Weak Link: Frontline instability and lack of manpower are becoming a key factor weakening Ukraine's bargaining position with the Kremlin

The Ukrainian front and the negotiation equation

Donald Trump’s team appears to have significantly shifted its approach to ending the war in Ukraine compared to the campaign period. A series of tougher statements and threats directed at the Kremlin in recent weeks suggest this change. Now, Trump’s inner circle sees a deal with Vladimir Putin as a prelude to negotiations with Beijing – negotiations Trump cannot enter from a position of strength without first demonstrating his ability to exert pressure on a weaker counterpart. In both Washington and Beijing, that counterpart is perceived to be President Putin (→ Re:Russia: The Frenzy of Transactionalism).

At the same time, the US administration has limited tools to compel the Kremlin into an acceptable agreement. These tools primarily include either a severe threat to Russia’s economic stability or a shift in the battlefield balance – or more likely, a combination of both. If Putin realises he cannot achieve further territorial gains while Ukraine’s army remains stable, alongside the looming risk of economic deterioration, he may be forced to scale back his ambitions. Conversely, even if Trump manages to lower oil prices (which experts remain skeptical about), the Russian economy and budget could endure for a while – making Ukraine’s military resilience a critical factor in the meantime.

Thus, four key factors that will determine the course of the negotiations can be distinguished at the moment: 1) Trump’s team’s views on the importance of security guarantees for Ukraine and the 'reliability' of a deal; 2) the availability of leverage to increase economic pressure on Russia; 3) the stability of arms supplies to Ukraine, and 4) the combat capability and sustainability of the Ukrainian army.

The last factor is an essential piece of the overall equation. In early 2024, Ukraine’s frontline weaknesses were largely attributed to a lack of weapons and ammunition due to delays in American aid. However, since summer, experts have increasingly highlighted internal challenges within Ukraine’s military – staffing shortages, morale, command structure, and trust issues across different levels of leadership.

Prominent military expert Michael Kofman, in a series of posts on X (formerly Twitter) earlier this year, described the current phase as the 'most difficult period' for Ukraine’s armed forces since the invasion began. Although ammunition shortages were alleviated by mid-2024 and mobilisation initially showed results, Kyiv struggled to sustain these gains. Mobilisation rates declined, desertion rates rose, and concerns over training quality and military governance became more pronounced. Kofman, who frequently visits the front, noted that while Russian losses remain substantial and recruiting new volunteers is becoming increasingly costly for the Kremlin, morale among Ukrainian forces is deeply pessimistic – not due to Russian advances, but because of internal structural issues.

The mobilisation crisis

Experts have been discussing Ukraine’s mobilisation crisis for over a year now. As Crisis Group analyst Simon Schlegel notes, Ukraine’s recruitment system relied too heavily on volunteers early in the war, but by the end of 2023, that influx had dried up. Additionally, the government struggled to assess the country’s mobilisation capacity, as the last national census was conducted in 2001. In late 2023, Ukraine launched a program aimed at expanding its draft pool and accurately counting eligible conscripts. In April 2024, President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law lowering the mobilisation age from 27 to 25, adding approximately 150,000–160,000 men to the draft pool. By July, according to the Ukrainian Defence Ministry, around 4.7 million men had registered for military service through enlistment offices and the Reserve+ app.

The influx of military personnel increased to around 30,000 per month after April 2024, but by fall, the numbers began to decline again. In October, Vasyl Rumak, head of the training at the General Staff of Ukraine’s Armed Forces , stated that the number of mobilised troops undergoing training had dropped to 20,000 per month. Analyst Simon Schlegel attributes this slowdown in recruitment to Ukraine’s high casualty rates. According to the UA Losses Project, which tracks losses based on publicly available information, Ukrainian casualties had exceeded 63,500 by mid-January 2025 (a similar Russian project by Mediazona and the BBC, estimates total losses by doubling figures obtained through open sources, a factor investigators have verified by analyzing military cemeteries). Schlegel notes that these high casualty rates fuel a vicious cycle: new recruits receive rushed and inadequate training, leading to further high losses and an accelerating depletion of human resources.

Ukraine’s Western allies have long urged Kyiv to lower the draft age to 18 (Trump's national security adviser Michael Waltz demanded this from Ukraine in January). The Ukrainian authorities argue that even the existing forces lack weapons and increasing their numbers will not have a significant effect (however, some military commanders refute these claims). Officials also warn that such a measure would be deeply unpopular and could trigger mass emigration among young men.

Mobilisation and voluntary service remain unpopular due to high casualties, expectations of a negotiated settlement to end the war, and declining trust in the government and its messaging. This erosion of trust has been exacerbated by corruption scandals in recruitment offices, which have fueled perceptions of social injustice in the mobilisation process.

Signs of demobilisation are evident in Ukrainian society’s increasing tolerance toward draft evasion, as indicated by public opinion polls, as well as a growing number of deserters. Estimates of the scale of desertion vary. At one of the meetings in the Verkhovna Rada, it was said that since the beginning of the Russian invasion, more than 80,000 soldiers have deserted the battlefield. The Ukrainian independent project Texty.org.ua conducted an anonymous online survey and in-depth interviews on the issue of desertion. It found that among its main reasons respondents cited the lack of clear terms of service and rotation (54%), incompetent actions of the command, endangering the lives of personnel (46%), fatigue and lack of opportunity for recovery (44%), corruption in the army (34%), ignoring the need for medical treatment (32%) and conflicts with the command (28%).

The personnel shortage has triggered a chain reaction: lack of rotations, exhaustion, internal conflicts, and worsening morale within military units. One in three surveyed soldiers mentioned corruption as a major issue. Previously, Ukraine’s army compensated for Russia’s numerical and firepower advantages with superior morale, but this advantage has now significantly diminished.

Command and trust issues

Ukrainian military analyst Tatarigami observes that as the war drags on, systemic issues within Ukraine’s military – some inherited from the Soviet era – have worsened. One of the most pressing problems is what he calls a ‘toxic culture of dishonest reporting’. Officers who report shortages of troops or supplies risk losing their positions, while those who agree to carry out unrealistic orders are promoted. This leads to excessive casualties and operational failures. Military analyst Mick Ryan notes that a similar culture of falsified reporting is widespread in the Russian armed forces and urges Kyiv to eliminate this practice to improve transparency in military communications.

However, this issue extends beyond the military and into the government’s broader communication with society, Tatarigami argues. While government propaganda was initially effective in mobilising the population, it has increasingly diverged from reality. Part of the public has become accustomed to hearing about Russian failures while downplaying Ukraine’s own setbacks, leading to inflated expectations of the Armed Forces' capabilities. Meanwhile, another segment of society is losing trust in mainstream information sources altogether.

Another issue Tatarigami highlights is the chaos in military command and control. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine dismantled large military formations such as corps and divisions, leaving the brigade as the highest-level tactical unit. While this decision seemed reasonable at the time, it created a gap in experience with commanding large-scale military operations. To compensate for this deficiency, the Ukrainian Armed Forces established temporary formations – operational-tactical groups and operational-strategic formations. However, the fragmented command system and high turnover among leadership have led to confusion and a lack of accountability in managing these units.

One high-profile failure resulting from such structural issues was the scandal with the formation of the 155th Army Brigade ‘Anna of Kyiv’, which inflicted serious reputational damage on Ukraine’s military. The brigade’s formation was announced at the D-Day anniversary ceremony in Normandy in June 2024. It was trained and equipped in France, with Paris covering the €900 million cost. However, due to mismanagement during deployment, nearly one-third of its personnel (1,700 soldiers) deserted. As a result, the brigade’s equipment – including Caesar howitzers and armored vehicles – was reassigned to other army units, and many of the trained soldiers were transferred to infantry roles.

From autumn 2023 to August 2024, Forbes writes, the Ukrainian command formed 10 new brigades – four mechanised brigades, five infantry brigades and a jaeger brigade. The creation of the new brigades is explained by the lengthening of the front line as a result of the Kursk operation, as well as the need for rotation. However, Forbes notes, it may take months before a brigade of up to 2,000 men is fully equipped and trained. The Ukrainian OSINT project DeepState, which tracks battlefield developments daily, reported that 'the newly formed brigades are nowhere near the level of those deployed in 2023.' Military expert Michael Kofman has criticised Kyiv’s decision to create new brigades instead of reinforcing battle-hardened units, calling it 'one of the most puzzling' strategic choices by Ukrainian authorities.

Is there a way out of the crisis?

Ukraine’s army is capable of stabilising the front in 2025, but doing so will require a coordinated approach between Kyiv and the West, leveraging existing resources and developing a realistic action plan, according to Michael Kofman. Tatarigami argues that Kyiv must undertake a real military reform to build a more modern fighting force. The first step should be reforming military leadership: generals who rose through the ranks in the 1990s and 2000s – with little actual combat experience – should be replaced by officers familiar with the realities of modern warfare. A new system for rotating senior commanders should be established, based on merit rather than political loyalty or personal connections.

With the volunteer recruitment pool drying up and partial demobilisation of society, Ukraine is unlikely to sustain troop levels through forced conscription alone. Like Russia, Ukraine will likely need to increase financial incentives to attract contract soldiers and support mobilisation efforts. Tatarigami also suggests that frontline infantry service should come with greater benefits, including guaranteed demobilisation timelines. He proposes a fundamental reform of Ukraine’s military justice system, creating an independent oversight body modeled after the US military, responsible for investigating violations and handling soldiers’ complaints.

Experts also advocate returning to permanent division- and corps-level military structures – a recommendation made by Michael Kofman. Analysts from Crisis Group argue that Kyiv should modernise its training system, adopting best practices from NATO countries and Ukraine’s own elite brigades, which have developed independent training centres and continue to attract volunteers – even for frontline service. In contrast, the state-run system relies heavily on coercion while remaining highly inefficient.

Ultimately, Ukraine’s frontline crisis and manpower shortage cannot be solely explained by its smaller population relative to Russia. Both sides have mobilised several hundred thousand troops, so the key challenges lie in incentives, organisational effectiveness, and trust in the military, the mobilisation system, and government institutions. This crisis has now become one of the most critical factors weakening Ukraine’s position in negotiations over ending the war.