Extraordinary Legitimacy: Amid protracted war, demand for accountability in Ukraine has increased, but this is a sign of normalisation, not crisis
The cohesion effect ('rally around the flag') in Ukrainian society continues to weaken, and Zelensky's rating continues to decline, though at a much more moderate pace. The weakening of Zelensky's 'extraordinary' legitimacy is, however, not a sign of crisis, but a return to normality. In the context of a protracted war, the demand for accountability in Ukraine has increased, and the government will have to reckon with it.
While critical of the results of Zelensky's five-year rule, citizens do not tend to overlook his achievements: just under 40% believe he has partially or fully fulfilled his promises. They are more likely to hold the government responsible for the deterioration of Ukrainian democracy than for the economy.
Ukraine exhibits a post-Soviet-specific attitude towards democracy. It has the highest proportion of people who consider democracy the best existing form of government, and 44% of those surveyed, despite martial law and the absence of elections, are convinced that power in the country still belongs to the people.
Two-thirds of Ukrainians believe that any possible agreements on peace terms should be approved via a referendum. The share of supporters for territorial compromises has significantly increased over the past year, including in Western Ukraine. Ukrainian society continues to see itself as the main actor in Ukrainian politics, and victory or defeat will ultimately be defined by what Ukrainians agree to consider as such, experts believe.
From rally to norm
President Volodymyr Zelensky is trusted by 59% of Ukrainians, according to a May poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). Trust in Zelensky has been declining for six months from its 'rally-around-the-flag' peak: immediately after the Russian invasion, the trust level soared from 37% to 90%, but by December 2023, it had fallen to 77%, and by February 2024, it had decreased to 64%.
Trust in Volodymyr Zelensky in Ukrainian society, 2019-2024, % of those surveyed
Experts have repeatedly noted that the 'rally-around-the-flag' effect in war-torn Ukraine, now more than two years into the conflict, is wearing off (→ Re:Russia: Victory and Defeat). The most acute critical sentiment is evident in the assessments of the president's team, his party, and individual politicians. For instance, only 7% of those surveyed now rate the performance of the ruling party, 'Servant of the People', as 'very good' or 'good'. The trend of declining trust in Zelensky indicates that the 'transfer of negativity' is gradually extending to the president himself, acknowledges KIIS sociologist Anton Hrushetsky.
The weakening of the 'rally' effect appears alarming in a context where regular elections are not being held: without formal legitimacy, the president may lose his 'exceptional' legitimacy. This is also the basis of Vladimir Putin's personal propaganda campaign against Zelensky, claiming that the expiration of Zelensky's presidential term means the end of his legitimacy.
However, as seen from the May data, the decline in Zelensky's rating has slowed. The share of those expressing distrust in him has not changed compared to February (35% and 36%). Meanwhile, 59% is a high level of trust for democracies. In most European countries, it is common for leaders to have trust ratings around 30–35% (for example, the rating of French President Emmanuel Macron currently stands at 24%). Conversely, the rating of Vladimir Putin (exceeding 70% or even 80% according to various polls) is an anomaly, indicating that something is wrong—either with the polls, the political system, or most likely, both.
The 'rally-around-the-flag' effect, described by sociologists, is based on the fact that in times of external danger, the opposition generally stops criticising the government, and trust in it sharply increases. However, this effect cannot be long-term. If the political system maintains a democratic character, the effect starts to wane: the opposition resumes criticising various government decisions. If the 'rally' effect does not wane, it usually means that the government has tried to institutionalise it, for example, by banning opposition parties or monopolising the media. In this case, the demand for unity is replaced by a demand for a 'strong hand' and centralised leadership, justified by the conditions of real or perceived external threats.
In other words, the exhaustion of the 'rally-around-the-flag' effect in Ukrainian society can be seen as a manifestation of normalcy and the embedded democratic potential within society. Moving away from the model of 'no criticism of the government in times of confrontation with the enemy' (rally effect) amid prolonged war, Ukraine is returning to a normalisation of the confrontation with the enemy, which does not exclude criticism of the government and demands for accountability.
At the same time, a discussion about the possibility of holding presidential elections and the potential negative impact of their postponement on the state of democracy in the country, which Russia could exploit for propaganda purposes, has taken place in Ukrainian society. Society has agreed with the arguments of those advocating for postponement: organising participation in elections for those on the front lines and for the 7 million Ukrainians abroad would be extremely challenging. According to various polls, 70–80% of Ukrainians agree with postponing the elections, according to Anton Hrushetsky.
Therefore, unlike Putin, Ukrainian citizens, without disputing Zelensky's political legitimacy, can soberly evaluate him as a leader. Only 27% of those surveyed would vote for him if elections were held 'this Sunday', according to the KIIS survey conducted in May. The same percentage would vote for Valeriy Zaluzhny. These are normal figures considering that presidential elections in reality have not even been announced in the country.
According to the KIIS survey marking the fifth year of Zelensky's presidency, the majority of Ukrainians surveyed (50%) believe that the president has not fulfilled his pre-election promises. 37% believe he has fulfilled them completely (18%) or partially (19%). In the context of war, this is a very reasonable balance. Ukrainian respondents attribute Zelensky's failure to fulfil his promises to the presence of dishonest and corrupt individuals in his team (50%), Russia's full-scale invasion (31%), lack of experience (27%), and the influence of oligarchs (26%). Only 14% attribute this to Zelensky's own corruption.
A relative majority believe that the situation with democracy (43%) and the economy (49%) in the country has deteriorated over this period. Ukrainians also attribute responsibility for the deterioration in democracy and the economy primarily to government mistakes – 28% and 23%, respectively. Regarding the regression of democracy, 11% of those surveyed are inclined to blame the Russian invasion, while 17% attribute this to the economic downturn. Another 9% believe that the economic decline is linked to both factors, while only 3% think the same regarding the regression of democracy. In other words, Ukrainians are more inclined to blame the authorities for the deterioration in democracy and less so for the economic situation. This reflects a fairly rational and balanced assessment of the current situation.
Democracy, war and peace
In general, Ukrainians' attitude towards democracy can be considered unusual compared to, especially, other post-Soviet countries with their increased demand for a 'strong leader'. Against the backdrop of critical external stress, Ukrainians' commitment to democratic values remains extraordinarily high. According to a Gallup International survey conducted at the end of 2023 in 43 countries (in Ukraine by the 'Rating' company), 64% of Ukrainians agree with the statement that 'democracy is the best form of government, despite all its shortcomings'. Ukraine ranked 6th in popularity of this thesis after Sweden, Austria, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland. Among other post-Soviet countries, the agreement was: Russia – only 22%, Kazakhstan – 42%, Moldova – 44%, Armenia – 52%, Georgia – 58%. In the same survey, war-torn Ukraine entered the top ten countries where residents believe that their state is governed according to the will of the people (44%). Among post-Soviet countries, agreement with this statement was: Russia – 13%, Georgia – 22%, Kazakhstan – 27%, Moldova – 28%, Armenia – 36%.
This conviction resonates with the opinion of Ukrainians that the state should be accountable to society even during wartime. According to KIIS data, only 13% of those surveyed believe that authorities cannot be criticised during wartime, while 50% think that criticism is necessary but should be balanced and constructive to avoid destabilising the country. Another 31% of citizens believe that criticism should be uncompromising because it is the only way to compel authorities to correct their mistakes (62% of those who do not trust Zelensky hold this opinion).
Unlike Russia, the question of continuing or ending the war in Ukraine is also largely seen as a matter of democratic choice. According to KIIS data, 65% of those surveyed believe it is necessary to approve any results of future peace negotiations and possible concessions through a referendum. Moreover, in this matter, there are almost no differences between the central, western, and eastern regions of the country. Interestingly, this aspect of the Ukrainian 'peace formula' is rarely mentioned internationally and in Western press.
Even more significant are the changes in Ukrainian public opinion on this issue that have emerged over recent months. According to the same survey, the proportion of Ukrainians who believe the country should not make any concessions to achieve peace has decreased from 80% in September 2023 to 58% in May 2024.
In the east of the country, the share of residents in favour of an uncompromising position is slightly lower (55%) than in the west (63%). However, the dynamics of softening of the position regarding territorial concessions is more pronounced in the west: in the past, it was the west that demonstrated the most intransigent position on this topic. Among those in the west who lived there before the start of the war (and did not move from conflict-affected regions), the proportion opposed to concessions decreased by 27 percentage points from September 2023, now standing at 56%, which is slightly lower than the national average, as noted in commentary on the survey materials by Professor Anton Oleinik of the University of Newfoundland. He considers this change extremely important; to a certain extent, it is the Ukrainian west that remains the leader in opinions on Ukrainian sovereignty issues. The proportion of those who find recognition of Donbass (within the full borders of Donetsk and Luhansk regions) as part of Russia unacceptable decreased in the national survey from 78% in 2023 to 57% in 2024 (a decrease of 20%).
Oleinik also notes that the government's ability to control changes in Ukrainians' perceptions on these issues is limited. On one hand, Ukrainian authorities have managed to neutralise the influence of Russian media and social networks and enhance the effectiveness of the 'Unified News' telethon as a mechanism of propaganda. However, the proportion of those who consider unified television news an important source of information decreased from 65% in May 2023 to 51% by February 2024, according to KIIS data, while Ukrainian Telegram channels and internet publications are considered such by 75% and 72% of those surveyed, respectively. Ukrainian society continues to perceive itself as the central subject of Ukrainian politics. In these conditions, victory and defeat will ultimately be defined by what Ukrainians agree to consider as such, Oleinik concludes.