The Doctrine of Nuclear Non-Deterrence: How the Kremlin turned nuclear blackmail into a tool of conventional warfare

Crisis escalation

The episodes that have received the most attention from analysts and the media are those in which hints of the possible use of nuclear weapons have come directly from Vladimir Putin. However, these statements are only part of a broader Kremlin information campaign aimed at heightening the nuclear threat. Russia's rhetorical nuclear escalations can be categorised into several types: crisis, background, propagandistic, and doctrinal.

Crisis escalations typically originate directly from Putin and are tied to moments of uncertainty or military setbacks for the Russian side. The first such warning came in his address on the invasion of Ukraine: ‘Whoever tries to interfere with us, let alone create threats to our country, to our people, must know that Russia's response will be immediate and will lead to consequences you have never encountered in your history'. He added ‘We are ready for any development of events. All necessary decisions in this regard have been taken’.

In reality, however, this was untrue: no nuclear deterrence measures had been implemented. Three days later, amid the initial failures of the Russian army’s advance on Kyiv and the West's decisive announcement to impose sanctions on Russia, Putin, in a meeting with Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, announced the introduction of a ‘special combat duty regime’ for nuclear deterrent forces. There was no official response from Washington to these actions. Unofficially, US Department of Defence officials noted that this step ‘potentially sets in motion forces that, if miscalculated, could make the situation much, much more dangerous’. At the same time, actions by Russian armed forces did not indicate preparations for nuclear use and remained within standard procedures.

In the background, these statements were supported by Russian state TV propagandists and various officials. For example, in April 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that further Western support for Ukraine could lead to World War III. Around the same time, Russia announced its first test of the ‘Sarmat’ intercontinental ballistic missile.

The next significant episode of nuclear crisis rhetoric occurred in late September 2022, against the backdrop of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' successful counteroffensive near Kharkiv and the partial collapse of the Russian front. In a special address regarding the ‘partial’ mobilisation, Putin promised to use 'all available means' to defend Russian territory, emphasising that this was not a bluff, and accused NATO of nuclear blackmail. As before, this statement was echoed by a chorus of Russian officials: Lavrov declared that ‘the entire territory of the Russian Federation’ is under state protection; Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev mentioned the possibility of using ‘the most terrible weapons against the Ukrainian regime', and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov directly called for the use of tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine.

Although US experts once again found no evidence of the movement of Russian warheads or preparations for their use, according to The New York Times, the likelihood of Moscow using tactical nuclear weapons as higher than at the start of the invasion, primarily because of Putin’s worsening position and the uncertainty around his ability to mobilise and stabilise the front. Then-CIA Director William Burns later recalled that in the autumn of 2022 ‘there was a real risk of potential use of tactical nuclear weapons’. In November 2022, Burns conveyed to Sergei Naryshkin, head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) a message from US President Joe Biden outlining ‘the consequences of Russian use of nuclear weapons and the risks of escalation to strategic stability’.

Putin's statements were reinforced by certain practical steps signaling changes in the Kremlin’s nuclear policy. For instance, in February 2023, during his address to the Federal Assembly, Putin announced the suspension of Russia's participation in the New START treaty, the last remaining arms control agreement between Russia and the United States. A month later, he revealed plans to deploy Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. Shortly thereafter, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced a training launch of 'Yars' intercontinental ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear warheads.

These measures aimed to signal an increased nuclear threat and the seriousness of the Kremlin’s intentions. At the same time, Putin's crisis-oriented nuclear rhetoric serves dual purposes: addressing the West as a warning that he would not permit an outright defeat of the Russian army, and targeting a domestic audience to reassure the population and bolster confidence in the eventual success of the invasion of Ukraine. Additionally, such rhetoric reinforces the narrative of the war as a conflict not only with Ukraine but also with the Western coalition supporting it, thereby justifying military failures in the eyes of the Russian populace.

Nuclear propaganda

Unlike Putin’s crisis statements, the routine background rhetoric of Russian political 'hawks' is primarily directed at the domestic audience. This includes announcements about missile tests and nuclear drills.

A case in point is the launch of the 'Oreshnik' ballistic missile against the 'Yuzhmash' factory in Dnipro, reportedly in response to Ukraine’s use of ATACMS missiles to strike Russian territory. In the West, the 'Oreshnik' had little impact. It is not a new development but a modification of the already-known ‘Rubezh’ missile. The use of a ballistic missile for a conventional strike sparked skepticism among experts: William Alberque of the Henry L. Stimson Center told Reuters that the United States had abandoned a program to use intercontinental ballistic missiles without nuclear warheads because such launches could be misinterpreted as a nuclear attack, potentially triggering a retaliatory nuclear strike. Moscow appeared aware of this risk, as it preemptively informed Washington about the 'Oreshnik' launch. The actual damage to the 'Yuzhmash' factory was minimal. According to The New York Times, Jeffrey Lewis of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies remarked that the damage amounted to 'nothing significant – just large holes in the roofs, which will inconvenience operations and likely halt production for a few days'. Maxim Starchak, a researcher at Queen’s University in Canada, noted in a commentary for Carnegie Politika, that the strike had no military, economic, or testing purposes. Russia did not collect data on missile flight trajectories, warhead positioning, or onboard systems. Therefore, the 'Oreshnik' launch resembled more of a theatrical gesture, Starchak concluded.

Domestically, however, the effect was significant. Putin delivered a special address on the occasion, praising the missile’s power and military characteristics, later extolling the ‘Oreshnik’ at the CSTO summit in Kazakhstan. Amplified by television propaganda, which devoted extensive coverage to the launch, these efforts proved effective. In a Levada Centre poll in late November, 20% of those surveyed identified the 'Oreshnik' launch as one of the month’s most memorable events – a remarkably high figure. By comparison, Donald Trump’s election victory was noted by 8%, and Joe Biden’s approval of strikes within Russia by 5%.

The ballistic missile strike should be viewed in the context of the propaganda campaign that Russian authorities have systematically pursued throughout the war in Ukraine. As Nobel Prize laureate and editor-in-chief of Novaya Gazeta Dmitry Muratov has noted, Russian propaganda is conditioning the public to accept the idea that nuclear war is acceptable, even promoting it ‘like pet food’. In April 2023, 29% of Russians responded positively when asked if the use of nuclear weapons by Russia during the war in Ukraine could be justified, while 56% said no (36% saying 'definitely not'). By June 2024, the share of those justifying nuclear use against a non-nuclear state had increased by 5 percentage points, and by November, it had risen another 5 percentage points to nearly 40%. Meanwhile, the share of respondents rejecting such an action fell to 45%, with 21% responding 'definitely not'.

‘Do you think Russia's use of nuclear weapons during the current conflict in Ukraine can be justified or not?’, 2023-2024, % of those surveyed

While these survey results, like all polls conducted during wartime and amidst repression, may be biased toward a more loyal audience, there appears to be a significant shift in societal perception of the nuclear threat in Russia. Unlike the Soviet era, when the leadership portrayed nuclear war as a Western threat while fostering a fear of its consequences, today’s nuclear propaganda aims to diminish that fear, normalising the idea of nuclear conflict.

Doctrinal escalation

Beyond crisis and propaganda-driven escalations, doctrinal discussions have played a crucial role in intensifying the nuclear atmosphere by formulating a new approach to the possibility of nuclear conflict. These discussions present the use of nuclear weapons as a permissible deterrent that does not necessarily escalate into a global nuclear war.

In June 2023, Sergei Karaganov, head of the Department of World Economy and World Politics at the Higher School of Economics and founder of the Valdai Club, published a provocative article entitled ‘The Use of Nuclear Weapons Can Save Humanity from Global Catastrophe’. In it, he advocated for targeting groups of objectives in certain countries to 'bring those who have lost their minds back to their senses' and restore 'the fear of nuclear escalation'. Karaganov later reiterated this reasoning in other writings, such as ‘Some people have lost their fear of hell. We need to restore it’, and in numerous interviews. His argument was that limited nuclear use could signal the West about Russia’s serious intentions and set a boundary against opposition to Russia’s actions in its 'vital interest zones'. In this view, a limited nuclear conflict is framed as a means of preventing a global catastrophe.

In March 2024, Dmitry Trenin, a Kremlin-affiliated international affairs expert and former head of the Carnegie Moscow Center, expanded on Sergey Karaganov's ideas in an article titled ‘Strategic Deterrence: New Contours’. Trenin proposed replacing the concept of nuclear deterrence with the concept of 'nuclear intimidation', which in practice 'means the potential for first use of nuclear weapons during an ongoing conflict – not necessarily on the battlefield or within Ukrainian territory'. He bluntly stated, 'The adversary must have no doubt: Russia will neither allow itself to be defeated nor permit its objectives to be obstructed by removing nuclear weapons “from the equation” of the conflict'.

These ideas were brought into the broader public domain during a de facto colloquium between Putin and Karaganov at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2024. At the forum, Karaganov urged Putin to 'press a nuclear gun to the heads of our Western opponents to keep them from flinching', asserting that 'accelerating movement up the ladder of nuclear escalation could save a large number of lives'. Putin, in contrast, struck a more restrained and conciliatory tone. However, near the end of the discussion, seemingly under pressure from Karaganov, he noted that unlike Europe, Russia has a well-developed missile attack warning system, rendering Europeans 'more or less defenseless' in this regard. Additionally, Putin claimed that Russia possesses a more powerful tactical nuclear arsenal than Europe and remarked that, 'should it come' to an exchange of nuclear strikes with European countries ('which one would very much not want'), 'Europeans must ponder... will the Americans get involved in such an exchange? I very much doubt it', he concluded.

These remarks were directly aimed at Europe, emphasising that it would bear the brunt of the costs in a limited nuclear conflict that might not escalate into a global confrontation. This rhetoric was clearly intended to bolster European political forces advocating for reduced support for Ukraine and diminished European involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. At the same time, it advanced the idea proposed by Karaganov and Trenin of a small-scale, demonstrative nuclear war that would not escalate into a global nuclear showdown.

Nevertheless, at both the St Petersburg Forum and in another discussion with Karaganov at the Valdai Club meeting in October 2023, Putin reiterated his stance against altering Russia's nuclear doctrine. Karaganov countered, however, saying, ‘I have no doubt it will be changed. I hope it will be changed soon, and you will already have the formal right to respond, if you so decide, with a nuclear strike to any attacks on our territory... I hope such a statement will appear in our doctrine, and it will somewhat cool our adversaries while also saving our soldiers eventually’.

By early September 2024, amidst a successful Ukrainian Armed Forces operation in the Kursk region and an intensifying debate over the possibility of long-range Western missiles targeting military sites deep within Russia, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated during Putin's visit to Vladivostok that Russia would adjust its nuclear doctrine due to threats to the country's security from the US and its Western allies. Later that month, Putin, while opening a Security Council meeting on nuclear deterrence, announced forthcoming changes to the nuclear doctrine, stressing that 'the contemporary military-political environment is dynamically evolving, and we must account for this.'

At the end of November, in response to President Biden’s authorisation for Ukraine to use long-range missiles against targets within Russia, the Kremlin approved a revised version of the doctrine. The updated text broadens the concept of nuclear deterrence and the range of scenarios it applies to, extends its provisions to the territory of Belarus, and lowers the threshold for the second condition for the use of nuclear weapons. Where the previous version read, 'in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation using conventional weapons when the existence of the state is threatened,' the new text now states: ‘in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation and/or the Republic of Belarus as members of the Union State, using conventional weapons, creating a critical threat to their sovereignty and/or territorial integrity’.

Thus, the doctrine stops short of incorporating the radical proposals by Sergey Karaganov and Dmitry Trenin advocating for the use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent against conventional attacks on Russia. However, it does make a modest step in that direction. Overall, the idea of a limited nuclear war as a tool of intimidation is becoming normalised and incrementally accepted by the Kremlin.

Does nuclear blackmail work and what are its objectives?

It is debatable whether nuclear blackmail has allowed Putin to achieve his objectives. According to sources in Putin's inner circle cited by The Washington Post, the West’s consistent disregard for Moscow’s 'red lines' has demonstrated that the Kremlin’s nuclear threats have lost their effectiveness. CIA Director William Burns, who had been concerned about the risk of nuclear conflict in the autumn of 2022, now suggests that the West should not take Putin's threats seriously. A number of analysts, including Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Centre in Berlin, believe that Putin has set the bar for nuclear escalation too high.

At the same time, it is undeniable that during the war in Ukraine, the nuclear threat has been an effective tool for the Kremlin, compelling Kyiv’s Western allies to exercise extreme caution in the scale and quality of the assistance provided. As a result, some experts argue that Ukraine has been fighting with 'one hand tied behind its back,' unable to fully exploit opportunities to decisively defeat Russian forces in the early stages of the conflict. The U.S. and the broader West have taken Putin’s 'crisis-level' threats of using tactical nuclear weapons seriously, especially in the event of a complete failure of the Russian invasion. This cautious approach allowed Putin to regroup and build up a military machine that was initially lacking at the outset of the invasion.

However, the implications of this relative success may be far-reaching. By demonstrating that Russia can withstand the burden of Western sanctions, Putin has effectively devised a new model of warfare, leveraging its nuclear superiority. This model involves conventional military conflict hovering on the brink of escalating into a nuclear one. The mere presence of such a threat forces the targeted nation to limit its response to aggression to prevent the conflict from reaching the nuclear threshold. Furthermore, it is assumed that a possible exchange of tactical nuclear strikes would not necessarily escalate into a global nuclear war. Although Russia would lose such a conflict, the costs could be prohibitively high and ultimately unpredictable for all parties involved.

The relative success of this hybrid conventional warfare model in Ukraine increases the likelihood of its replication in potential confrontations between Russia and European NATO countries – a scenario military analysts are increasingly discussing with greater certainty (→ Re:Russia: Trump's Challenge and Europe's Dilemma) – or in other conflicts, such as those in the Asia-Pacific region.

One way or another, an analysis of the rhetorical nuclear escalation campaign conducted by the Russian authorities over the past two and a half years reveals it not as a series of emotional statements or propagandistic slogans, but as a deliberate and systematic effort to prepare public opinion and elites for the possibility of a limited nuclear conflict. It also aims to normalise such a conflict as a legitimate political and military tool for resolving international disputes. To some extent, this represents a logical extension of the thinking within Putin's circle about how to leverage Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal, which had ceased during three decades of peace to function as a tool affirming Russia’s exceptional status in the world. By increasing readiness for nuclear conflict, Putin sees himself as reclaiming the role of a superpower leader. So far, the West has not formulated an adequate response to this strategy.