According to The Kremlin's Script: How the Istanbul talks are structured and who stands to gain from them

Two memoranda and their logics

During the talks in Istanbul on 2 June, Russia and Ukraine exchanged memoranda outlining their irreconcilable positions and agreed on a new prisoner swap. In terms of content, this round of negotiations was nearly identical to the previous one, held on 16 May, where both sides had already presented these same intransigent positions. This time, however, the memoranda were made public.

It is worth recalling that this round of talks was initiated by President Trump, following his phone conversation with Vladimir Putin on 19 May. During that call, Trump unexpectedly deviated from the previously agreed position, shared with both allies and Ukraine, that the starting point for negotiations should be a 30-day ceasefire agreement. Before this, the American side had hinted at the possibility of introducing additional sanctions against Russia should it refuse such a scheme. However, following his discussion with Putin, Trump demanded that negotiations resume in Istanbul without Russia agreeing to a ceasefire and without U.S. participation. The fact that the talks are proceeding in the exact format favoured by the Kremlin, i.e. without a ceasefire, is being portrayed by Russian propaganda as a major diplomatic win for Moscow, which also repeatedly stresses that the negotiations are taking place at Putin’s initiative.

The Russian memorandum handed over to the Ukrainian side in Istanbul contains a list of Russia’s well-known ultimatums, modelled after capitulation agreements. Russia demands territories of Ukraine it has not yet conquered but claims as its own. Ukraine is to renounce the prospect of joining any military alliances and to forgo the development of nuclear weapons. There should be no foreign troops on Ukrainian soil. Limits are to be placed on the size of Ukraine’s military and its armaments. Ukraine must abandon all claims for reparations for the damage caused by Russian aggression. It must also drop all sanctions against Russia and ensure the restoration of Russian transit routes to Europe, including for gas. In addition, Ukraine is to recognise Russia’s right to intervene in its internal political affairs: it must adopt Russian-approved laws on the status of the Russian language and the 'protection of Russian-speaking populations', as well as laws banning the promotion of Ukrainian nationalism and dissolving political parties that Moscow deems nationalist.

The Ukrainian memorandum, by contrast, is ideologically framed as an agreement to freeze the conflict, that is, to implement a ceasefire along the line of confrontation and to introduce mechanisms to monitor compliance. It also states that Ukraine should receive security guarantees from the international community, though these are not specified. The memorandum maintains that Ukraine retains full sovereignty, firmly rejecting any restrictions on its armed forces or its right to join military alliances. It insists on the official non-recognition of Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territories and proposes the use of frozen Russian assets to rebuild Ukraine if reparations are not paid. It also proposes the phased lifting of sanctions on Russia, with an automatic reinstatement mechanism if Russia violates the terms of the agreement.

Thus, the memoranda are based on two opposing presumptions. The Ukrainian memorandum, as already mentioned, proceeds from the presumption of freezing the conflict, assuming that Russia is unlikely to achieve further military success and is abandoning such attempts. The Russian memorandum, on the contrary, deliberately includes maximal demands and assumes that Russia will be able to exploit its battlefield advantage to worsen Ukraine’s position or even bring about its military defeat, the outcome of which is essentially already 'written in' to the proposed surrender memorandum.

The Russian memorandum deliberately overstates its demands and includes provisions that the Kremlin, in reality, does not expect to be fulfilled and is apparently prepared to drop (such as the transfer of territories not yet captured, and legislation on the Russian language, etc.). What is fundamental for Moscow is the restriction of Ukraine’s rights to self-defence, rearmament, and participation in international alliances – measures designed to preserve Ukraine’s vulnerability to future Russian aggression. The Kyiv memorandum, by contrast, is much closer to Ukraine’s real 'red lines': limiting its right to self-defence, rearmament, and military alliances would turn the threat of a new Russian invasion into a permanent feature of national existence and would prevent Ukraine from recovering politically or economically. A constant threat of renewed invasion would make foreign private investment in the economy virtually impossible and leave Ukraine stuck in a post-war state of ruin.

Although the Russian memorandum does not depart in any way from the Kremlin’s longstanding maximalist demands, presenting it anew in the form of a 'negotiating' platform allows Russia to sustain the illusion of an ongoing peace process. For President Trump, this, in turn, serves as a justification for not imposing additional sanctions on Russia, as he had threatened two months ago, and for avoiding discussion of further military aid to Ukraine. For Russia, such a pause provides favourable conditions for a new offensive, during which it hopes to improve its battlefield position and thereby raise its demands at the negotiating table.

How hopes for peace help Russia wage war

The simulation of negotiations, beyond its foreign policy purpose of supporting Trump’s strategy of postponing further sanctions, is also important for the Kremlin in terms of domestic political objectives. 

It is meant to demonstrate Moscow’s willingness to reach a peace settlement and to reinforce among the Russian public the impression that the war is nearing a favourable conclusion for Russia.

Overall, expectations for a swift end to the conflict are very high in Russia, as evidenced by a recent poll conducted by the Levada Centre at the end of May. In response to the question of whether military operations should continue or peace talks begin, support for continued warfare dropped to 28% (down from a January–May average of 31%), while support for negotiations rose to 64% (up from a 60% average). In the second half of 2024, the average ratio had been 37% versus 55%. Also in late May, 87% of those surveyed said they definitely or mostly supported the talks held in Istanbul on 16 May. Only 6% expressed opposition. Predictably, 73% of those polled took the Kremlin’s position, namely, that a ceasefire must be preceded by Ukraine agreeing to the main points of the Russian ultimatum, while 18% believed negotiations should begin with a ceasefire.

In general, the prospect of a speedy resolution through talks has raised public expectations regarding the conditions of peace. Until February 2025, around 48–49% of respondents were prepared to support a withdrawal of Russian troops and the start of peace negotiations, even if the goals of the 'special military operation' had not been achieved, while 31–33% were not ready to do so. In March 2025, willingness fell to 45%, and reluctance rose to 42%, notes sociologist and founder of the ExtremeScan project Elena Koneva, citing data from that project and Chronicles. In late 2024, when it became clear that the Russian offensive had yielded little and that even full control over Donetsk Oblast was still far off, the war appeared endless and futile to many Russians, increasing the proportion willing to end it on compromise or even nearly any terms. By contrast, Russian-American consultations, during which Washington showed increasing understanding of the Kremlin’s position and made new concessions, raised expectations regarding the 'effectiveness' of the war. In February, 50% believed it would take another year or more to end the conflict, while 30% thought it would end within six months. But by late March, the number of sceptics had nearly halved, down to 28%, and the number of optimists had risen to 43%, Koneva notes, citing Chronicles and ExtremeScan data.

Furthermore, the expectation of a relatively quick end to the war appears to be contributing to a more active recruitment of contract soldiers in Russia. Previously, such contracts were seen as indefinite, with a high risk of death upon signing. Now, however, people are rushing to enlist, believing that the conflict’s imminent end lowers the chances of being killed. Journalists from Verstka, having seen confidential data from the 'Unified Recruitment Point' in Moscow, reported a sharp increase in people wishing to sign contracts beginning in mid-March. They attributed this rise to the 'peace negotiations'. This growing influx of 'volunteer-contract soldiers' is, in turn, strengthening Russia’s position in the talks by increasing its potential for future success on the battlefield.

Thus, the Kremlin-imposed concept of 'direct negotiations' without intermediaries, i.e. negotiations that are unlimited in both time and outcome, requires no concessions from Moscow. Yet it enables Russia to avoid the threat of further sanctions, dulls the urgency around military aid to Ukraine, improves the social climate in Russia by raising hopes of a favourable end to the war, likely boosts the recruitment of contract soldiers, and overall creates the most advantageous conditions possible for a Russian offensive this summer.