it is being echoed by German politicians – and not just by pro-Russian far-left or far-right factions. Some representatives of the CDU/CSU, the most popular party at the time of the parliamentary elections, have voiced support for reviving the Nord Stream pipelines once the war ends. The party’s leader, Friedrich Merz, is on track to become the next Chancellor.
Surprisingly, this approach may actually better align with the EU’s strategic goal of supply diversification. Cheap Russian gas could serve as a counterbalance to US pressure. However, the heads of France’s Engie and Total, Didier Holleaux and Patrick Pouyanné, as quoted by Reuters, warn that returning to previous import volumes of 150 billion cubic metres per year from Russia would be a mistake. They argue that a supply level of 70 billion cubic metres would represent a reasonable compromise. In that case, Russia would cover about 25% of the EU’s needs, consistent with diversification goals.
Russian gas supplies to the EU, 2021 and 2024, billion cubic metres
Technically, the resumption of Russian supplies could happen at any time: there are no EU sanctions in place against Russian pipeline gas, and its import is not legally prohibited. However, the EU must not lose sight of its strategic objective to reduce dependence on fossil fuel imports to achieve greater energy resilience, experts from the Bruegel analytical centre have written. To ensure that cheap Russian supplies do not suppress incentives to expand the use of renewable energy, they propose two instruments for managing Russian gas imports: quotas or tariffs.
The drawback of quotas is that, in times of shortage (should they occur), Russia’s export revenues would increase – an outcome the EU wants to avoid. Tariffs, on the other hand, do not directly limit volumes but make Russian gas less competitive. This could push Russia to lower prices and encourage the EU to expand its use of alternative energy sources. Additionally, tariff revenues could be used to support countries most affected by rising prices or directed toward other political goals. Imposing tariffs requires only a qualified majority in the EU Council, meaning pro-Russian member states would not be able to block the decision. Bruegel experts assume that Russia would be willing to negotiate, as it lacks an alternative market for its pipeline gas. Thus, this approach could help the EU simultaneously achieve three major goals: diversification of supply, limitation of Kremlin revenues, and preservation of decarbonisation incentives.
The open hostility of the Trump administration toward European interests, the arbitrariness of its economic demands, and its two-front trade war – against both the EU and China – are forcing Europe to reassess its geoeconomic priorities. The value of its partnership with the US is diminishing, while Moscow and Beijing, against the backdrop of Trump’s policies, appear to be more predictable counterparts. Relations with them are becoming a necessary tool to help balance Washington’s economic opportunism.