Radar of Uncertainty: Perceptions of the global order are undergoing dramatic changes in world public opinion, but remain undefined

Threats and camps

The war in Ukraine and the Western coalition’s failure to effectively counter Moscow’s aggression have become catalysts for fundamental shifts in the perception of the international order and geopolitical balance. More so than Donald Trump’s erratic initiatives, these developments are now at the heart of discussions on the end of the 'old order' and debates over what will replace it – a bipolar, multipolar, or non-polar world.

But to what extent do these political and expert discussions truly reflect shifts in public perceptions and demands across different nations? A glimpse into this question is offered by the large-scale sociological study ‘Security Radar’, conducted by Germany’s Friedrich Ebert Foundation across 14 countries and unveiled at the Munich Security Conference last week.

The survey shows that the world is becoming more dangerous, and public sentiment is growing more anxious. However, this increase in concern about global affairs is most characteristic of European countries, particularly the larger and more prosperous ones. In France and Germany, 69% of those surveyed expect the global security situation to worsen. In Italy, Poland, the UK, and Sweden, similar concerns are shared by 52–61%. Outside of Europe – in Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia – only 19–34% of the population expresses such concerns. However, in these countries, respondents are more likely to consider the threat of a Third World War as a real possibility.

The survey included 14 countries: six EU member states (Germany, France, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Sweden), the UK and the US, as well as non-European nations such as Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, Serbia, Turkey, and Georgia. In 12 out of 14 countries, respondents ranked inflation, economic crises, and wars/conflicts among their top three concerns. Military conflicts were the primary concern in four countries: Ukraine, Georgia, Latvia, and Germany. Predictably, most European countries view Russia as the primary external threat. This sentiment is strongest in Russia’s immediate neighbors – Georgia, Poland, and Latvia (51–55%) – and is, unsurprisingly, highest in Ukraine (74%). Following them are Sweden (38%), Germany (30%), and the UK (30%). In Italy, on the other hand, concern about Russia is at a minimum (8%). Meanwhile, China is seen as a threat by only 1-7% of European respondents – a lower percentage than those who see the US as a threat. In the US, 17% of those surveyed consider Russia a threat, whereas 25% view China as the greater danger.

The majority of those surveyed in most surveyed countries support increasing military spending, but with varying degrees of confidence. The strongest support is observed in Ukraine, Georgia, and Poland (75–77%)—countries that feel a direct threat from Russia. The next group includes Sweden, Russia, and Turkey (60–67%). In other European countries there is no such firm majority: in Germany, France and the UK, 52-56% favour increased military spending, in Latvia – 49%, in Italy – 26%. Despite geopolitical tensions, much of Europe remains reluctant to abandon the benefits of the 'peace dividend' era. However, respondents in Ukraine (63%), Russia (44%), and Poland (38%) show the highest willingness to cut other budget areas (including social spending) to finance military needs. In the US, Germany, and Turkey, this willingness stands at 30%.

In general, the countries of the survey are divided into several ‘geopolitical camps’. The first are those who feel that they are directly threatened by Russia (Poland, Latvia, Georgia, Ukraine). The second are countries with an increased ‘external responsibility’ mindset — Great Britain, Germany, and to some extent France and Sweden. Here people feel more responsible for the fate of Europe (and the world as a whole). In Sweden, the high level of ‘external’ responsibility is focused on the problems of the Baltic region, for which Russia is perceived as a direct threat. The third group of more detached European nations is represented in the sample by Italy – more distanced with regard to both the conflict in Ukraine and geopolitical challenges. Finally, the fourth group includes the countries with a ‘non-European perspective’ (Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkey and Serbia; Georgia also appears here on some issues). Finally, the United States stands apart, in some ways converging with the European vision, and in some ways moving away from it.

New (dis)order and rising indifference

The general trends in the change of perceptions of the world political order in the Ebert Foundation surveys are quite similar to those recorded by the authors of the Munich Security Report (→ Re:Russia: Munich Discord). The belief that the era of US dominance has ended is most widespread in the 'non-European perspective' countries – Russia, Serbia, Turkey, and Kazakhstan (51–62%). However, a similar sentiment is shared by nearly half of respondents in Germany, France, and the UK (46–47%). Even in the US, 43% agree that American global supremacy is over. Residents of the countries most vulnerable due to their proximity to Russia – Poland, Georgia, and Ukraine – continue to place the most hope in the US in its role of ‘world policeman’.

There is a wide polyphony of opinions about what will replace the ‘old order’. This reflects trends rather than a fully developed vision of the future. The most widely shared expectation is an 'era of wars and conflicts'. 70-79% of those surveyed in European countries (France, Italy, Sweden, Great Britain) and in the USA, as well as in Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine believe this. The idea of a new Cold War between the US and China is most common outside Europe – Turkey, Serbia, Ukraine, and Russia (60–68%) – but is supported by only 50% of Europeans. The principle of 'My country first' is particularly popular in Turkey (83%), followed by France, Georgia, Serbia, and the UK (71–74%). In Italy, Sweden, Ukraine, and the US, 60–68% also endorse this view.

In general, the isolationist principle that ‘My country should focus on its own well-being and avoid involvement in international affairs’ is the least popular in Sweden, yet even there, 50% of those surveyed support it. In Poland, France, Italy, the UK, Germany, and Russia, this view is shared by 55–57%, while in the US, it reaches 65%. Among non-European nations such as Serbia, Turkey, and Georgia, this self-centred pragmatism resonates with 70–86% of respondents. Thus, support for both this principle and the previous 'My country first' sentiment, though to varying degrees, is characteristic of all geopolitical camps. Previously, this kind of 'non-ideological' pragmatism was considered typical primarily of developing nations in the Global South, while the 'collective West' was thought to distinguish itself through stronger value-driven policies. However, this distinction is blurring, even though it still holds significance on specific geopolitical issues.

Even more striking is the fact that in the 'Old West’ – often accused of imposing its values and order on the world – the most popular sentiment is: 'My country should remain committed to our values at home but should not try to promote them abroad.' This principle is supported by 65% of Germans and 44–49% of those surveyed in Sweden, the UK, the US, and France. Meanwhile, only 35–39% in these countries (and just 25% in Germany) favour actively spreading their values internationally. In contrast, in Poland, Serbia, Italy, Ukraine, and Turkey, the majority (53–62%) supports promoting their values globally, with only 26–38% arguing that their values should remain domestic matters.

Perhaps the most contradictory aspect of this new indifference is seen in the fact that in all surveyed countries, a majority (51–78%) supports cooperating for peace and security even with nations that do not share their values. However, an even stronger majority (60–82%) believes their country should reduce its dependence on nations that do not align with their values. This reflects a growing desire to distance themselves from two types of dependence: direct dependence on ‘dominant powers’ on the one hand and, ‘bloc dependence’ within geopolitical alliances, on the other. Across all geopolitical camps, there is a rising emphasis on 'sovereignty' in the broadest sense of the word.

The strongest support for reducing dependence on Russia – even at the cost of economic losses and a lower standard of living – is found in Poland, Sweden, the UK, Ukraine, and the US. In these countries, 71–85% of respondents favour cutting ties. In Germany, France, Italy, and Latvia, the figure is 60–67%, while even in Georgia and Turkey, 58% support this move.However, opposition to dependence on China is significantly weaker: More than 60% in France, Sweden, the UK, and the US support reducing economic reliance on China while a simple majority in Germany, Italy, Turkey, Ukraine, and Georgia shares this view. The presence of Georgia and Turkey in both lists is notable. Although these countries benefit from good relations with Russia, they strongly reject dependence on any major power, emphasising strategic autonomy as a guiding principle.

‘Schrodinger's Great Power’

As researchers have noted in other surveys, European countries – especially the 'core' EU states – are deeply entrenched in pessimism and a kind of 'reflective powerlessness.' It is understandable, for example, that the small nation of Latvia is the most pessimistic about its ability to defend itself against a Russian attack – only 8% believe they could resist. However, the figures for France and Germany are only slightly higher, with just 9% and 16%, respectively, believing in their own military capabilities. These numbers are even lower than in tiny Georgia (17%). By contrast, in the US (70%), Turkey (59%), and Ukraine (53%), a significant majority expresses confidence in their armed forces in the event of a conflict with Russia.

The EU’s role in the modern world appears paradoxical. The authors of the report titled their section on Europe’s geopolitical role: 'The EU is Schrödinger’s Great Power.' From an external perspective, the EU is often seen as a major power, thanks to its economic strength and the combined military resources of its member states. In the global geopolitical landscape, the EU is viewed as a bloc of like-minded nations, potentially acting alongside the US, Russia, or China as a global power. However, internally, the perception is very different. EU citizens, especially those from key member states, are not only reluctant to view Europe as a great power but also exhibit deep skepticism about the EU’s global standing and influence.

For example, when asked whether the EU could defend itself without US support, only about 30% of respondents across most EU countries answered positively. Meanwhile, in non-EU countries such as Kazakhstan, Serbia, the UK, and the US, 41–45% shared this view, while in Russia and Turkey, two-thirds believed the EU could stand on its own. In the five EU countries surveyed, only 32% agreed with the statement that 'The European Union is becoming a global power, taking a position distinct from China and the US' The exception was Sweden, where 46% supported this view. Among non-European countries, 37% on average agreed. The idea of establishing a common and strong European army barely garners majority support within the EU: it is supported by 56% in France, 54% in Poland, 50% in Latvia, 49% in Germany, 45% in Sweden and 42% in Italy.

This situation can partly be explained by the growing focus on 'sovereignty' worldwide, which creates internal contradictions within the European Union and deepens the divide between 'Euro-optimists' and those who see 'national sovereignty' as a refuge from global instability. As the Ebert Foundation survey shows, the belief that 'EU policy regularly conflicts with my country’s interests' is shared by 77% in Russia and 65-66% in Turkey and Serbia, which is natural – a reflection of their geopolitical divergence from the EU. However, within the EU this sentiment is also shared by 51% in Poland, 47% in France, 44% in Italy, 43% in Germany. This likely reflects the coexistence and competition between different conceptions of sovereignty within a unified Europe.

In general, these surveys suggest that the foundations of Euro-Atlantic ideology appear significantly weakened, though not entirely dismantled. Distrust of bloc thinking, indifference, and a focus on national sovereignty and self-interest are spreading from the countries of the Global South to Europe – the home of Western geopolitical thinking. However, these trends do not only weaken Western unity, they also undermine Beijing’s and Moscow’s hopes for the emergence of an anti-Western bloc in global politics. The Ebert Foundation survey aligns with findings from a recent study by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), which argues that the world is not simply shifting from an old unipolar order to classic multipolarity. Instead, it is evolving into a new 'à la carte' world order (→ Asch, Krastev, Leonard: Peace à la carte). And, crucially, these global public opinion shifts are not merely reactions to the Trump administration’s erratic policies. Instead, it is more likely that Trump’s actions themselves were a response to these deeper changes, including the widespread belief that the era of American dominance is fading and that the bloc-based worldview is losing relevance.